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“Recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable 
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dom, justice and peace in the world.”
—universal declaration of human rights (1948), preamble
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In great part the history of humanity has been about wars for scarce resources and 
kindred struggles for human freedom and equality within societies. Most domes-
tic struggles were no more than peaceful protests and demands, whilst others 
were civil wars, violent revolts, or bloody revolutions. Even so, after millennia the 
world remains a place of startling contrasts and unevenness of a wide variety both 
within and between countries of the world. The material and social divide between 
the Global North and Global South requires no further description. Much of the 
economic contrast and relative underdevelopment is attributable to a prolonged 
colonial and imperialist project. Within countries too, inequality and exclusion on 
the grounds of race, gender, religion, disability, sexual orientation, migration, and 
above all class or socioeconomic status is prevalent.
The vexed question that Advancing Equality must and does ask is: Has the 
advent of constitutionalism, particularly since the 1948 Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, made the world a better place to live? Are the markers of exclusion 
and discrimination like gender, race, religion, sexual orientation, and socioeco-
nomic status and disability any more mitigated than before many of the constitu-
tions of the world proclaimed fundamental rights and freedoms due to everyone?
South Africa’s 1996 constitution—which enshrined both comprehensive protec-
tions against discrimination and a wide range of social and economic rights—offers 
insights. It was Arthur Chaskalson, the first President of the Constitutional Court 
and later the Chief Justice of post-apartheid South Africa, who warned against the 
effusive optimism that our brand-new aspirational democratic constitution would 
firmly shut the door on the inhumanity and toxic inequality of our apartheid past. 
Chaskalson was counseling against my more youthful revolutionary zeal, that the 
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constitution and other related new law could and must be harnessed to erase the 
past and immediately install equality and justice. It is indeed so that we may not 
hang all our quests for advancing equality in the world on one peg. Some deep 
causes of inequality are embedded in history or are structural or systemic. The 
inequality may well be the product of inflexible power relations within a soci-
ety that would rather increase than arrest, say, racial or gender or socioeconomic 
inequality. At the same time, strong constitutional protections can provide a foun-
dation for addressing many of inequality’s core contributors.
Advancing Equality does not stumble into the pitfall of arguing constitutions 
are the sole solutions but rather demonstrates the powerful role they can play in 
addressing inequality. This remarkable evidence-based study readily identifies the 
important uses of written constitutions around the world. Expectedly some con-
stitutions are older and sparse or at best only implicit in recognizing the equal 
worth of all people. Other constitutions are newer and more open in their com-
mitment to secure the equal worth of human beings. These constitutions have 
drawn from global notions of human decency that have firmed up into interna-
tional humanitarian law.
This work reminds us that the achievement of equality in any society or in the 
world is a work in progress and certainly not an event. To that end a domestic con-
stitution is a covenant between the people and their state. It serves as a minimum 
set of protections below which no state or its people may drop. It is a preexisting 
and collective agreement by all within a society that certain safeguards and entitle-
ments may not be violated, and that if they were to be limited in their scope of 
protection it would be by a law of general application which must be reasonable, 
the least invasive and justifiable in order to achieve one or other public purpose. 
Put more simply, a protection or right may not be taken away arbitrarily, and if its 
enjoyment is reduced, the curtailment of it must be clearly justified.
Constitutions and other laws have an important aspirational role. This is par-
ticularly so in post-conflict societies. The aftermath of a social upheaval or a war 
presents the real possibility of revisiting myriad entrenched power relations in a 
society. Constitutions of that kind are not written to record the existing societal 
patterns and arrangements but rather to end or to alter them radically and lift the 
nation’s eyes toward renewal. The inequalities of the past cannot in theory escape 
full scrutiny and radical adaptation. This explains in great part the replete and 
explicit constitutional guarantees against historical and irrational exclusions and 
prejudices. Newer constitutions tend to place fundamental rights and freedoms at 
the center of their democratic governance and social enterprise. Then the obses-
sion is rightly to alter society irreversibly.
Clearly not all constitutions bear the same backdrop or mission. Oth-
ers merely record preexisting arrangements and conventions. What matters is 
whether on a proper reading the constitutions of that kind provide sufficient 
prescripts that embrace the democratic enterprise of an open and just society 
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that cares for all human beings and their equal worth and opportunity to realize 
their full potential.
Advancing Equality reminds us with remarkable clarity, chapter after chapter, of 
the historic and persisting inequality in the world, and the critical need to address 
its causes and consequences. The book opens with the history of entrenched 
legal inequality predicated on race and ethnicity. Discrimination of this kind and 
indeed of any kind stubbornly persists long after its formal end and leaves its vic-
tims with deep scars and social disability. Long and calculated impoverishment 
of people on account of race and ethnicity is likely to leave them hurt, broken, 
undervalued, and poor.
Astute constitutional change should acknowledge such a horrific past and pro-
vide for appropriate relief such as reparation, restitution, and other remedial inter-
ventions. Constitutional protections for core social and economic rights can also 
accelerate progress: quality, useful, and accessible education and training comes to 
mind as the single most potent catalyst toward equality and self-worth and escape 
from poverty. Much the same must be said about the right of access to health care. 
Study after study has shown that ill health is closely allied to inadequate education 
and challenged socioeconomic conditions. Lack of adequate access to healthcare 
can only deepen and reinforce poverty and inequality. Advancing Equality power-
fully addresses each of these in turn.
Advancing Equality correctly points to the foundational nature of gender equal-
ity. It is indeed so that addressing gender is a core, if not the most vital, com-
ponent of equalizing society. This work reminds us of the profound impacts of 
gender inequality that stem from a simple observation: that the largest group 
facing inequalities in the world are women and girls, a group that has histori-
cally been denied the right to vote, and continues in some settings to be excluded 
from workplaces and schools, facing frequent violence, and in many countries is 
still prevented from full participation in the economy. We are all the poorer for 
it. What is more, gender inequality tends to be intersectional because it is rein-
forced by other exclusion grounds such as race, pregnancy, marital status, and cul-
tural or religious exclusions. This means in most societies women have to endure 
multiple jeopardies.
This systematic exclusion of half the global population is intolerable and must 
stop. Most world constitutions say so and yet so much more has to be done in 
the ordinary lives of most women and girls. Most men worldwide are indeed the 
biggest culprits in demeaning the equal dignity and respect women and girls are 
plainly entitled to. Strong and effective legislation must be used to combat patriar-
chy and push back against toxic masculinity.
It is indeed instructive to learn from this work that in 1991 there were 100 mil-
lion migrants worldwide, and by 2017 that number had increased to nearly 258 
million migrants. It is plain, despite the narrow, homegrown chauvinism and 
nationalism rearing its head around the world, that we may not talk about human 
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dignity and equal worth of all people to the exclusion of the world’s migrants. In 
smaller oases of democracy and constitutionalism such as where I come from, 
there is a considerable inflow of migrants from diverse parts of the world. Ours 
was a long struggle to restore inclusion and advance equal worth of all and yet 
there are occasional outbursts against or hatred of migrants. Migrants are some-
times viewed as unwelcome competitors for scarce resources. Even so, world con-
stitutions and progressive world activists must remain steadfast in recognizing 
the inevitability, value, and human dignity of migrants and extending them equal 
protection under the law.
I welcome the affirmation of the need for explicit protection of sexual and gen-
der minorities, including those who identify as lesbian, gay, bisexual, or transgen-
der. I agree entirely that “achieving equality for the LGBT+ community is no less 
urgent and no less fundamental.” Constitutional guarantees of fundamental rights 
regardless of sexual orientation and gender identity are rightful human dignity 
and equality claims that are worthy of assertion and protection. In South Africa we 
did the right thing. In our supreme law we prohibited unjustified discrimination 
on the ground of sexual orientation as a legitimate part of our equality protection. 
Our courts rightly enforced these protections and construed them to embrace 
same-sex marital unions. A variety of courts and law-making chambers around 
the world are properly, albeit slowly, recognizing equal rights on the basis of sexual 
orientation and gender identity as worthy of protection.
As I conclude I make a few observations about class inequality. Arguably this 
is the most vexed and contested part of the equality discourse. This work opts for 
the tag socioeconomic status (SES), which it defines as “an individual’s social and 
economic position relative to others. Income and wealth, educational attainment, 
occupation, and inherited statuses are all aspects of SES. Like disability status, SES 
can be lifelong, and it can change over the life course. National economic troubles 
can push increasing numbers into poverty.”
Of course, one’s class is an aggregate of the identified attributes. Clearly, some 
attributes are within the grasp and control of the individual. They can be ame-
liorated by personal agency, which may enhance the opportunities of access to 
quality education, training, and experience. The rest of the attributes of SES are 
embedded in a history of past privilege such as inherited status and wealth, which 
often is an outcome of prolonged accumulation. The national economy too is usu-
ally beyond the individual’s influence and is a function of the development and 
ownership of the means of production peculiar to that economy.
All of these intricacies tend to pose the difficult question: When, for historical 
and other structural reasons, socioeconomic inequality persists within a national 
economy, can equality promises in a constitution and other laws help bridge the 
gap? Several radical scholars think not. They argue that only fundamental eco-
nomic changes may reduce socioeconomic inequality.
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Whilst I recognize the force of that contention in relation to socioeconomic 
inequality, I think it lacks nuance. It ignores the potential for equalizing society 
by way of shifts in laws, their implementation, and social norms—a process that 
requires the engagement of the state, citizens, civil society, and all concerned. Also 
equality rights properly asserted may serve as a catalyst for economic growth and 
in turn socioeconomic upward mobility.
The better approach is to be found in Advancing Equality, which opts for an 
evidence-based approach that asks how far has the world come, under the influ-
ence of equality protections in world constitutions. This work argues that while 
protections have strengthened in many areas, significant gaps remain. With the 
support of data the work provides a comprehensive analysis of these trends over 
time, paired with a deep discussion of key cross-cutting questions and ongoing 
challenges that policymakers, civil society organizations, engaged citizens, and 
researchers must take up to fully protect and fulfill equal rights in all our countries.
The abiding task to provide for and advance equality under world constitutions 
and the law is worthy and must continue. While substantial work remains, South 
Africa’s experience over the past two decades offers examples of the types of con-
stitutional action that can lead to meaningful change. Our decision in a 2002 case 
on the constitutional right to health, spearheaded by a movement of citizens and 
civil society organizations, brought life-saving treatment to expecting mothers liv-
ing with HIV across the country. In a 2004 decision, we upheld a law designed to 
advance racial equality by temporarily providing increased pension contributions 
to parliamentarians elected after apartheid, illustrating how constitutional equal-
ity provisions can provide a foundation for restorative justice. Two years later, our 
decision in Home Affairs v. Fourie made South Africa the first country on the con-
tinent—and just the fifth in the world—to legalize same-sex marriage, building on 
a precedent ending discrimination against same-sex couples in immigration law 
from a few years prior. And in 2009, we cited the right to education to success-
fully urge a school district to abandon its Afrikaans-only language policy, which 
for 93 years had served as a tool of racial exclusion. Constitutions, together with 
communities and courts working to fulfill the constitutions’ promises, have great 
power to shift the trajectories of individual lives and countries.
Dikgang Moseneke
Deputy Chief Justice, Constitutional Court of South Africa (2005–2016)






The Urgency of Advancing Equality
Over the past several years, grave threats to equal rights, both new and long-
standing, have come into sharp relief. Against the backdrop of persisting gaps in 
women’s representation in government and equal participation in the economy, a 
global movement has exposed the prevalence of sexual harassment in our work-
places, schools, streets, and even legislatures. Violence and natural disasters have 
created unprecedented numbers of refugees, who face not only significant barriers 
to accessing jobs and education upon resettling in new countries, but also discrim-
ination due to their race/ethnicity, religion, and national origin. Meanwhile, in a 
range of countries, extremist movements and politicians have capitalized on the 
public’s fears, insecurities, and misperceptions to call for the expulsion of immi-
grants and ethnic, racial, and religious minorities, using dehumanizing rhetoric 
hearkening back to the rise of the Nazis.
At the same time, the beginning of the twenty-first century has witnessed the 
culmination of decades of dramatic progress in addressing many of the great-
est barriers to equality—from discriminatory laws to the inaccessibility of basic 
services and institutions. Just in the two years prior to this writing, 65 countries 
reformed laws that limited women’s ability to participate and succeed in the 
economy, building on hundreds of reforms adopted since the 1960s.1 Globally, 
the number of people living in extreme poverty fell by half between 1990 and 
2015, while that of people accessing basic education rose by over 40 million.2 
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Groundbreaking national laws, as well as an international treaty, have acceler-
ated progress toward the full inclusion of people with disabilities in education 
and employment.
This is a book about how far we’ve come on equal rights—and how far we 
have to go. This is also a book about what we all can do to advance equality in 
the urgency of this moment, both as individuals and as countries. And this is a 
book about how nations set the ground rules and whether those ground rules 
are designed to ensure that you, your children, and your grandchildren—whoever 
they become, wherever they live, and whomever they love—will have a fair chance.
CHANGES IN LEGAL RIGHT S IN OUR LIFETIME
Over the past 60 years, countries around the world have witnessed revolutions 
in equal rights. In the United States and South Africa, the overdue demise of Jim 
Crow and apartheid, two legal regimes premised on racial hierarchy, inaugurated a 
new era for equality and civil rights. In the Middle East and North Africa, women’s 
rights movements have made steady gains over the past decade for gender equality 
in the law, including with respect to violence, freedom of movement, and the right 
to participate in politics;3 similar regional and national movements dating back 
to the nineteenth century have brought a wave of social, economic, and political 
“firsts” for women around the world. Across low- and middle-income countries, 
the right to education has flourished, as governments have increasingly eliminated 
tuition fees that once put public school out of reach for girls and students from 
poor families. And across every region, countries have begun recognizing equal 
human rights regardless of sexual orientation and gender identity.
This progress is remarkable and worth celebrating. Yet we know that exclusion 
persists, and that countless daily experiences of discrimination and bias contribute 
to devastating disparities in education, health, and work.
THE DIGNIT Y OF EVERY HUMAN BEING
In recent years, the troubling and vocal resurgence of overt discrimination has 
called into question whether equality truly is a shared value. As hate rallies and 
ethnic, racial, and religious slurs have dominated the headlines, it is reasonable 
to wonder whether there was ever genuine consensus about our universal dignity 
and humanity.
Numerous historical examples show how perceived physical or economic vul-
nerability—whether based in evidence or stoked by opportunistic leaders and pol-
iticians—can inspire distrust, division, and, in the worst cases, gross human rights 
abuses. In some countries, these conditions have resulted in atrocities committed 
by governments; other countries have endured sharp escalations in interpersonal 
hostilities and violence.
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While we must recognize these dynamics and dangers, we must also firmly 
reject the idea that hateful views are representative in any of our countries. The 
data convincingly tell us otherwise. The World Values Survey asks people about 
their core beliefs in the privacy of their homes in over 100 countries, representing 
90% of the global population. These surveys reveal that the view that every human 
being deserves dignity is both widespread and not unique to any country. For 
example, when asked which qualities it was especially important for children to 
learn at home, 86% of respondents in Australia, 86% in Colombia, 89% in India, 
and 80% in Libya indicated “tolerance and respect for other people.”4
One critical development over the past 75 years has been the formalization of 
these values in international treaties and agreements. In 1948, the newly formed 
United Nations adopted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), 
which unequivocally affirmed that “[a]ll human beings are born free and equal 
in dignity and rights,” and prohibited discrimination on the basis of “race, colour, 
sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, prop-
erty, birth or other status.” The UDHR also guaranteed the rights to education, 
health, and a wide range of other social, economic, civil, and political rights. In 
1966, the U.N. built on these commitments with two additional treaties, the Inter-
national Covenant on Civil and Political Rights5 and the International Covenant 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.6 Together, these three instruments are 
known as the “International Bill of Rights.”
Additionally, throughout the decades, the U.N. has adopted treaties specifically 
and comprehensively addressing the equal rights of historically marginalized or 
vulnerable groups, including refugees,7 racial/ethnic minorities,8 women,9 chil-
dren,10 migrant workers and their families,11 and people with disabilities.12
These international commitments have had important normative impacts, and 
many have been widely or nearly universally ratified. Even more recently, in 2015, 
all 193 U.N. countries adopted the Sustainable Development Goals, pledging to 
end poverty, reduce inequality, ensure access to healthcare and education, and 
achieve a range of other human rights objectives by 2030.13 The question, then, is 
not whether human dignity and equality are overarching, widely shared values—
but whether these values and commitments have been translated into enforceable 
national rights.
WHY C ONSTITUTIONS
In many ways, constitutions provide ideal vehicles for doing so. As we explore 
throughout this book, constitutions’ pathways to impact vary across countries 
with different legal traditions, levels of civil society engagement, and avenues to 
justice. At the same time, constitutions provide the foundation of almost every 
nation’s legal system, and many of their core functions are largely consistent 
across countries.
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A Statement of Values
To start, constitutions both express values and embody contracts between govern-
ments and their people to realize those values. Through the principles it protects, 
a constitution can importantly shape national discourse, in turn influencing social 
norms. New constitutions can also serve to inaugurate a new era for equal rights 
that sharply diverges from the past. For example, upon signing South Africa’s post-
apartheid constitution in 1996, President Nelson Mandela remarked: “In centu-
ries of struggle against racial domination, South Africans of all colours and back-
grounds proclaimed freedom and justice as their unquenchable aspiration. They 
pledged loyalty to a country which belongs to all who live in it. . . . Out of such 
experience was born the understanding that there could be no lasting peace, no 
lasting security, no prosperity in this land unless all enjoyed freedom and justice 
as equals.”14
Through a new constitution grounded in principles including equality, diver-
sity, freedom, and reconciliation, South Africa created a new statement of values 
to guide its transition into democracy.
Dismantling Discriminatory Laws
Second, in the vast majority of countries, constitutions trump other sources of 
law—making them critical tools for overturning discriminatory legislation, 
including both newly enacted and decades-old laws. In India, the Supreme Court 
ruled in 2017 that the traditional practice of “instant divorce” in Islamic marriages, 
which allowed men to legally divorce their wives simply by saying the Arabic word 
for divorce three times, violated the constitution’s protection of gender equality, 
in a landmark ruling strengthening women’s economic security and access to jus-
tice.15 In Tunisia and Morocco, women’s rights groups are leading advocacy cam-
paigns to overturn discriminatory inheritance laws, based on their new constitu-
tions’ guarantees of women’s equal rights.16
Domesticating Global Treaty Commitments
Third, constitutions often directly determine the status of international treaties—
including whether ratified treaties have the force of law, take precedence over 
conflicting legislation, or can be directly invoked in court. As explored in the fol-
lowing chapters, in countries ranging from Mexico to the Czech Republic, these 
constitutional provisions have helped ensure that national courts interpret domes-
tic laws to protect and advance human rights.
Protecting against Backsliding
Fourth, constitutions can offer protection against policy and legal changes that 
would undermine equal rights. However, when constitutions lack clear protec-
tions for groups that are vulnerable to discrimination, these groups’ rights may 
face threats during political shifts or budgetary cutbacks.
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For example, for decades, the United States has had excellent laws ensuring that 
children with disabilities have equal access to quality education, and that adults with 
disabilities can contribute fully at work. However, the U.S. Constitution has no foun-
dational guarantee of equal rights for people with disabilities—and strong as they 
are, these laws would be far easier to dismantle or outright repeal than a constitu-
tional protection against discrimination. This vulnerability has intensified under the 
Donald Trump administration, which has targeted both laws. In the absence of a 
stronger constitutional foundation for equal rights on the basis of disability in work 
and education, these attacks threaten to unravel the gains of the past three decades.
The same potential for retrenchment exists in the courts. When rights are 
not clearly protected in the constitutional text, a court’s interpretations of who 
deserves equal treatment may expand and contract over time, especially as the 
court’s composition evolves. Similarly, even when courts rule in favor of equality, 
the legislature may enact discriminatory laws in response, unless the constitution 
prevents them from doing so.
For example, in Bermuda, the Supreme Court’s landmark 2017 decision legal-
izing same-sex marriage came under threat when Parliament passed a law the fol-
lowing year banning same-sex marriage—making Bermuda the first country to 
grant and then revoke equal marriage rights. Like most countries, Bermuda has 
yet to specifically prohibit discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation in its 
constitution. However, the Court applied another constitutional right—freedom 
of religion—to overturn the discriminatory law, which the justices deemed an 
imposition of specific religious views.17 Yet as this book will explore, such favor-
able outcomes are far from guaranteed when constitutions are ambiguous about 
whose equal rights are recognized.
Setting the Terms of the Debate
Fifth, constitutions matter because of how they shape decision-making outside the 
courts—including by other branches of government. For example, between 2015 
and 2017, the constitution was a topic of discussion and debate in 87% of par-
liamentary sessions in India.18 These conversations covered wide-ranging topics 
central to equality, including the equal rights of members of lower castes, religious 
minorities, and transgender people.
Similarly, over the same period, the constitution arose in 88% of parliamentary 
sessions in Canada, 97% of those in Brazil, and 99% of those in Kenya.19 In Canada, 
the constitution was cited in support of bills aiming to protect against gender dis-
crimination, expunge unjust convictions targeting the LGBT+ community, and 
ensure equal pay for work of equal value for women in the Canadian Public Ser-
vice. Likewise, in Brazil, the constitution came up in legislators’ discussions about 
the rights to healthcare, nondiscrimination, and access to water, while in Kenya, 
legislators referenced the constitution when discussing education, healthcare, and 
gender equality in politics.
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A Tool for Civic Engagement
Finally, constitutions provide tools for civic engagement, education, and activism. 
In India, activists undertook a 115-day march to establish a constitutional right to 
education.20 In Kenya, civil society groups are publishing copies of the constitution 
in Braille, and handing out pocket-size text versions nationwide.21 In Germany, 
newly arriving refugees receive copies of the bill of rights in Arabic.22
Yet even as constitutions articulate fundamental values and provide legal bases 
for decisions that affect millions of lives, few people know exactly which rights 
their constitution protects, or how their constitution’s protections compare to 
others’. In an era of increased popular engagement in constitution drafting and 
amending, addressing these information gaps is crucial.
D O OUR C ONSTITUTIONS VALUE EVERY PERSON?
In recent years, countries have increasingly convened widely representative consti-
tutional congresses to draft their constitutions. In these processes, the chance that 
the constitution equally values every person has increased.
Many of us live in countries, however, whose constitutions were written cen-
turies ago or have not been amended in decades. Early constitutions were often 
written by small, nonrepresentative groups. Many later constitutions used these 
documents as models. And because of their foundational role in defining how 
a government works, identifying whether our countries’ constitutions establish 
a framework providing for equal and full opportunities for everyone is essential.
In this book, we report on over a decade of research. We have led and been part 
of a large, international, multilingual, multidisciplinary team that has reviewed 
constitutions in each one of the 193 U.N. countries. At least two team members 
have read every constitution and examined where each comes down in terms of 
guaranteeing equal rights to us all, regardless of gender, socioeconomic status, 
race/ethnicity, or religion, belief, or nonbelief. We have also looked at whether 
equal rights are guaranteed regardless of our sexual orientation or gender identity, 
whether we have a disability, and whether we are a refugee or a migrant. Finally, 
we have examined whether every person is guaranteed an equal opportunity for an 
education and access to the healthcare they need to survive and thrive.
Throughout this book, we present data on constitutions produced through this 
initiative at the WORLD Policy Analysis Center.23 In each chapter, you will learn 
what percentage of the world’s countries has adopted fundamental constitutional 
protections. We have also included global maps in many core areas so you can eas-
ily see how your country’s constitution compares to others. To illustrate the impact 
of these choices in practice, we searched over 16,000 court cases from around the 
world. Throughout the chapters, we present examples of case law from over 40 
countries representing diverse regions and legal traditions. More details on the 
data and our approach to case law are available in the Appendix. Interactive policy 
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maps, data tools, and further information on WORLD are available on our web-
site: worldpolicycenter.org.
THE CHAPTERS
Chapter 2: Historic Exclusion and Persisting Inequalities: Advancing 
Equal Rights on the Basis of Race and Ethnicity 
In numerous countries throughout history, racial/ethnic discrimination has played 
a foundational role in structuring economies and legal systems, leading to physi-
cal segregation, denials of economic rights, and, in the worst cases, enslavement. 
In the United States, even after a constitutional amendment prohibited slavery, 
Jim Crow laws systematically excluded African American citizens from political 
power and economic opportunities for decades. In South Africa, apartheid pro-
hibited the black population from owning land and relegated black families to 
substandard housing in designated neighborhoods.
Jim Crow fell in 1965 and apartheid followed in 1991—but the impacts of these 
systems continue to reverberate. What’s more, even as legal discrimination on the 
basis of race/ethnicity fades, discriminatory practices persist, with consequences 
for health, justice, and economic security. Globally, how many countries guar-
antee equal rights across race/ethnicity and prohibit all direct discrimination? 
Without being explicitly discriminatory, policies and practices can still dispro-
portionately disadvantage certain racial/ethnic groups; how often do constitutions 
address “indirect discrimination” and have these protections had impact in court? 
How are constitutions addressing segregation, which persists in many countries 
despite guarantees of racial/ethnic equality and case law striking down “separate 
but equal”? And for countries with long histories of racial/ethnic oppression and 
exclusion, are constitutions and courts providing a foundation for efforts to dis-
mantle the persisting impacts of past discriminatory laws and practices?
Chapter 3: Why Addressing Gender Is Foundational
Women and girls are the largest global population to have been systematically 
excluded from enjoying basic rights in constitutional texts and by other laws. 
One of every two people, women and girls have been denied the right to vote, 
excluded from workplaces and schools, and prevented from full participation in 
the economy.
For millennia, women have also been leaders in governments, commerce, and 
civil society. But in most societies, they were the exceptions. Most women were 
not allowed to fully participate. Chapter 3 examines whether the world’s consti-
tutions have dismantled gender inequality in the law. Do all constitutions guar-
antee women and girls equal rights? If so, do these protections support equal 
opportunities and pathways to advancement by covering discrimination by both 
public and private employers and schools? Women also disproportionately face 
8    Urgency of Advancing Equality
discrimination based on their expected roles within families. Do any constitu-
tions successfully address discrimination on the basis of pregnancy, child-bearing, 
marital, or family status? How are civil society groups, lawyers, and courts using 
prohibitions on sex discrimination to address these intersectional issues? And 
finally, how can constitutions best address not only sex discrimination, but also 
gender discrimination against anyone who does not conform to cultural expecta-
tions about what it means to be a man or a woman?
Chapter 4: One in Thirty: Protecting Fundamental Rights for the 
World’s Migrants and Refugees
Ensuring all human beings have equal rights is impossible without protecting the 
rights of migrants and refugees. In a room of 30 people, one, on average, will be 
a migrant.24 If you live in Montreal, Paris, or Frankfurt, around one in four of 
your neighbors was born in another country, while more than four of five people 
in Dubai migrated from elsewhere.25 Worldwide, there were nearly 258 million 
migrants in 2017—an increase of over 100 million since 1990.26
In short, one of the most striking transformations of the past half century has 
been the freedom of movement. This is in part due to the globalization of the econ-
omy. But even without trade agreements, the feasibility and accessibility of all forms 
of transportation have improved. Buses now provide dramatically expanded service 
to many rural areas, while air travel has become increasingly affordable. The types 
of transportation accessible to different individuals varies. Still, with this greater 
overall mobility, borders inevitably mean something different. A century ago, when 
it invariably took months to travel between countries and enormous resources to 
cross an ocean, mobility was limited. Now, and into the future, if you or your chil-
dren are hungry or fleeing war, being drawn to another country is inevitable.
Global treaties recognize much of this. Around the world, 145 countries have 
agreed to a refugee convention that guarantees the right to education and wage-
earning employment. But have countries’ constitutions caught up? And what do 
countries do about economic migrants, for whom there is less international agree-
ment? Chapter 4 will examine the approaches countries’ courts and constitutions 
have taken to supporting newcomers to both meet their basic needs and contrib-
ute to their full potential. How many constitutions protect the rights to education, 
health, work, and non-discrimination for migrants and refugees? Does it make a 
difference in practice when a constitution refers to “people” rather than “citizens”? 
And what protections can constitutions provide to the 10 million people around 
the world who are not officially citizens of any country?
Chapter 5: Negotiating the Balance of Religious Freedom 
and Equal Rights
The history of religious discrimination is long and pervasive. People were denied 
the ability to work in trades based on their religion. People were segregated into 
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ghettos based on religion.27 And some countries had important pieces of their ori-
gins in fleeing religious persecution or founding safe havens for religious practice. 
It was this history that inspired the separation of religion and state in the U.S. 
Constitution, in contrast to England’s official state religion. Yet history has also 
left discriminatory imprints. In Latin America, indigenous religions faced wide-
spread persecution during Spanish colonialism, which established Catholicism as 
the governing faith and led to the continuing influence of the Catholic Church—
including in constitutions—long after independence.28
Indeed, many of the worst forms of discrimination were state-sponsored or 
state-supported. State laws set up the ghettos. State rules prohibited people of cer-
tain religions from working in specific professions. Government rulers led many 
of the religious crusades and much of the persecution.
In chapter 5, we strive to answer a fundamental question: how can govern-
ments ensure that all religions can thrive while protecting all people’s fundamental 
rights? Due to a history of killings and restrictions on movement, residence, and 
work, there is clearly a profound need to ensure safety, full equal opportunities, 
and equal rights before the law regardless of religion. At the same time, given the 
history of discriminatory abuses and denial of basic human rights by governments 
in the name of religion, achieving freedom of religion and belief, and equal rights 
and dignity for all, requires that the role of the state in prioritizing one religion 
be curtailed.
To understand the full range of current approaches, we examine the details of 
how all the world’s constitutions negotiate this balance. We identify how many 
of the world’s constitutions protect against religious discrimination and ensure 
that all people regardless of religious belief or nonbelief enjoy equal rights. We 
also address the relationship between religion and the state, examining how a role 
for religious bodies in governments may contribute to inequalities. Particularly 
important, we examine whether religious law, when it does coexist with secular 
law, is governed by constitutional rights, and whether equal rights take precedence 
when the two conflict. Finally, we examine the wide variation among constitutions 
that describe their government as “secular,” illustrating how countries often subtly 
privilege one belief system over others.
Chapter 6: Moving Forward in the Face of Backlash: Equal Rights 
Regardless of Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity
Both within individual countries and globally, equal rights have often moved for-
ward erratically—not for everyone together. In eighteenth-century France, revolu-
tionaries fought for the Declaration of the Rights of the Man and of the Citizen—
a widely celebrated document that nevertheless completely ignored the rights of 
women and citizens of the French colonies, who were deemed “passive citizens.” 
In Peru, the 1823 constitution not only limited the right to vote to men but also 
imposed a literacy requirement, at a time when formal education was far from 
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universal.29 In what is now the United States, soon-to-be Americans fought for 
a democracy that extended full citizenship only to white, male property owners. 
Native Americans, African Americans, and those without property were explicitly 
excluded. Women were not even considered.
On a global scale, countries adopted equal rights conventions one at a time for 
refugees (1951), racial/ethnic minorities (1965), women (1979), migrant workers 
(1990), and people with disabilities (2006). The one group treated in this book for 
whom there is still neither a specific international convention nor explicit protec-
tions in any international human rights treaty is sexual and gender minorities, 
including those who identify as lesbian, gay, bisexual, or transgender. The lack of 
a global agreement makes achieving equality for the LGBT+ community no less 
urgent and no less fundamental. If anything, the lack of agreement and the fact 
that there are currently 68 countries that criminalize the humanity and love of 
their LGBT+ residents make it all the more urgent.30
Chapter 6 examines how far equal rights on the basis of sexual orientation and 
gender identity have come in constitutions. Are they ahead of global agreements? 
While some countries strongly deny basic human rights, do others clearly protect 
equality? And what works to advance further reforms? In the absence of explicit 
constitutional protections, what strategies have advocates successfully used to 
move equal rights forward for the LGBT+ population using their constitution? Do 
social norms need to change first, or can legal change spur greater public support 
for equal rights?
Chapter 7: From Nondiscrimination to Full Inclusion: Guaranteeing 
the Equal Rights of People with Disabilities
One of the few groups for whom overt discrimination remains widespread is 
people with disabilities. Companies still post job ads specifying that people with 
disabilities need not apply. The overt discrimination continues both because it is 
perceived as socially acceptable and because so many people believe that having a 
disability equates to being unable to learn in school or perform at work as well as 
another. Children who are blind, are deaf, use a wheelchair, or have some mobil-
ity limitation are excluded from schools when a disability or difference in no way 
inherently limits what they can accomplish with their minds. Children with learn-
ing disabilities and differences are assumed—even more than those with physical 
limitations—to be unable to learn as much as others, in spite of clear evidence that 
they have the same distribution of intellectual abilities as other children.
Implicit bias measures how each of us thinks about another group even if we 
are unaware of it. Implicit bias tests examine whether an individual automatically 
views another group as less smart, less able, more violent, more likely to com-
mit a crime, more likely to achieve great things. The level of implicit bias against 
people with disabilities is higher than against all other groups tested. In other 
words, tests reveal more unconscious discrimination based on disability than on 
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the basis of race/ethnicity, religion, sexual orientation or gender identity, or nearly 
any other category.
The scope and costs of the resulting exclusion of people with disabilities are 
staggering. Children with disabilities in low- and middle-income countries are 
30–50 percentage points less likely than children without disabilities to even enroll 
in school.31 These gaps persist in high-income countries. Nearly one-third of youth 
with disabilities in the European Union do not finish secondary school, compared 
to only 12% of youth without disabilities.32 The ripple effect means that adults with 
disabilities, lacking equal chances at education and even the simplest and lowest-
cost accommodations at work, are less likely to have full-time work, and less likely 
to exit poverty. The loss to society is massive. Nearly one in six people have a dis-
ability.33 This is an enormous share of any country’s population to underutilize.
The U.N. Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) was 
one of the most rapidly adopted human rights treaties in history. Between its adop-
tion in December 2006 and September 2014, 150 countries agreed to be legally 
bound by the CRPD’s commitments;34 as of this writing, the list has grown to 177.35 
Integral to the convention is the recognition that children and adults with disabili-
ties have the same human rights as people without disabilities, and realizing these 
rights is as important as realizing the rights of other groups.
In chapter 7, we examine the extent to which constitutions have incorporated 
these views. How many prohibit discrimination on the basis of disability? Are all 
people with disabilities guaranteed the rights to education, healthcare, and work? 
Equal opportunity at work requires reasonable accommodation—antidiscrimina-
tion alone without reasonable accommodation leaves workplaces and opportuni-
ties entirely inaccessible. How well are constitutions addressing accommodation? 
Likewise, the odds of children receiving a poorer quality education and both chil-
dren and adults facing stigma and societal discrimination greatly increase when 
students with disabilities are completely segregated from other children. How well 
are countries meeting their commitments to full inclusion in education?
Chapter 8: Ensuring Rights and Full Participation Regardless of Social 
and Economic Position
Socioeconomic status (SES) is generally understood as an individual’s social and 
economic position relative to others. Income and wealth, educational attainment, 
occupation, and inherited statuses are all aspects of SES. Like disability status, SES 
can be lifelong, and it can change over the life course. National economic troubles 
can push increasing numbers into poverty. For example, the share identifying as 
lower SES in Egypt increased from 34% in 2001 to 50% in 2012.36 Meanwhile, even 
when countries as a whole have strong economies, a major personal illness or job 
loss can cause individuals and their families to move from being middle class to 
poor. In the United States, it is estimated that nearly 40% of 25–60-year-olds will 
fall below the poverty line for at least one year of their adult lives.37
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Discrimination on the basis of SES takes many forms. For example, in a range 
of countries, researchers have shown that employers discriminate against candi-
dates with names, accents, appearance, or residency associated with lower-class 
status. Rights are also unequal across SES when accessing essential public goods 
or services is contingent on income. For example, when a public hospital refuses a 
patient for lack of funds, or a public school turns away a child because of inability 
to pay tuition, SES barriers create inequalities, with consequences for the fulfill-
ment of fundamental rights.
These examples help illustrate why nondiscrimination alone is not enough to 
achieve equality—a topic explored in more detail in chapters 9 and 10. Without 
access to the basics, including healthcare and education, a child will not have an 
equal opportunity to survive and succeed. Further, rights are insufficient if people 
with low incomes are unable to claim them because of the costs of going to court 
or hiring a lawyer. Chapter 8 examines whether countries’ constitutions explicitly 
prohibit discrimination on the basis of SES, as well as whether they guarantee 
that income is no barrier to education, healthcare, or political participation. The 
chapter further explores how constitutions and courts can ensure that SES does 
not determine access to justice. The chapters that follow examine in greater depth 
how constitutions can support access to health and education, while ensuring that 
people across SES can effectively fulfill their rights.
Chapter 9: The Right to Education: A Foundation 
for Equal Opportunities
Throughout history, governments have denied groups access to education because 
they knew of its fundamental role in empowering people to fight for their equal 
rights, and because the contributions of diverse groups within a country were not 
equally valued. Over time, social movements succeeded in dismantling many for-
mal barriers to schooling through courts and legislatures, and today, more chil-
dren than ever are getting an education—but important gaps remain.
Girls, students from poor families, and children with disabilities remain more 
likely to be out of school, especially in lower-income countries where resources are 
scarce. Even in countries where enrollment rates are relatively high, school quality 
often varies markedly, partly because of inequitable or inadequate funding. Conse-
quently, millions of children worldwide are missing out on the widely recognized 
social, economic, and health benefits of education, and the persisting disparities in 
who gets to attend school perpetuate inequality later in life.
When education is a right for everyone, families and advocates are better 
equipped to ensure all children have the opportunity to fulfill their potential. 
What is the role for constitutions in improving educational access, quality, and 
attainment for all students? While fully realizing education rights takes invest-
ment, are there aspects of the right to education that all countries can and should 
immediately fulfill? And as economies grow, how can constitutional rights 
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to education be designed to meet both the country’s ability to provide more 
education for all and residents’ need to complete higher education for better 
work opportunities?
Chapter 10: The Right to Health: From Treatment and Care to 
Creating the Conditions for a Healthy Life
Health is foundational to whether we all have an equal opportunity to succeed 
and participate fully in society. Our access to clean water and sanitation, adequate 
nutrition, preventive care and immunizations, and treatment and care for illness 
and injury all critically shape both our individual health and our communities’ 
well-being.
In recent years, more and more constitutions have enshrined a right to health. 
In some countries, constitutional health rights have expanded access to lifesav-
ing medicines, led to improvements in the water supply for entire neighborhoods, 
and spurred free immunization campaigns for low-income children. In others, the 
right to health has given rise to thousands of individual lawsuits that benefit only 
one person at a time.
In chapter 10, we explore countries’ different approaches to constitutionally 
protecting the right to health, including whether they focus just on medical care 
and treatment or also promote health, prevent illness, and protect against injury—
in short, address public health. Drawing on the experiences of courts and coun-
tries around the world, this chapter examines which factors shape whether the 
right to health improves conditions on a broad scale or benefits only a few. What 
types of health cases have had the greatest impact for communities and countries? 
How can courts effectively realize the right to health while keeping the court sys-
tem from becoming overburdened by individual cases? For countries with limited 
resources, what constitutional and judicial approaches have ensured that the right 
to health is enforceable nevertheless?
Chapter 11: How Far Has the World Come?
In chapter 11, we examine the findings across all types of discrimination to under-
stand to what extent the world’s constitutions comprehensively address equal 
rights—and how the prevalence of these fundamental guarantees has evolved over 
time. While protections have strengthened in many areas, significant gaps remain. 
In addition to providing a comprehensive summary of findings, this chapter dives 
into multiple cross-cutting questions and ongoing challenges that policymakers, 
civil society organizations, engaged citizens, and researchers must address to effec-
tively realize equal rights in all our countries. For example, while the oldest con-
stitutions were generally understood to only prohibit discrimination by govern-
ments, how have newer constitutions and the courts that interpret them addressed 
discrimination in the private sphere? How can constitutions and courts iden-
tify and effectively respond to discrimination based on multiple or intersecting 
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characteristics? And how can constitutions best support efforts to address the con-
sequences of historic discrimination and exclusion?
Chapter 12: Each of Us, All of Us: Taking Action to 
Strengthen Rights Globally 
Finally, chapter 12 focuses on moving from evidence to action. In this chapter, we 
explore what is needed beyond strong constitutional texts for advancing equal-
ity, including shifts in norms, access to justice, adequate resources and attention 
dedicated to implementation, and meaningful commitments to advancing change. 
Chapter 12 also discusses examples and strategies of successful action taken by 
citizens and civil society, offering practical lessons for realizing change across 
contexts. Around the world, activists, community leaders, and others seeking to 
address inequalities have led successful campaigns to strengthen constitutional 
protections against discrimination and for basic social and economic rights by 
organizing campaigns, working in coalitions, and drawing on the successful 
approaches of other countries. Likewise, lawyers, civil society groups, and con-
cerned residents and citizens have used their constitutions to speak out against 
discriminatory rhetoric and practices, empower people to know and claim their 
rights, and bring court cases that have transformative nationwide impacts. This 
concluding chapter explores these and other ways—large and small—that people 
can shape and use their constitutions to make a difference.
A FEW WORDS AB OUT THIS B O OK
Our Approach to Case Law
Throughout this book, we attempt to draw lessons about the impact of consti-
tutional rights from a wide range of countries. We do this by pairing globally 
comparative data on 193 countries’ constitutions with court cases from 45 coun-
tries that mattered for equality. In some cases, countries offered as examples may 
have much in common. In other cases, they may represent largely distinct social, 
economic, and political contexts. And ultimately, every country is different, and 
shaped by a unique set of cultural and historical influences.
Countries vary importantly when it comes to certain procedural aspects of 
their legal systems that can significantly shape constitutional rights’ accessibility 
and impact, as we explore throughout the chapters. For example, the difficulty of 
amending the constitution differs around the world. In addition, the role of case 
law in constitutional jurisprudence largely depends on whether the country has 
a “common law” system, which relies heavily on past court interpretations, or a 
“civil law” system, which relies primarily on the text of the law. Different countries 
also provide different levels of access to justice.
Wherever possible, we bring attention to these differences and their implica-
tions. At the same time, we aim to highlight above all the impacts of constitutional 
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drafting choices and identify lessons and insights that are relevant to groups writ-
ing and amending constitutions.
Finally, while most cases included in this book have reached the final stage of 
the judicial process, we occasionally include cases decided by lower courts, which 
may be subject to appeal. It is possible that the outcomes of these cases may change 
after publication. Likewise, even those decided by the highest courts may later 
be overturned.
Our Approach to Legal Terminology
Although this book engages in depth with some aspects of constitutional law, 
our aim is accessibility to lawyers and readers from nonlegal backgrounds alike. 
To that end, wherever we introduce a technical legal term, such as public interest 
litigation or standing, we have provided a simple definition. For easy access, these 
terms are also included in a glossary at the back of the book.
How We Hope You Will Use This Book
We hope this book will provide you with information on whether your country, 
compared to others, has laid the groundwork for ensuring that governments, com-
panies, institutions, and individuals recognize the value of every human being in 
every city, town, and rural community. We hope the book will offer a sense of what 
your and other countries are doing to ensure that every person has the education 
to support reaching their full potential and the health to thrive.
We also hope it will give you the tools to create opportunities for every one of 
us. The book is for you, your children, and your grandchildren. None of us know 
who our children and grandchildren will become or how life’s twists and turns will 
affect whether each of us will have a fair chance—unless we together create the 
ground rules to guarantee that all of us do.

Part One




Historic Exclusion and Persisting 
Inequalities
Advancing Equal Rights on the 
Basis of Race and Ethnicity
The history of international human rights as we know it today is deeply inter-
twined with national and global efforts to end violence and discrimination based 
on religion, race, and ethnicity. When world leaders gathered in 1945 to form the 
United Nations, discrimination and violence were central concerns; the minister 
for foreign affairs of Uruguay, for example, argued in his opening speech that the 
“repudiation of doctrines of racial division and discrimination” was a prerequi-
site for lasting global peace, a sentiment shared by delegates from a wide range of 
countries.1 At the same time, colonial powers and countries that still had systems 
of de jure discrimination expressed concern about their national sovereignty.2 The 
compromise was a U.N. Charter that expressly affirmed “universal respect for, and 
observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinc-
tion as to race, sex, language or religion”—but also clarified that the U.N. would 
not “intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of 
any state.”3
Over the following few years, however, the U.N. built on these commitments in 
drafting the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR). These international-
level developments coincided with country-level movements to advance racial and 
ethnic equality, and the two came to inform one another. The UDHR Drafting 
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Committee consulted national constitutions submitted by over 50 countries,4 and 
drew inspiration from equal rights provisions that explicitly addressed race from 
countries spanning different regions.5 In 1948, the U.N. adopted the UDHR, which 
proclaimed that “All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights,” 
and entitled to fundamental rights and freedoms “without distinction of any kind, 
such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or 
social origin, property, birth or other status.”6
Yet even as some countries’ laws served as models, these international com-
mitments to equal rights regardless of race/ethnicity were clearly ahead of other 
countries’ policies and practices: the UDHR preceded the Civil Rights Act in the 
United States by over 15 years, and the fall of apartheid in South Africa by over four 
decades. In a 1944 report, the Commission to Study the Organization of Peace, a 
U.S.-based organization founded in 1939 to promote the establishment of the U.N., 
acknowledged this tension, arguing: “We cannot postpone international leader-
ship until our own house is completely in order . . . Through revulsion against Nazi 
doctrines, we may, however, hope to speed up the process of bringing our own 
practices in each nation more in conformity with our professed ideals.”7
In some cases, the U.N.’s new commitments to equality enabled activists and 
governments to bring national-level struggles against racism to the global stage. 
For example, in 1946, India filed a complaint with the U.N. about discrimina-
tion against its citizens living in South Africa, citing the charter. While the South 
African government protested that it was an issue of domestic jurisdiction, this 
complaint triggered the U.N. system’s first examination of apartheid, laying the 
foundation for a global campaign that supported national movements in bringing 
about apartheid’s downfall.8
Likewise, in 1947, U.S. civil rights leader W.E.B. Du Bois submitted a report to 
the U.N. on behalf of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored 
People (NAACP), calling attention to how racial discrimination within the United 
States not only hurt its own people but also undermined the U.N.’s potential, 
especially given the establishment of U.N. headquarters in New York. Citing one 
recent example of discrimination against a high-profile foreign visitor—an Illinois 
restaurant’s refusal to serve Mahatma Gandhi’s personal physician, whom they 
perceived as black—Du Bois urged that “a discrimination practiced in the United 
States against her own citizens . . . cannot be persisted in, without infringing upon 
the rights of the peoples of the world.”9
Further, the UDHR’s approach to race/ethnicity established a critical precedent 
that would influence subsequent international agreements and national laws. In 
1965, the U.N. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimina-
tion (ICERD), which as of February 2019 had 179 states parties, established detailed 
commitments to eliminating racial discrimination, segregation, and violence.10 
Likewise, international human rights treaties targeting other groups—including 
children, women, refugees, and people with disabilities—all explicitly prohibit 
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racial discrimination.11 In its preamble, the U.N. Convention on the Elimination of 
All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) calls for “the eradication 
of apartheid, all forms of racism, [and] racial discrimination,”12 while the Conven-
tion on the Rights of the Child (CRC) guarantees fundamental rights “irrespective 
of the child’s or his or her parent’s or legal guardian’s race, colour . . . or . . . ethnic 
[origin].”13 Similarly, key international treaties and agreements on civil, political, 
social, and economic rights make clear that their protections must apply regardless 
of race/ethnicity.14
THE PERSISTENCE OF R ACIAL DISCRIMINATION 
IN PR ACTICE
Seventy years since the UDHR’s adoption, the world has achieved substantial 
progress on some measures of social and economic inclusion, but racism con-
tinues to shape health and opportunity in nearly every society. Surveys reveal the 
persistence of discrimination and bias: in the United States, for example, 84% of 
black adults report that black people are treated less fairly by the police than white 
people, a perception shared by 50% of white respondents.15 In a nationally repre-
sentative survey in Brazil, 37% of self-identified black respondents reported expe-
riencing racial discrimination, compared to 6.7% of white respondents.16 In Japan, 
a 2017 survey of 18,500 foreign-born residents found that nearly 30% frequently or 
occasionally heard racial insults directed toward them.17
Individual-level experiences of racial discrimination have been linked with 
increased risk of anxiety and depression, higher blood pressure, and lower over-
all ratings of health and well-being.18 Meanwhile, population-level discrimina-
tion on the basis of race/ethnicity, including discrimination embedded in the 
law, has contributed to marked disparities in access to education,19 health,20 
income21 and employment,22 and wealth.23 Spanning 18 countries from 2005 to 
2016, a review of research on racial discrimination in hiring found that in 34 of 
37 studies, discrimination had a negative effect on the callback rates of racial and 
ethnic minorities.24
Finally, more blatant racism has reemerged in the context of recent political 
campaigns and the rhetoric of elected leaders, especially as race/ethnicity inter-
sects with migration status. While experiences of racism and even definitions of 
race/ethnicity vary across regional and historical contexts, the impacts of racial/
ethnic discrimination are global.25
In addition to the human rights necessity of guaranteeing equal rights and 
opportunities regardless of race/ethnicity, a growing body of evidence demon-
strates why doing so is core to creating sustainable and thriving societies. More 
diverse groups, across a range of characteristics including race/ethnicity, take more 
information into account when making decisions.26 This can lead to more effective 
problem-solving27 as well as greater creativity28 and cooperation.29 The benefits of 
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diversity for decision-making may also help explain why companies with more 
diverse governance structures tend to perform better; a 2017 study found that 
those with the most racially and ethnically diverse executive teams were 33% more 
likely to outperform their peers on profitability.30 These economic benefits extend 
across low- and high-income countries alike. In a 2018 study spanning 492 firms 
across 23 countries in sub-Saharan Africa, researchers found that ethnic and lin-
guistic diversity had a strong positive effect on revenue and productivity.31 Simi-
larly, a study of the executive boards of 127 large companies in the United States 
found that those with higher numbers of women and racial/ethnic minorities were 
associated with better financial performance.32
The benefits of diversity and integration also extend to improved individual 
outcomes. College students who have more interactions with peers of other racial 
backgrounds, whether as roommates or classmates, demonstrate improved leader-
ship skills, higher intellectual engagement,33 greater self-confidence and cognitive 
development,34 and increases in civic attitudes, such as the belief that individuals 
can make a difference in solving community problems.35
In short, while ensuring equal rights and opportunities regardless of race/eth-
nicity is of profound importance for historically marginalized groups, the ben-
efits ultimately extend to everyone. Advancing racial equality is therefore both a 
human rights imperative and a prerequisite for countries and institutions to real-
ize their full potential.
CURRENT C ONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTIONS
National constitutions hold power not only as instruments for protecting and 
enforcing equal rights, but also as mechanisms for shaping norms and commu-
nicating values on behalf of the state. To ensure that they fully recognize every 
person’s human rights and provide the foundation for responsive governance, con-
stitutions should explicitly include unequivocal protections for the full equality 
and inclusion of all racial and ethnic groups. But how many do so—and how can 
these provisions be further strengthened?
Equal Rights on the Basis of Race and Ethnicity
As of 2017, 76% of countries explicitly protect against discrimination on the basis 
of race/ethnicity in their constitutions (see Map 1). For example, the Constitution 
of Colombia provides that “All individuals are born free and equal before the law, 
will receive equal protection and treatment from the authorities, and will enjoy the 
same rights, freedoms, and opportunities without any discrimination on account 
of . . . race.”36 Likewise, Andorra’s constitution states that “1. All persons are equal 
before the law. No one may be discriminated against on grounds of . . . race . . . 2. 
Public authorities shall create the conditions such that the equality and the liberty 
of the individuals may be real and effective.”37
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Another 20% of countries protect against discrimination generally, without 
explicitly mentioning race/ethnicity. Paraguay’s constitution, for instance, pro-
vides that “All residents of the Republic are equal as far as dignity and rights are 
concerned. No discrimination is permitted. The State will remove all obstacles and 
prevent those factors that support or promote discrimination.”38 An additional 
two countries use aspirational language. For example, Madagascar’s constitution 
commits to “privileging a framework of life allowing for living together without 
distinction of region, of origin, of ethnicity, of religion, of political opinion, or 
of gender.”39
Hungary: Using Constitutional Protections against Racial/Ethnic Discrimination to 
Challenge Separate (and Unequal) Education
At the Ferenc Pethe School in Tiszavasvari, a small town in northeast Hungary, 
250 of 531 students were Roma, Europe’s largest ethnic minority.40 All but five of 
the Roma students were assigned to Roma-only classes or classes for students 
with disabilities. These classes were held in a separate, auxiliary building that was 
in disrepair, and for over a decade, the vast majority of Roma students had not 
been allowed to access the cafeteria or gymnasium in the main building.41 The 
school kept records for the Roma-only classes marked with a “C” for “Cigany,” the 
Hungarian word for “Gypsy”—long considered a derogatory term for the Roma. 
According to a Hungarian newspaper, the separate and decidedly unequal facili-
ties had been established at the request of non-Roma parents.42
The school also held separate graduation ceremonies for each group. In 1997, 
after media coverage of the separate ceremonies got the public’s attention, 14 
Roma students, together with the Foundation for Romani Civil Rights, brought 
a lawsuit alleging violations of their rights to equality and education,43 which 
eventually reached the Supreme Court. In 2002, the Court ruled that the school’s 
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practice of segregation violated the constitution’s protections against discrimina-
tion, as well as the Civil Code, the public education law, and the Law on Rights of 
National and Ethnic Minorities.44 The constitution in place at the time prohibited 
discrimination “on the basis of race, color, gender, language, religion, political or 
other opinion, national or social origins, financial situation, birth or on any other 
grounds whatsoever.”45
In 2002, the government adopted a National Integration Program, which 
pledged to desegregate all schools by the year 2008.46 While challenges remain 
for achieving de facto integration in Hungary,47 the Ferenc Pethe case was 
the first legal challenge to racial/ethnic segregation in schools in Central 
and Eastern Europe, and helped stimulate a wave of litigation throughout the 
region.48 Legal action at the national level has also inspired stronger regional rul-
ings and commitments.49
France: Why Addressing Racism Requires Acknowledging Race
Protections of equal rights have made a difference in addressing racial discrimi-
nation in many areas of public life. For example, France’s Constitutional Council 
ruled in 2017 that police cannot stop someone for questioning or ask them to show 
their immigration documents simply because they do not look “French.”50 The 
case was targeting a widespread problem: according to a 2009 report analyzing 
500 police stops in Paris, “blacks were between 3.3 and 11.5 times more likely than 
whites to be stopped; while Arabs were stopped between 1.8 and 14.8 more times 
than whites.”51 While the Constitutional Council stopped short of invalidating the 
law that gave police wide latitude to conduct stops, it cited the principle of equality 
before the law in cautioning against discriminatory implementation.52
Interestingly, though, the Constitutional Council relied on the broad guarantee 
of equality before the law found in the 1789 Declaration of the Rights of Man and 
the Citizen, rather than the guarantee that explicitly protects equal rights regard-
less of race in Article 1 of France’s constitution. The constitution’s preamble estab-
lishes that the declaration’s principles have constitutional status. This example thus 
illustrates how even general guarantees of equality can provide an important foun-
dation for protecting against racial discrimination.
However, using these broad guarantees to protect against racial discrimination 
may become much harder if “race” itself is no longer legally recognized—a shift 
increasingly embraced by French policymakers. In 2018, the National Assembly 
voted to remove the word “race” from the constitution’s equal rights guarantee. 
The stated intent of the proposed amendment is to move away from treating race 
as a scientific fact, rather than a social and legal construct. Yet critics of the pro-
posal argue that erasing “race” will not reduce racism, and in fact will eliminate 
one of the most important tools to fight it. In the words of one opponent, “Race 
may not exist, but racism still does, and it kills.”53
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More concretely, a potential consequence of the amendment is that rulings 
broadly prohibiting “discriminatory” treatment, such as the 2017 decision on 
police searches, might not clearly extend to discrimination on the basis of race/
ethnicity, since such discrimination will no longer be constitutionally recognized. 
In other words, while broad guarantees of equality before the law are important, 
their impact will be limited if governments adopt a “colorblind” approach and 
refuse to acknowledge how perceived race/ethnicity can lead to unequal treat-
ment. This possibility is illustrated by a 2007 U.S. Supreme Court decision that 
used the idea of a “colorblind Constitution” to dismantle a voluntary public school 
desegregation program, reasoning that its mere consideration of race was uncon-
stitutional.54 In the years since, the decision has chilled efforts to desegregate 
schools throughout the country.55
Equal Rights on the Basis of Language
In addition to race/ethnicity, some constitutions address equal rights on the basis 
of language. Discrimination on the basis of language often acts as a proxy for dis-
crimination on the basis of race/ethnicity, making explicit protections in this area 
important for a comprehensive commitment to equality.
In total, 44% of constitutions explicitly protect against language discrimination, 
while an additional two countries include aspirational provisions (Map 2).
In addition, 19% of countries guarantee students who are linguistic minorities 
the right to learn in their own language, while three countries have aspirational 
provisions (Map 3). For example, Ukraine’s constitution establishes that “Citizens 
who belong to national minorities are guaranteed in accordance with the law 
the right to receive instruction in their native language, or to study their native 
No specific provision
Equality guaranteed,
not specific to language
Aspirational provision
Guaranteed right
MAP 2. Does the constitution explicitly guarantee equality or non-discrimination 
across language?
MAP 2. Does the constitution explicitly guarantee equality or nondiscrimination across 
language?
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language in state and communal educational establishment and through national 
cultural societies.”56 However, another three countries have restrictions on the pro-
vision of education in foreign languages. Panama’s constitution, for example, pro-
vides that “Education shall be imparted in the official language. Only in specially 
qualified cases of public interest can an educational establishment be permitted by 
law to teach in a foreign language.”57
South Africa: Dismantling Language Discrimination, a Relic of Apartheid
South Africa’s constitution establishes 11 national languages, including nine 
indigenous languages: Sepedi, Sesotho, Setswana, siSwati, Tshivenda, Xitsonga, 
Afrikaans, English, isiNdebele, isiXhosa, and isiZulu, the most commonly spo-
ken language at home.58 Afrikaans derived from the language of the Dutch set-
tlers who arrived in the 1600s, and although many black South Africans now 
speak Afrikaans, among other languages, it remains the primary language of 
the country’s white Afrikaner minority. Afrikaans is also often associated with 
racial oppression due to an apartheid-era requirement that black students learn 
in Afrikaans, which spurred the Soweto student uprising in 1976—an event 
that catalyzed broader resistance to the apartheid regime.59 Meanwhile, Eng-
lish, initially the language of the British colonizers, became the main language 
of the post-apartheid government, making it one of the country’s most widely 
spoken languages.60
In 2007, South Africa’s Mpumalanga Department of Education determined that 
a public school’s Afrikaans-only policy violated English-speaking students’ right to 
an education and perpetuated apartheid-era inequalities, and ordered the school 
to begin providing instruction in both languages. Because of its Afrikaans-only 




Guaranteed for at least
some minority groups
MAP 3. Does the constitution provide for the right to education in their own language 
for linguistic minorities?
MAP 3. Does the constitution explicitly provide for the right to education in their own 
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low student-to-teacher ratio compared to other local schools, even as neighbor-
ing English-language schools were so overcapacity that some students were being 
taught in old laundry facilities rather than classrooms.61
After the school challenged the order, the case eventually reached the Con-
stitutional Court. In 2007, the Court found that the Department of Education 
could not force the school to make the change, given the authority of individual 
schools to determine their languages of instruction under the Schools Act, but 
also ordered the school’s governing body to reconsider its language policy in 
light of constitutional mandates, including the right to education and the pro-
hibition of discrimination on the basis of language, race, and social origin.62 In 
addition, Section 29(2) of the South African Constitution provides for education 
in the language of one’s choice where feasible taking into account “(a) equity; (b) 
practicability; and (c) the need to redress the results of past racially discrimina-
tory laws and practices.”63 The school was required to report back to the Court 
within 90 days, by which point it had changed its policy to begin instruction in 
both languages.
Mexico: Addressing the Impact of Language Discrimination on Indigenous Peoples
A recent court case in Mexico illustrates how discrimination on the basis of lan-
guage can also intersect with discrimination on the basis of indigenous status. In 
a range of countries, particularly in Latin America, constitutions explicitly pro-
tect the rights of indigenous groups—often focusing on the right to be consulted 
on development projects and other initiatives that will affect indigenous commu-
nities and lands, as is consistent with international agreements.64 Some of these 
constitutions also establish individual or collective protections from discrimina-
tion based on indigenous group membership. For example, Ecuador’s constitu-
tion provides that “Indigenous communes, communities, peoples and nations are 
recognized and guaranteed . . . the following collective rights: . . . (2) To not be 
the target of racism or any form of discrimination based on their origin or ethnic 
or cultural identity.”65
The Mexico case focused on a 2014 telecommunications law that required all 
radio and television broadcasts to be in Spanish, with the exception of broadcasts 
produced under “social licenses” specifically granted to indigenous groups. The 
plaintiff, Mardonio Carballo, was a poet and journalist who worked in both Span-
ish and náhuatl, an indigenous language.66 Deeming the law a “totally discrimina-
tory” barrier to his livelihood, Carballo initiated a constitutional challenge that 
reached the Supreme Court the following year.67
In its decision, the Supreme Court cited Mexico’s constitutional provisions on 
indigenous groups, which include commitments to “promote equal opportunities 
for indigenous people and to eliminate discriminatory practices” and protect the 
rights of indigenous peoples to “preserve and enrich their languages” and “acquire, 
operate and manage media.”68 In addition, the Court cited Articles 26 and 27 of the 
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International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). Article 26 prohibits 
discrimination on any grounds, including language, while Article 27 protects the 
rights of ethnic and linguistic minorities to use their own language. Under a 2011 
amendment to the Mexican constitution, these provisions are directly applicable 
in court.69 After taking all these national and international laws into account, the 
Court declared the law unconstitutional.70
Because Mexico has a civil law system and Carballo’s challenge was filed as an 
amparo, or individual action, the Court’s decision was initially applicable only to 
him; it did not change the law for others. However, a few months after the decision, 
the challenged law was amended to allow for broadcasts in any national language. 
Based on the list of national languages established by the General Law for Linguis-
tic Rights of Indigenous Peoples in 2003, this meant that journalists, artists, and 
others could freely use both Spanish and indigenous languages.
Expansion of Equal Rights over Time
Importantly, protections of equal rights on the basis of race, ethnicity, and 
language are all on the rise. While fewer than half of constitutions adopted 
before 1970 include race/ethnicity-specific guarantees, 89% of those adopted 
between 2000 and 2009 and 79% of those adopted between 2010 and 2017 do so 
(see Figure 1).
Likewise, while just 20% of constitutions adopted before 1970 prohibit discrim-
ination on the basis of language, 75% of those adopted between 2010 and 2017 
include these guarantees (see Figure 2).
Still, for the quarter of countries that have yet to enact a race/ethnicity-specific 
equality guarantee, the widespread persistence of racial discrimination under-
scores the urgency of doing so. Further, to address discrimination and exclusion 
in all its forms, countries may need to take more targeted approaches in key areas, 
as discussed in the following section.
BEYOND DIRECT DISCRIMINATION: 
ADDRESSING SPECIFIC CHALLENGES
Addressing Segregation
While the increase in race/ethnicity-specific constitutional provisions is encour-
aging, even with broad nondiscrimination provisions, racial segregation may per-
sist. Segregation imposed by law has a long global history, and intensified during 
colonialism, when colonial officials would often reserve certain parts of cities in 
Asia and Africa for Europeans. South Africa was far from alone in the segregation 
of populations. An 1811 map of Madras, India, reveals a government-segregated 
“Black town” and “White town.”71 In early twentieth-century West Africa, colonial 
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that segregation was necessary for preventing the Europeans’ exposure to malaria 
and the plague.72
Devastating segregation persists across countries, as illustrated by “spatial seg-
regation indices.”73 These indices, which usually range from zero (indicating a par-
ticular group’s complete integration into the population at large) to one (indicat-
ing complete segregation), have found extremely high levels of segregation—0.75 
and above—in multiple African countries,74 as well as in major urban areas in the 
United Kingdom.75 In the United States, African Americans remain the most seg-
regated racial group, though even higher levels of segregation persist among South 
Asian populations in cities like London and Birmingham.76
Segregation often perpetuates racial disparities and discriminatory attitudes. 
In Europe, ethnic groups segregated into poorer neighborhoods are more likely 
to be unemployed.77 A 2016 study of 16 African countries found that ethnic segre-
gation was clearly correlated with mistrust among ethnic groups.78 In the United 
States, residential segregation has been identified as a “fundamental cause” of 
racial health disparities, and a primary cause of disparities in socioeconomic sta-
tus and education.79
Meanwhile, a growing body of evidence finds that school desegregation both 
improves outcomes for students who are members of disadvantaged racial or 
ethnic groups and decreases societal racism.80 This may be explained by research 
showing that increased contact with other racial groups reduces prejudice.81 Like-
wise, living in close proximity to families from other racial, ethnic, or cultural 
backgrounds has been found to reduce stereotyping.82
United States: The Promise—and Pitfalls—of Brown v. Board of Education
Constitutions have been demonstrated tools for dismantling segregation. In 1954, 
the U.S. Supreme Court famously ruled in Brown v. Board of Education that “sepa-
rate but equal” racially segregated schools violated the Fourteenth Amendment, 
which broadly guarantees “equal protection of the laws.” In the decades since, 
Brown has become perhaps the most celebrated decision of the U.S. Supreme 
Court, garnering numerous citations even in foreign courts.83
Yet despite its tremendous symbolic value and initial impacts, Brown’s promise 
has gone unfulfilled. While modest integration was achieved in the 1970s and ’80s, 
American schools have been resegregating as court orders are lifted.84 From 1988 
to 2014, the percentage of “hyper-segregated schools,” in which 90% or more of 
students are minorities, grew from 5.7% to 18.4%.85
The barriers to integration are many, and illustrate how exclusion in one setting 
leads to exclusion in others. Mid-twentieth-century housing policies—including 
restrictive covenants that limited the neighborhoods in which black families could 
live, as well as banks’ “redlining” practices that prevented black families from 
accessing loans—gave rise to the housing segregation that has persisted to this day 
in the United States. When black families did move into white neighborhoods, 
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once their numbers reached a “tipping point,” white families moved out, in a 
phenomenon famously dubbed “white flight” by economist Thomas Schelling.86 
Meanwhile, a significant portion of funding for public education has historically 
come from local property taxes, leading to inadequate investment in the schools 
that need it most (where average incomes are lower) and perpetuating racial dis-
parities in access to quality education, given the association of race/ethnicity and 
class in the context of a history of discriminatory barriers.87
But the persistence of segregation also has to do with the constitution. To start, 
the U.S. lacks a race-specific equality provision—and it is noteworthy that numer-
ous decisions upholding segregation predated Brown but were based on the exact 
same constitutional language. Most notoriously, in 1896, the Supreme Court ruled 
in Plessy v. Ferguson that the establishment of separate train cars for white and 
“colored” passengers did not amount to unconstitutional discrimination. The 
Plessy decision also pointed to the existence of segregated schools, and state courts’ 
approval of them, as justification for its conclusion.88 Similarly, in a lesser-known 
case from 1924, just three decades before Brown, the Supreme Court ruled against 
a nine-year-old Chinese American student in Mississippi who had enrolled at a 
white school when no “colored” school was available, finding that school segrega-
tion “does not conflict with the Fourteenth Amendment.”89
For the U.S., a first clear priority is enacting a race-specific constitutional 
equality provision. But given the courts’ narrow interpretation of equality—
and insistence that the “enforced separation of the two races” was not intended 
to be discriminatory90—even this may not have been enough to yield a differ-
ent outcome during the eras these cases were decided. Meanwhile, in modern 
times, the constitution’s silence on desegregation, racial equality, and the right 
to education leaves advocates for equal educational rights with limited tools to 
correct course.
Namibia, Sierra Leone, and New Zealand: Divergent Approaches to Segregation
Several countries provide examples of more explicit constitutional language 
committing to the eradication of segregation and promotion of integration. For 
example, Namibia’s constitution provides that “The practice of racial discrimina-
tion and the practice and ideology of apartheid from which the majority of the 
people of Namibia have suffered for so long shall be prohibited.”91 In Sierra Leone, 
the constitution’s chapter on “fundamental principles” proclaims that “the State 
shall promote national integration and unity and discourage discrimination on 
the grounds of place of origin, circumstance of birth, sex, religion, status, ethnic 
or linguistic association or ties.”92
Globally, however, few constitutions explicitly address segregation. Further, 
those that do may address only a fraction of the segregation that persists in schools 
and workplaces. Unless constitutional provisions are clearly applicable to both 
public and private institutions, exceptions will undercut the intent of desegregation 
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efforts. Meanwhile, a few countries still explicitly allow for separate education. 
New Zealand’s constitution, for instance, declares: “An educational establishment 
maintained wholly or principally for students of one sex, race, or religious belief, 
or for students with a particular disability, or for students in a particular age group, 
or the authority responsible for the control of any such establishment, does not 
commit a breach of section 57 [nondiscrimination in education] by refusing to 
admit students of a different sex, race, or religious belief, or students not having 
that disability or not being in that age group.”93 Although in a minority of cases 
separate education for marginalized groups has been designed to address histori-
cal disparities, establishing in the constitution that schools can exclude students 
on any of these grounds opens the door for widespread discrimination and puts at 
risk all the benefits of integration.
While “separate but equal” is now widely understood as inherently unequal—
an interpretation underscored by international human rights bodies94—language 
that more thoroughly articulates this principle can provide a stronger foundation 
for reducing the salience of race/ethnicity in shaping opportunity.
Addressing Indirect Discrimination
Beyond direct discrimination and segregation, a third key area constitutions can 
address is indirect discrimination—policies or practices that are “race-neutral” on 
their face but disproportionately harm particular racial/ethnic groups.
Indirect discrimination is also known as “disparate impact” discrimination, 
which speaks to its focus on the outcomes of a particular policy or practice rather 
than its stated intention. Indirect discrimination can take several forms. In some 
cases, indirect discrimination intentionally targets a racial/ethnic group through 
a seemingly race-neutral policy. An example of this is the use of literacy tests as a 
requirement for voting across the Jim Crow–era American South, which did not 
explicitly prohibit voting on the basis of race but was clearly intended to disenfran-
chise black Americans who had been denied a formal education.
In other cases, criteria that have disparate impacts may be necessary to achieve 
an important purpose, and are generally not viewed as legally discriminatory. 
For example, a fire department’s requirement that applicants be able to carry 100 
pounds up a flight of stairs may disproportionately exclude women, but tests an 
ability that is essential for fulfilling a firefighter’s duties.
Finally, in some cases, disparate impact may be unintentional but is also unnec-
essary. The use of certain tests and hiring practices that disproportionately dis-
advantage certain groups, but have not been shown to closely relate to the actual 
duties of the job they are applying for, generally fall into this category.
Protections against indirect discrimination are intended to advance more equi-
table outcomes, and to root out more “invisible” forms of bias that lead to dis-
proportionate exclusion on the basis of race/ethnicity or another characteristic. 
Rather than just limiting the judicial analysis to whether all people are subject 
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to identical rules, by looking at the goal and impact of rules, protections against 
indirect discrimination can help advance substantive equality. Court rulings have 
shown that it is feasible to parse out the different types of indirect discrimination, 
and to distinguish between genuinely needed policies or practices that have a dis-
parate impact and those that derive from or perpetuate bias without demonstrat-
ing their necessity. Cases from a range of countries illustrate how courts have dealt 
with indirect discrimination across various constitutional contexts.
South Africa: Indirect Discrimination Is Unconstitutional
In a 2011 case from South Africa, the plaintiffs were three women who had been 
badly injured in traffic accidents. Two of them had been riding in minibus taxis, 
and one had been a passenger in her employer’s car. Their injuries were severe and 
interfered with their ability to work: two of the plaintiffs had been hospitalized for 
two months, and one underwent a foot amputation.95
South Africa had established a Road Accident Fund to provide compensation 
to individuals who were injured by others’ negligent or illegal driving. However, 
the legislation establishing the fund capped compensation for victims who were 
injured while riding public transportation or while being transported by their 
employer. While other third parties could receive full compensation from the 
fund, those who fell into these exceptions were only eligible to receive a maximum 
of 25,000 rand (a little more than 2,000 USD), regardless of the extent of their 
injuries or the accident’s impact on their livelihood.
In a challenge to the relevant section of the Road Accident Fund Act, the 
plaintiffs argued that the cap on reimbursement indirectly discriminated against 
black South Africans, who, because they were more likely to be poor, were sig-
nificantly more likely than white South Africans to take public transportation. 
The Constitutional Court agreed, finding that because the “impugned provi-
sions . . . overwhelmingly affect black people, they create indirect discrimina-
tion that is presumptively unfair,” in violation of Section 9(3) of the Consti-
tution.96 Moreover, while the Court acknowledged that the government could 
legitimately limit the compensation available to accident victims, it could not 
“singl[e] out” one group of South Africans for a reduced benefit under a piece of 
social security legislation.97
United Kingdom: Measures Have to Be Justified
A case from the United Kingdom found against indirect discrimination in a dif-
ferent context. In Essop v. Home Office, an experienced immigration officer chal-
lenged the use of a Core Skills Assessment (CSA) exam as the basis for promotions. 
The CSA was a generic exam administered to all employees of the Home Office, 
the U.K.’s national security and immigration agency, who were seeking promotion 
to a certain level. In 2010, a Home Office–commissioned study of the CSA found 
that “black and minority ethnic” employees passed the test only 40% as often as 
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white employees. The report estimated that there was only a 0.1% probability that 
this disparity was by chance.98
The U.K. has no codified constitution, but a collection of parliamentary acts 
regarded as having constitutional status.99 While there is some debate about pre-
cisely which acts rise to the level of constitutional law, a range of sources attribute 
this status to the Equality Act, a comprehensive piece of legislation that expressly 
prohibits indirect discrimination.100
In an important ruling, the Supreme Court found that individuals claiming 
indirect discrimination were not required to explain why an “apparently neutral 
provision, criterion or practice” had a disproportionate impact on a particular 
group; it sufficed to show that it did. At the same time, the Court noted that no 
finding of discrimination would result if the employer could show that the CSA 
was a justified condition for promotions, though the opinion suggested that a rea-
sonable employer who became aware of a policy’s disparate impact would “try 
and see what can be modified to remove that impact while achieving the desired 
result.”101 Moreover, the Court explained that the person alleging discrimination 
did not need to prove they personally experienced the “same disadvantage” shared 
by the group, though the employer would also have the opportunity to show that 
“the particular claimant was not put at a disadvantage by the requirement”—
maybe he just didn’t study, or went to the wrong test center. Having provided this 
analysis, the Court granted Essop’s appeal and remanded the case to the Employ-
ment Tribunal.
United States: The Constitution Prohibits Only “Intentional” Discrimination
In the absence of a constitutional protection against indirect discrimination, 
courts have ruled differently on testing requirements in the United States.102 In 
1970, two black police officers who had applied for positions in the District of 
Columbia Police Department challenged the constitutionality of a written exam 
used throughout the civil service that was “designed to test verbal ability, vocabu-
lary, reading and comprehension.”103 The two plaintiffs argued that the test had not 
been shown to predict job performance as a police officer, and had the effect of 
disproportionately excluding black applicants: between 1968 and 1971, 57% of black 
applicants failed the test, compared to just 13% of whites.
The sources of bias in testing, which have been long studied, include racially 
and culturally biased content, methodological bias, and the psychological effect 
of “stereotype threats.”104 As just one example, studies have found that the election 
of Barack Obama as the first black president of the United States had a positive 
effect on the test scores of black Americans, which researchers suggest is due to the 
reduction of stereotype threat; President Obama’s high-profile disruption of black 
stereotypes had a psychological effect on test-takers.105 Similarly, the subject matter 
of standardized tests often advantages test takers with higher socioeconomic status, 
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measuring not just relevant knowledge but also what they have been exposed to 
outside the classroom.106
However, in Washington v. Davis, the Supreme Court ruled that “a law or other 
official act, without regard to whether it reflects a racially discriminatory purpose, 
[is not] unconstitutional solely because it has a racially disproportionate impact.”107 
In so doing, the Court emphasized that the racial trends in the test outcomes were 
irrelevant to the test’s constitutionality; the black plaintiffs “could no more success-
fully claim that the test denied them equal protection than could white applicants 
who also failed.”108 As a consequence of this ruling, the Court has consistently held 
since 1976 that the constitution protects against racial discrimination only where 
the plaintiff can prove it was “intentional”—a high burden of proof that has signifi-
cantly limited the potential of the Equal Protection Clause.109
The consequences of this ruling were especially apparent in the 1987 case of 
McCleskey v. Kemp, in which attorneys representing a black man on death row pre-
sented a significant body of statistical evidence showing that prosecutors were more 
likely to pursue capital punishment when there was a white victim and a black defen-
dant (as in McCleskey’s case), and that juries were 4.3 times more likely to impose 
the death penalty when crime victims were white than when they were black.110 
However, the Court held that this statistical evidence was insufficient to prove intent 
to discriminate, and that “[a]pparent disparities in sentencing are an inevitable part 
of our criminal justice system.”111 Through these rulings, the Court effectively ren-
dered the constitution powerless to address indirect racial discrimination.
Lessons for Protecting against Indirect Discrimination across Contexts
The U.K. and South Africa cases illustrate that courts have the capacity to address 
indirect discrimination in nuanced ways—but as the U.S. case reveals, they may be 
unlikely to address it at all without a foundation in the constitutional text. In the 
U.K., the Court emphasized that if the employer could show the test was necessary 
for the job, it would still be constitutionally valid. In South Africa, the Court clari-
fied that the government was within its rights to limit compensation to accident 
victims; it just could not do so in a discriminatory manner. But in the U.S., the 
Court simply refused to acknowledge indirect discrimination as discrimination, 
without reaching the more nuanced question of whether the test at issue was an 
essential and effective means of achieving its stated objective.
Altogether, only 5% of countries prohibit indirect discrimination. Serbia’s con-
stitution, for example, states: “All direct or indirect discrimination based on any 
grounds, particularly on race . . . shall be prohibited.”112 Similarly, Zambia’s consti-
tution defines discrimination as “directly or indirectly treating a person differently 
on the basis of that person’s birth, race, sex, origin, colour, age, disability, religion, 
conscience, belief, culture, language, tribe, pregnancy, health, or marital, ethnic, 
social or economic status.”113
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Advancing Equality through Affirmative Measures
In many parts of the world, contemporary racial inequalities are shaped by long 
histories of slavery, colonialism, discriminatory laws, or other systematic racial 
oppression. Guaranteeing equal rights regardless of race/ethnicity is a first and 
essential step toward creating a level playing field. Yet in many countries, this 
is insufficient to undo the material and expressive harms caused by centuries of 
state-sanctioned discrimination, particularly given the persistence of segregation 
and concentrated disadvantage.
To accelerate progress toward racial equality and mitigate the impact of historic 
injustices, some countries have enacted affirmative measures, which may permit 
schools, employers, and other institutions to take race/ethnicity and the impacts of 
past discrimination into account when making decisions about admissions, hiring, 
or other areas that shape representation and access to resources. While their design 
raises complex questions, as discussed in more detail below, affirmative measures 
provide one of the most promising mechanisms for accounting for cumulative 
disadvantage, implicit bias, and ongoing and historic discrimination.114 Moreover, 
when well-designed and implemented, affirmative measures can advance at least 
three goals: restorative justice, human rights, and diversity and inclusion.
The Case for Affirmative Measures—and Its Implications for Human Rights
The restorative justice case for affirmative measures focuses on the responsibility 
of governments to enact remedies for harms done in their name. This rationale 
acknowledges that past injustices often have enduring consequences and that true 
equality will not immediately flow from the removal of formal barriers. In the 
words of former U.S. president Lyndon Johnson, “You do not wipe away the scars 
of centuries by saying: Now you are free to go where you want, and do as you 
desire, and choose the leaders you please .  .  . We seek not just legal equity but 
human ability, not just equality as a right and a theory but equality as a fact and 
equality as a result.”115 Likewise, as observed by Dikgang Moseneke, former deputy 
chief justice of the Constitutional Court of South Africa: “Absent a positive com-
mitment progressively to eradicate socially constructed barriers to equality and to 
root out systematic or institutionalised under-privilege, the constitutional promise 
of equality before the law and its equal protection and benefit must, in the context 
of our country, ring hollow.”116
Today, the impact of past racial discrimination on persisting socioeconomic 
inequalities remains profound, providing a powerful example of why a restorative 
justice approach is important for advancing equality in practice. In South Africa, 
25 years since apartheid ended, black South Africans still own only 4% of the land, 
while white South Africans own 72%.117 In Brazil, poverty rates among Afro-Bra-
zilians are twice those of white Brazilians.118 In the United States, the median black 
family earned $39,490 in 2016, compared to $65,041 for the median white family.
Rights on the Basis of Race/Ethnicity    37
The wealth gap is even wider: median net worth for black families in the U.S. is 
$17,600, or around 10% of the median net worth of white families ($171,000).119 The 
greater disparities in wealth compared to income arise because wealth gets passed 
down intergenerationally—and even long after slavery’s abolition, black Americans 
were routinely excluded from the laws and policies that helped white Americans buy 
homes, attend college, and build assets to pass on to their children.120 And crucially, 
access to resources—whether it is just money to pay for a car repair or a college 
savings account—can shape whether someone can access opportunities and social 
networks, and withstand periods of unemployment or other hardship. These foun-
dations provide a crucial complement to protections against discrimination.
Accordingly, a restorative justice framework seeks to both redress past injus-
tices and build a foundation for the full exercise of human rights and capabili-
ties in the present. This explains the strong commitment to affirmative steps in 
the ICERD: “States Parties shall, when the circumstances so warrant, take, in 
the social, economic, cultural and other fields, special and concrete measures to 
ensure the adequate development and protection of certain racial groups or indi-
viduals belonging to them, for the purpose of guaranteeing them the full and equal 
enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms.”121
A second rationale for affirmative measures is that by increasing diversity in 
schools, workplaces, and other institutions, they benefit everyone. Indeed, repre-
sentation helps to ensure a diversity of views, advance innovation, and facilitate 
effective decision-making that addresses the needs and experiences of all people. 
Diversity in the classroom has been shown to benefit all students, and workplaces 
report similar results.122 Evidence also shows that leaders and role models matter to 
the aspirations of the next generation.123 Well-designed affirmative measures have 
been effective at more rapidly changing representation in universities, workplaces, 
and positions of power and leadership.
Questions That Arise in the Design of Affirmative Measures
Across countries, affirmative measures are undeniably controversial, and raise legit-
imately complex questions—some pragmatic, others more philosophical. While the 
issues that follow are not comprehensive, they reflect some considerations that com-
monly arise in discussions of affirmative measures across a wide range of settings.
Duration: The ultimate goal for affirmative measures is to create a society that gen-
uinely provides for equal opportunities, both by removing material barriers and 
by dismantling stereotypes that fuel discrimination. Yet even if everyone agrees 
that past discrimination has shaped present inequalities, how can policymak-
ers anticipate how long change will take, or establish when affirmative measures 
have succeeded? While affirmative measures are generally agreed to be temporary 
rather than permanent fixes for inequality, deciding upon the time horizon is a 
recurring challenge.
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Which Groups Are Included: Another question is how to design affirmative mea-
sures to address residual discrimination as well as ongoing bias and discrimina-
tion. Many groups have faced and continue to face different types and degrees 
of discrimination and bias, and identifying the appropriate remedies in the pres-
ent is rarely straightforward. Further, even within these groups, not everyone has 
experienced the same consequences of past and ongoing discrimination that affir-
mative measures seek to remedy. Ensuring that affirmative measures are fair and 
effective requires taking these considerations into account.
Targeting Benefits: Similarly, there are valid reasons to believe that affirmative mea-
sures in some countries disproportionately benefit the most advantaged members 
of the targeted group (such as those with the highest incomes), leaving those fac-
ing the greatest marginalization behind; the intersection of socioeconomic status 
(SES) and race/ethnicity is a persistent subject of debate when it comes to affirma-
tive measures.
In countries where race/ethnicity and SES are highly correlated, some have 
argued that affirmative measures based on SES would more effectively benefit 
individuals from marginalized racial/ethnic groups who are also economically 
disadvantaged. Moreover, this approach could also potentially meet with a lower 
level of discriminatory political or popular backlash. At the same time, targeting 
SES alone, even when strongly associated with marginalized racial/ethnic groups, 
will not fully address the racial/ethnic discrimination and exclusion that often 
occurs across social class.
How to Address Disparities: Countries have taken various approaches not only to 
whether but to how schools and employers can take race/ethnicity into account. 
With regard to “how,” successful approaches include focusing on ensuring a richly 
diverse applicant pool; valuing diversity, all else being equal; and explicitly recog-
nizing the value of a diversity of experiences and perspectives at each step of the 
selection process.
While perhaps no existing national policy is without its shortcomings, a range 
of countries offer insights into how to craft affirmative policies in nuanced and 
effective ways. Sample cases illustrate how considerations about remedies, evalua-
tion criteria, and time horizons have played out in the courts in countries that have 
taken different constitutional approaches and prioritized different goals.
South Africa: Targeted and Time-Bound Action to Address Economic Inequalities
In South Africa, the post-apartheid government has focused over the past two 
decades on increasing the representation of black South Africans who were long 
excluded from educational opportunities, access to resources, and positions of 
power in government and the economy. These efforts have had tangible impacts, 
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although South Africa’s commitment to remedying long-standing injustices and 
inequalities within a short time frame has also presented challenges and generated 
controversy.124 Yet even as debates about the most effective ways to accelerate prog-
ress toward equity continue to unfold, South Africa has demonstrated the feasibil-
ity of addressing some of the economic impacts of past discrimination through 
restitution, as illustrated by a 2004 case.
In Minister of Finance v. Van Heerden, the Constitutional Court addressed 
whether a new pension fund that temporarily provided for higher state contribu-
tions to members of Parliament first elected in 1994, relative to those who had 
been members since the apartheid era, violated the constitution’s equality provi-
sion.125 The new pension was established as a restitutionary measure to account for 
economic inequality created by apartheid. Between 1994 and 1999, new members 
of Parliament would receive pension contributions equaling 17% (for those under 
age 49) or 20% (for those 49 and over) of their annual salary, while those who had 
been members prior to 1994 would receive only 10%. After that period, everyone 
would receive 17%. The group temporarily receiving lower pension contributions 
under the new scheme included 105 white members (including the plaintiff), two 
black members, 11 Indian members, and 28 “colored” members (the South African 
term for mixed-race people).
In evaluating whether the differential treatment was nevertheless consis-
tent with equal rights, the Court based its judgment on Section 9, the constitu-
tion’s equality provision. Section 9(1) provides that everyone is equal before the 
law, while 9(2) allows for “legislative and other measures designed to protect or 
advance persons, or categories of persons, disadvantaged by unfair discrimina-
tion” to “promote the achievement of equality.” The Court explained that these 
two sections were complementary, and that in order to be valid under 9(2), an 
affirmative measure had to satisfy three criteria: it had to (1) “target persons or 
categories of persons who have been disadvantaged by unfair discrimination,” (2) 
be designed to protect or advance those persons, and (3) promote the achievement 
of equality.
Addressing these requirements one by one, the Court found that the new 
pension satisfied the first criterion, since “an overwhelming majority of the new 
members of Parliament were excluded from parliamentary participation by past 
apartheid laws on account of race, political affiliation or belief.” The Court also 
found that the higher pension contributions were designed to benefit this group, 
and that the government was not required to show that there was no less onerous 
way to accomplish their objective (in other words, the government did not have to 
prove that the 10% threshold for the apartheid-era members of Parliament was the 
maximum they could afford while providing the 17% and 20% benefits to the new 
members). Finally, the Court found that the new pension scheme was a reasonable 
and time-bound effort to “distribute pension benefits on an equitable basis with 
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the purpose of diminishing the inequality between privileged and disadvantaged 
parliamentarians.”
The powerful judgment, written by then-Deputy Chief Justice Moseneke, 
explained how affirmative measures were not only constitutional but also critical 
to achieving the constitution’s transformative aims:
[O]ur Constitution heralds not only equal protection of the law and non-discrim-
ination but also the start of a credible and abiding process of reparation for past 
exclusion, dispossession, and indignity within the discipline of our constitutional 
framework . . . [O]ur constitutional understanding of equality includes . . . “remedial 
or restitutionary equality.” Such measures are not in themselves a deviation from, or 
invasive of, the right to equality guaranteed by the Constitution. They are not “re-
verse discrimination” or “positive discrimination” as argued by the claimant in this 
case. They are integral to the reach of our equality protection.126
In addition to applying a clear restorative justice frame, by providing a discrete and 
time-bound remedy, the ruling made clear its goal was equality. However, as the 
next cases will underscore, when it comes to reducing barriers to employment and 
education, rather than more equitably compensating those already in leadership 
positions, designing affirmative measures is rarely as straightforward.
United States: Advancing Diversity through Holistic Evaluations
In the United States, many universities have enacted policies that emphasize the 
holistic evaluation of applicants’ experiences, skills, and qualifications and take 
into account the value of a diverse student body. While the constitution’s lack of 
clear language permitting affirmative measures has left these programs vulnerable 
(as will be detailed later), the Supreme Court has historically found these policies 
to be constitutional. They offer one approach to diversifying student bodies.
In Grutter v. Bollinger, the Supreme Court affirmed the constitutionality of an 
admissions policy at the University of Michigan Law School that considered race/
ethnicity as “one factor among many” in its process for selecting among the top 
candidates in its applicant pool. The law school had implemented the policy in 
1992 to ensure that the student body included a “critical mass” of underrepresented 
minority students, in an effort to “achieve that diversity which has the potential to 
enrich everyone’s education and thus make a law school class stronger than the 
sum of its parts.”127
In a 5–4 decision in 2003, the Court found that the law school used race/eth-
nicity as a “plus” factor in the context of a comprehensive, individualized review, 
and that race/ethnicity was not the “defining feature” of any prospective student’s 
application.128 Second, although achieving a “critical mass” of underrepresented 
students required “some attention to numbers,” Justice O’Connor acknowledged 
that the proportion of minority applicants enrolled each year varied significantly, 
indicating that the school’s policy was not equivalent to a quota.129
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The Grutter decision was a landmark for affirmative measures, and Michigan 
Law School’s holistic approach became a model for other universities across the 
country seeking to ensure diverse student bodies without triggering constitutional 
claims. Nevertheless, without constitutional text permitting affirmative measures, 
the decision rested on somewhat shaky ground, and the wave of affirmative action 
challenges since the ruling indicates that the debate is far from over.130
In addition, whereas the U.S. Supreme Court once considered equal rights and 
remedying past discrimination to be the core justifications for efforts to integrate 
schools at all levels, more recently, the Court has generally viewed the broad-based 
benefits of diversity as the sole constitutional rationale.131 In so doing, the Court 
has diminished the potential of the Equal Protection Clause to address historic 
disparities.132 Moreover, cases challenging affirmative measures typically invoke 
the Equal Protection Clause, arguing that any policies that take race/ethnicity 
into account are inherently discriminatory. This trend illustrates how neglecting 
to specify that affirmative measures are consistent with equality can undermine a 
constitution’s potential to advance equal rights in practice.
Rwanda and Brazil: The Rapid Change Associated with Quotas—but Not 
without Risks
The question of how rigid or flexible affirmative measures should be, whether for 
race/ethnicity or for other categories, is a challenge that emerges across coun-
tries. Rigid approaches like quotas may quickly change representation of mar-
ginalized groups and increase the diversity of historically exclusive institutions. 
Rwanda, for example, introduced a legislative quota in its 2003 constitution that 
reserved 30% of government seats for women, and quickly became the world’s first 
country with a female majority in parliament, compared to a global average of 
only around 20%.133
However, quotas may not fundamentally change power dynamics. In some 
countries, for example, researchers have raised concerns that male party leaders 
select women to fill quota seats based on their loyalty; in others, male relatives 
of elected women may have undue influence on their decisions in office.134 Simi-
larly, some quotas have functionally established ceilings, rather than floors, for 
representation. Further, depending on prevailing attitudes in institutions where 
they are enacted, quotas may stigmatize beneficiaries and do not always provide 
opportunities to fully consider other aspects of a person’s background or experi-
ence that may be relevant. Finally, while the specifics of their design vary,135 quotas 
and other mechanical measures that make certain demographic characteristics 
central to decision-making may reinforce stereotypes.
A recent example comes from Brazil. Although Brazil did not enforce racial 
segregation in the same way as the United States or South Africa, its own legacy 
of slavery and legal discrimination has created deep disparities in resources and 
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economic opportunities. Seeking to remedy this inequality, after the Supreme 
Court ruled that affirmative action was constitutional in 2012, the government 
enacted a quota system targeting public school students who were low-income 
and/or identified as black, indigenous, or mixed-race.
The effort has successfully increased the representation of marginalized groups 
in higher education. However, its race-based allocation of a specific number of 
seats has also inadvertently reinforced racial classifications, in a country where cit-
izens have historically provided as many as 136 different descriptions of their race 
in the census.136 More broadly, quotas present the risk of reifying stereotypes about 
a group’s characteristics, both during the process of determining who belongs to 
the group, and through reactions to and assumptions about those who benefit.
India: A Commitment to Periodic Evaluation of Progress
Whatever approach is taken, countries benefit from building in periodic reviews 
of affirmative measures. In India, recognizing how the caste system’s rigid hierar-
chy of inherited social status had excluded a large segment of the population from 
political representation for centuries, the independence constitution reserved leg-
islative seats for members of designated castes and tribes, proportional to their 
share of the population.137 According to the provision’s “sunset clause,” the reserva-
tion policy would apply to elections for the next ten years. However, the politi-
cal reservations have been extended via constitutional amendment six times, with 
the most recent reform extending them through 2020.138 In effect, ten-year win-
dows have become a mechanism for periodic reevaluation of whether the quotas 
remain needed.
Courts from Washington to Johannesburg have debated how long affirmative 
measures should be in place. In Grutter, Justice O’Connor predicted that “25 years 
from now, the use of racial preferences will no longer be necessary to further the 
interest approved today.” In South Africa, the Labour Court issued two conflicting 
opinions about whether employers could continue to consider race and gender in 
their hiring decisions even after legislative quotas were met, evaluating the dura-
tion of affirmative measures not just in policy but in practice.139 In a 2006 decision, 
the Court found that continuing to consider race and gender after quotas were 
filled would be “unfair”; in a 2007 ruling, it questioned whether setting aside these 
considerations “advances the spirit and purpose of employment equity and the 
notion of substantive equality.”140
As these examples suggest, committing to periodically evaluating the efficacy of 
affirmative measures is a practice that has potential to facilitate the identification 
of successful approaches and the monitoring of government actions to ensure pol-
icies are working as intended. Establishing specific benchmarks and the evidence 
of impact may provide a valuable strategy for accelerating progress and identifying 
persisting barriers.
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Constitutions can provide frameworks for affirmative measures by including 
language that allows countries to take steps designed to both address past inequal-
ity and advance future equality without violating their guarantee of equal treat-
ment under the law. While a range of countries have adopted affirmative measures 
without clear support in the constitutional text, these policies are subject to persis-
tent constitutional challenges and political vulnerability.
In total, 17% of countries permit affirmative measures on the basis of race/ethnicity 
(Map 4), and 5% allow for affirmative measures to promote linguistic equality.
C ONCLUSION
As a modern ideal, democracy rests on the premise of equal voice and represen-
tation in governance. A true democracy is a system in which human rights are 
universally respected, all people have an equal opportunity to participate fully, and 
elected leaders are accountable to all of their constituents.
The history of democracies, however, is one of exclusion, with broad classes of 
people barred from full participation or citizenship on the basis of race/ethnicity, 
gender, socioeconomic status, and other characteristics. In ancient Greece, often 
hailed as the world’s first democracy, only free men could vote; women, slaves, 
and foreigners, who were not considered citizens, were denied the franchise. In 
the United States, the 1789 constitution defined African slaves as less than human 
through the Three-Fifths Compromise, while permitting states to restrict voting 
rights to white, male property owners.141 In France, the Declaration of the Rights 
of Man and of the Citizen, a precursor to the constitution that proclaimed “liberté, 
egalité, fraternité,” banned slavery in France—but did not explicitly extend its com-
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And throughout Latin America, during the nineteenth-century independence 
movements, women and slaves were excluded from political citizenship.143
Since the mid-twentieth century, the world has made remarkable progress on 
addressing racial discrimination through constitutions and courts. Constitutional 
reforms catalyzed progress on racial justice in many nations, and often served as 
a point of transition for countries seeking to inaugurate a new era of civil rights. 
In many of these, including South Africa, Brazil, and Colombia, inclusive drafting 
processes that involved historically marginalized racial and ethnic groups were 
critical to establishing and leveraging new guarantees of racial equality to have 
broader impacts.144 While transformative constitutional protections were also 
introduced in landmark court rulings, these were more vulnerable to regress.
Still, nearly a quarter of constitutions include no explicit protections against 
discrimination on the basis of race/ethnicity. Many more are silent on indirect 
discrimination, which can shape racial disparities in outcomes even in the absence 
of conscious discriminatory intent. Fewer than one in five explicitly allow the gov-
ernment to take affirmative steps to advance equality, while only a handful of con-
stitutions specifically address segregation, despite growing research evidence that 
living, learning, and working alongside members of other racial or ethnic groups 
helps reduce bias.145 Given the overwhelming evidence that racism continues to 
harm individuals, families, and societies all over the world, it is clear that more 
concerted efforts are needed.
Yet although discrimination persists and even the most celebrated rulings 
face implementation challenges, it is important to note that norm shifts related 
to racial/ethnic equality have happened, both at the global level and in individual 
countries. As in other areas, cases and constitutional reforms sometimes change 
before norms, rather than after. Even when popular opinion narrowly supports 
a court finding, the constitutional case and changes it leads to may contribute to 
further reductions in bias.
Over the past few years, we have witnessed the troubling resurgence of more 
overt racism across countries, as well as the demonstrated vulnerability of democ-
racies. Against this backdrop, the foundational role of constitutions in protecting 
rights for everyone is all the more important. In the decades to come, continuing 
to develop more representative schools, workplaces, and societies—and eliminat-
ing discrimination in all its forms—will be key to moving toward a world where 
race and ethnicity genuinely have no bearing on health, opportunity, resources, or 
full social, economic, and political participation.
45
3
Why Addressing Gender 
Is Foundational
Legally perpetuated gender inequality has been pervasive globally for millennia. 
Women have been excluded by law from property ownership, professions, and 
political participation. Only for slightly over a century have women been allowed to 
vote—finally gaining this fundamental right first in 1893 in New Zealand and only in 
2011 in Saudi Arabia.1 Women’s social and economic rights, and their full realization, 
lag far behind men’s. In all countries but one, the average woman still earns less than 
the average man,2 104 countries have legal barriers to women’s employment in spe-
cific jobs,3 and one-third of the world’s countries lack laws against workplace sexual 
harassment.4 In every society, gender-based violence continues to inhibit women’s 
ability to move freely through the world and exercise other fundamental rights and 
devastating loopholes undermine rape prosecutions in far too many nations.5
Gender-based discrimination remains the form of discrimination that affects 
the most individuals globally, impacting nearly every household. Gender discrim-
ination cuts across social class, race/ethnicity, and religion; leaves marginalized 
groups of women further behind; and leaves women in nearly all groups less likely 
to have an equal voice, decision-making roles, or opportunities for equal resources.
To address inequality, we must first understand where and how discrimination 
occurs, as well as the extent to which constitutions and laws can address each type 
of discrimination. In the case of gender, inequality is fueled by
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• Discrimination embedded in laws and government policies. Examples include 
laws that historically prohibited women from voting, continue to bar women 
from certain professions, or limit women’s freedom of movement. Laws that 
differentiate on the basis of sex, in ways that perpetuate inequity rather than 
redress past inequality, embody and further discrimination. In 80% of countries, 
inequalities in labor/social security laws limit whether all people regardless of 
sex or gender have equal opportunities to perform the same jobs, work under 
the same conditions, take paid leave for infant care, or retire at the same age.6
• Governments’ failure to prohibit common discriminatory practices. For example, 
when governments neglect to legally prohibit workplace sexual harassment 
or gender discrimination in employment, they facilitate abuse, unequal pay, 
and disparities in hiring and firing. One-quarter of countries do not explicitly 
prohibit gender discrimination in either hiring or terminations, and nearly half 
fail to explicitly guarantee women equal pay for work of equal value.7 Similarly, 
nearly half fail to prohibit discrimination in decisions regarding promotion 
or advancement.8
• Policies and rules of private institutions that create unequal opportunities in 
education, civic participation, and other spheres. Private institutions that exclude 
individuals based on gender, including some schools and social/political orga-
nizations, are engaging in direct discrimination. Such private policies’ impact 
is magnified when these institutions provide entry points for opportunities to 
participate or assume leadership roles in education, the economy, government, 
or politics.
• Individual actions, taken on behalf of institutions, that are systematically dis-
criminatory—even when policies are not. Extensive evidence has demonstrated 
that individual action can increase disparities. For example, studies in which 
prospective employers receive resumes that are identical aside from applicants’ 
names have revealed systematic gender discrimination; men receive more 
interview invitations than women.9 While institutions’ advertisements may not 
specify that jobs are restricted on the basis of gender, individuals’ implementa-
tion of searches can be heavily biased.
• Laws that regulate interpersonal relations in ways that limit equal rights and 
shared decision-making. Examples include laws that treat men and women 
differently with respect to rights in marriage or divorce, the ability to make 
decisions on their children’s behalf, or the ability to confer citizenship to 
family members.10
Sustainable change requires challenging inequalities in constitutional rights, 
laws and policies, programs and services, and norms. While change at every 
level of government is greatly needed, constitutions often provide the strongest 
foundation for countering discrimination and unequal treatment of men and 
women by governments, public institutions, and laws governing civic space. 
Depending on the details of their provisions and implementation, constitutions 
can also reduce discrimination in private institutions and advance equality in 
private relations.
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C ONSTITUTIONS’  ABILIT Y TO ADDRESS L AWS AND 
POLICIES FUELING GENDER INEQUALIT Y
Around the world, both individual women and civil society groups have 
employed their constitutions’ equal rights protections to challenge the types 
of discrimination described above. These efforts have yielded remarkable vic-
tories, including court decisions affirming women’s right to confer citizenship 
in Botswana, ending a prohibition on married women’s property ownership in 
Swaziland, and invalidating the exclusion of female applicants for a position in 
Kuwait’s Justice Ministry.11
In Zimbabwe and Nepal, women have leveraged their constitutions over the 
past two decades to challenge some of the discrimination women face at the 
intersection of their public and private lives. From laws permitting girls to be 
married as children to legal exceptions for marital rape, these cases reveal the 
consequences of unequal treatment by governments for both public opportuni-
ties and relationships within families. Further, the courts’ demonstrated capacity 
to address these different types of discrimination underscores the role constitu-
tions can play in dismantling gender inequality in all spheres, provided they are 
well designed.
Zimbabwe: Addressing Gender Discrimination Embedded in 
Child Marriage Legislation
In 2013, 95% of Zimbabwean voters approved a new constitution containing 
strengthened provisions on gender equality, including overall equal rights guaran-
tees, specific protections of women’s social and economic rights, and recognition 
of “gender equality” as a founding principle.12 A recent case on child marriage 
illustrates how these provisions have provided tools for changing laws and chal-
lenging private decisions that have discriminatory impacts.
As of 2014, the rate of child marriage among girls in Zimbabwe was 34%.13 That 
year, two of these girls, Loveness Mudzuru and Ruvimbo Tsopodzi, now young 
women, challenged Zimbabwe’s minimum marriage age law, which permitted girls 
to be married at 16—two years earlier than boys. The disparity, the women argued, 
amounted to discrimination violating Article 81 of the constitution, which estab-
lished that “every boy and girl under the age of eighteen years, has the right to 
equal treatment before the law.”
The Constitutional Court agreed, citing both Article 81 and Zimbabwe’s com-
mitments to gender equality under the U.N. Convention on the Elimination of All 
forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) and the U.N. Convention on 
the Rights of the Child. Tendai Biti, the young women’s lawyer, remarked on the 
victory’s significance: “Parliament should have done this many years ago. They had 
over 36 years to do it; they did not do it. So it has taken a bold decision from a bold 
court to do this.”14
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While changing laws is only the first step in eliminating child marriage—and 
while the age of marriage law has yet to be amended as of this writing—Zimba-
bwe’s example shows how establishing gender equality as a fundamental constitu-
tional principle can provide the foundation for ending discriminatory legislation, 
even when the legislature has been slow to act. Since the Zimbabwe case, a Tanza-
nian high court delivered a similar ruling declaring its child marriage legislation, 
and specifically legal disparities in the minimum age, unconstitutional.15
Nepal: Reforming Laws to Support Greater Equality in 
Private Relationships
As illustrated by Zimbabwe, constitutions have proven to be critical tools in coun-
tering discriminatory legislation, including unequal child marriage laws, which 
undermine girls’ opportunities and facilitate relationships that are often marked 
by abuse.16 Yet legal inequalities can persist even when both partners enter into 
marriage as fully consenting adults.
Although legislation prohibiting sexual violence has strengthened in recent 
decades, many countries’ laws provide inadequate protection against rape by peo-
ple known to the victims, in general, and marital rape in particular. A 2017 Equal-
ity Now report found that marital rape was expressly legal in 12% of the countries 
studied.17 Starkly underreported and rarely prosecuted, marital rape remains a 
form of domestic violence that has too long left women with little legal recourse.
In Nepal, the Forum for Women in Law and Development (FWLD), a national 
NGO, challenged the exception for marital rape on the basis of women’s equal 
rights in the constitution. In its decision, Nepal’s Supreme Court cited not only 
the constitution’s equality guarantee but also Nepal’s CEDAW commitments, spe-
cifically referencing CEDAW’s expansive definition of sex discrimination: “any 
distinction, exclusion or restriction made on the basis of sex which has the effect 
or purpose of impairing or nullifying the recognition, enjoyment or exercise by 
women, irrespective of their marital status, on a basis of equality of men and 
women, of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, 
social, culture, civil or any other field.” Moreover, the Court refuted the state’s 
claim that a consent requirement in marriage was incompatible with Hinduism, or 
that “marriage is a permanent consent expressed to have sexual relations.”18 Draw-
ing on both the constitution and Nepal’s international commitments, the Court 
pronounced that “[t]here is no justification in differentiating between women who 
are wives and other women,” and called on the legislature to “define marital rape 
. . . as a criminal offence.”19
Advocates recognized the victory’s importance, but acknowledged that it 
was just one of the steps needed to end violence against women. According to 
Sapana Pradhan Malla, FWLD president and a lawyer who worked on the case, 
“[r]ecognizing rape within marriage as a crime is the first step. The second step 
is to amend the law and to get it passed in parliament. Third, enforcement and 
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awareness measures have to be put in place to create an environment for victims 
to come forward.”20
The second step was soon realized. In 2006, the Nepalese Parliament passed the 
Gender Equality Act, which criminalized marital rape. Yet when women began 
using the law, Pradhan Malla noticed that their husbands received remarkably 
light sentences compared to others found guilty of rape.21 Through another case 
in 2008, she challenged the disparity, which had actually been written into the 
Gender Equality Act—and won. The Court held that “there is no rationality in dif-
ferentiating between marital and non-marital rape,” effectively abolishing distinc-
tions in punishment for different types of perpetrators.22
While challenges continue in order to ensure that new rape laws are imple-
mented and that women can access the supports needed to leave violent relation-
ships, FWLD’s work in Nepal shows how constitutional equality guarantees can 
help dismantle discriminatory legislation and support women’s equal rights in 
both the public and private spheres. More recently, FWLD has taken on gender 
inequalities in inheritance law.
Yet there have also been setbacks, including a new constitution, enacted in 2015, 
that prohibits women from passing on citizenship to their children independently 
of men.23 Women’s groups throughout Nepal have vowed to continue pushing for 
change—including a constitutional amendment—to ensure that the principle of 
gender equality is fully realized.24
ADVANCING GENDER EQUALIT Y IN C ONSTITUTIONS
As demonstrated in Nepal, Zimbabwe, and numerous other countries, guarantee-
ing gender equality in constitutions can have, and has had, significant tangible 
impacts—from strengthening women’s protection from violence to removing 
barriers to women’s employment. And importantly, these reforms’ benefits are 
not limited to women. Removing obstacles to women’s full participation in soci-
ety creates gains that extend across all people, families, communities, and entire 
economies. As discussed in depth toward the end of this chapter, using the law to 
counter gender stereotypes can broaden opportunities for everyone. So how many 
countries enshrine this value in their fundamental documents? And are equal 
rights provisions designed such that they can reach gender discrimination in the 
public sphere, private institutions, and the family alike?
Building a Universal Foundation: Gender Equality Provisions 
Governing State Action
The overwhelming majority of constitutions (85%) explicitly guarantee gender 
equality, most often by prohibiting formal discrimination by the state and/or guar-
anteeing equal rights regardless of sex or gender (see Map 5). For example, Spain’s 
constitution provides that “Spaniards are equal before the law and may not in any 
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way be discriminated against on account of . . . sex.”25 Similarly, Eritrea’s constitu-
tion provides: “1. All persons are equal under the law. 2. No person may be dis-
criminated against on account of . . . gender.”26
Additionally, 5% of constitutions address indirect discrimination on the basis 
of sex, providing a tool for challenging laws and policies that are not explicitly 
discriminatory but have discriminatory effects. For example, Cyprus’s constitution 
provides: “Every person shall enjoy all the rights and liberties provided for in this 
Constitution without any direct or indirect discrimination against any person on 
the ground of . . . sex.”27
Gender equality has figured centrally in a range of recent constitutional reform 
processes. For example, Tunisia’s 2014 constitution, adopted three years post-
revolution, guaranteed equal rights for men and women—in a first for both the 
country and the region. “This article is a revolution in itself,” said Lobna Jeribi, a 
scientist and member of the constituent assembly created to chart the country’s 
path forward. “It’s a big, historic step, not only for Tunisian women.”28
When the constitution passed, similar reactions reverberated throughout the 
streets, social media, and the legislature itself, where the gender equality provi-
sions had been hotly debated. For assembly vice president Meherzia Labidi, who 
had campaigned for the new protection despite resistance in the religious political 
party she represented, the gender equality provision was “one of the articles in the 
constitution that I am most proud of.”29 The gender equality articles also included 
a requirement to work toward gender parity in elected bodies.30 In the years since, 
more equal political representation has followed. Thanks to a 2014 local elections 
law establishing more specific measures to advance gender parity, Tunisia’s 2018 
municipal elections marked the country’s first election with equal numbers of 
male and female candidates; women ultimately won 47.7% of seats.31
All constitutions adopted in 2000–2017, including Tunisia’s, include explicit 
gender equality guarantees—a notable change from the constitutions of a century 
No specific provision
Equality guaranteed, 
not specific to sex or gender
Aspirational provision
Guaranteed right
MAP 5. Does the constitution explicitly guarantee equality or non-discrimination 
across ex and/or gender?
MAP 5. Does the constitution explicitly guarantee equality or nondiscrimination across sex 
and/or gender?
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ago (see Figure 3). Although only a first step toward realizing gender equality in 
practice, such guarantees signal a critical commitment to protecting equal rights 
and provide mechanisms for challenging discriminatory barriers.
Reducing Discrimination in the Private Sector
Today, private institutions are increasingly playing a role in providing traditionally 
public services, including healthcare and education, that are essential to the fulfill-
ment of other fundamental human rights.32 If private institutions providing these 
services are exempt from constitutional restraints, then “the protective umbrella 
of the concept of a private sphere prevents them from being held accountable 
for their action,” drastically weakening guarantees of fundamental rights and 
nondiscrimination.33
Moreover, private institutions play larger roles than ever in countries’ econo-
mies, directly impacting the ability of individuals to earn income and meet basic 
needs. Consequently, private-sector discrimination is a critical concern for the 
well-being of all groups included in this book. Gender discrimination in private-
sector workplaces—whether during hiring processes or in decisions about pay and 
promotions—can starkly undermine women’s ability to support themselves and 
exercise other fundamental rights.
While prohibiting direct discrimination by state actors is essential—and the 
original role of constitutional equal rights clauses—these protections reach only 
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FIGURE 3. Explicit constitutional guarantee of equality or nondiscrimination across sex and/or 
gender by year of constitutional adoption
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marginalized groups, globally. Discrimination in the private sphere, whether by 
service providers, employers, or landlords, can profoundly affect women’s live-
lihoods and exercise of other rights. Can constitutions effectively address these 
forms of discrimination?
Zimbabwe: Pregnancy Discrimination in Private Schools
In Zimbabwe, a 1999 case illustrates the importance of addressing discrimination 
by private service providers—as well as the limitations of constitutions that do not 
clearly articulate their ability to reach these institutions.
Twenty-one-year-old Enita Mandizvidza had just gotten married and was pre-
paring to finish her third and final year at Morgenster Teachers’ Training College 
in Masvingo, Zimbabwe. But when Mandizvidza got pregnant, the school’s princi-
pal declared that she would be expelled as a consequence.34 She would no longer be 
able to take her fall exams and would have to put her career goals on hold.
Mandizvidza’s expulsion hinged on a contract that students were required to 
sign upon enrolling at the college, a private school operated by the Reformed 
Church.35 One provision read: “I understand that I will be withdrawn from the 
course when I fall pregnant or am involved in causing the pregnancy of another 
student or pupil.”36 Like other new students, Mandizvidza had signed. Yet when 
it became the basis for her expulsion, she questioned how the contract could be 
compatible with gender equality.
Shortly after being forced to sign a letter of resignation, Mandizvidza took 
her case to Zimbabwe’s High Court, where she challenged the school’s action as 
unconstitutional gender discrimination—and prevailed.37 However, the school 
appealed, arguing that because it was a private institution, the constitution’s pro-
tections against discrimination did not apply.
In 2002, the Supreme Court ruled on the case. As the Court explained, the con-
stitution then in place explicitly protected only against discrimination by a “public 
authority.” In some cases, the Court noted, this could include private institutions 
providing traditionally public services like education—but only where the state 
exercised some control over their operations. However, the Court found that was 
not the case for Mandizvidza’s school: although the government provided some 
funding, it was “not responsible for, nor d[id] it have control of, the education at 
the college.”
Nevertheless, the Court cited precedents establishing its authority to declare 
a contract “contrary to public policy.” Using this legal basis, the Supreme Court 
invalidated the contract, finding that its expulsion provision had broad conse-
quences and created double standards for male and female students: “It punishes 
the married woman who falls pregnant. It does not punish the male student 
who has extra-marital sex with a non-student, even if she becomes pregnant 
as a consequence.”38 Through this contract law rationale, Mandizvidza’s case 
was ultimately resolved in her favor. At the same time, the Court noted that its 
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authority to void contracts could only “be exercised sparingly and only in the 
clearest of cases.”
Ensuring that constitutional protections can reach discrimination within pri-
vate education and employment is critical for the full, consistent realization of 
equal rights. Moreover, cases from other countries indicate that pregnancy dis-
crimination—a form of gender discrimination discussed in more detail toward the 
end of this chapter—remains common, particularly in schools and workplaces.39
Across Contexts: Constitutional Approaches to Reaching Private-Sector Gender 
Discrimination
The application of constitutional rights to private actors is an emerging issue 
worldwide. As understandings of constitutions and the “public/private divide” 
shift, courts are increasingly applying constitutional values to cases between pri-
vate parties even when constitutional provisions are not directly applicable against 
private actors.40
For example, Colombia’s constitution broadly provides that “[w]omen cannot 
be subjected to any type of discrimination,” which the Constitutional Court has 
interpreted to prohibit discrimination by both the state and private employers. 
This interpretation has yielded rulings expanding protection against private sec-
tor pregnancy discrimination and affirming a pilot’s right to health coverage for 
her miscarriage.41 The broad scope of Colombia’s gender discrimination provision 
is further bolstered by the acción de tutela, a unique legal mechanism that allows 
individuals to approach the Constitutional Court with a claim against a private 
party that is directly threatening their fundamental rights, provided they are in a 
subordinate position to the defendant and have no other remedies.42 (We discuss 
the tutela in more detail in later chapters.)
Countries have also already shown that constitutions can more directly prohibit 
discrimination in private workplaces. For example, Bolivia’s constitution declares: 
“The State shall promote the incorporation of women into the workforce and shall 
guarantee them the same remuneration as men for work of equal value, both in the 
public and private arena.”43
In other countries, constitutions have begun to address discrimination by pri-
vate actors beyond the workplace. For example, Chad’s constitution provides: “The 
state assures to all equality before the law, without distinction of .  .  . sex .  .  . . It 
has the duty to see to the elimination of all forms of discrimination with regard 
to women and to assure the protection of their rights in all areas of private and 
public life.”44
Likewise, Equatorial Guinea’s constitution provides that every citizen enjoys 
equality before the law, further clarifying that “[t]he woman, whatever her civil 
status may be, has equal rights and opportunities as the man in all the orders of 
public, private, and family life, [and] in civil, political, economic, social, and cul-
tural [life].”45
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Equal Rights within the Family and Reproductive Health
One area of private life that deserves special attention is the family. As the intro-
ductory cases illustrated, laws and policies establish legal rights within marriages 
and other partnerships. These include the ability to enter and exit marriage and 
rights within marriage, as individuals and with respect to pregnancy and chil-
dren. As a matter of justice, these rules must treat all parties equally and fairly. The 
impacts of unfair rules on individual women, their children, and broader society 
can be profound.
Constitutional provisions establishing equal rights in the family can provide a 
foundation for overturning discriminatory family laws and marital practices. For 
example, Uganda’s Supreme Court ruled in 2015 that a customary law require-
ment that women refund their “bride price” upon divorce was unconstitutional. 
In Uganda, a bride price, similar to a dowry, is a pre-marriage transfer of livestock 
or other assets from the groom to the bride’s family. In 2007, Mifumi, a Uganda-
based international women’s rights group, initiated a challenge to the bride price.46 
In addition to arguing that the bride price itself was discriminatory and treated 
women like property, Mifumi alleged that the requirement that it be refunded 
upon a marriage’s dissolution compelled women to stay in violent relationships—
an assertion supported by research and women’s personal accounts.47
When the case finally reached the Supreme Court in 2015, Justice Jotham Tum-
wesigye ruled that “the custom and practice of demand for refund of bride price 
after the break down of a customary marriage is unconstitutional as it violates 
Article 31(1)(b) of the Constitution,”48 which provides that men and women “are 
entitled to equal rights in marriage, during marriage and at its dissolution.” While 
the Court stopped short of declaring the bride price itself unconstitutional, wom-
en’s rights advocates viewed the ruling on refundability as a major blow against 
the practice.49
Equal Rights in the Family: Current Constitutional Approaches
Globally, only one-quarter of constitutions guarantee equal rights within or while 
entering and exiting marriage (see Map 6). Just 6% comprehensively protect equal-
ity at each stage: entering, exiting, and within marriage. Armenia’s constitution, 
for instance, provides that men and women “are entitled to equal rights as to mar-
riage, during marriage and divorce,” while Ecuador establishes that marriage is 
based on “equality of rights, obligations and legal capacity.”50
Reproductive Rights in Constitutions
Finally, constitutional protections for women’s reproductive rights both are vital in 
themselves and can importantly complement protections of women’s equal rights 
as individuals and within relationships, as family planning influences women’s 
broader realization of their rights. Insufficient access to reproductive healthcare 
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imperils many women’s health, autonomy, and educational and economic pros-
pects. Constitutions can provide stronger protections both by explicitly establish-
ing equal rights to health regardless of sex or gender, and by specifically refer-
encing reproductive and maternal health. For example, Nepal’s 2015 constitution 
establishes: “Every woman shall have the right to safe motherhood and reproduc-
tive health,” and the Supreme Court’s interpretation of a similar provision in the 
2007 interim constitution encompassed a broad range of reproductive and mater-
nal health rights.51
In some countries, these provisions have provided bases for challenging legisla-
tion restricting reproductive rights. For example, in 2006, Colombia’s Constitu-
tional Court ruled that the country’s complete ban on abortion violated women’s 
constitutional right to health, and decriminalized the termination of pregnancies 
in limited circumstances. In so doing, the Court held that the protection of prenatal 
life, while a constitutional value, could not take “absolute privilege” over women’s 
fundamental rights to health, dignity, and autonomy.52 While advocates continue 
to push for more comprehensive reproductive rights in Colombia and throughout 
Latin America, the 2006 ruling represented a significant step forward.53
The rights to physical health, mental health, and bodily autonomy are funda-
mental, universal human rights.54 Ensuring women are the decision-makers when 
it comes to their own reproductive health is critical to both protecting these rights 
and laying a foundation for gender equality. While few constitutions currently 
address reproductive rights in detail, at a time when up to 13.2% of maternal deaths 
each year are attributable to unsafe abortion,55 strengthening legal protections for 
women’s decision-making regarding their own medical care should be a priority 
for equal rights and public health.
May be limited
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MAP 6. Does the constitution explicitly protect women's right to equality in marriage 
in all aspects including entering, exiting, and within marriage?
MAP 6. Does the constitution explicitly protect women’s right to equality in marriage in all 
aspects including entering, exiting, and within marriage?
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ADVANCING GENDER EQUALIT Y WITHOUT 
CLEAR EQUAL RIGHT S
Progress on women’s equal rights in constitutions over the past century has 
been remarkable—yet 15% of countries, home to 404 million women, have yet to 
include specific language in their constitutions.56 In these countries, identifying 
other strategies to advance women’s rights, while continuing to push for clear pro-
tections in the text, can be important for accelerating progress. The United States 
provides an example.
United States: A Long Road to Women’s Equal Rights
The U.S. guarantees equal rights in broad language, but not explicitly on the basis 
of sex or gender. According to the Fourteenth Amendment, ratified in 1868, “[n]o 
State shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process 
of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the 
laws.” In the absence of explicit text, eliciting constitutional protections of women’s 
rights has been an uphill, decades-long battle premised on incremental victories 
at the Supreme Court.
While the Nineteenth Amendment extended the right to vote to American 
women in 1920, it was not until a series of cases in the 1970s, many argued by 
future Supreme Court Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, that the constitution’s scope 
of protection for gender equality more broadly took shape. Some of the first cases 
strategically approached the subject from the perspective of a disadvantaged man, 
such as the widowed husband who could not access survivor benefits without 
proving his financial dependence on his late wife, whereas hers was presumed.57 
In fact, male plaintiffs brought over two-thirds of the gender equality cases argued 
before the Supreme Court between 1971 and 1984, the key period during which the 
Court’s gender equality jurisprudence developed.58
Yet although Justice Ginsburg’s focus on male plaintiffs may have been more 
strategic than ideological, some early discrimination cases following this model 
clearly illustrated how gender stereotypes can limit opportunities for both men 
and women. For example, in a 1982 case, a male applicant to a women-only 
nursing school established in 1884 challenged the admissions criteria as vio-
lating the Equal Protection Clause. Although the school claimed that limiting 
admission to women constituted affirmative action, the Court, in a decision 
authored by its first female justice, Sandra Day O’Connor, disagreed, especially 
since the gender restriction “tends to perpetuate the stereotyped view of nurs-
ing as an exclusively women’s job.”59 Despite maintaining the name “Mississippi 
University for Women,” men now comprise nearly 10% of the university’s nurs-
ing school students.60
Over time, these cases emanating from the constitution’s general equality 
provision—the Equal Protection Clause—established a precedent holding that 
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discrimination against women was unconstitutional unless the government 
could prove the discriminatory law was “substantially related” to an “important 
government interest.” This “intermediate scrutiny” assessment of constitution-
ality would prove unique, falling between the “strict scrutiny” test applied to 
racial classifications and the “rational basis” test used to assess restrictions on 
rights for groups that do not currently receive special protection under the law 
(see Figure 4).
While the victories achieved for women under the Equal Protection Clause 
have been critical, the path toward their realization has been needlessly tortuous 
and even controversial.61
•Law or policy must be "narrowly tailored"
to achieve a "compelling governmental
interest"
•Applies to distinctions on the basis of
race, national origin, religion, and some
relating to citizenship
Strict Scrutiny
•Law or policy must be "substantially
related" to an "important governmental
interest"




•Law or policy must be "rationally related"
to a "legitimate governmental interest"
•Applies to distinctions on the basis of
disability, socioeconomic status, age,
sexual orientation,* and others not listed
above
Rational Basis
*The U.S. Supreme Court has remained vague about the 
standard of review for sexual orientation discrimination, 
but most courts have only applied rational basis.
FIGURE 4. Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment: current standards of review.
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Older Constitutions and Newer Rights
As a practical matter, one reason the U.S. Constitution does not include a gender 
equality guarantee is that in addition to being one of the world’s oldest consti-
tutions, it is particularly difficult to amend; although the U.S. Congress actually 
voted to adopt an Equal Rights Amendment (ERA) in the early 1970s, by 1982, it 
had failed to attain the required ratification by at least 38 of the 50 states. Recently, 
however, a revived movement to ratify the ERA has achieved some important vic-
tories: in 2017, Nevada became the 36th state to ratify the ERA, followed by Illinois 
in 2018. While legal scholars debate the feasibility of enacting the ERA after the 
initial deadline, some argue that the U.S. is just one state vote away from a consti-
tutional amendment generations in the making.
As this example suggests, while the difficulty of amending most constitutions 
makes them especially powerful instruments for establishing enduring protec-
tions of rights, it also creates hurdles to enacting new equality protections that 
were not included initially. Still, some countries with older constitutions have suc-
cessfully adopted amendments to protect women’s rights and keep up with global 
norms. For example, Luxembourg amended its 1868 constitution in 2006 to affirm 
that “[w]omen and men are equal in rights and duties,” and that “[t]he State must 
actively promote the elimination of any existing obstacles to equality between 
women and men.”62
DESIGNING PROTECTIONS FOR WOMEN’S 
EQUAL RIGHT S:  IMPORTANT GAPS AND MORE 
DIFFICULT QUESTIONS
The fact that 85% of constitutions now include language specifically protecting 
women’s equal rights attests that striving for gender equality has become a global 
norm. Nevertheless, the global extent of disparities indicates that existing protec-
tions have not sufficed to inaugurate a new era for equal rights and opportunities.
In some countries, courts’ narrow interpretations of gender equality provisions 
have limited their potential for impact. For example, “sex discrimination” has not 
always been interpreted to fully cover pregnancy discrimination; especially given 
how few constitutions currently address indirect gender discrimination, these nar-
row readings have significant potential consequences. Other countries, attempting 
to recognize the disproportionate role women continue to play in caregiving, have 
tacitly endorsed unequal gender norms by treating gendered divisions of house-
hold labor as natural.
Further, historically, both constitutional texts and case law have often taken nar-
row, binary approaches to sex and gender, or have framed gender equality solely in 
terms of women. To advance transformative change, constitutions and the people 
who enforce them must take a broad view of gender equality that acknowledges 
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the many ways restrictive gender norms not only limit women’s opportunities, but 
also foster discrimination against men who do not adhere to narrow expectations 
about masculinity, as well as sex and gender minorities.
The way that constitutions are drafted can help ensure courts and legislatures 
address gender equality more effectively and comprehensively. Below, we examine 
a few key choices likely to make a difference.
Questions of Language: Sex vs. Gender
One choice for constitution drafters is whether to prohibit discrimination on the 
basis of gender or of sex. Put simply, sex refers to biological differences, while 
gender refers to the roles, responsibilities, and characteristics typically associated 
with being male or female in a particular cultural context.63 Gender norms are the 
unspoken “rules” about what behaviors and attributes are deemed acceptable and 
valuable for men and women, respectively.64
Evidence shows that while sex discrimination remains rampant, discrimination 
against people who do not align with gender-normative expectations is similarly 
widespread and damaging. For example, in workplaces, while “assertive” behavior 
by men is generally viewed favorably, assertive women are viewed as less compe-
tent.65 Meanwhile, men who are perceived as more sensitive or “nurturing”—char-
acteristics aligning with feminine rather than masculine stereotypes—are viewed 
as lacking leadership skills.66
These expectations also shape individuals’ access to employment opportuni-
ties. Violating unspoken “rules” about gender can lead to backlash and discrimi-
nation in hiring.67 Additionally, widespread perceptions of certain jobs as tradi-
tionally “male” or “female” can exacerbate occupational gender segregation, and 
discourage people from entering fields where they would be a distinct minority. 
For example, on average, just 6% of the world’s early childhood education teachers 
are male.68
Addressing both sex and gender is one way that constitutions can acknowledge 
how stereotypes and culturally defined expectations about what it means to be a 
man or a woman can contribute to discrimination, and limit opportunities for all 
people at home, at work, and within the political sphere.
Among countries guaranteeing equal rights, most list “sex” as the relevant pro-
tected category in their equality provisions; a smaller number use “gender.” In a 
few countries, such as Fiji, Guyana, South Africa, and Zimbabwe, both “sex” and 
“gender” are included as prohibited grounds of discrimination. (In chapter 6, we 
look separately at protections for “gender identity.”)
Countries also vary in whether they use a “symmetrical” approach or specifi-
cally frame women’s equal rights in relation to men’s. Five countries protect gen-
der equality only within the framework of ensuring women’s rights. For example, 
France’s constitution provides: “The law guarantees women equal rights to those of 
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men in all spheres.”69 Likewise, China’s constitution states: “Women in the People’s 
Republic of China enjoy equal rights with men in all spheres of life, in political, 
economic, cultural, social and family life.”70 This “asymmetrical” approach, while 
importantly protecting women’s basic rights, establishes men’s rights as the base-
line, rather than recognizing and guarding against the range of ways that gender 
stereotypes can hurt women, men, and gender minorities alike.71
Ultimately, fulfilling equal rights requires addressing both sex and gender dis-
crimination, and dismantling discriminatory norms that limit opportunities for 
everyone. However, doing so may require different approaches in different con-
texts. While a small subset of constitutions now directly address both sex and 
gender in the text, this strategy may be less straightforward in some countries; 
in Arabic, the words “sex” and “gender” are typically the same (سنج), which helps 
explain why different English translations of Arabic constitutions sometimes use 
different terms for the same article.72 In Bahasa, the national language of Malaysia, 
there is no word for “gender.”73 Further, for the many countries whose constitu-
tions prohibit only “sex” discrimination, the odds of passing an amendment to add 
“gender” may be quite low, given the general procedural barriers to constitutional 
amendment and the political mobilization required.
Within courts, justices have not consistently held that protections against 
sex discrimination extend to laws or policies prescribing adherence to gendered 
expectations, including dress- or appearance-related conventions.74 For example, 
in 1977, the U.K. Employment Appeal Tribunal held that a bookshop’s prohibi-
tion of female employees wearing pants did not amount to sex discrimination;75 
two decades later, it confirmed this precedent in ruling against a male delica-
tessen worker who was fired for having a ponytail, when no such restriction 
applied to female employees.76 Likewise, in 1991, Germany’s Constitutional Court 
ruled that an employer’s prohibition on men wearing earrings did not amount to 
sex discrimination.77
Protections against gender discrimination are important for providing legal 
recourse for discrimination based on gendered expectations not only about 
appearance, but also about behavior. As noted earlier, studies have shown that 
women and men are evaluated differently based on the same qualities, depend-
ing on whether those qualities align with or diverge from gendered expectations 
about demeanor. Prohibiting sex discrimination alone may be insufficient to 
address these forms of conscious and unconscious bias. For example, if a min-
ing company consistently prefers male over female candidates, but refuses to hire 
more soft-spoken or seemingly “gentle” men who are nevertheless well qualified 
for the job, then both sex discrimination and gender discrimination are tak-
ing place. Wherever possible, enacting more comprehensive provisions would 
strengthen the protective potential of constitutional text and other laws. Beyond 
improving constitutions through explicit protections, urging courts to adopt an 
expansive interpretation of “sex discrimination” encompassing both physical traits 
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and gendered social expectations is essential to comprehensive protections from 
discrimination.78 Ultimately, the more comprehensive the text, the better the odds 
it will consistently provide protection of equal rights for all people.
Questions of Impact: Accounting for Real Differences without 
Sanctioning Discrimination
A critical question is how to design constitutions enabling courts to address dis-
crimination based on genuine intergroup differences, such as women’s unique 
experiences with pregnancy, without opening the door for wider discrimination.
There is great strength in explicitly prohibiting discrimination on the basis of 
pregnancy and marital or family status, as well as gender. Discrimination on the 
basis of women’s expected roles in families accounts for a significant share of gen-
der discrimination in education, work, the political sphere, and elsewhere. While 
the share of countries explicitly limiting women’s rights once they marry or have 
children has declined, discriminatory practices continue. For example, in Spain, 
a top airline came under scrutiny in 2017 for requiring female job applicants to 
take pregnancy tests;79 in Honduras, female factory workers have reported similar 
requirements to obtain or keep their jobs,80 as have students simply looking to 
finish their secondary or tertiary education in the Philippines, Tanzania, the U.K., 
and the U.S.81 A 2018 survey of U.K. private-sector employers revealed that one-
third believed it was reasonable to ask a woman during the hiring process about 
her plans to have children; 59% thought a female applicant should have to disclose 
a pregnancy, while 46% thought they should be able to ask whether the woman 
had young children.82
These forms of discrimination remain under-addressed in constitutions. Fur-
thermore, courts have not always found that pregnancy discrimination is fully 
encompassed by existing protections against sex discrimination.83 These gaps in 
protections widen further when taking into account many constitutions’ limited 
application to private employers and schools, as explored earlier in the case of 
Enita Mandizvidza in Zimbabwe.
Overall, just 6% of constitutions include pregnancy as a prohibited ground 
for discrimination. For example, Fiji’s constitution states: “A person must not be 
unfairly discriminated against, directly or indirectly on the grounds of his or her 
. . . sex, gender . . . marital status or pregnancy.”84 Bolivia’s constitution provides: 
“The State prohibits and punishes all forms of discrimination based on sex .  .  . 
[and] pregnancy.”85 Spain’s constitution guarantees that “[t]he public authorities 
. . . ensure full protection of . . . mothers, whatever their marital status.”86
Reproductive-age married women are often subject to discrimination because 
of their anticipated likelihood of pregnancy and caregiving. At least 8% of coun-
tries address equality and nondiscrimination based on marital or civil status. For 
example, Malawi’s constitution states: “Women have the right to full and equal 
protection by the law, and have the right not to be discriminated against on the 
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basis of their gender or marital status.”87 In other countries, marital or civil status is 
commonly included in overall equal rights provisions alongside other prohibited 
grounds of discrimination.
Finally, some countries include language actively promoting the sharing of 
responsibilities between parents. Since the presumption that women will be the 
primary caregivers contributes to discrimination against women in the work-
place and men in family roles, this language represents an important step toward 
shifting norms toward equal opportunities at work and at home for both parents. 
Ecuador’s constitution, for instance, provides that citizens’ duty “to help feed, edu-
cate, and raise one’s children” is a “joint responsibility of mothers and fathers, in 
equal proportion.”88 Similarly, Colombia’s constitution provides: “The state shall 
promote the joint responsibility of both mother and father, and shall monitor ful-
fillment of the mutual duties and rights between mothers, fathers, and children.”89
It is important to recognize that women continue to play disproportionate roles 
in caregiving globally, and to identify how their greater time investment in caring 
for children or older family members can lead to direct and indirect discrimi-
nation. However, laws reinforcing the idea that caregiving is primarily women’s 
responsibility only further entrench this inequality, even when targeting women 
as beneficiaries. Three cases spanning the past 40 years—two from Germany and 
one from South Africa—illustrate some of the ways that courts have navigated 
this balance.
Germany: Legal Approaches to Advancing Gender Equality at Home
In Germany, a 1979 case followed a decade of legal reforms and cases designed to 
shift norms around roles within the family. Most notably, in 1976, the Parliament 
reformed the Civil Code, eliminating a provision that had clearly delineated men’s 
responsibility to earn income and women’s responsibility to manage housework.90 
Three years later, the Constitutional Court declared that a law providing women 
working outside the home with one paid “holiday” each month to do housework 
was unconstitutional, in that men were not offered the same benefit.91 In so doing, 
the Court helped dismantle the expectation that women alone were responsible 
for household upkeep.
In 2011, the Court heard a challenge to a law relevant to family caregiving. In 
the intervening years, the constitution’s equality provision had been amended to 
add language specifically mandating that the government take steps to realize 
gender equality in practice: “Men and women shall have equal rights. The state 
shall promote the actual implementation of equal rights for women and men and 
take steps to eliminate disadvantages that now exist.”92 In the case, a woman who 
had recently given birth contested the structure of Germany’s paid parental leave 
program, which offered each family 12 months of leave, along with two “bonus” 
months if the father took at least two months of the total leave available. In other 
countries that have adopted such incentive structures for their paid leave policies, 
Why Addressing Gender Is Foundational    63
the share of men taking leave has increased, an important step toward shifting 
restrictive gender norms around both work and caregiving.93 The same was true in 
Germany: between the adoption of the provision in 2007 and the end of 2009, the 
share of fathers taking leave grew from 15% to 24%.94
However, the woman challenging the policy argued that she was uniquely 
equipped to provide care for her baby, who had been born prematurely, and 
that therefore she should be able to take both the 12 months available to her and 
the two “bonus” months reserved for couples sharing leave.95 Nevertheless, the 
Court reasoned that fathers still faced significant stigma in taking leave, and that 
invalidating the policy would undermine the constitution’s protections of sub-
stantive gender equality. Finding that it had a “constitutional duty . . . to enforce 
gender equality in social reality and overcome traditional gender roles in the 
future,” the Court dismissed the woman’s challenge and maintained the policy’s 
incentive structure.96
South Africa: When a Ruling Benefiting Women Nevertheless Reinforces Stereotypes
A contrasting decision comes from South Africa. In 1994, President Nelson 
Mandela issued an order to pardon all incarcerated mothers, but not fathers, 
with children under 12. In 1996, John Hugo, an incarcerated single father with 
a 12-year-old son, challenged the order as unconstitutional gender-based dis-
crimination. The lower courts ruled in Hugo’s favor, finding that the “pardon was 
based on the impermissible stereotype that mothers are the primary caretakers 
of children.”97
However, the Constitutional Court reversed in 1997, finding that the order did 
not amount to “unfair discrimination,” given that women did in fact typically play 
a larger role in caregiving than men, and citing the pardon’s widespread benefits 
for the nation’s children.98 Consequently, although the decision acknowledged the 
social reality of women’s disproportionate role in childcare, it also arguably rein-
forced gender stereotypes that have long inhibited men’s participation at home and 
women’s participation at work and in the public sphere. In the Court’s view, how-
ever, the use of a generalization to benefit a group did not raise the same concerns 
as a generalization used to harm.99
Affirmative Measures and “Unfair” Discrimination in Constitutions
Designing constitutions to fully protect gender equality will require language 
enabling governments to undertake positive action to remedy the persisting 
impacts of past discrimination. In chapter 2, we explored the case for affirma-
tive measures, and the importance of constitutional language ensuring that poli-
cies that take into account the impacts of past racial/ethnic discrimination are not 
automatically considered equal rights violations. Given women’s long-standing 
exclusion from institutions and positions of power, affirmative measures are also 
important for gender equality.
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Some countries have approached issues of substantive equality through lan-
guage regarding “fairness.” While potentially allowing for affirmative steps, evalu-
ations of what’s “fair” inevitably raise difficult questions. Prohibiting only “unfair” 
discrimination, which allows courts to distinguish between actions that unjustly 
disadvantage a group and actions designed to advance equality in practice, pro-
vides one constitutional approach to affirmative measures. Yet it also may open 
the door to discrimination.
The term “unfair discrimination” appears in several constitutions adopted over 
the past 25 years. Like South Africa (1996), Zimbabwe (2013) and Fiji (2013) guar-
antee protection from unfair discrimination, further clarifying that discrimina-
tion is presumed “unfair” until established otherwise. Similarly, Albania (1998) 
prohibits “unjust” discrimination, while Finland (1999) prohibits discrimina-
tion “without an acceptable reason.” An additional 8% of countries have provi-
sions explicitly allowing for any “restriction . . . or . . . any privilege or advantage 
that, having regard to its nature and to special circumstances pertaining to those 
persons or to persons of any other such description, is reasonably justifiable in a 
democratic society.”
For gender, questions of what’s “unfair” commonly intersect with how coun-
tries address pregnancy, newborn care, and other family issues often involving 
both genuine biological differences and restrictive gender norms and stereo-
types.100 As demonstrated throughout this chapter, many countries maintain laws 
and policies that reinforce specific gender roles in public and private life—and 
ultimately, while judges aim for objectivity, they are influenced by their own 
countries’ norms, as well as their personal beliefs and experiences. Women also 
remain significantly underrepresented on the highest courts around the world.101 
Against this backdrop, tasking courts with applying a vague, inherently subjective 
standard of “unfair discrimination” could open the door to laws or decisions that 
are either directly discriminatory and disadvantage large groups of women or, as 
demonstrated in Hugo, benefit some women, but in a way that undermines gender 
equality more broadly. This risk is greatest in the absence of explicit prohibitions of 
discrimination on the basis of pregnancy, marital, and family status.
Addressing Gender Equality Loopholes: Constitutional Exceptions for 
Religious and Customary Law
A final way that constitutions can shape equal rights regardless of gender, and spe-
cifically equal rights within the family, is their treatment of religious and custom-
ary law, which are often invoked to argue against equality in families and repro-
ductive health. Some constitutions explicitly provide that religious and customary 
laws can take precedence over the constitution with regard to family matters 
including marriage, divorce, and inheritance. In defending primacy of religious or 
customary law, proponents cite religious freedom (addressed in chapter 5) and the 
right of national self-determination.
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Yet CEDAW (ratified by 189 countries) and other global treaties and agree-
ments—concluded by leaders from every world region with representation from 
across religions, belief systems, and nonbeliefs—are clear that the equal rights of 
women and girls should take legal precedence over discriminatory customary 
or religious practices.102 More recently, UNESCO, which has 193 member states, 
adopted the Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity, which proclaims: “No 
one may invoke cultural diversity to infringe upon human rights guaranteed by 
international law, nor limit their scope.”103
Regional agreements and courts have similarly concluded that equal rights 
across sex and gender should take precedence over customary or religious laws. 
For example, the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights 
on the Rights of Women in Africa, commonly known as the Maputo Protocol, 
provides comprehensive protections for women’s rights in the family, including 
equal rights in marriage, divorce, and inheritance.104 As of March 2019, 36 African 
countries had ratified the protocol, while another 15 had signed; just three had 
neither signed nor ratified.105 In 2018, the African Court on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights (AfCHPR) applied the Maputo Protocol in a case addressing Mali’s Persons 
and Family Code, which allowed girls to be married at 16 (or 15 with her father’s 
consent), and established religious and customary law as the default inheritance 
regime, providing women with only half the inheritance of men.106 Ruling that 
both religious and customary provisions directly violated the protocol, the Court 
ordered the legislature to amend the law.
Similarly, in Europe, regional laws binding all E.U. members—including the 
Equal Treatment Directive of 2000, the Gender Equality Directive of 2006, and 
the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR)—clearly establish that 
equal rights take precedence over discriminatory religious laws or practices, or 
discriminatory applications of religious law. This principle has had important 
implications for gender equality as well as discrimination on other grounds. For 
example, in 2018, the European Court of Human Rights ruled that a Greek court 
had violated the ECHR’s protections against discrimination by applying Islamic 
law to an inheritance case involving Molla Sali, a Muslim widow.107 Sali’s late hus-
band had written up his will according to Greek civil law; nevertheless, after the 
man’s sisters challenged the will’s validity, the Greek court applied Islamic law, 
leaving Sali with a fraction of the inheritance she was entitled to (or intended by 
her husband).108
These global and regional agreements align with the broader principle that the 
arbitrary circumstances of one’s birth—including gender and geography—should 
have no bearing on the applicability of universal rights. Yet the realization of this 
principle, and the global commitments it reflects, requires its enshrinement within 
enforceable domestic laws. As of this writing, in 8% of countries, including 17% in 
sub-Saharan Africa, 13% in East Asia and the Pacific, 10% in the Middle East and 
North Africa, and 12% in South Asia, customary and religious laws are explicitly 
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permitted to prevail over all or some constitutional equality provisions. What are 
the impacts of these provisions, and how have courts and activists successfully 
changed laws permitting discrimination?
Zimbabwe: Reforming the Constitution to Strengthen Women’s Rights
A 1999 case from Zimbabwe’s Supreme Court provides an example of what is at 
risk when customary or religious practices are constitutionally privileged over 
women’s equal rights—as well as the potential for reform.
When Venia Magaya’s father died, a community court ruled that she should 
inherit, as she was his oldest surviving child. But when her younger half-brother 
appealed the decision based on customary law, Venia lost her right to the family 
home where she lived; her brother kicked her out, leaving her to live in a shack. 
Venia appealed, but the Supreme Court upheld the decision, finding that discrimi-
nation against women under customary law was “the nature of African society” 
and did not violate the constitution.109 Under Article 23 of the constitution at 
the time, gender discrimination was prohibited, but the text explicitly provided 
for exceptions in cases of customary law.110 Following the Court’s ruling, women 
marched through the streets of Harare, hoisting signs with slogans including “We 
will not accept customary legalised tyranny” and “Discrimination against women 
is not compulsory in African society.”111
That same year, women’s advocacy groups built alliances with civil society orga-
nizations nationwide during Zimbabwe’s constitution drafting process. Although 
the draft constitution included a gender equality guarantee, the groups collectively 
felt the drafting process had not been transparent or inclusive, and consequently 
campaigned against it in the 2000 constitutional referendum. The new consti-
tution was rejected in a 54% to 46% vote, with a voter turnout rate of 26%.112 A 
decade later, however, as another constitution drafting process commenced, the 
women’s groups organized a lobbying group for advancing their rights.113 Dubbed 
the “G-20,” the group undertook a “gender audit” of the draft constitution and 
compiled a list of demands for “the prohibition of unfair discrimination, the rec-
ognition of women as equal citizens, a Bill of Rights to supersede the customary 
law, and the protection of women from all forms of violence.”114
The resulting constitution included strong protections of women’s rights and 
called for the establishment of a “Gender Commission” charged with “do[ing] 
everything necessary to promote gender equality,” including reviewing discrimi-
natory laws and recommending changes.115 The 2013 constitution also maintained 
a “right to culture,” which has its own basis in global agreements, and can provide 
indigenous and marginalized groups an important tool for preserving their lan-
guages and traditions.116 However, as the G-20 had demanded—and as countries 
have ratified in global treaties—the “right to culture” provision made clear that 
gender equality would take precedence, by establishing that “no person exercis-
ing these rights may do so in a way that is inconsistent with” the constitution’s 
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fundamental rights. As Zimbabwe’s example demonstrates, reforming discrimina-
tory customary laws may ultimately require a multipronged strategy that centers 
on community engagement and leverages the courts, international human rights 
agreements, and constitutional reform.117
South Africa: Ensuring Gender Equality Takes Precedence over Discriminatory 
Customary Laws
In South Africa, the 1996 constitution included strong protections for gender and 
racial equality; at the same time, the constitution recognized the country’s legal 
pluralism and gave limited constitutional recognition to customary law.118 The 
constitution also obliges courts to “promote the spirit, purport and objects of the 
Bill of Rights” when “interpreting” or “developing” customary law,119 signaling 
their capacity to change customary law in conformance with constitutional values 
through their rulings. In a 2004 case, the Constitutional Court put these provi-
sions into practice to determine whether two customary laws governing inheri-
tance were compatible with the equality guarantee.120
Before the Court were two questions: first, the constitutionality of Section 23 of 
the Black Administration Act, which established that customary law rather than 
the Intestate Act would apply to black South Africans’ estates; and second, the 
constitutionality of primogeniture in the context of customary law, a principle 
by which only male descendants qualify as heirs for individuals who die without 
a will.
Addressing the first question, the Court quickly determined that a separate 
legal system for black South Africans’ estates was inherently discriminatory, thus 
violating the equality article. Turning to the question of primogeniture, the Court 
first acknowledged that historically the male heir was expected to live with and 
financially support the deceased’s entire family; thus, the benefits of the inheri-
tance law ostensibly extended to all descendants. However, the Court explained, 
“customary law has not kept pace” with societal values and circumstances, includ-
ing nuclear family-centered living arrangements.121 According to the Court, “[t]rue 
customary law will be that which recognises and acknowledges the changes which 
continually take place.”122
Discussing remedies, the Court acknowledged its constitutional responsibil-
ity to consider whether the customary-law rules of succession could be modi-
fied to align with the Bill of Rights.123 However, given its discriminatory effects 
for women, the Court found that the customary law could not “be reconciled 
with the current notions of equality and human dignity as contained in the Bill 
of Rights,”124 and was therefore invalid. In other words, while the Court care-
fully considered the customary law and aimed to interpret it as progressively 
as possible—thus engaging in a sincere effort to reconcile the country’s parallel 
legal traditions—the constitution’s strong, superseding protections for equality 
ultimately prevailed.
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Moving Forward: Women’s Role in Reforming Laws
Women in many countries are directly advocating for clear constitutional protec-
tions against religious and cultural practices that harm women and girls, along 
with strong commitments to implementation and community engagement. Just 
as the Bill of Rights’ supremacy was a core demand of the women’s groups that 
shaped the 2013 Zimbabwe constitution, Somalia’s 2012 provisional constitution, 
in addition to guaranteeing gender equality, explicitly bans female genital mutila-
tion, describing it as “a cruel and degrading customary practice .  .  . tantamount 
to torture.”125
Women have also been directly involved in reforming customary law and prac-
tices. As many scholars and activists have emphasized, customary law was histori-
cally an unwritten, flexible, and evolving form of law; only when a limited version 
of customary law was codified following colonialism, often with the input of only 
a few male elders and colonial officials, did it become static and increasingly anti-
quated.126 According to constitutional scholar Muno Ndulo, urging the courts to 
restore the understanding that customary law is flexible and progressively inter-
pret customary law in accordance with contemporary norms of equality—coupled 
with the adoption of strong constitutional equality provisions—may be an effec-
tive strategy for accelerating change.127 In Liberia, where the constitution contains 
an unconditional gender equality guarantee, the legal system has been used to 
empower individual women to shape and change their communities’ customary 
laws.128 As these examples indicate, social movements that propel change and con-
stitutional and legal reforms that create the national foundations for gender equal-
ity are together yielding transformative advances.
Text and Interpretation
Without a doubt, courts should do their best to rule in a way that advances 
substantive equality for all people regardless of sex or gender. This must mean 
acknowledging how laws and policies affect different groups differently. It must 
mean taking an expansive approach to “sex” that encompasses stereotypes and 
gendered expectations. However, it does not mean basing rulings on preconceived 
notions about the societal roles of men, women, and gender minorities.
Constitutional language can be improved to provide a strong foundation for 
addressing these issues. Still, even well-written constitutional provisions can fall 
short of their drafters’ vision depending on courts’ interpretations. Ultimately, 
working to advance both norm change and legal change is essential, and the two 
will inevitably influence each other.129
UNFINISHED BUSINESS
Remarkable global progress on gender equality in the past century is reflected in 
constitutional change. Ninety-one percent of constitutions enacted in the 1980s, 
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93% in the 1990s, and 100% since 2000 explicitly guarantee sex and/or gender 
equality, compared to only 54% of those enacted before 1970. However, the 15% of 
constitutions that fail to guarantee either sex or gender equality, and the 8% that 
allow customary or religious law to take precedence over women’s equal rights, 
signal there is much work left to be done. Further, five constitutions use language 
articulating women’s rights only in relation to men’s, and this may not protect men 
from gender discrimination. Another 14 use binary language that may exclude sex 
and gender minorities from full constitutional protection.
Globally, one reason for optimism is women’s and gender minorities’ increasing 
role in constitutional drafting processes, which in turn is shaping these fundamen-
tal documents’ approaches to gender equality. For example, 88% of constitutions in 
sub-Saharan Africa have been rewritten since 1990, with women often playing key 
roles in shaping constitutional approaches to issues such as land rights, women’s 
political representation, violence against women, and the status of customary law.130 
In Uganda, as the Constitutional Commission prepared to draft a new constitution 
in the early 1990s, women’s groups weighed in more than any other sector of soci-
ety, despite the fact that women comprised just 19% of the 1993 Ugandan constitu-
ent assembly.131 The resulting document included powerful protections for women’s 
rights, including equal rights in the family, affirmative measures promoting political 
representation, and the prohibition of harmful religious and customary practices.
Yet there are also cautionary tales. While inviting public feedback and participa-
tion in drafting may lead to more inclusive constitutional protections, submitting 
basic equal rights to a vote undermines the fundamental premise that these rights 
are already universal. More participatory mechanisms can effectively strengthen 
rights when they serve to include the voices and perspectives of large groups that 
have been historically excluded, such as women. However, participatory decision-
making does not automatically lead to more expansive rights for groups that have 
been discriminated against and yet comprise small fractions of the population, 
which speaks to the broader need for processes that ensure the rights of minorities 
and subgroups.
Even the rights of large groups do not necessarily pass a vote. The recent exam-
ple of the Bahamas illustrates this point. In March 2016, the Bahamian parliament’s 
lower house voted to advance four amendments to its 1973 constitution to create 
stronger protections for women’s rights. In addition to adding “sex” to the con-
stitution’s antidiscrimination provision, the reforms would establish that women 
have the same rights as men to confer citizenship. Remarking on the amendments, 
Prime Minister Perry Christie declared it to be a “moral imperative of the first 
magnitude that we seize the opportunity to usher in a new era in our civilization—
an era that will proceed on the righteous and unassailable premise that we are all 
equal before the law irrespective of whether we are male or female.”132
In June 2016, however, when presented to the public in a constitutional referen-
dum, all four amendments failed to pass.133 According to media coverage, concerns 
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that the amendment to establish gender equality would open the door to same-sex 
marriage drove much of the opposition.134 Prime Minister Christie even addressed 
these concerns directly by condemning marriage equality and reassuring voters 
that he “would not be supporting [the amendment] if it would change marriage 
in The Bahamas.”135 As this example illustrates, struggles for equality across groups 
are often connected, and leaving any group’s fundamental rights up to public 
debate can lead to injustice.
Moving forward across countries will require social movements that seek to 
both strengthen legal rights and change the restrictive gender norms that limit 
opportunities for women, men, and gender minorities. In some countries, norms 
have already shifted significantly toward equality, but the constitution and other 
laws have not caught up. In others, grassroots movements to change norms and 
public opinion will likely play pivotal roles in strengthening the prospects for leg-
islative and constitutional reform.
Further, even in countries with relatively strong constitutional provisions, 
more comprehensive protections addressing discrimination based on preg-
nancy, marital, and family status would provide stronger foundations for wom-
en’s equality. More broadly, addressing indirect gender-based discrimination 
is crucial. Job requirements like a minimum height often disproportionately 
exclude women without being essential to effective performance in the position. 
Similarly, mandatory work meetings unnecessarily scheduled in the evening 
may contribute to indirect discrimination against women where safety, societal 
constraints, and/or disproportionate caregiving responsibilities prevent them 
from attending. Finally, addressing both sex and gender discrimination would 
more thoroughly guard against the range of ways that bias and stereotypes limit 
individuals’ potential.
Over the past 50 years, equal rights on the basis of sex and gender have dra-
matically increased in constitutions. Nevertheless, the extensive inequality that 
persists in the law, and the well-documented discrimination that continues to 
obstruct equal rights in education, work, and politics, underscore how far we have 
to go. In the coming decades, individuals, civil society groups, lawyers, and judges 
all have critical roles to play in closing gaps in the law, speaking out against gender 





Protecting Fundamental Rights for the 
World’s Migrants and Refugees
According to the United Nations, there were 258 million international migrants 
worldwide as of 2017—a number that has increased by over 100 million just since 
1990.1 The circumstances that compel migration are diverse. Some individuals and 
families leave their home countries due to war, violence, or persecution and dis-
crimination. Others flee following natural disasters or because they were unable 
to obtain enough food or meet their basic needs in the countries where they were 
living. Some migrate for a chance to access better jobs and educational opportuni-
ties. For many, a combination of reasons motivates the weighty decision to leave 
home and start over in a new place.
Despite the wide-ranging circumstances that bring them to new countries, 
refugees and migrants share many of the same basic needs upon resettling. Adults 
need jobs in order to integrate into a new economy and provide for their families. 
Children need access to schools. All people need access to basic healthcare. These 
essentials are both core to successful resettlement and to the fulfillment of funda-
mental human rights. But host countries may face challenges in fully meeting all of 
these needs for everyone, especially if their economy is already struggling, which 
often leads them to design policies that ration access to these public goods. Some 
of these restrictive policies, however, derive more from discrimination than from 
accurate evaluations of resource constraints.
Protecting Rights for Migrants/Refugees
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These issues raise important and complex questions. First, how can constitu-
tions protect fundamental rights for migrants and refugees, while recognizing the 
practical constraints countries face in the context of large-scale migration? Sec-
ond, are countries’ courts and constitutions addressing the needs of migrants dif-
ferently based on their status as refugees, asylum seekers, or economic migrants? 
And finally, how can constitutions address the barriers to starting over in a new 
country that result from discrimination?
MIGR ATION IN C ONTEXT:  WHO MIGR ATES AND WHY? 
In the twenty-first century, migration touches more lives than ever before. If all the 
world’s migrants lived in a single country, its population would be the fifth largest 
in the world.2 Migration is truly a global phenomenon: the 20 countries hosting 
the largest numbers of immigrants span every region of the world.3 In 2017, 24.7 
million international migrants lived in Africa, 79.6 million in Asia, 77.9 million 
in Europe, 57.7 million in North America, 9.5 million in Latin America and the 
Caribbean, and 8.4 million in Oceania.4 While few people expect to permanently 
leave their home countries, political, environmental, and economic instability have 
made migration an often inevitable reality for nearly one in 30 individuals on the 
planet. The odds that any one person will need to move to a new country, or that 
their family members or close friends will, have never been higher. Regardless of 
where migrants and refugees end up, they need access to services and the ability to 
work, alongside protections against discrimination, to start over in a new country.
Among the world’s migrants are 22 million people who meet the formal, nar-
row definition of a refugee established by the U.N. Convention Relating to the 
Status of Refugees (the “Refugee Convention”) and therefore qualify for interna-
tional protection. However, tens of millions more who fall outside of the Refugee 
Convention’s scope are nevertheless fleeing desperate circumstances beyond their 
control, such as natural disasters, war, famine, economic collapse, and widespread 
violence. Moreover, while migrant workers are often perceived as having migrated 
voluntarily rather than by necessity, lack of economic opportunities in their home 
countries can make seeking work elsewhere the only viable option for survival. In 
almost all cases, refugees and economic migrants alike decide to leave their coun-
tries of origin to ensure that they and their families are safe, healthy, and have the 
opportunity to pursue the same kinds of aspirations that all people share.
Importantly, in addition to the Refugee Convention, international treaties and 
agreements such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and the 
International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers 
and Members of Their Families (the “Migrant Workers Convention”) protect basic 
rights to education, health, decent working conditions, and nondiscrimination 
for migrants. Through detailed commitments in each of these areas, these global 
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agreements affirm the principle that fundamental rights transcend borders and 
apply regardless of citizenship status. This universality is core to the idea of human 
rights and their foundations in our common humanity.
In countries with a modest proportion of immigrants, these objectives are read-
ily achieved. In countries with a large proportion of immigrants, fulfilling these 
goals becomes critically important. The strength of each of our societies depends 
on the well-being of all members. Children getting a healthy start in life and hav-
ing access to the education, resources, and family caregiving they need shapes 
their ability to lead fulfilling lives and contribute to their full potential as adults. 
In Australia, for example, nearly half of residents are first- or second-generation 
migrants.5 In Canada, migrants comprise 22% of the population, representing 
around 200 different countries of origin; another 17% of people have at least one 
parent who is a migrant.6 In Jordan, 41% of the population migrated from else-
where.7 In the United States, migrants and their children account for 28% of all res-
idents;8 in a 2001 survey, 40% of Americans said at least one of their grandparents 
was born in another country.9 We cannot afford to leave migrant families behind.
C ONSTITUTIONAL APPROACHES AND  IMPACT S
In practice, constitutions do not draw explicit distinctions between the rights of 
refugees and those of other migrants. As a result, the data presented in this chap-
ter focus more broadly on whether constitutions guarantee or restrict rights to 
noncitizens and stateless persons. In addition, we examine whether constitutions 
prohibit discrimination on the basis of citizenship or place of origin.
However, legislation and policies relevant to education, health, and work often 
do distinguish among economic migrants, refugees, and asylum seekers—and 
when these laws are challenged as unconstitutional, courts often must make deter-
minations about the scope of constitutional rights that take the realities of differ-
ent migration statuses into account. What can we learn about how constitutional 
texts shape interpretations of the rights to education, work, and basic health ser-
vices for migrants and refugees?
Access to Education
In the late 1960s and early 1970s, four couples migrated from different parts of 
Mexico to Tyler, Texas, in search of better economic opportunities. Having found 
jobs in foundries, meatpacking plants, and pipe factories, the parents sent for their 
children, who prepared to enroll in the local schools.10
In the fall of 1977, when the children headed off to school, they discovered that 
their first day of classes might be their last. Pursuant to a recent Texas law, the 
Tyler school district had enacted a new policy requiring students who could not 
prove they were citizens or documented immigrants to pay tuition to attend public 
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schools, at a level that was prohibitive for most families. In the following years, the 
children’s parents would risk their own ability to stay in the U.S. to ensure their 
sons and daughters could have the opportunities they had sacrificed for.
The families who relocated to Tyler in the late 1960s and early 1970s were at 
the beginning of a new era in U.S. immigration policy. The 1965 Immigration 
and Nationality Act had ended the U.S.’s long-standing practice of legally favor-
ing immigrants from Northern and Western Europe through a system of quotas, 
which had allocated nearly 70% of visas to immigrants from the U.K., Germany, 
and Ireland,11 and in its place established a system that opened a higher percent-
age of slots to other countries. While this reform was generally a victory for civil 
rights and racial equality, the legislation also imposed the first-ever cap on immi-
gration from the Americas; as a result, the number of visas available to migrants 
from Mexico and other countries in the region dropped by 40%.12 Meanwhile, a 
separate reform passed a year earlier had ended the Bracero program, which had 
been enacted to fill a labor shortage during World War II and had, over the past 
two decades, legally admitted 4.5 million temporary agricultural workers from 
Mexico (many of whom faced significant exploitation despite their legal status).13 
Although high demand for the labor of migrants continued, opportunities to enter 
the U.S. with a work visa from Mexico had been dramatically reduced.
As a result, many more immigrant families were unauthorized to stay in the 
U.S. In the 1970s, the backlash against undocumented immigrants began to inten-
sify. In 1975, the Texas legislature prohibited public schools from using state money 
to fund the education of undocumented students. Schools could either refuse 
admittance to undocumented students or charge tuition to cover their costs. In 
Tyler, Superintendent James Plyler pursued the latter option, requiring each of the 
60 undocumented students enrolled in his district to pay $1,000 annually—over 
$4,400 in today’s dollars—to attend public schools.14 Such a high tuition would 
prevent many children from attending school; for immigrant families, the jobs 
most commonly available in agriculture or factory work paid only around $4,000 
per year.15
After learning of the situation, a local lawyer teamed up with the Mexican 
American Legal Defense Education Fund (MALDEF) to challenge the new law in 
court. The four families who served as plaintiffs risked a great deal by participat-
ing in the litigation. Although MALDEF convinced the court that they should be 
able to use pseudonyms, the parents knew they could be targeted for deportation, 
despite having children who were American citizens and strong social and finan-
cial ties to their communities.16
Meanwhile, as the case moved through the courts, many children were kept 
out of school, while others attended “clandestine night schools” run by volunteer 
teachers.17 Finally, in 1982, Plyler v. Doe reached the U.S. Supreme Court. In a 5–4 
decision written by Justice William Brennan, whose own parents had emigrated 
from Ireland, the Court struck down the Texas law, finding that it violated the 
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Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which by its own terms 
applied to “persons” rather than “citizens.”18 According to the Court, imposing 
tuition on undocumented children was not a “rational” way to pursue the govern-
ment’s goal of curbing unauthorized immigration or cutting education costs, and 
would have long-term consequences for both the child and society at large. As 
Brennan explained, the “denial of education to some isolated group of children 
poses an affront to one of the goals of the Equal Protection Clause: the abolition of 
governmental barriers presenting unreasonable obstacles to advancement on the 
basis of individual merit.”19
In the decades since, the Plyler case has had a major impact on the rights of 
all children to an education, regardless of immigration status. It was the first 
U.S. Supreme Court decision to clarify that the Equal Protection Clause applies 
to people who are undocumented.20 What’s more, the 40-year-old decision has 
protected against policy retrenchment amidst more recent anti-immigrant back-
lash. For example, a judge invoked the case in 1997 to strike down significant 
portions of Proposition 187, a California law adopted by referendum that would 
have banned undocumented students from attending public schools and required 
school administrators to report undocumented parents to the authorities.21 More 
recently, advocates invoked Plyler to fight back against a suggestion from the U.S. 
Department of Education that schools could choose to report undocumented chil-
dren to immigration authorities. In response, a spokesperson clarified that Edu-
cation Secretary Betsy DeVos’s “position is that schools must comply with Plyler 
and all other applicable and relevant law.”22 Likewise, immigration lawyers have 
pointed to the case to demand that unaccompanied migrant children being held in 
shelters receive an education.23 Meanwhile, commenting on the 25th anniversary 
of the decision in 2007, Superintendent Plyler described his own change of heart: 
“It would have been one of the worst things to happen in education” had the courts 
not overturned the policy.24
Strong Protections for Universal Education in International Law
International treaties are particularly strong on the universality of the right to 
education. Under the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights (ICESCR) and the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), free pri-
mary education for all is protected unequivocally, while free secondary education 
is an obligation of all countries that can afford it—and under the Migrant Workers 
Convention, countries must ensure that education is available to migrants on an 
equal basis with citizens.25 The requirement of equal access also applies to higher 
education. Similarly, the Refugee Convention guarantees that refugees must be able 
to access secondary and higher levels of schooling on the same basis as other non-
citizens.26 In 2017, the two U.N. committees responsible for monitoring implemen-
tation of the CRC and the Migrant Workers Convention, respectively, published a 
joint general comment that made countries’ commitments clear: “All children in 
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the context of international migration, irrespective of status, shall have full access 
to all levels and all aspects of education, including early childhood education and 
vocational training, on the basis of equality with nationals of the country where 
those children are living. This obligation implies that States should ensure equal 
access to quality and inclusive education for all migrant children, irrespective of 
their migration status.”27
Notably, nearly all U.N. members and other countries worldwide—196 as of 
2019—are parties to the CRC, which binds them to uphold these standards (the 
United States is the only nonratifier among U.N. member states).28 Overall, these 
treaties show that countries have no justification in international law to discrimi-
nate against migrants and refugees in education.
Opposition to migrant students’ access to public education is often framed 
as an issue of resources. For overburdened or underfunded school systems, any 
increase in class size can feel like a strain on capacity. The question of costs may 
be especially pressing in countries with the highest percentage of migrants. How-
ever, these expenditures are still generally a small fraction of overall education 
budgets.29 Further, for countries that are receiving the largest share of refugees, 
the global community has a role to play in supporting the provision of education 
for all.
In addition, evidence shows that education is central to children’s integration, 
and that the long-term economic and social benefits far outweigh the costs.30 
According to an Oxford University study, migrants in the U.K. pay more in taxes 
and social security contributions than they receive in tax credits and other ben-
efits, and migration can reduce government deficits and debt over time.31 Likewise, 
by the second generation, immigrant families in the U.S. typically contribute sig-
nificantly more in taxes than they receive in state expenditures on education and 
other services.32 With over half of all refugees globally under the age of 18, ensuring 
equal access to education regardless of citizenship status presents a huge need and 
opportunity. Similarly, adult education—such as language training for refugees—
may be a prerequisite for getting a job.
The Right to Education for Noncitizens in Constitutions
Overarching nondiscrimination provisions, such as the Equal Protection Clause 
invoked in Plyler, can offer important support for upholding children’s education 
rights, provided rights to equal treatment are not articulated as belonging exclu-
sively to “citizens.” Yet more specific guarantees are likely to provide stronger foun-
dations for equal rights to education, especially in the face of opposition based in 
fiscal arguments. Currently, just 17% of constitutions globally protect the right to 
education for noncitizens (Map 7).
Five percent of constitutions explicitly restrict some aspect of noncitizens’ 
right to education or reserve education rights for citizens. For example, Slovakia’s 
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constitution provides that “foreign nationals enjoy in the Slovak Republic basic 
human rights and freedoms guaranteed by this Constitution, unless these are 
expressly granted only to citizens.” While Slovakia guarantees that “[e]veryone has 
the right to education,” it limits access to education for noncitizens, stating: “Citi-
zens have the right to free education at primary and secondary schools.”33
Access to Employment
In countries around the world, the issue of migrants’ access to employment in 
their destination countries has long met with controversy, which often stems from 
concerns about the jobs and economic security of native-born citizens. These 
debates can become particularly fraught during economic recessions or periods of 
higher-than-average unemployment.
It is reasonable for countries to care about ensuring there is decent work for all 
citizens. This means not only creating enough jobs but also paying and enforcing 
an adequate wage. Providing decent work for all also addresses one of migration’s 
root causes—lack of economic opportunity—and allows more people who prefer 
to stay in their countries of origin to do so, rather than being compelled to leave 
their friends and family just to be able to make a living.
The particular impacts of immigration on a given economy will vary depend-
ing on the size of immigration flow, the size and state of the economy, and the 
complementarity of skills. For example, in settings of high unemployment, such as 
South Africa, the evidence is mixed. Some studies suggest migration is linked to 
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higher unemployment;34 at the same time, immigration has helped fill skills short-
ages within the country,35 and other evidence suggests immigrant entrepreneurs 
are helping to create jobs for native South Africans.36 In countries like Switzerland 
and Luxembourg, the fiscal impact of migration is clearly positive: immigrants are 
responsible for a 2% boost in GDP each year.37
For low- and middle-income countries facing a particularly significant influx 
of immigrants, global funds could help with transitional times and ease any tem-
porary economic strain. In the long run, however, the economic benefits of migra-
tion generally outweigh the costs, especially since immigrants who integrate into 
the economy end up creating more jobs for everyone. For example, a systematic 
review of 27 studies conducted over 30 years found that the “short-term wage 
effects of immigrants are close to zero—and in the long term immigrants can 
boost productivity and wages.”38 In one study of 15 European countries from 1996 
to 2010, a doubling of the foreign-born population was associated with a 0.7% 
increase in the wages of native workers.39 While it is important not to oversimplify, 
the literature as a whole suggests that popular rhetoric on the possible impact of 
immigration on jobs and unemployment, especially in higher-income countries, 
often overstates any potential detriment.
At the same time, there is ample reason to believe that a substantial part of 
the opposition to immigration on the basis of its potential impacts on employ-
ment derives from fears unsubstantiated by the evidence, as well as from bias 
and discrimination.40
The benefit that immigration brings to economies has not prevented a long 
global history of discrimination toward and stereotyping of immigrants, often on 
the basis of race/ethnicity, which has frequently been intertwined with economic 
anxieties.41 In France, immigrant workers from Italy, who were at the time viewed 
as comprising a separate ethnic group, were met with hostility in the late nine-
teenth century, triggering riots in Marseille where a large share of Italian migrants 
were employed as dock workers.42 In the U.S., legislators banned immigration 
from China through the Chinese Exclusion Act in 1882, and placed restrictions 
on land ownership by Japanese immigrants through “alien land laws” in the early 
twentieth century.43 Both measures were framed as protections against immigrants 
to the West Coast gaining too much economic power. And much more recently, 
U.K. leaders have advocated for “Brexit” and argued against immigration from 
other European countries by greatly exaggerating migrants’ use of state benefits; in 
fact, noncitizens access benefits at far lower rates than U.K. citizens.44
Most fundamentally, all people want access to decent work. For citizens of a 
country, this would ideally mean having access to a range of available jobs that 
pay adequately and provide safe working conditions. For migrants and refugees, 
this would mean the legal ability to work and access to employment that meets the 
same standards as the jobs available to native workers. Moreover, these principles 
are embedded in international agreements. The Migrant Workers Convention 
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guarantees conditions of work for migrants, including pay and safety, that are “no 
less favorable” than those for citizens.45 The Refugee Convention guarantees refu-
gees the right to “engage in wage-earning employment” under the most favorable 
terms provided to other noncitizens, as well as the rights to remuneration, work-
ing conditions, and social security on the same basis as citizens.46 How do coun-
tries’ constitutions align?
Rights to Work and Nondiscrimination
Constitutions and courts can shape access to employment for migrants and refu-
gees by how they define the right to work and whether they broadly protect the 
equal rights of noncitizens. Cases from two European countries provide examples 
of these provisions in action.
In 2008, a Burmese man entered Ireland seeking asylum, and filed his applica-
tion for refugee status the day after he arrived. At the time, human rights viola-
tions and state violence against minority ethnic groups were widespread across 
Burma.47 However, the man’s application for refugee status was denied, and he 
appealed. As his application continued to move through the system, according to 
Ireland’s Refugee Act, the man had no legal right to work. Instead, he lived in rudi-
mentary government housing, as required by law, and subsisted on the €19 weekly 
allowance the state provided to asylum seekers.48
This holding pattern stretched on for years. In 2013, the man was actually 
offered a job within the housing facility where he lived, but the minister of jus-
tice informed him he could not accept the offer because of the Refugee Act.49 In 
response, the man challenged the prohibition in court, arguing that the complete 
ban on his ability to seek employment violated the Charter of the European Union, 
the European Convention on Human Rights, and the Irish Constitution.50 In his 
pleadings, the man described suffering from depression and a loss of autonomy, 
and argued that being allowed to work was critical to his “sense of self worth.”51
Finally, in 2017, the Supreme Court ruled on his case. In a significant decision 
for asylum seekers throughout Ireland, the Court held that the right to work, 
which it derived from the constitution’s provision on liberty and equality, “can-
not be withheld absolutely from non-citizens.” Although the government could 
impose some limits on work rights before a person obtained refugee status, the 
Court acknowledged, an “absolute prohibition on employment, no matter how 
long a person was within the system,” exceeded the scope of the constitution. 
Further, while the Irish Constitution’s equality provision itself makes reference to 
“citizens,” the Court focused on the clarifying language that follows—“as human 
persons”—to adopt a more expansive interpretation of its application. The Court 
further explained that, for someone like the petitioner who by then had been mov-
ing through the asylum system for eight years, “The point has been reached when 
it cannot be said the legitimate differences between an asylum seeker and a citizen 
can continue to justify the exclusion of an asylum seeker from the possibility of 
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employment .  .  . This damage to the individual’s self worth and sense of them-
selves, is exactly the damage which the constitutional right [to seek employment] 
seeks to guard against.”52 As a remedy, the Court ordered the Parliament to make 
submissions to the court about how to amend the Refugee Act and other relevant 
laws within six months. As a result of the decision, up to 3,000 asylum seekers 
across the country may become eligible to seek work.53 In addition, Ireland will no 
longer be an outlier in the region; according to the Immigrant Council of Ireland, 
among EU countries, only Ireland and Lithuania completely prohibited asylum 
seekers from seeking employment.54 Contrary to the fears leading to bans on work, 
the facts are that more rapid integration of immigrants, a critical element of which 
is employment, has been found to support their success and reduce fiscal costs.55
For many migrants, exposure to discrimination may continue even after citi-
zenship has been gained. For example, in Greece, a draft presidential decree pro-
posed in 2016 sought to prohibit naturalized citizens from enrolling in the Warrant 
Officers’ School of the Fire Brigade Academy until at least a year after obtaining 
citizenship.56 In other words, the decree proposed to give preferential treatment to 
citizens born in Greece, while treating citizens who had been born elsewhere as, 
quite literally, second-class citizens. However, the Supreme Administrative Court 
of Greece found that the distinction violated the country’s constitution, which 
provides that “All Greeks are equal before the law.”
As these cases suggest, the rights to both work and nondiscrimination can sig-
nificantly affect whether migrants can support themselves and their families at all 
stages of resettlement. However, while some constitutions explicitly protect non-
citizens’ equal treatment in employment, others broadly exclude noncitizens from 
work opportunities. Further, some constitutions, like that of Ireland, are silent on 
both the right to work and noncitizens’ rights, leaving courts to determine the 
scope of their protections.
Altogether, 21% of constitutions protect some aspect of equality and nondiscrim-
ination in working life for noncitizens (see Map 8). Consistent with international 
conventions, some of these provisions focus on pay and working conditions, which 
can protect against the exploitation of migrant labor. For example, Portugal’s consti-
tution provides that “[r]egardless of age, sex, race, [or] citizenship . . . every worker 
shall possess the right . . . [t]o the remuneration of his work in accordance with its 
volume, nature and quality, with respect for the principle of equal pay for equal 
work and in such a way as to guarantee a proper living.”57 In addition, one-third 
of countries protect nondiscrimination and decent work based on national origin.
At the same time, five percent of countries reserve fundamental work rights for 
citizens or have exceptions to work rights for noncitizens. Mongolia’s constitution, 
for instance, provides:
Art. 16: . . . The citizens of Mongolia are guaranteed . . . (4) the right to free choice 
of employment, favorable conditions of work, remuneration, rest and private enter-
prise. No one shall be subjected to forced labour.
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Art. 18: . . . (5) In allowing foreign citizens and stateless persons under the juris-
diction of Mongolia to exercise the basic rights and freedoms provided for in Ar-
ticle 16 of this Constitution, the State may establish by law relevant restrictions upon 
the rights other than the inalienable rights spelt out in international instruments to 
which Mongolia is a Party, out of the consideration of ensuring national security, the 
security of the population and public order.58
Notably, Mongolia is party to neither the Refugee Convention nor the Migrant 
Workers Convention, suggesting that these provisions leave the door open 
to discrimination.
Other countries have provisions focused on protecting decent work for native 
workers, rather than restricting the rights of migrant workers. For example, Gua-
temala’s constitution states, “In comparable circumstances, no Guatemalan worker 
can earn a lesser wage than a foreigner, be subjected to inferior conditions of 
employment, or obtain lesser economic benefits or other services.”59
Three percent of countries explicitly prioritize citizens in hiring. Again, while 
these provisions may be intended to offer protection, in some cases, they may limit 
employers’ ability to hire the people best suited for positions, such as when global 
experience is central to an organization’s work or when specific skills are scarce 
locally. Honduras’s constitution outlines specific quotas for foreigners versus cit-
izens: “It is prohibited for employers to hire less than 90 percent of Honduran 
workers and to pay them less than 85 percent of the total amount of the salaries 
paid in the respective enterprise. Those percentages may be modified in excep-
tional cases specified by the Law.”60
Work rights are explicitly
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Finally, in two countries, preferences for citizens in hiring occur alongside guar-
antees of nondiscrimination in working conditions for noncitizens. For example, 
Costa Rica’s constitution states, “No discrimination shall be made with regard to 
wages, advantages, or working conditions between Costa Ricans and foreigners, or 
with respect to any group of workers. Under equal conditions, Costa Rican work-
ers shall receive preference.”61
Rights to Employment Benefits
Importantly, employment-related issues matter not just for jobs but also for access 
to benefits linked to labor market participation, such as unemployment insurance 
and old-age pensions. Regional and international agreements have established 
that refugees and migrants have a right to fundamental supports, especially in 
the form of contributory benefits and social insurance programs that are available 
to the whole population. For example, the UDHR establishes that “everyone” has 
a right to social security, while the Refugee and Migrant Workers Conventions 
guarantee equal access to social security as citizens. Similarly, ILO Convention 
118 requires ratifiers to provide equal treatment to refugees and stateless persons 
with respect to social security, which it specifies could encompass everything from 
paid sick leave to maternity benefits; however, only 38 countries have ratified the 
convention. More recently, a European Union directive established that “third-
country workers”—that is, workers from outside the EU who are legally working 
in EU countries—should receive equal treatment with respect to the full range of 
social security benefits.62
By contrast, countries have established different standards for whether nonciti-
zens qualify for public assistance and under what terms. For example, Germany’s 
Constitutional Court ruled in 2012 that asylum seekers have a right to benefits 
sufficient to support both physical existence and minimum participation in social 
and cultural life, pursuant to the right to dignity.63 Meanwhile, Denmark’s Supreme 
Court upheld a two-tiered system of cash benefits that provided lower levels of 
assistance to anyone who had not lived in Denmark for at least seven of the past 
eight years—a policy that did not directly distinguish on the basis of citizenship, 
but had the effect of disproportionately relegating immigrants to the lower tier.64
Importantly, though, these choices do not obviate countries’ responsibilities 
under the UDHR and international treaties to ensure all people within their bor-
ders can meet their fundamental needs. However, across both public assistance 
and benefits linked to work history, the presence or absence of explicit constitu-
tional language may determine access by migrants and refugees.
One case illustrating the impact of language comes from South Africa. In Khosa 
& Others v. Minister of Social Development & Others, Mozambican refugees who 
had been living and legally working in South Africa for decades challenged a pro-
vision in the Social Assistance Act 59 of 1992, which lists South African citizenship 
as a necessary criterion for receiving an old-age pension.65 In ruling in favor of 
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the refugees, the Constitutional Court relied on Section 27, which proclaims that 
“[e]veryone has the right to have access to . . . social security.”66
The Court held that the use of the term “everyone” in Section 27 clearly sup-
ported extending social security to permanent residents like the plaintiffs, espe-
cially since Section 27 was not one of the provisions in the constitution that explic-
itly referred to “citizens.”
The Constitution vests the right to social security in “everyone”. By excluding perma-
nent residents from the scheme for social security, the legislation limits their rights 
in a manner that affects their dignity and equality in material respects. Dignity and 
equality are founding values of the Constitution and lie at the heart of the Bill of 
Rights. Sufficient reason for such invasive treatment of the rights of permanent resi-
dents has not been established. The exclusion of permanent residents is therefore in-
consistent with section 27 of the Constitution.67
In addition, the Court found that the citizenship requirement amounted to 
“unfair”—and therefore unconstitutional—discrimination under Section 9, which 
prohibits discrimination on a range of grounds the Court deemed “analogous” to 
citizenship, which is a “personal attribute which is difficult to change.”68
Widely ratified globally, the ICESCR, like South Africa’s constitution, protects 
the right of “everyone” to social security.69 The treaty also establishes that countries 
have an immediate obligation to ensure nondiscrimination in their implementa-
tion of economic and social rights. At the same time, consistent with the principle 
of progressive realization, the ICESCR clarifies: “Developing countries, with due 
regard to human rights and their national economy, may determine to what extent 
they would guarantee the economic rights recognized in the present Covenant 
to non-nationals.”70 Through Khosa, South Africa’s Constitutional Court demon-
strated the feasibility of extending social protection to noncitizens even in lower-
resource settings, even though it would be reasonable for some courts in low- and 
middle-income countries to reach a different decision. In many settings, however, 
the inclusion of noncitizens is already realizable.
Access to Health Systems
Finally, while education and work are critical to human development, fulfillment, 
and the ability to make a living, access to basic healthcare is fundamental to sur-
vival and the exercise of all human rights. In a range of countries, health systems 
that differentiate on the basis of citizenship have raised constitutional questions 
about implementation of the “right to health,” and under what conditions, if any, 
limitations on public healthcare for noncitizens can be justified.
In Canada, a 2012 reform to the Interim Federal Health Program (IFHP) estab-
lished a three-tier healthcare system that accorded different standards of care to 
migrants depending on their status and countries of origin. As a consequence, 
Hanif Ayubi, who had immigrated to Canada from Afghanistan but was denied 
formal refugee status for being unable to show he was directly threatened by the 
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Taliban, suddenly lost access to his diabetes medication and care. As a dishwasher 
living on a modest income, Ayubi was unable to afford the drugs on his own.
Similarly, Daniel Garcia Rodrigues, who came to Canada after fleeing the 
FARC in Colombia, was unable to afford surgery when he experienced a detached 
retina, since his status as a “failed refugee” rendered him ineligible for the IFHP. 
Fortunately, a generous doctor agreed to perform Rodrigues’s operation at a dis-
count. Yet his and Ayubi’s cases were not outliers: following the reform, a range of 
migrants who had been denied formal refugee status but were permitted to stay 
in the country under Canadian policy found themselves without access to basic 
prenatal, obstetrical, and pediatric care, as well as essential medicines like insulin 
and cardiac drugs.71
When the Ayubi and Rodrigues cases reached the Supreme Court, the justices 
evaluated the constitutionality of the reform with respect to two different sec-
tions in the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. First, the Court found that 
because the three-tier structure called for treating refugees from different countries 
differently, it amounted to national origin discrimination—which is explicitly pro-
hibited by Section 15, the equality provision. Second, the Court discussed whether 
the system was also unconstitutional discrimination on the basis of citizenship. 
Although Section 15 does not list citizenship as a prohibited ground, the Court 
noted that “citizenship has expressly been recognized as an analogous ground for 
the purposes of section 15,” and that even if there were no national origin discrim-
ination, the system would still be discriminatory.72 As the Court described, the 
system’s rules would inevitably lead to inequitable and arbitrary outcomes, even 
among noncitizens from the same countries and/or facing the same health condi-
tions: “[A] government-assisted refugee from Burma will have insurance coverage 
for asthma medication, but a refugee claimant from Burma would not. A pregnant 
refugee claimant from Iran will have insurance coverage for pre-natal and obstet-
rical care, but a pregnant refugee claimant from Mexico will not.”
Finally, citing its consequences for children who were brought to Canada 
with no say in the matter, the Court found that the reforms violated Article 
12—the prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment. As a result, the Court 
struck down the 2012 orders that had established the three-tier system, and gave 
the government four months to pass new legislation before its decision would 
come into effect (to ensure that the ruling did not create a “policy vacuum”). The 
Court also ordered the government to ensure Ayubi’s continued health coverage 
after the four-month period (and noted that Rodrigues had become a permanent 
resident since the case began and was therefore covered by the Ontario Health 
Insurance Plan).
What Are the Arguments against Health Rights for Migrants and Refugees? 
The clear inequities created by the Canadian IFHP reform provided leverage to 
those challenging it as discriminatory. Yet tiered systems of healthcare linked to 
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citizenship status are not uncommon, and some have been upheld as constitu-
tional.73 As discussed in more detail in chapter 10, guaranteeing access to health 
services requires an outlay of resources typically exceeding that required to pro-
tect civil and political rights. As a result, health rights have raised concerns about 
capacity and resource constraints, and these concerns may become amplified in 
the context of guaranteeing healthcare to noncitizens. Likewise, the notion that 
people will migrate to a specific country with the goal of accessing its health ser-
vices has fueled alarm that immigration will overwhelm health systems in coun-
tries that extend the right to health to noncitizens.
However, the evidence to support these arguments is slim.
First, while diverse factors drive migration to specific countries, many studies 
suggest that economic opportunity is a principal driver of destination choice,74 
while for economic migrants, family and social networks also play an important 
role.75 Other factors that shape migrants’ choices about where to settle include 
proximity76 (especially for South–South migrants),77 cultural and historical fac-
tors (including language barriers),78 and social and political climates (including 
whether countries are perceived as welcoming to foreigners, and whether they 
have multicultural societies).79 It is also important to note that some migrants 
make no choice at all about where they end up, especially refugees and asylum 
seekers, who may be at the whim of smugglers.80
There is limited evidence of healthcare accessibility playing a role as one 
component of the broader social and political climate. For example, a 2013 
study of individuals in France, Germany, the U.K., and the U.S. found that good 
health and education outcomes, as measured by test scores and infant mortality 
rates, had a positive effect on decisions to migrate.81 Additionally, one study of 
the U.S. found that the generosity of states’ Medicaid programs, which serve 
very low-income families as well as the elderly and people with disabilities, play 
a role in refugees’ choice of destination state once they are in the U.S.82 Taken 
together, these findings suggest that healthcare matters for some migrants, 
but it is not one of the most important factors in shaping choices about perma-
nent migration.
Second, in general, the world’s economic migrants—who comprise the vast 
majority of migrants globally—arrive in their destination countries in good health. 
Studies find evidence of the “healthy immigrant” effect, wherein migrants self-
select and tend to be healthier than the nonmigrant population.83 For example, 
according to a 2002 study, foreign-born Hispanics had a 45% lower mortality risk 
and U.S.-born Hispanics had a 26% lower risk than U.S.-born white people with an 
equivalent socioeconomic and demographic background. Black immigrants had a 
48% lower mortality risk. Among Asians and Pacific Islanders (APIs), immigrants’ 
mortality risk was 43% below that of U.S.-born white people, while U.S.-born APIs 
had a 32% lower risk. Finally, white immigrants’ mortality risks were 16% below 
those of white people born in the U.S.84
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Ultimately, everyone has the right to health, regardless of place of residence or 
citizenship status. For economic migrants, the evidence suggests the net costs of 
upholding the right to health are minimal. For both economic migrants and more 
vulnerable migrants, like refugees and asylum seekers, international conventions 
reflect widespread global agreement that provision of basic healthcare is a human-
itarian duty. Far more needs to be done at the national level.
The Right to Health for Migrants and Refugees in Constitutions
Altogether, 14% of constitutions guarantee some aspect of the right to health 
to noncitizens, but 3% of constitutions reserve some or all aspects of the right 
to health for citizens or permit restrictions on the right for noncitizens (Map 9). 
In some, tiered levels of coverage are built into the constitutional provision; again 
in Slovakia, for example, the constitution guarantees that “[e]veryone has a right 
to the protection of health. Based on public insurance, citizens have the right to 
free health care and to medical supplies.”85
Beyond their clear impacts on individuals and families, the denial of social 
and economic rights on the basis of citizenship has broader social consequences. 
Health provides a particularly acute example. When migrants and refugees are 
unable to get the healthcare they need, including preventive services, the risk of 
communicable diseases may increase—undermining the right to public health for 
all people.86
Likewise, when noncitizen workers are excluded from basic labor protections, 
employers are less likely to be held accountable for unsafe working conditions, 
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below-minimum wages, or other violations of the law. Depriving refugee and 
migrant workers of these fundamental rights therefore has consequences for 
everyone by contributing to the establishment of unsafe and coercive work envi-
ronments that affect citizens and noncitizens alike, and creating an exploited 
underclass of laborers who work on different terms than citizens do.87 While 
migrants’ rights should be protected for their own sake, citizens also fare better 
when migrants’ rights are realized.
L ANGUAGE MAT TERS:  RIGHT S GR ANTED TO 
ALL PERSONS VS.  CITIZENS
In the U.S. Constitution, only one right appears twice: the right to due process. Put 
simply, due process means that the government cannot arbitrarily detain someone 
or take away their rights or property. The Fifth Amendment guarantees due pro-
cess with respect to the federal government, while the Fourteenth Amendment 
extends the same protection against the states.
And critically, both amendments guarantee these rights to “persons”—not 
“citizens.”
In January 2017, this distinction proved critical in the courts following President 
Trump’s executive order to ban all refugees as well as citizens from seven Muslim-
majority countries—Iran, Iraq, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen—from 
entering the country, even if they were lawful permanent residents of the United 
States. Within a week, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit had blocked 
the order nationwide, ruling that the revocation of visas and refusal to recognize 
individuals’ lawful immigration status would likely violate the Fifth Amendment’s 
guarantee of due process, and affirming that due process rights “are not limited 
to citizens.”88
Troublingly, the Supreme Court ultimately upheld a pared-down version of 
the so-called “travel ban” in June 2018, determining that the president had broad 
power to exclude classes of people from entering the country under the Immi-
gration and Nationality Act. The Court further ruled that the reformulated ban, 
which encompassed five of the original seven Muslim-majority countries—Iran, 
Libya, Somalia, Syria, and Yemen—but also Venezuela and North Korea, no lon-
ger evidenced religious discrimination.89 Although it no longer extends to lawful 
permanent residents, the policy will undoubtedly harm millions of individuals 
and families, and despite how the policy has evolved, its discriminatory intent 
seems undeniable.
This example underscores two key points. First, the use of words like “citi-
zen” versus “person” throughout constitutions can have far-reaching implica-
tions, including denials of fundamental rights, even where not explicitly stated. 
Globally, around one-third of constitutions that guarantee a right to education, 
health, or labor use “citizenship” language to describe that right without further 
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addressing whether rights using citizenship language are reserved only for citi-
zens. The importance of this language choice is increasingly capturing the atten-
tion of constitutional drafters. For example, South Korea’s National Human Rights 
Commission proposed in June 2017 to replace the word “citizens” with “people” in 
the constitution’s basic rights provisions, to ensure that all individuals within the 
country would benefit from the same fundamental legal protections.90
Second, discrimination on the basis of migration status, either on a broad scale 
or by individual employers or institutions, affects migrants’ abilities to fulfill their 
fundamental rights. How can constitutions address these forms of discrimina-
tion—and in what areas are they exacerbating discrimination?
Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Citizenship
In November 2016, an asylum seeker in Belgrade tried to buy a train ticket to Sid, 
Serbia, a city near the Croatian border where there was a reception center for asy-
lum seekers. But at the ticket counter, she was refused. Ten minutes later, however, 
a nonmigrant traveler made the same request—and walked away with a ticket.
This did not come as a surprise to CKPR, a Serbian organization working on 
behalf of refugees and asylum seekers. Having suspected that the train station was 
discriminating against migrants, CKPR sent in testers to confirm the practice. After 
the asylum seeker was refused, CKPR filed a lawsuit against Serbian Railways.  
When the case reached the Commissioner for the Protection of Equality, 
a state authority charged with enforcing equal rights, she found that the train 
company could reduce service to a border city if the refugee reception center 
temporarily lacked capacity. This had been a genuine problem for the reception 
center in Sid, which had reported nearly 200 men sleeping in and around the cen-
ter around the time CKPR’s complaint was filed.91 However, the company could 
not restrict access solely by migrants, especially since asylum seekers had just 72 
hours to report to an asylum/reception center after entering Serbia before their 
presence would be considered illegal. Distinguishing between migrants and other 
customers who wished to purchase a ticket, the commissioner held, violated the 
constitution’s guarantee of equality based on nationality, as well as the constitu-
tional right to asylum.92
Against the backdrop of globalization and recent large-scale migration across 
Europe, fundamental protections against discrimination on the basis of citizen-
ship or place of origin have become all the more important. These protections also 
align with international commitments. For example, the U.N. International Con-
vention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD) explic-
itly prohibits discrimination on the basis of national origin. While the ICERD 
allows for some distinctions between the rights of citizens and noncitizens, the 
Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination has clarified: “The possi-
bility of differentiating between citizens and non-citizens . . . must be construed so 
as to avoid undermining the basic prohibition of discrimination; hence, it should 
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not be interpreted to detract in any way from the rights and freedoms recognized 
and enunciated in particular in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the Inter-
national Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.”93 In effect, this means that only 
those narrow exceptions permitted by these other agreements, such as limits on 
certain political rights, are acceptable forms of differentiation.
Globally, nearly a quarter of constitutions explicitly protect noncitizens from 
discrimination (Map 10). Further, 60% guarantee equal rights on the basis of for-
eign national origin. In Serbia, the equality provision takes the latter approach: 
“All direct or indirect discrimination based on any grounds, particularly on .  .  . 
national origin . . . shall be prohibited.”94 Across the border, Croatia’s constitution 
addresses foreign citizenship directly, providing that “[c]itizens of the Republic of 
Croatia and aliens shall be equal before the courts, government bodies and other 
bodies vested with public authority.”95
However, 77% of countries that are parties to the ICERD have yet to guarantee 
nondiscrimination without exceptions on the basis of foreign citizenship. Four-
teen percent of parties explicitly allow for restrictions on equal rights for foreign-
ers. For example, under Panama’s constitution, “[a]ll Panamanians and aliens are 
equal before the Law, but the Law, for reasons of labor, health, morality, public 
security and national economy, may subject to special conditions, or may deny 
the exercise of specific activities to aliens in general.”96 While narrow exceptions 
on certain rights are permissible under international law, broadly or ambiguously 
worded limitations may open the door to discrimination. Likewise, 41% of coun-
tries that have ratified the ICERD have not enacted a guarantee of nondiscrimina-
tion on the basis of foreign national origin.
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The number of new constitutions with restrictions has been declining since 
the 1980s (Figure 5). None of the constitutions enacted since 2010 include explicit 
restrictions on the rights of noncitizens.
Still, there seems to be little momentum toward a widespread guarantee of equal 
rights for noncitizens. Whereas protections for these groups peaked among constitu-
tions adopted in the 1990s, coinciding with the breakup of the Soviet Union, Yugo-
slavia, and Czechoslovakia, levels of protection have been only slightly higher among 
constitutions adopted since 2000 than among those adopted in the 1970s and 1980s.
Restrictions on Other Rights 
Under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), coun-
tries are permitted to reserve certain political rights for citizens, such as the right 
to vote or run for office. However, some countries also restrict noncitizens’ rights 
in other areas, which can have far-reaching implications that limit the ability to 
meet basic needs. Two particularly important and common areas where restric-
tions occur are freedom of movement and due process. Under the ICCPR, due 
process is guaranteed to everyone, while freedom of movement is guaranteed to 
everyone lawfully within the country.97
Freedom of Movement
As the Serbian case suggests, formal and informal restrictions on the free movement 
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significant increase in migration. Some countries’ constitutions, however, explicitly 
allow for restrictions on noncitizens’ freedom of movement, with very real conse-
quences for migrants and refugees attempting to access basic institutions.
For example, Zambia’s constitution broadly guarantees equal rights for all by 
using the term “every person in Zambia” in its provision on fundamental rights 
and freedoms.98 However, its provision on nondiscrimination stipulates that the 
prohibition of discrimination does not apply “with respect to persons who are not 
citizens of Zambia.”99 Another provision within the same article establishes that 
the rights of noncitizens can be restricted in areas including the right to privacy, 
freedom of conscience, freedom of expression, freedom of assembly and associa-
tion, and freedom of movement.100
Under the Refugee Convention, lawfully present refugees have the right 
“to choose their place of residence and to move freely within its territory, subject to 
any regulations applicable to aliens generally in the same circumstances.”101 The 
U.N. Human Rights Committee has further clarified that asylum seekers
may be detained for a brief initial period in order to document their entry, re-
cord their claims and determine their identity if it is in doubt. To detain them 
further while their claims are being resolved would be arbitrary in the absence of 
particular reasons specific to the individual, such as an individualized likelihood 
of absconding, a danger of crimes against others or a risk of acts against national 
security. The decision must consider relevant factors case by case and not be based 
on a mandatory rule for a broad category; must take into account less invasive 
means of achieving the same ends, such as reporting obligations, sureties or other 
conditions to prevent absconding; and must be subject to periodic re-evaluation 
and judicial review.102
Likewise, the UNHCR has made clear that “[a]sylum-seekers should be guaran-
teed freedom of movement wherever possible.”103 In other words, although receiv-
ing countries can briefly detain newly arriving refugees, broader and ongoing 
restrictions on the freedom of movement exceed the scope of international law.
Yet although Zambia has ratified all the major human rights treaties, its broad 
constitutional restrictions on freedom of movement are further reinforced through 
legislation including the Refugees (Control) Act, which requires all refugees to live 
in a designated settlement, and have also been upheld by the High Court.104 Nota-
bly, while Zambia became a party to the Refugee Convention in 1969, it did so 
subject to a “reservation” on the article protecting freedom of movement. Within 
the international treaty system, a reservation is a stipulation that the country may 
not give legal effect to a specific treaty provision, even while adopting the treaty as 
a whole. Under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, reservations must 
not be “incompatible with the object and the purpose of the treaty.”105 In practice, 
however, determining incompatibility is a gray area, and reservations have the 
potential to significantly undermine a treaty’s effect. In its reservation on freedom 
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of movement, Zambia specified that the government “reserves the right to desig-
nate a place or places of residence for refugees.”106
Zambia’s restrictions have wide-ranging consequences for refugees seeking 
to integrate and pursue basic opportunities. According to the UNHCR, “[t]he 
restriction on the freedom of movement is one of the primary sources of discon-
tent among the refugees’ communities, as it limits their access to essential goods, 
sources of income and education opportunities.”107 The effects are especially nota-
ble for youth, “who are keen to advance their human capital credentials through 
tertiary and vocational training that is often located in urban areas” where they 
are not permitted to live.108 Among both urban and rurally based refugees in Zam-
bia, restrictions on freedom of movement rank third among their top five liveli-
hood challenges.109
This example underscores the potential consequences of constitutional lan-
guage that allows for the broad-based denial of noncitizens’ rights, which has 
actually become more common in some civil rights areas over the past several 
decades.110 Globally, 16% of constitutions reserve the right to freedom of move-
ment for citizens or permit exceptions to the right for noncitizens (Map 11).
Rights to Due Process
Around the world, migrants commonly face violations of their right to due pro-
cess, which sharply undermines protections in international law. The principle of 
non-refoulement, which forbids countries from sending asylum seekers back to 
countries where they are likely to face persecution, is central to the Refugee Con-
vention, which also guarantees access to the courts for all refugees. Under the 
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and protections against arbitrary detention. Nevertheless, lengthy detentions of 
migrants and mass deportations that can endanger lives remain far too common.
In some countries, these rights are explicitly restricted—but they have also 
been successfully challenged in court. For example, in a unanimous decision in 
2017, the Constitutional Court of South Africa invalidated provisions within the 
Immigration Act of 2002 that allowed “illegal foreigners” to be detained for up to 
30 days without a warrant, and an additional 90 days once a warrant was secured. 
Citing Section 35 of the constitution, which requires that anyone who is arrested be 
brought before a judge within 48 hours, the Court ruled that immigrants are enti-
tled to the same protections.111 Effective institutions and supportive mechanisms 
for the implementation of the constitutional rights of refugees and migrants are 
central to their impact, and ensuring there are no exceptions to the fundamental 
right to due process is core to this commitment.112
ADDRESSING STATELESSNESS
While addressing the rights of noncitizens has critical implications, so too does 
specifically articulating the rights of stateless persons. Stateless persons—i.e., indi-
viduals who are not recognized as citizens by any state, including many refugees—
are especially vulnerable to arbitrary detention and other denials of fundamental 
rights and freedoms. People can become stateless at birth if they do not meet the 
requirements for citizenship in the country where they are born—for example, 
if the country does not recognize birthright citizenship, or if the person is born 
in a refugee camp.113 Later in life, people can become stateless if their country of 
origin ceases to exist; the dissolution of the Soviet Union, for instance, resulted 
in widespread statelessness.114 Today, with more than 10 million stateless persons 
worldwide, addressing the gaps in legal protections can be highly consequential 
for migrants.115
Issues of statelessness also intersect with constitutional gender equality provi-
sions, and specifically whether women have the same rights to acquire, change, 
retain, and pass down citizenship.116 When women do not have the same rights 
as men to confer nationality to their children, their children are at risk of state-
lessness, which often creates barriers to public education, healthcare, and, later, 
employment and political participation.117 Among its list of ten priorities for end-
ing statelessness by 2024, the UNHCR’s Global Action Plan to End Statelessness 
includes removing gender discrimination from nationality laws.118
The Practical Consequences of Statelessness 
In recent years, the consequences of constitutional provisions around statelessness 
have been devastating to hundreds of thousands of individuals and their families 
in the Dominican Republic. In 2013, the Constitutional Court ruled that anyone 
born in the country to undocumented parents since 1929 was not automatically a 
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Dominican citizen—a ruling that disproportionately affected the country’s sub-
stantial Haitian population, and resulted in the retroactive stripping of citizen-
ship.119 According to the conservative estimates of government officials, around 
138,000 people were rendered newly stateless by the change, many of whom were 
subsequently targeted for deportation.120 This ruling resulted from a challenge to 
a 2010 constitutional amendment establishing that the Dominican-born children 
of undocumented residents would not receive citizenship by nature of their birth: 
“Art. 18. The following are Dominicans: . . . (3) People born in the national terri-
tory, with the exception of the sons and daughters of foreign members of diplo-
matic and consular legations, of foreigners that find themselves in transit or reside 
illegally in Dominican territory. All foreigners are considered people in transit as 
defined in Dominican laws.”121
The woman who brought the case, Juliana Deguis Pierre, had been issued a 
Dominican birth certificate when she was born to Haitian immigrant parents in 
1984, and had never left the country since. Yet when she went to get a national ID 
card in 2008—by then a mother of four children of her own—her birth certificate 
was confiscated due to her Haitian last names. In 2013, the Constitutional Court 
determined that she had been wrongly registered at birth.122
The consequences of the constitutional reform and subsequent Constitutional 
Court decision have been profound, especially for stateless children who have been 
unable to enroll in primary or secondary school due to lack of documentation.123 
Without access to education, these children are more vulnerable to child labor, 
such as the fifth grader who became a bricklayer’s assistant after he was removed 
from school.124 Children forced to withdraw from school due to the reform also 
face the prospect of reduced opportunities in the formal labor market as adults. 
Meanwhile, adults without identity cards have encountered barriers to realizing 
their rights to work and health. According to one Dominican-born man, whose 
ID card was initially revoked in 2008: “You need your identity card in order to 
do absolutely everything . . . You could be somebody with a lot of experience in 
a specific area, but without an identity card you can’t be contracted. You can do 
absolutely nothing.”125
While the situation in the Dominican Republic has received global attention, 
the enshrinement of the exclusionary citizenship provision within its constitution 
has been retained, even following a second series of reforms in 2015. Interestingly, 
the constitution does guarantee that foreigners have “the same rights and duties 
as nationals” within the Dominican Republic, subject to certain exceptions126—but 
the lack of an explicit protection on the base of statelessness has left thousands of 
residents’ futures uncertain.
Globally, 8% of constitutions explicitly prohibit discrimination on the basis of 
statelessness, while 15% limit full equal rights solely to citizens or permit excep-
tions for equal rights for stateless persons. Guarantees for stateless persons peaked 
among constitutions adopted in the 1990s (see Figure 6).
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THE ABILIT Y TO EXERCISE RIGHT S
Finally, while the existence of rights is an essential precondition for their realiza-
tion, claiming rights often poses additional hurdles, particularly for those whose 
very presence in the country may put them at risk. For undocumented immi-
grants, access to legal assistance and the ability to engage with the legal system 
without fear of retribution are common obstacles to obtaining justice.
In some countries, these barriers are compounded by codified restrictions on 
undocumented immigrants’ access to legal services. In Italy, for example, although 
the constitution guarantees the right to legal aid for the poor, free representation 
for civil matters is restricted by law to citizens and migrants with legal status.127 
Likewise, in Mongolia, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, and Turkmenistan, the constitu-
tion protects the right to legal aid but uses “citizenship” language to articulate the 
right.128 In the United States, Congress banned legal aid providers from represent-
ing undocumented immigrants, bringing class actions, or representing clients in 
a range of specific types of claims.129 Although policymakers have justified the 
restrictions on the basis of limited resources, the role of employers that rely heav-
ily on undocumented labor in advocating for the restrictions suggests there are 
other interests at stake.130 Indeed, it was only after migrant workers began suing for 
unpaid wages that the agricultural industry began advocating for limitations on 
their access to free legal representation.131
By contrast, some countries explicitly guarantee the right to legal assistance for 
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as “everyone”—in either their constitutions or relevant legal aid statutes.132 With-
out the ability to exercise rights, they remain empty guarantees. Reducing both the 
formal and informal barriers to justice commonly facing migrants and refugees 
must be a priority for ensuring these rights have meaning in practice.
C ONCLUSION
In an era of globalization and instability, anyone may become a migrant or have 
family members who immigrate. Just since 2000, the number of migrants world-
wide has increased by 41%, and migrants now comprise 3.3% of the global popula-
tion—or one in every 30 people.133
Yet despite the large size of this population, migrants and refugees worldwide 
face marginalization and discrimination. According to a report jointly authored 
by the International Organization on Migration, the ILO, the U.N. High Commis-
sioner for Human Rights, and UNHCR, “violations of human rights of migrants, 
refugees and other non-nationals are so generalized, widespread and commonplace 
that they are a defining feature of international migration today.”134 These findings 
mirror key concerns voiced in the 2001 Durban Declaration on Racism, Racial 
Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance, which broadly proclaimed: 
“We recognize that xenophobia against non-nationals, particularly migrants, refu-
gees and asylum-seekers, constitutes one of the main sources of contemporary 
racism and that human rights violations against members of such groups occur 
widely in the context of discriminatory, xenophobic and racist practices.”
While the dynamics of large-scale migration present challenges for destination 
countries, it is important to reach consensus on key areas that are critical to the 
preservation of fundamental rights. At a minimum, a fundamental commitment 
to nondiscrimination, children’s access to education, universal access to emer-
gency healthcare and preventive services, and refugees’ and asylum seekers’ right 
to seek work have emerged as core elements that all countries should be able to 
provide. Providing access to social insurance based on contributions may require 
the development of new transferable or transnational systems that recognize the 
frequency of migration.
The desire of countries to ensure the continued economic well-being, educa-
tion, and health of all people already within their borders is understandable. Yet 
the obstacles to extending these basic rights to noncitizens are often rooted in fear 
and stereotypes rather than evidence about actual impacts and capacity. Immigra-
tion far more often boosts countries’ economies in the long run than threatens 
them. Supporting refugees and asylum seekers in getting a fresh start is essential 
not only for meeting humanitarian needs but also for enabling them to integrate 
and contribute to their new community. It is essential to not repeat errors that 
have characterized responses to migration for centuries, and to recognize and 
reject pernicious justifications for exclusion when they reemerge.
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Negotiating the Balance of Religious 
Freedom and Equal Rights
On a cold December night in Brockton, Massachusetts, nine-year-old Betty Sim-
mons stood alone on a street corner. In a canvas bag over her shoulder, she carried 
magazines published by the Jehovah’s Witnesses containing teachings on biblical 
prophecies and religious history. Betty held copies to display to passersby, and her 
bag advertised that the magazines were for sale.1
About 20 feet away, Betty’s aunt and legal guardian, Sarah Prince, stood engaging 
in her own street preaching work, as she did regularly. Around 8:45 p.m., a school 
attendance officer approached Sarah and asked for Betty’s name and where she went 
to school. Sarah refused to provide her niece’s name, but admitted she had provided 
Betty with the magazines to sell. The officer advised her to go home within five min-
utes, citing previous warnings he had given. Although Sarah complied, she vigorously 
objected, “This child is exercising her God-given right and her constitutional right 
to preach the gospel, and no creature has a right to interfere with God’s commands.”2
Under a Massachusetts statute, however, children were forbidden from selling 
merchandise in public places, and adults who provided children with goods to sell 
or permitted them to work in violation of the law could be charged with a misde-
meanor. Because of Betty’s repeated appearances selling religious literature on the 
streets of Brockton, and Sarah’s acknowledgment that it was at her behest, Sarah 
was convicted and fined for violating the state’s child labor laws.
Balancing Religious Freedom/Equal Rights
98    Balancing Religious Freedom/Equal Rights
Over the next three years, Sarah challenged the decision through the courts, 
arguing that the child labor provision violated Betty’s right to religious freedom, 
Sarah’s right to raise her child within her own faith, and both of their rights to 
freedom from discrimination. Since street preaching and distributing literature 
were critical aspects of Jehovah’s Witnesses’s religious practice, she argued, the 
restriction on children selling goods in the street amounted to discrimination 
against members of the faith. During trial, Betty testified that she believed fail-
ing to spread Jehovah’s Witnesses’s teachings would condemn her “to everlasting 
destruction at Armageddon.”3
When the case reached the Supreme Court, however, Justice Wiley Rutledge 
clarified that freedom of religion, although central to the constitution’s First Amend-
ment, is not absolute. In particular, he argued, “The right to practice religion freely 
does not include the right to expose the community or the child to communicable 
disease or the latter to ill-health or death.”4 Further, although Betty had a right to 
religious freedom, different standards could validly apply to children and adults, 
given the “interests of society to protect the welfare of children,” and democracy’s 
reliance upon “the healthy, well rounded growth of young people into full maturity 
as citizens.”5 While adults were free to sell religious materials in the streets, even 
during severe cold weather, the child labor law was a valid exercise of Massachu-
setts’s authority to protect against the “crippling effects of child employment.”6
Turning to Sarah’s argument about her right to raise her child in her faith, the 
Court reasoned that despite the government’s obligation to respect private family 
life, “the family itself is not beyond regulation in the public interest.”7 Notably, the 
Court did not argue that Sarah could not provide Betty with the religious education 
of her choosing; she simply could not compel Betty to engage in religious practices 
that violated the law. Finally, addressing Sarah’s equal protection claim, the Court 
concluded that as a generally applicable law that treated children of all faiths the 
same, the child labor legislation was not discriminatory against Jehovah’s Witnesses.
PERSISTING QUESTIONS—AND MOVES TOWARD 
GLOBAL C ONSENSUS 
Prince v. Massachusetts was decided 75 years ago, but its most fundamental issues 
remain relevant across countries. In the United States, the decision continues to 
serve as a critical precedent in cases where religious freedom is pitted against pub-
lic health or children’s safety.8 Globally, Prince exemplifies some common ques-
tions that emerge when tensions arise between the exercise of religion and other 
fundamental rights and state interests. Under what conditions can the government 
restrict religious practice?
In the decades since Prince, heated debates about religion’s ideal role in soci-
ety—and in constitutions—have persisted, though important moves toward con-
sensus have occurred in key areas.
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International agreements have addressed rights to equality across religions. 
Beginning with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), countries 
from all regions collectively established a comprehensive set of principles articu-
lating important protections for equal rights on the basis of religion. The Inter-
national Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), adopted in 1966, and 
the Declaration on Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimina-
tion Based on Religion or Belief, adopted in 1981, further clarified these goals 
and responsibilities.
These agreements also express the global consensus that, while important and 
widely valued across societies, the ability to practice one’s religion is not unquali-
fied: it can be curtailed in some circumstances, such as for public health and the 
protection of others’ fundamental rights and freedoms, including their rights to 
equality. At the same time, individuals of all religions, beliefs, and nonbeliefs must 
be protected from discrimination and persecution, whether in countries with reli-
gious governments, secular governments, or increasing religious diversity.
Achieving broad global agreement on key principles has been a remarkable 
step. But to what extent have they translated into practice?
EQUAL RIGHT S ON THE BASIS  OF RELIGION: 
WHAT IS  THE CHALLENGE?
In some ways, protecting against religious discrimination is similar to protecting 
against discrimination on the basis of race/ethnicity, gender, or other aspects of 
identity. Constitutional nondiscrimination clauses that include religion can ensure 
that members of religious minorities have the same rights to access education, 
work, participate in government, and lead full lives as members of the majority.
Yet a more challenging issue for national constitutions is that, more than other 
aspects of identity, an individual’s religion may prescribe a set of rules to live by. 
Religious laws and practices related to family, marriage, child-bearing, death, 
property, and other realms of life may intersect with areas covered by the state.
Moreover, historical traditions of a wide range of religions have come into 
conflict with the equal rights of groups both within and outside these religions. 
Inequalities remain embedded in some religious legal systems; disparities in prop-
erty rights9 and the criminalization of groups10 present just two examples. Yet, for 
most religions, there are also adherents who believe the religion can be practiced 
while respecting the equal rights of all.
International Agreements on Respecting Religious Freedom 
While Guaranteeing Human Rights to All
While freedom of religion and separation of religion and state are ideas that have 
a long global history, dating back at least to ancient Greece, much of the progress 
is centuries old.11 In 1598, the Edict of Nantes newly granted rights to Protestants in 
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predominantly Catholic France, opening the door to religious tolerance and secu-
larism. In the United States, religious freedom was foundational to the American 
Revolution, and as Virginia’s governor, Thomas Jefferson drafted a bill to grant 
“legal equality for citizens of all religions—including those of no religion” within 
the state.12 In the early twentieth century, Kemal Ataturk’s deep commitment to 
secular government marked the end of the Ottoman Empire, and the beginning of 
a staunchly secular Turkey.13
Yet these developments coincided with a long history of religious persecution 
by leaders and states. In ancient Rome, Christians suffered several centuries of 
persecution until the emperor Constantine converted to Christianity in 312 AD; 
after his infamous vision of the cross with the words “In this sign you will con-
quer,” Constantine went on to subject pagans to the same relentless treatment, 
partly through discriminatory laws.14 Beginning in the fifteenth century, Spain’s 
monarchy expelled hundreds of thousands of Jews from the country, and perse-
cuted thousands of “New Christians” suspected of continuing to practice Juda-
ism despite being forced to convert.15 Throughout the nineteenth century, national 
struggles against the Ottoman Empire led to large-scale violence against Muslims 
in Greece,16 Serbia,17 and elsewhere. Numerous other countries offer similar exam-
ples. It was religious persecution at its worst—genocide of Jews by the Germans in 
World War II—that led to global commitments to protect all human rights.
Both the UDHR and the ICCPR, as well as subsequent agreements, guarantee 
freedom of religion. Specifically, the UDHR prohibits discrimination on the basis 
of religion, and further proclaims: “Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, 
conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or 
belief, and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or 
private, to manifest his religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship and obser-
vance.” These agreements also establish that “freedom of religion” applies equally 
to the freedom to believe and the freedom to not believe. According to Article 18 
of the ICCPR, “[n]o one shall be subject to coercion which would impair his free-
dom to have or to adopt a religion or belief of his choice.” The U.N. Human Rights 
Committee has clarified that Article 18 “protects theistic, non-theistic and atheistic 
beliefs, as well as the right not to profess any religion or belief,” and that “[t]he 
terms ‘belief ’ and ‘religion’ are to be broadly construed.”18 In practice, this means 
that “freedom of religion” encompasses not only the right to hold and observe 
beliefs of one’s choice, but also the rights to freely change or denounce one’s reli-
gion or beliefs.
At the same time, these documents protect the equal rights of all. The UDHR 
designated equal rights as the highest priority, even in cases of conflict with other 
rights, by clearly stating that “[r]ecognition of the inherent dignity and of the 
equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the founda-
tion of freedom, justice and peace in the world.” Similarly, the U.N. has specified 
that the ICCPR, an enforceable treaty, cannot be used to “sanction discrimination 
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against any group of persons,”19 and that Article 18 in particular “may not be relied 
upon to justify discrimination against women by reference to freedom of thought, 
conscience and religion.”20
The international agreements embodying these values have been widely signed 
and ratified by countries around the world. The 171 U.N. member states that have 
ratified the ICCPR comprise all countries in Europe and Central Asia, 96% of 
those in sub-Saharan Africa, 89% of those in the Americas, 88% of those in South 
Asia, 84% of those in the Middle East and North Africa, and 60% of those in East 
Asia and the Pacific.
Freedom of religion is divided into beliefs and practices. There are no restric-
tions on beliefs. More complex questions emerge around religiously motivated 
actions. Practices can be subject to limitations that are “prescribed by law and 
are necessary to protect public safety, order, health, or morals or the fundamental 
rights and freedoms of others,” including their fundamental rights to equality.21
Historically and still today, religion has been invoked or interpreted by some 
in ways to rationalize and excuse unequal treatment. For example, colonial-
ism and slavery, among other large-scale denials of fundamental human rights, 
have been justified on religious grounds at various points in history. So, too, have 
mass killings.
Like the UDHR, ICCPR, and International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights, the Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National 
or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities protects equal human rights. The 
declaration makes the state responsible for ensuring that while groups covered 
by the declaration can make decisions relevant to the group, those groups can-
not “discriminate in any way against any person on the basis of his/her group 
identity and must take action to secure their equal treatment by and before the 
law.” The declaration then proceeds to discuss with clarity how actions related 
to the group identity must accord with international standards of treating all 
people equally.22
Regional bodies have independently developed principles that likewise honor 
equal treatment of all religions while simultaneously requiring that religious prac-
tice respects all people’s equal rights. For example, the African Charter on Human 
and Peoples’ Rights, ratified by all the continent’s countries but one,23 protects free-
dom of religious practice while explicitly prohibiting discrimination on the basis 
of sex, race, social origin, and other characteristics. Further, the Maputo Protocol, 
an add-on to the charter addressing women’s rights that has been ratified by 36 
African countries and signed by another 15,24 specifically calls for all countries to 
“include in their national constitutions and other legislative instruments . . . the 
principle of equality between women and men and ensure its effective applica-
tion.”25 In guidance detailing the protocol’s commitments, the African Commis-
sion made clear that countries had a duty to ensure religious beliefs did not under-
mine women’s right to health.26
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The State of the World’s Constitutions
Three core principles, grounded in international agreements, can help ensure 
that governments equally support the dignity and fundamental rights of all, 
regardless of religion, belief, or nonbelief. The first is to ensure that the govern-
ment does not privilege one religion over other religions or beliefs. The most 
straightforward approach to doing so is a commitment to secular government. 
Second, countries must ensure that there is no religious discrimination by public 
or private institutions, to the extent the constitution covers the private sector. 
Third, governments must protect freedom of belief for all in their borders, and 
protect freedom of practice up to the point where it infringes on the fundamental 
rights of others.
Like equal rights, freedom of religion and separation of religion and state are 
principles that societies around the world have long deemed valuable, including 
within their constitutional documents. The Constitution of Medina, believed to 
have been drafted by the Islamic prophet Mohammad in the early seventh century, 
explicitly protected freedom of religion for all within the city walls.27 The Magna 
Carta, drafted in 1215, declared “that the English church shall be free,” interpreted 
by some to provide an early guarantee of separation between religion and state.28 
The Great Law of Peace, considered the oral constitution of the Iroquois confed-
eracy that predated European colonization of North America, included freedom 
of religion as a fundamental principle.29 In the United States, freedom of religion 
and separation of religion and state were understood to be so foundational that 
these principles were enshrined in the constitution’s first amendment in 1789. Yet 
in the modern human rights era, how do constitutions protect religious freedom 
while ensuring equality?
In this chapter, we seek to understand how constitutions address equality across 
people with different beliefs, ensure equality between believers and nonbelievers, 
and protect religious freedom without allowing infringements of other rights. To 
identify the full range of approaches, we comprehensively examined references to 
religion and belief throughout each constitution’s text. As we will explore, consti-
tutions often contain conflicting provisions with regard to religion. For example, 
some guarantee equal rights regardless of religion, but nevertheless prioritize a 
single religion elsewhere in the text. Others proclaim their countries secular, but 
give special recognition to a particular religion legally or symbolically.
Our analysis proceeds in three in-depth sections. In the first, we look at the 
constitutions that come closest to guaranteeing equal rights regardless of religion 
or belief by fully enshrining the principles outlined above. In the second, we exam-
ine those constitutions with provisions explicitly limiting rights based on religion 
or establishing a role for religion in governance. Third, we analyze those consti-
tutions that do not formally treat religion as a source of law, but do recognize a 
particular religious heritage or tradition, or favor religion generally, thus failing to 
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treat all religions and beliefs equally. Within each section, we explore the diversity 
of constitutional choices countries have made, while drawing on case studies to 
understand how these choices may matter.
By contrast to constitutional protections of equality on other grounds, equal 
rights on the basis of religion cannot be largely measured by examining nondis-
crimination provisions alone. Our goal in this chapter is instead to provide an 
overview of the wide-ranging constitutional approaches to this important issue, 
and to highlight the contradictions within constitutional texts that preclude their 
straightforward categorization.
HOW C ONSTITUTIONS CAN GUAR ANTEE EQUAL 
RIGHT S AND EQUAL TREATMENT ACROSS RELIGIONS
Generally, provisions governing religious life fall into those addressing the rights 
of the individual, and those addressing religion’s role in the public sphere. Fully 
protecting equality requires addressing both elements.
Various pathways allow for fully protecting equal rights, regardless of religion, 
belief, or nonbelief, while simultaneously upholding other fundamental rights. 
For example, a country could adopt a “multidenominational” or “multicultural” 
approach that supports all religions equally. This approach typically welcomes 
religious expression in the public sphere by people of all faiths, and may provide 
tax exemptions or other financial support to religious groups. At the same time, 
to adequately protect equality and dignity for all and avoid privileging religiosity 
over nonbelief, this country would protect the rights of nonreligious people and 
ensure that nonreligious organizations with similar civic, educational, or chari-
table purposes are eligible for all the same benefits as the religious groups. Finally, 
this country would ensure that the public or private exercise of religious beliefs 
does not violate the rights of others.
A second possible approach is to completely separate religion and state. Under 
this approach, religious groups receive no privileges or special recognition from 
the government, and religious practice is largely confined to the private sphere 
rather than supported by public resources or institutions. This country would 
also clearly protect freedom of religion, limiting religious practice only where 
it affects others’ fundamental rights. Finally, this country would guarantee non-
discrimination and equal rights regardless of whether people have any belief 
in religion.
Currently, just 7% of constitutions cover all elements described above: 
nondiscrimination; freedom of religion, including freedom to not believe; 
limitations on religious practice to protect people’s rights; and no implicit or 
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• Article 7: “The state and religious communities shall be separate. Religious 
communities shall enjoy equal rights; they shall pursue their activities freely.”
• Article 14: “In Slovenia everyone shall be guaranteed equal human rights 
and fundamental freedoms irrespective of . . . religion, political or other 
conviction.”
• Article 15: “Human rights and fundamental freedoms shall be limited only by 
the rights of others and in such cases as are provided by this Constitution.”
• Article 41: “Religious and other beliefs may be freely professed in private and 
public life.”30
Likewise, Nicaragua covers these elements through four separate articles:
• Article 14: “The State has no official religion.”
• Article 27: “There shall be no discrimination based on birth, nationality, politi-
cal belief, race, gender, language, religion, opinion, origin, economic position or 
social condition.”
• Article 28: “Everyone has the right to freedom of conscience and thought and to 
profess or not profess a religion.”
• Article 69: “All persons, either individually or in a group, have the right to 
manifest their religious beliefs in public or private, through worship, practices 
and teachings. No one may evade obedience to the law or impede others from 
exercising their rights and fulfilling their duties by invoking religious beliefs or 
dispositions.”31
Burkina Faso’s constitution addresses each element as follows:
• Article 1: “Discrimination of all sorts, notably those founded on race, ethnicity, 
region, color, sex, language, religion, caste, political opinions, wealth and birth, 
are prohibited.”
• Article 7: “The freedom of belief, of non-belief, of conscience, of religious opin-
ion, [of] philosophy, of exercise of belief . . . are guaranteed by this Constitution, 
under reserve of respect for the law, for public order, for good morals and for 
the human person.”
• Article 31: “Burkina Faso is a democratic, unitary and secular State.”32
As Table 1 illustrates, some types of provisions, such as nondiscrimination on the 
basis of religion, are widespread; protections for the right to nonbelief are less 
common. Examining each element individually provides further insights into why 
these provisions matter and where there are opportunities for strengthening pro-
tections for equality.
Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Religion
As with other areas of equal rights, ensuring nondiscrimination on the basis of 
religion is foundational. Evidence shows that religious discrimination continues 
to limit access to basic opportunities and institutions, while having wide-ranging 
health impacts. For example, in Denmark, which lacks any protections against dis-
crimination in its constitution, a 2017 survey found that over one in five Muslims 
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had experienced discrimination in the preceding five years in employment, edu-
cation (as a parent/guardian), or housing.33 In Greece, where the constitution 
recognizes the Greek Orthodox Church as the “prevailing religion” and the vast 
majority of citizens identify as Orthodox, research has shown that members of 
minority faiths, such as Pentecostals and Jehovah’s Witnesses, consistently receive 
fewer callbacks and lower initial salary offers.34 In many countries, discrimination 
on the basis of religion (or perceived religion) intersects with discrimination on 
the basis of race/ethnicity and nationality.35
Similarly, violence targeting members of particular religious groups, or those 
perceived to be members of those groups, remains commonplace. In 2017, 1,749 
people were victims of antireligious hate crimes in the United States; over half 
were targeted for being Jewish, and nearly one-fifth for being Muslim.36 Moreover, 
these figures likely underestimate the scope of the problem. In a 2013 survey span-
ning Europe, 64% of respondents who reported having experienced anti-Semitic 
physical violence or threats of violence said they had not contacted the police 
about the most serious incident.37
Globally, 78% of constitutions explicitly guarantee equality and nondiscrimina-
tion based on religion or belief (Map 12). For example, Peru’s constitution states: 
“Every person has the right .  .  . [t]o equality before the law. No person shall be 
discriminated against on the basis of . . . religion, opinion, . . . or any other distin-
guishing feature.”38
These provisions appear more frequently in more recently enacted 
constitutions: half (56%) of those adopted before 1970 explicitly guarantee 
equal rights regardless of religion, compared to 92% of those adopted in 2010–
17 (see Figure 7).
As with provisions banning discrimination on other grounds, constitutional 
protections against religious discrimination can play a critical role in ensuring 
a given policy or practice does not target a specific group. A recent case from 
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In 2015, two teachers in North Rhine-Westphalia suddenly found themselves 
facing unemployment—not because of their performance or budget issues, but 
because of their attire. Both teachers were Muslim women who wore the Islamic 
headscarf, which they understood as a requirement of their faith. Yet under a new 
state law, “political, religious, or other ideological expressions by public school 
teachers” were prohibited if they had “the potential to endanger or disturb state 
neutrality or the peace at school.”39
The law made an explicit exception for the expression of Christian traditions. 
However, the Islamic headscarf was quickly deemed a violation. Both teachers 
received warnings from their employers after the law went into effect. One of 
them, a social science teacher, offered to instead wear a cap and matching turtle-
neck, but school authorities found that this substitute could still be perceived as 
a “manifestation of Islamic faith,” and was thus prohibited. The second, a Turkish 
language teacher who simply refused to comply with the ban, was fired.
In an effort to keep their jobs, the women took their case to court. In a 6–2 
decision, the German Constitutional Court upheld the law, but found that it had 
been incorrectly applied. As long as teachers’ visible expressions of their faith were 
not accompanied by proselytizing, the Court found, they did not undermine the 
state’s religious neutrality or infringe upon students’ right to education free from 
religious indoctrination.40 Additionally, the Court ruled that the law’s exemp-
tion for Christian symbols and traditions was discriminatory and consequently 
invalid.41 Finally, the Court noted that since women alone wore the headscarf for 
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FIGURE 7. Explicit constitutional guarantee of equality or nondiscrimination across religion by 
year of constitutional adoption
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The issue of restrictions on religious apparel has raised constitutional ques-
tions in many countries, and courts have reached different conclusions sometimes 
because of different decision makers and at other times because the questions 
relating to equal treatment and impact on both religious practice and other human 
rights differ.43 A full review of these cases is beyond the scope of this chapter, and 
the topic as a whole raises many complex considerations. Sometimes, however, the 
matter before the court is relatively straightforward. The law in Germany, which 
banned teachers from wearing attire associated with a minority religion while spe-
cifically allowing teachers to wear Christian symbols, provides a clear-cut example 
of religious discrimination, which the constitution, and specifically its guarantee 
that “no one may be placed at a disadvantage or favoured because of his or her 
faith or religious views,” was well positioned to address.44
No Role for Religion in Governance or Support for Particular Faiths
As the German Constitutional Court’s reasoning suggests, one important com-
ponent of equality across religions is ensuring that the government does not 
implicitly or explicitly support one religion over others, or over nonbelief. The 
same principles and concerns apply to constitutional texts themselves. In some 
countries, the constitution explicitly supports a specific religion, which may also 
be a source of law. In others, the constitution articulates a commitment to religious 
neutrality, but also contains religious references indicating a preference for a spe-
cific set of beliefs. In either case, the constitutional language is at odds with full 
equal rights and treatment of people of all religions and beliefs.
In total, 41% of constitutions establish state secularism or separation of reli-
gion and state. For example, France’s constitution provides: “France shall be an 
indivisible, secular, democratic and social Republic.”45 However, nearly half of these 
constitutions nevertheless include religious references or specify a role for religion.
Among the 22% of constitutions that include an unconditional commitment to 
secularism, a handful explicitly place limitations on the relationship between gov-
ernment and religion. For example, Japan’s constitution states that “[n]o religious 
organization shall receive any privileges from the State, nor exercise any political 
authority. .  .  . The State and its organs shall refrain from religious education or 
any other religious activity,” and further clarifies that “[n]o public money or other 
property shall be expended or appropriated for the use, benefit or maintenance of 
any religious institution or association.”46
Freedom of Religion—and Freedom to Not Believe
Despite some overlap with protections against religious discrimination, freedom of 
religion more specifically guarantees that the state will not interfere with individu-
als’ beliefs. The freedom to hold beliefs of one’s choosing, or to hold no religious 
beliefs, is central to broader protections for civil and political rights, and to building 
societies that allow for diversity of thought and opinion. Freedom of religion should 
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also include the freedom to change or denounce a religion. These protections are 
critical everywhere, but especially in countries that maintain an official state religion 
or where minority religions or the nonreligious have historically faced persecution.
Today, the vast majority of national constitutions—95%—take some approach 
to protecting freedom of religion or belief (Map 13). However, 18% of constitutions 
state that they guarantee freedom of religion, but are affiliated with a specific reli-
gion. Similarly, 9% of constitutions have language guaranteeing freedom of reli-
gion, but have a strong state religion that governs public and/or private life, which 
may directly limit full expression of freedom of religion for religious minorities.
Further, only 25% of constitutions explicitly protect the freedom to not believe, 
practice, or disclose one’s religion (Map 14). For example, Russia’s constitution 
provides: “Everyone shall be guaranteed freedom of conscience and religion, 
Denied in full or part
for at least some religions
No specific provision
Guaranteed, but strong state religion
Guaranteed, but state affiliated with specific religion
Guaranteed and no state religion
MAP 13. Does the constitution take an explicit approach to protect ng 
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including the right to profess individually or collectively any religion or not to 
profess any religion, and freely to choose, possess and disseminate religious and 
other convictions and act in accordance with them.”47 Similarly, Japan’s constitu-
tion establishes that “[n]o person shall be compelled to take part in any religious 
act, celebration, rite or practice.”48
Only 23% of constitutions protect the right to change religion.
Protections for the Rights of Others
Constitutional provisions on freedom of religion take a range of approaches to 
distinguishing between belief and practice, and particularly whether restrictions 
on religious practice to protect others’ fundamental human rights are permis-
sible. Religious conduct is protected from government interference, but subject 
to limitations: again, as the ICCPR establishes, countries can limit religiously 
motivated actions where such restrictions are “prescribed by law and are neces-
sary to protect public safety, order, health, or morals or the fundamental rights 
and freedoms of others.”49 These limitations are designed to provide protection 
against religious practices that have discriminatory impacts or jeopardize equal 
access to education, healthcare, employment, and other universal human rights. 
Restrictions intended to protect the fundamental rights of others are both consis-
tent with the ICCPR and essential to maintaining the balance between freedom 
of religion and equality.
Some constitutions make clear that religious conduct can be limited, even if 
belief is unqualified. For example, Greece’s constitution states: “Freedom of reli-
gious conscience is inviolable. . . . All known religions shall be free and their rites 
of worship shall be performed unhindered and under the protection of the law. 
The practice of rites of worship is not allowed to offend public order or the good 
usages.”50 However, others leave this distinction more open-ended, which may 
engender case law challenging what “freedom of religion” truly encompasses. The 
United States, for instance, simply provides: “Congress shall make no law respect-
ing an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.”51 In one 
of its earliest “free exercise” cases, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld a federal law 
banning polygamy, finding that “[l]aws are made for the government of actions, 
and while they cannot interfere with mere religious belief and opinions, they may 
with practices.”52
Only 46% of constitutions explicitly prevent freedom of religion from infringing 
on the rights and freedoms of others, including their right to equality (Map 15). For 
example, Antigua and Barbuda’s constitution states that like other rights, freedom 
of religion is “subject to such limitations . . . to ensure that the enjoyment of the said 
rights and freedoms by any individual does not prejudice the rights and freedoms 
of others or the public interest.”53 Much smaller numbers include language spe-
cifically prohibiting the use of religion to incite hatred or create social divisions, or 
allowing limitations on freedom of religion only to protect others’ religious beliefs. 
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While important restrictions, these narrowly worded provisions offer little protec-
tion against religious acts that violate fundamental rights more broadly.
HOW C OUNTRIES CAN BE REPRESSIVE OF RELIGIOUS 
PR ACTICE AND EQUAL RIGHT S
By contrast to the approaches above, some countries’ constitutions clearly privilege 
one religion, or fail to provide essential safeguards for equality and dignity across 
religions. In these countries, the presence of even one provision explored in this 
section creates a significant barrier to full equality. At the same time, the severity 
of the risk to rights varies markedly: a number of countries include a range of ele-
ments that restrict freedom of religion simultaneously.
Altogether, 16% of constitutions include provisions limiting rights for minority 
religions. In some countries, freedom of religion is protected for the majority reli-
gion, but minority faiths and nonbelievers face restrictions. Countries’ approaches 
to religion can also be discriminatory if they impose a specific set of religious 
beliefs on the population. Some countries apply the law of a designated religion 
directly through their constitutions; others require the top positions in govern-
ment to be held by adherents of a specific religion. Similarly, some constitutions 
require that any laws passed in the country be consistent with religious law or 
principles—essentially elevating the religion to constitutional status. Finally, some 
constitutions allow religious law to supersede constitutional provisions either 
overall or in areas with clear implications for equality, such as family law.
Importantly, even if countries clearly privilege a specific religion in the law, 
this does not mean that other protections of individual rights are unimportant. 
No universal guarantee
of religious freedom
No relevant restrictions or
right is explicitly inviolable
Protection of others' religious beliefs 
or secularism of the state
Protection from incitement to hatred
Explicit protection of rights of others
MAP 15. Does the constitution explicitly protect freedom of religion from infringing 
on the rights of other ?
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Explicit protections of the equal rights of women and other groups, for example, 
can provide tools for challenging discriminatory interpretations of religious law. 
Further, as demonstrated by a case from Malaysia detailed later in this chapter, 
protections for freedom of religion have made a difference even in countries with 
a religious government. However, this case also underscores the limits of freedom 
of religion alone, and the challenges to effectively practicing one’s faith within a 
broader legal context that privileges a single religion.
Constitutions That Allow Religion to Govern or 
Take Precedence over Equal Rights
One way that countries express a clear preference for one religion over others is 
by designating a state religion. Some countries’ constitutions specify that reli-
gious law governs public or private life, while others designate a particular reli-
gion as historically or culturally significant. While this latter approach may not 
carry explicit legal implications, it normatively privileges one religion in a way 
that would be unimaginable in application to race/ethnicity in the twenty-first 
century. Both of these approaches are inconsistent with a full commitment to 
equality. However, those countries where religion is the basis of governance, or 
is allowed to take precedence over constitutional equal rights, pose the graver 
threat to equality both for people of different faiths and for groups the religion 
discriminates against.
Religion Governs Public Life
Altogether, in 10% of countries, religion governs public life by requiring the execu-
tive to be a member of a specific religion and/or having religious law govern public 
as well as family life (see Map 16). In the Middle East and North Africa, 74% of coun-
tries provide a role for religious law in governance, more than any other region. For 
example, Kuwait’s constitution provides: “The religion of the State is Islam, and the 
Islamic Sharia shall be a main source of legislation.”54 Further, many of these coun-
tries lack full protections for equal rights on the basis of gender, sexual orientation, 
and gender identity, which are common bases of discrimination in religious law. 
The combination of elevating religion to have legal authority and failing to protect 
all core aspects of equality poses significant risks to the rights of large populations.
Religion Governs Family Life
Religion governs family but not public life in an additional two constitutions that 
are affiliated with, or under the jurisdiction of, a specific religion. These include 
countries that establish religious family law courts. For example, Jordan’s constitu-
tion establishes that “Islam is the religion of the state” and stipulates that Sharia 
Courts have exclusive jurisdiction in “matters of personal status of Muslims.”55 This 
approach differs from that of countries that have no state religion but are willing 
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to recognize religious law in family matters, while requiring conformance with the 
constitution; the example of South Africa’s approach is discussed toward the end 
of this chapter. By contrast, in countries where religious law governs family life 
automatically, many people have no say in whether they are bound by religious law 
with respect to marriage, inheritance, and other issues.
Religious Law Can Supersede Constitution, or Laws Cannot Contradict Religion
Third, 4% of countries specify that religious law can prevail over some or all con-
stitutional provisions. In Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Somalia, religious law can super-
sede the constitution in its entirety. For example, Saudi Arabia’s constitution states: 
“The authority of the regime is derived from the holy qur’an and the prophet’s 
sunnah which rule over this [the constitution] and all other state laws.”56
In Ethiopia, Kenya, Malaysia, and the Maldives, religious law may prevail over 
constitutional provisions related to personal law, discrimination, or fundamental 
rights and freedoms. For example, Ethiopia’s constitution states: “This Constitu-
tion shall not preclude the adjudication of disputes relating to personal and family 
laws in accordance with religious or customary laws.”57 In the Gambia, religious 
law is generally subordinate to the constitution, but can prevail over discrimina-
tion and personal law.
Finally, 5% of constitutions state that legislation cannot contradict religious law. 
For example, Afghanistan’s constitution states: “No law shall contravene the tenets 
and provisions of the holy religion of Islam in Afghanistan.”58
The Risks for Equality of Making Religious Law Supreme
Notably, even newer constitutions have tended to retain provisions making religious 
law supreme. Some scholars argue that this trend is not greatly concerning because 
constitutions with “Islamic supremacy clauses,” such as that of Afghanistan, often also 
Religion governs public life
as well as private life
Religion governs family life
No jurisdictional control
MAP 16. What is the constitutional role of religion in countries where the state 
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include relatively substantial protections for civil or political rights, possibly reflecting 
the role of political coalitions and compromises in their drafting.59 However, under 
Islamic supremacy clauses, these broader rights may fully extend only to a minority 
of the population. For example, if courts interpret these clauses to allow prohibitions 
on same-sex relationships and restrictions on women’s movement, general consti-
tutional guarantees of freedom of association do not truly apply to all. Likewise, if 
courts decide that Islamic supremacy clauses allow for preferential treatment of men 
in inheritance, constitutional guarantees of gender equality are incomplete.
These are not just hypothetical situations. For example, the Maldives’s 2008 
constitution includes extensive protections of fundamental rights, equality, and 
the right to privacy, but the country’s 2014 penal code nevertheless criminalized 
homosexuality.60 The legislation’s stated purpose was “to establish a system of pro-
hibitions and penalties to deal with conduct that unjustifiably and inexcusably 
causes or threatens harm to those individual or public interests entitled to legal 
protection, including Islam.” This justification aligns with the constitution’s state 
religion provision, which establishes that Islam is a basis of law and that “[n]o law 
contrary to any tenet of Islam shall be enacted in the Maldives.”61
Importantly, religion is not inherently at odds with equal rights, which arose in 
many different belief systems, philosophies, and religions around the world.62 In 
fact, many cases of advocacy for greater equality have been partly based on reli-
gious beliefs. In Morocco, Muslim women’s groups have led efforts to reform dis-
criminatory laws by invoking Islamic principles.63 In Southeast Asia, Buddhists led 
movements for democracy and equal human rights beginning in the 1980s.64 And 
the U.S. civil rights movement was deeply informed by the faith-infused rhetoric 
of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., an ordained minister, and supported by Christians, 
Jews, and humanists, among others.65 Yet, given the wide-ranging interpretations 
of doctrine and the history of discrimination, constitutional protections are essen-
tial to ensure every person’s equal rights are respected.
Constitutions That Limit Freedom of Religion for Specific Groups
A fourth way that constitutions infringe on equality is by establishing discrimina-
tory standards for religious expression. Some constitutions explicitly limit free-
dom of religion for particular groups. These provisions range in severity from 
those completely limiting certain groups’ free exercise of religion to those sending 
exclusionary messages by targeting aspects of religious exercise.
Broad Restrictions on Practice by Religious Minorities
In some countries, discriminatory limits on freedom of religion take form as 
broad prohibitions on religious practice. For example, Iran’s constitution provides: 
“Zoroastrian, Jewish, and Christian Iranians are the only recognized religious 
minorities, who, within the limits of the law, are free to perform their religious rites 
and ceremonies, and to act according to their own canon in matters of personal 
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affairs and religious education.”66 All unnamed religious groups, such as Iran’s 
300,000 Baha’is, have no constitutional right to practice their religion.67 Moreover, 
the constitution accords “full respect” and “official status” only to followers of six 
specified schools of Islam.68 Reports indicate widespread harassment, discrimina-
tion, and state violence against unprotected religious minorities in Iran,69 while 
Muslims from other branches of Islam, including many Sunnis, face significant 
discrimination and marginalization in employment and political representation.70 
Evidence suggests even the named minority groups face discriminatory treatment, 
reflecting the impacts of the constitution’s clear privileging of a single belief sys-
tem. These constitutional provisions limiting religious freedom are buttressed by 
laws criminalizing “enmity against God.”71
An example of differential treatment of groups comes from Liechtenstein. While 
not explicitly limiting the right to practice to specific religious minorities, the con-
stitution draws a distinction in rights between adherents of the state religion and 
members of other faiths: “The Roman Catholic Church is the State Church and as 
such enjoys the full protection of the State; other confessions shall be entitled to 
practise their creeds and to hold religious services to the extent consistent with 
morality and public order.”72 While Liechtenstein’s provision may embody a lesser 
degree of repression, evidence suggests that the country’s minority religions strug-
gle for equality. For example, although 5.9% of Liechtenstein’s 39,000 residents are 
Muslims, there are no mosques in the country, and Muslims have faced difficulty 
in seeking to rent rooms for prayer.73
Targeting Proselytism
A few countries’ constitutions ban proselytizing by specific religious groups. For 
example, Somalia’s constitution proclaims: “No religion other than Islam can be 
propagated in the Federal Republic of Somalia.”74 While blanket limits on coercive 
forms of proselytizing have been deemed justified by regional and international 
tribunals,75 selective limits that target only particular religions and ban noncoer-
cive proselytizing are discriminatory.
Exclusionary Provisions
Finally, some constitutions include provisions that do not target religious prac-
tice as directly, but send a message of exclusion of particular religions (Table 2). 
For example, under Switzerland’s constitution, freedom of belief is guaranteed, 
but “the construction of minarets [the mosque towers from which Muslims are 
called to prayer] is prohibited.”76 This provision resulted from a 2009 referendum 
in which 57.5% of voters supported the amendment. At the time, there were only 
four minarets across the country. Responding to the vote, Farhad Afshar, direc-
tor of the Coordination of Islamic Organizations in Switzerland, remarked: “Most 
painful for us is not the minaret ban, but the symbol sent by this vote. Muslims do 
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The Importance of Other Constitutional Protections in the Context of Religious 
Government
While giving one religion a role in governance inherently conflicts with full equal-
ity across religions and beliefs, other provisions within a constitution can nev-
ertheless provide important and impactful safeguards for the equal rights of all. 
Specifically, protections for freedom of religion and comprehensive guarantees of 
nondiscrimination in countries with state religions can provide important founda-
tions for ensuring the rights of religious minorities and challenging discrimina-
tion that affects other groups.
As explored in the preceding section, the establishment of a state religion 
doubtless creates a significant threat to freedom of religion. Moreover, the greater 
the role of a state religion as a source of both norms and law, the greater the likeli-
hood that religious minorities will face barriers to observing their faiths, and that 
people without religious beliefs will face pressure to adhere to religious doctrine.
Still, even as full religious freedom may be unattainable in countries with a 
state religion, guarantees of freedom of religion remain essential in these contexts. 
International treaties uphold this view by clearly establishing that governments 
must protect religious minorities’ rights and religious freedom regardless of the 
state-religion relationship. For example, as affirmed by the U.N. Human Rights 
Committee in a comment on the ICCPR: “The fact that a religion is recognized as 
a State religion or that it is established as official or traditional or that its followers 
comprise the majority of the population, shall not result in any impairment of the 
enjoyment of any of the rights under the Covenant, including articles 18 [free-
dom of religion] and 27 [rights of religious minorities], nor in any discrimination 
against adherents of other religions or non-believers.”78
Malaysia provides one example of these practical implications. Under Article 3 
of Malaysia’s constitution, “Islam is the religion of the Federation; but other reli-
gions may be practised in peace and harmony in any part of the Federation.”79 
Article 11 further provides: “Every person has the right to profess and practise his 
religion.”80 According to census figures, 61% of Malaysians identify as Muslims, 
while 20% are Buddhists and 9% are Christians.81
Malaysia is also one of a few countries that include religion on national ID cards. 
In 2015, Azmi Mohamad Azam Shah, who as an eight-year-old converted to Islam 
with his family, sought to renounce Islam, convert to Christianity, and change his 
name and religious affiliation on his ID card accordingly. Shah, who now goes by 
the name Roneey Anak Rebit, was told by the National Registration Department 
that he would need to bring a letter of release from Islam from the Syariah Court, 
which administers Islamic law. However, the Syariah Court refused to provide the 
letter, claiming lack of jurisdiction since Rebit was no longer a Muslim.
Rebit then challenged the National Registration Department’s requirements 
within the civil legal system. Before the Kuching High Court, Rebit argued that 
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he should be able to change his name and religion without the Syariah Court’s 
approval, by nature of his constitutional right to freedom of religion. In a land-
mark 2016 decision, High Court judge Datuk Yew Jen Kie agreed, citing the consti-
tution’s protections in Article 11. She commented on the decision to the press: “He 
does not need a Syariah Court order to release him from Islam because freedom of 
religion is his constitutional right and only he can exercise that right.”82 In Novem-
ber 2016, Rebit received his new ID card.83
A range of religious groups welcomed the decision. The Association of 
Churches in Sarawak urged the government to “uphold the constitutional rights 
and fundamental liberties accorded by the federal constitution to all citizens of 
Malaysia,” while Sisters in Islam noted approvingly that “[t]his judgment reaffirms 
the supremacy of the Federal Constitution, which under Article 11 defends every 
Malaysian citizen’s right to freedom of religion.”84
Strong protections against discrimination on other grounds can also make a 
difference in countries with a state religion. One example comes from Tunisia.
In 2014, Tunisia adopted a new constitution, drafted by a constituent assembly 
that included both secular groups and members of the country’s religious political 
party. The constitution establishes that Tunisia’s “religion is Islam” and restricts 
eligibility for the presidency to Muslims (though not elevating religious law 
above the constitution); however, it also guarantees freedom of religion and cre-
ates strong protections for gender equality. Beyond explicitly committing to equal 
rights for men and women, the Tunisian Constitution “unequivocally affirms gen-
der equality in the workplace, the right to adequate working conditions, and a fair 
wage for both sexes,” and obliges the state to promote women’s equal political rep-
resentation and work toward eradicating violence against women.85 Responding 
to input from civil society organizations, the final draft omitted earlier-proposed 
references to men and women as “complementary” rather than equal.86
Since its enactment, the constitution has provided a foundation for further 
change: in 2017, President Beji Caid Essebsi launched the Individual Freedoms 
and Equality Committee (COLIBE), tasked with ensuring consistency between 
Tunisia’s laws and new constitution.87 Also in 2017, citing the constitution’s equal 
rights provision, Essebsi called for gender equality in the inheritance law and lifted 
a 44-year ban on Muslim Tunisian women marrying men from other religions, 
which had imposed no equivalent restrictions on Muslim men.88 More recently, 
COLIBE issued a report recommending gender equality in inheritance, the right 
to confer citizenship, and the right to pass on one’s last name to children.89
HOW C ONSTITUTIONS CAN SET UNEQUAL NORMS
The third broad group of constitutions includes those referenced throughout the 
preceding sections, which do not go so far as to make religion the source of 
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law, but do give some special recognition to a particular religion or religious 
views. These types of provisions may be historical holdovers or recently nego-
tiated compromises. However, especially in an era of increased migration and 
growing religious diversity, recognizing ways that constitutions subtly privilege a 
particular set of religious beliefs over others is important for identifying the full 
scope of barriers to equal treatment (Table 3). These provisions may affect not 
only the exercise of rights, but also the cultural norms shaping whether religious 
minorities are welcomed and accepted. Already, 27% of people live in countries 
where they are religious minorities, and this figure will likely increase in the 
coming decades.90
Altogether, 57% of constitutions include provisions communicating a pref-
erence for one religion over others, or for religion generally over nonbelief. In 
some of these countries, the constitution designates a “state religion” but does 
not endow that religion with legal authority, or acknowledges a history or special 
relationship with a specific religion. For example, the preamble of the Bahamas’ 
constitution references “an abiding respect for Christian values and the Rule 
of Law.”91
Self-identified secular countries also commonly include a role for religion. 
Indeed, only around half of the constitutions that establish state secularism or 
separation of religion and state fully reflect those very principles in their text 
(Map 17). In the remainder, the constitution outlines a special relationship with 
a specific religion, privileges religion over nonbelief, requires leaders to swear on 
God’s name in the oath of office, or references God in the preamble. This also 
includes one country (Kenya) that provides for Islamic courts.
For example, Bulgaria’s constitution states: “Religious institutions shall be sepa-





God included in oath of office
References God in preamble
No role for religion
MAP 17. How do countries that identify in their constitution as secular treat 
religion?
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traditional religion in the Republic of Bulgaria.” Croatia’s constitution commits 
to supporting religious groups without specifying equal support for non-religious 
groups with similar goals:
All religious communities shall be equal before the law and clearly separate from 
the state.
Religious communities shall be free, in compliance with law, to publicly conduct 
religious services, open schools, academies or other institutions, and welfare and 
charitable organizations and to manage them, and they shall enjoy the protection 
and assistance of the state in their activities.92
Finally, 18% of constitutions include provisions or language that support reli-
gious practice, but do not specify a particular religion. In most cases, the preamble 
includes references to God and the constitution does not explicitly address the 
relationship between the state and religion. This includes one country (Switzer-
land) that leaves the question of separation between state and religion to subna-
tional units.
THE C OMPLEXIT Y AND IMPORTANCE OF 
ADDRESSING RELIGION AROUND THE WORLD
As this analysis reveals, few countries have constitutional provisions that compre-
hensively protect: (1) freedom of religion, belief, and nonbelief, with a safeguard 
for the rights of others; (2) nondiscrimination on the basis of religion or belief; 
and (3) the separation of religion and government. Many of the most significant 
constitutional restrictions on equality are found in the Middle East and North 
Africa, a region including 14 of the world’s 20 countries with a state religion gov-
erning public and private life. Nonetheless, discriminatory restrictions on reli-
gious freedom cut across countries in Europe and elsewhere, including Switzer-
land and Liechtenstein.
Furthermore, while a substantial number of countries identify as “secular,” this 
designation belies notable variation in national approaches. Nearly half of these 
countries include references to either a specific religion or God, which implic-
itly endorses monotheistic faiths. Consequently, even among constitutions that 
include commitments to secularism, many cannot assert “neutrality” on religion’s 
role in society. Additionally, this variation in how countries define “secular” in the 
text is mirrored by variation in courts’ application of the concept.93
As countries revise existing constitutions or draft new ones, their treatment of 
equal rights across religion and belief is an important area for continued review 
and advancement. While there are various constitutional approaches to protecting 
equality across religions, guaranteeing freedom of religion and the separation of 
religion and government are two foundational elements.
Further, there is ample reason to believe this approach works, if we mea-
sure effectiveness by the lack of religious discrimination and the presence of 
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flourishing religious practice. A series of studies across the world’s constitutions 
provide interesting insights into how religion provisions shape exclusionary 
practice and equality for people of all faiths and beliefs. They first examine coun-
tries’ religious legislation, including whether they impose restrictions on inter-
faith marriages, fund religion or require religious education in schools, or have 
religious appointments to government offices. They then assess the relationship 
between constitutional provisions concerning religion and the existence of these 
types of religious laws.
In short, when constitutions guarantee freedom of religion, there is less reli-
gious discrimination by the government in the form of religious legislation. Simi-
larly, when constitutions guarantee separation of religion and state or prohibit reli-
gious discrimination, countries are less likely to legally privilege or burden specific 
religions.94 Meanwhile, countries with an official religion are much likelier to have 
religious discrimination in the law. This is true overall. However, the countries 
where this most commonly occurs, likely because of the larger role given to reli-
gious law, are Muslim-majority countries.95
Most interestingly, religious practice flourishes in countries with more religious 
freedom. Both restrictions on religious freedom and state religions negatively 
impact the percent of the population that is regularly practicing their religion. 
Those countries that guarantee freedom of religion and have no state religion saw 
religious practice grow in the years following their constitutions’ passage.96
IMPLEMENTING RELIGIOUS FREED OMS  
IN THE C OURT S
As explored previously, constitutional text can provide a starting point for guar-
anteeing that all people have an equal right to practice their religion, while ensur-
ing that religious practices do not undermine others’ fundamental rights. How-
ever, even compared to other complex topics explored in this book, freedom of 
religion presents unique challenges with respect to ensuring consistent rulings 
across courts. Courts are tasked with continually defining and redefining the line 
between freedom of religion and freedom from religion. Is allowing an Amish fam-
ily to homeschool their 14-year-old child protecting their freedom of religion—
or infringing on the child’s right to education?97 Can a private business choose 
to serve only those clients whose views and relationships align with the owner’s 
religious beliefs?98 Does a statute prohibiting stores from selling goods on Sun-
days infringe business owners’ religious freedom?99 Can someone be convicted for 
refusing military service based on their religious beliefs?100
These are among the many questions about religious freedom that have reached 
countries’ highest courts. Yet although constitutional texts rarely provide crys-
tal-clear answers to cases presenting nuanced sets of facts, two factors that may 
influence decision-making are the extent to which constitutions protect other 
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fundamental rights, and whether constitutions clearly state that equal rights take 
precedence. Specifically, the strength of other equality provisions in a country’s 
constitution—such as whether it unequivocally protects equal rights regardless of 
sexual orientation—may affect how courts interpret religious freedom in a given 
set of circumstances. Similarly, the strength of protections of other groups’ equal 
rights, including those of women, can influence how judges rule when religious 
practices conflict with equality.
These relationships among rights are explored further below, through cases 
from the United States and South Africa. As emphasized throughout this chapter, 
international law is clear that the exercise of religion, while an important free-
dom, should not infringe on others’ rights. Yet to fully understand this principle’s 
implications—and identify strategies to support its realization—it is important to 
examine some common manifestations of this conflict in practice. At the national 
level, there are two common and significant ways religion can threaten others’ 
fundamental equal rights: first, through the invocation of freedom of religion as 
a justification to discriminate, including by private businesses and employers; 
and, second, through constitutions that allow religious law to supersede equal 
rights provisions.
Freedom of Religion, not Freedom to Discriminate
As previously noted, nearly half of countries (46%) explicitly acknowledge that 
some restrictions may be placed on religious conduct to protect people’s fun-
damental rights and freedoms; other countries apply similar analyses through 
the courts. However, the extent to which equal rights take precedence over reli-
giously motivated discrimination often hinges on several factors and aspects 
of the country’s constitutional system. These include whether the discrimina-
tion occurred in a public or private setting, who engaged in discrimination, 
and whether the constitution explicitly protects against discrimination for the 
affected group.
In recent years, this tension has emerged with respect to sexual orientation 
in a number of countries. A range of courts have evaluated constitutional chal-
lenges involving businesses or service providers that decline to serve lesbian or 
gay clients, arguing that doing so would conflict with their religious freedom. 
An example from the United States highlights the impact of lacking clear consti-
tutional protections for marginalized groups and shifting norms on how courts 
negotiate the balance between religious freedom and equal rights.
In Colorado, an antidiscrimination law prohibited businesses serving the pub-
lic from discriminating on the basis of sexual orientation. However, citing his 
Christian beliefs, a bakery owner refused to make a cake for a same-sex couple’s 
wedding. According to the baker, being compelled to make the cake would require 
him to express support for gay marriage, violating his First Amendment rights of 
freedom of religion and expression.
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In 2018, the Supreme Court ruled 7–2 in favor of the baker in Masterpiece 
Cakeshop v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission.101 The legal basis of the decision 
was narrow: rather than establishing a new constitutional precedent on freedom 
of religion versus equal rights, the Court’s decision rested on its finding that the 
Colorado Civil Rights Commission, which had ruled against the baker after the 
couple filed a complaint, had not acted with “religious neutrality” in assessing the 
baker’s objections.
Perhaps more remarkable, however, was the amicus brief submitted by the U.S. 
Department of Justice (DOJ), which underscored how explicit protections against 
discrimination in constitutional texts and jurisprudence may influence whether 
freedom of religion takes precedence over equal rights. In urging the Court to 
decide in favor of the baker, the DOJ drew a distinction between discrimination by 
businesses based on race and discrimination based on sexual orientation. The brief 
argued that racial discrimination carries greater weight against the First Amend-
ment than sexual orientation discrimination, partly because racial discrimination is 
subject to “strict scrutiny” constitutional review while sexual orientation discrimi-
nation is not. The government further claimed that private racial discrimination 
“violates deeply and widely accepted views of elementary justice,” whereas “opposi-
tion to same-sex marriage has ‘long been held—and continues to be held—in good 
faith by reasonable and sincere people.’ ”102 In other words, the government’s top 
lawyers invoked both inadequate protections in constitutional law and discrimina-
tory social norms to justify continued discrimination against same-sex couples.
This argument aligns with past cases that have excused sexual orientation dis-
crimination on the basis of First Amendment rights, but have not accepted the 
same rationale for racial discrimination.103 Given these precedents, it seems rea-
sonable to infer that the stronger the Court’s rulings have been historically against 
a particular type of discrimination, the likelier it is the Court will find that equal 
rights prevail over religiously motivated exclusion. Constitutionally speaking, 
LGBT+ rights are a relatively new topic, at least in comparison to racial discrim-
ination—and as the DOJ itself noted, there remains less nationwide consensus 
about full equality. It is for this reason that explicit protections against discrimina-
tion on the basis of sexual orientation and gender identity (SOGI), as discussed in 
chapter 6, are so essential.
Pluralistic Legal Systems
Pluralistic legal systems are those that recognize the authority of more than one 
type of law.104 Two major types of pluralistic legal systems are those recognizing 
customary law, and those recognizing religious law. Some countries fall within 
both categories. Generally, however, most countries that recognize customary 
law are former British and French colonies in Africa and Asia;105 in many of 
these countries, customary law was unwritten before colonialism, but certain 
aspects became codified by colonial officials, who often consulted with just a 
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small number of male elders.106 Nearly all countries that recognize religious law 
are Muslim-majority.107
As discussed earlier, international law indicates that any pluralistic system 
should still honor fundamental human rights. There is no reason to believe that 
countries cannot guarantee equality while simultaneously enabling the full exer-
cise of religious freedoms. In 2017, a group of religious leaders from around the 
world, representing various faiths, convened to issue a declaration affirming their 
“deep conviction that our respective religions and beliefs share a common com-
mitment to upholding the dignity and the equal worth of all human beings,” which 
included references to all the foundational religious texts.108 Among the declara-
tion’s 18 commitments are pledges to “promote constructive engagement on the 
understanding of religious texts,” “ensure non-discrimination and gender equal-
ity,” “stand up for the rights of all persons belonging to minorities,” and “monitor 
interpretations, determinations or other religious views that manifestly conflict 
with universal human rights norms and standards.”109
Approaches vary among countries with constitutionally established pluralistic 
systems. In two such countries, South Africa and Cyprus, religious law is explicitly 
subordinate to the constitution. South Africa’s constitution provides that legisla-
tion may recognize “marriages concluded under any tradition, or a system of reli-
gious, personal or family law [and] systems of personal and family law under any 
tradition, or adhered to by persons professing a particular religion,” but that this 
recognition “must be consistent with . . . the Constitution.”110 In Cyprus, family law 
is “subject to the provisions of this Constitution.”111 However, in 13% of countries, 
religious laws can take precedence over the constitution and/or laws cannot be 
enacted if they conflict with religious law or norms, placing equality and other 
fundamental rights at risk.
A significant case from South Africa’s Constitutional Court illustrates the effect 
of language guaranteeing that constitutional equal rights take precedence. When 
Juleiga Daniels’s husband Mogamat died in 1994, the couple had been sharing a 
small home in a Cape Town suburb for 17 years.112 Juleiga had lived there even 
longer, having shared the home with her first husband beginning in 1969. When 
Mogamat died without a will, a judicial officer was appointed to administer his 
estate.113 However, noting that her marriage had been conducted under Muslim 
rites, the officer told Juleiga she had no entitlement to the property.114
Because Juleiga and Mogamat had been married under Islamic law, their union 
was not formally recognized by the state. Therefore, Juleiga was not covered by 
the legal benefits and protections established by the country’s Marriage Act. Con-
sequently, after Mogamat’s death, Juleiga suddenly found herself facing eviction, 
completely excluded from the inheritance rights typically guaranteed to South 
African wives.
Juleiga’s loss of her property rights resulted from how the law treated both 
her religion and her gender. When Juleiga and Mogamat married in 1977, they 
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provided a copy of their marriage certificate to the city, which then transferred 
the tenancy of Juleiga’s home to Mogamat, considering him the “principal bread-
winner.” In 1990, Mogamat entered into an agreement with the property owner 
to purchase the home. Although Juleiga contributed to the purchase price and 
co-signed the deed of sale, after Mogamat died, the property was transferred to 
his estate—and Juleiga was told she had no claim to it since she was not legally his 
“surviving spouse.”
Juleiga decided to challenge this interpretation, arguing that her exclusion 
from the laws on inheritance and maintenance was discriminatory on the basis of 
gender, religion, and marital status. In 2003, her case reached the Constitutional 
Court, where Justice Albie Sachs walked through a careful analysis of the facts 
and the applicable law. Justice Sachs first examined the plain meaning of the term 
“spouse,” finding: “The word ‘spouse’ in its ordinary meaning includes parties to 
a Muslim marriage. . . . It is far more awkward from a linguistic point of view to 
exclude parties to a Muslim marriage from the word ‘spouse’ than to include them. 
. . . Such interpretation owed more to the artifice of prejudice than to the dictates 
of the English language.”115 
Justice Sachs then turned to the intent of both the law and the constitution. 
He noted that the constitution aims to achieve “substantive equality between 
men and women,” although “[t]he reality has been and still in large measure 
continues to be that in our patriarchal culture men find it easier than women to 
receive income and acquire property.”116 Regarding the laws on inheritance and 
maintenance, Justice Sachs proclaimed: “The central question is not whether the 
applicant was lawfully married to the deceased, but whether the protection which 
the Acts intended widows to enjoy should be withheld from relationships such as 
hers.” Using this analytical frame, the Court found that the term “spouse” must 
be interpreted to include a “party to a monogamous Muslim marriage.” Juleiga, 
whose marriage to Mogamat was always monogamous, was thus entitled to stay 
in her home.117
In so doing, the Court affirmed that the constitution’s protection of equal rights 
took precedence over conflicting religious laws. As a concurring opinion from 
Justice Dikgang Moseneke observed, “[t]he tenets of our Constitution prom-
ises religious voluntarism, diversity and independence within the context of the 
supremacy of the Constitution.”118 Further, the decision made clear that under the 
constitution’s clearly articulated guarantee of gender equality, Muslim women 
share the same inheritance rights as women who marry according to other reli-
gious traditions.
C ONCLUSION:  ACHIEVING THE BAL ANCE
Guarantees of the right to freedom of religion, broadly defined, are nearly uni-
versal across constitutions adopted in the past 60 years, and protections against 
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religious discrimination have steadily increased. Yet to truly understand religious 
freedom and equality in a given country, we cannot consider this language alone. 
Many countries that guarantee freedom of religion also privilege one religion in 
governance, effectively undermining full equality across religions, beliefs, and 
nonbeliefs. Likewise, even if they do not specify that religion governs public or 
private life, a range of countries’ constitutions more subtly support one religion 
over others, potentially impeding the development of norms embracing the full 
inclusion of all.
Similarly, even countries that identify as “secular” take a range of approaches 
to religion that do not always treat all religions or beliefs equally. Some of this 
variation is evident in the constitutional text; other points of divergence emerge in 
how courts interpret secularism. This complexity illustrates how taking a “neutral” 
stance to religion—one that is “truly areligious and that neither favors nor disad-
vantages any religion or the non-religious”119—is a challenge on its own, and the 
meaning of “neutrality” will likely remain contentious as religious demographics 
continue to shift with large-scale migration.
Nevertheless, the principles initially established in international law can pro-
vide a valuable framework for resolving even complex cases, and should provide 
a foundation for further constitutional reform. Global agreements are clear that 
states cannot discriminate on the basis of religion, nor can religion be invoked as 
a basis for discrimination on other grounds. Moreover, while freedom of religion 
is central, so too is the freedom to denounce, change, or forego religion entirely, 
and international law recognizes that these are fundamentally personal choices. 
To promote equality, constitution drafters and courts must continue returning 
to and actively advancing these principles. Further, strengthening other rights in 
constitutions—such as rights to health, education, substantive gender equality, 
and nondiscrimination on the basis of SOGI—would provide a stronger consti-




Moving Forward in the 
Face of Backlash
Equal Rights Regardless of Sexual Orientation and 
Gender Identity
The extent of legalized discrimination and violence around the world against 
lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender individuals and other sexual and gender 
minorities (LGBT+)1 remains staggering. As of 2019, 68 countries had criminal-
ized consensual sexual activity between adults of the same sex, nearly all of which 
provide for some length of imprisonment.2 In 32 countries, the maximum prison 
sentence for same-sex relationships ranges from 10 years to life, while the laws of 8 
countries allow for the death penalty.3
The treatment of LGBT+ individuals is also one of the few areas in which a 
significant number of countries are increasing rather than dismantling dis-
crimination in the law. Indeed, while many countries’ criminalization laws are 
historical holdovers, others were enacted much more recently, such as Nigeria’s 
“Same-Sex Marriage Prohibition Act,” adopted in 2013, and the Maldives’s 2014 
Criminal Code.4
Discrimination affects the lives of LGBT+ individuals and their families around 
the world. Across Europe, 13% of LGBT respondents to a 2012 survey reported that 
they had experienced discrimination when applying for jobs in the previous year, 
including 30% of transgender respondents; of those who were working, 19% had 
personally experienced discrimination, while 67% reported witnessing negative 
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treatment toward a colleague perceived to be LGBT.5 Similarly, in a survey of the 
LGBTI population in China, 56% reported experiencing discrimination within 
their families, as did 40% in education and 21% in the workplace.6 According to 
the World Values Survey, which asks respondents across 58 countries for their 
views on important social issues, 54% of adults in the average country surveyed 
would not want a gay person as their neighbor.7 This discrimination—whether by 
the state, private employers, or others in one’s community—can have devastating 
effects on home and personal life, educational and career opportunities, and lead-
ership in public and private spheres.
Legal protections from discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation and 
gender identity (SOGI) lag far behind protections against other common grounds 
of discrimination, like race and religion. Yet in countries where legal protections 
are passed and enforced, the impact can be dramatic, even in the face of the back-
lash that can follow progress.
THE PACE AND POSSIBILIT Y OF CHANGE
In this chapter, we examine what can be done to ensure the removal of discrimina-
tory laws and the enactment of equal rights for those in the LGBT+ community. 
For effective change to happen, which needs to change first: norms or laws?
We believe the answer is that both need to change, but either can change first.
In every area of profound bias, markedly reducing discrimination requires 
changes both in legal rights and in people’s beliefs. Without legal protections 
from discrimination, marginalized populations’ access to education, work, and 
civic and community life can be impaired. Even when the views of the majority of 
the population do change, without legal protections, people have few tools to use 
against institutions that choose to discriminate. But likewise, laws alone are rarely 
enough. While constitutional equal rights can help protect against discrimina-
tory laws and reduce systematic institutional discrimination, constitutional equal 
rights are unlikely to effectively change the behavior of a country’s population as a 
whole unless they contribute to changing people’s beliefs.
While it may be self-evident that both equal legal rights and the public’s beliefs 
about equality need to change, it has been less clear which has to change first. Some 
have argued that laws never change before social values change, while others have 
argued that legal change is a powerful force in itself for changing communities’ 
beliefs. The evidence is clear and compelling. There are strong examples of coun-
tries that enacted laws and expanded constitutional protections—both through 
new constitutions and through court interpretations—well in advance of popular 
support for equal rights, but subsequently saw marked shifts in public opinion in 
favor of equality. There are also examples of countries where social movements led 
to widespread change in public beliefs and legal rights followed.
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Ireland: Broad Public Support Leads to Stronger Rights
Ireland provides an example of a country where norms changed first. In 2015, Ire-
land became the first country in the world to legalize same-sex marriage through 
a popular vote, when 62% voted in favor of a constitutional amendment via refer-
endum.8 This broad popular support for marriage equality reflected a remarkable 
norm shift in a country where 83% of citizens identify as Catholic and where Cath-
olic doctrine had been interpreted as opposing same-sex marriage.9 Many Catho-
lics who voted in favor of the amendment, including clergy members, described 
support for marriage equality as a “natural outgrowth of their faith” rather than 
something that conflicted with it, signaling how even long-standing religious 
norms and traditions are often less rigid than presumed.10
South Africa: A Transformative Constitution Precedes 
Shifts in Public Opinion
The opposite was true in South Africa, which adopted a new constitution guaran-
teeing equal rights well before the public widely accepted the equality of LGBT+ 
individuals. The 1996 constitution grew out of widespread movements for equal-
ity, dignity, and freedom in post-apartheid South Africa. Following many decades 
of among the worst subjugation on the basis of race, the post-apartheid consti-
tutional congress displayed a profound commitment to ensuring all people were 
treated equally.
A wide range of marginalized groups, including LGBT+ advocacy groups, had 
a voice in the drafting of the 1996 constitution.11 After a few key activists worked to 
get an explicit protection of equal rights on the basis of sexual orientation included 
in the 1993 interim constitution, an umbrella organization of 78 LGBT+ organi-
zations, the National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality (NCGLE), formed 
to participate in the work of the Constitutional Assembly as a united force and 
ensure the language was preserved in the final draft.12 As a result of their orga-
nizing, the assembly received 7,032 submissions in favor of retaining the explicit 
protection, and just 564 opposing it.13 The NCGLE focused their advocacy on the 
core principles of equality and nondiscrimination, rather than specific rights like 
marriage, and drew parallels between racial discrimination and discrimination on 
the basis of sexual orientation.14 Their efforts paid off when the new constitution 
was enacted in 1996, which represented a major victory for both the LGBT+ com-
munity in South Africa and LGBT+ movements globally.
Nearly two decades after the post-apartheid constitution prohibited discrimina-
tion on the basis of sexual orientation, surveys reveal that only one-third of South 
Africans believe that society should “accept homosexuality.”15 However, there has 
been progress over time. Between 2012 (the first year the question was asked) and 
2015, the share of South Africans saying they “strongly agreed” with same-sex mar-
riage increased from 1.5% to 9.9%, while the share saying they “strongly disagreed” 
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decreased from 48.5% to 23.4%.16 Moreover, in a survey of 39 countries by the Pew 
Research Center, acceptance of same-sex relationships in South Africa, the only 
African nation to explicitly guarantee equal rights on the basis of sexual orienta-
tion in its constitution, was 24 to 31 percentage points higher than throughout the 
five other African countries surveyed.17
Working in Coalitions to Advance Equal Rights
In South Africa, one key strategy for advancing the constitutional provision 
on sexual orientation was working in partnership with other groups seeking to 
advance equal rights, and identifying both common goals and shared experiences. 
In addition to inviting LGBT+ groups to directly participate in the constitution’s 
drafting, the South African process recognized the interconnectedness of strug-
gles for equal rights across groups and across history, as emphasized by the coun-
try’s Constitutional Court itself: “In the judges’ conceptualization, the struggle for 
equality for LGBT persons flowed from the struggle against racism.”18
Building alliances with other marginalized groups has also been important in 
countries that enacted equal rights by popular vote. For example, in Ecuador dur-
ing the early 2000s, LGBT+ rights groups partnered with the country’s burgeon-
ing feminist and indigenous movements to advocate for more comprehensive pro-
tections of equal rights in the new constitution, including an explicit prohibition 
of discrimination on the basis of both sexual orientation and gender identity.19 The 
2008 constitution—which, in addition to establishing equal rights across SOGI, 
strengthened rights to education and pensions for informal sector workers—was 
approved by popular vote, with 64% voting in favor.20
The Broader Role of Constitutional Rights and Rulings in 
Shifting Views on Equality
LGBT+ individuals are not the only group for whom constitutional change and 
the recognition of equal legal rights have preceded shifts in popular views of 
equality. For example, just 20% of Americans approved of interracial marriage 
the year after its prohibition was found unconstitutional in Loving v. Virginia, 
and this figure did not pass 50% for nearly four decades.21 In India, the 1950 
independence constitution abolished “untouchability” and prohibited caste dis-
crimination at a time when the caste system was still deeply entrenched, as a way 
to accelerate the shift toward abandoning caste distinctions.22 And in Tunisia, 
the 2014 constitution guaranteed women’s and men’s equal opportunities in all 
domains, even as women’s labor force participation rates remained low and 86% 
of respondents to a 2012 poll felt that men should have priority access to employ-
ment when jobs were scarce.23 Nevertheless, the inclusion of this language sig-
naled a state commitment to shifting norms to enable all people to have equal 
chances regardless of gender.
132    Sexual Orientation/Gender Identity Rights
HOW C ONSTITUTIONAL EQUAL RIGHT S 
MAKE A DIFFERENCE
As discussed in previous chapters, constitutional equal rights guarantees can have 
important effects on both public and private life. First, constitutions can be used 
to ensure that all legislation in a country is consistent with equal rights. Second, 
they can ensure that the application and implementation of a country’s laws is 
done in a way that upholds equal rights and opportunities. Third, they can ensure 
individuals are treated equally by the private institutions that shape many aspects 
of our lives. And fourth, they can ensure the equal application of laws that shape 
interpersonal relations.
Constitutional equal rights for LGBT+ individuals have played important roles 
in each area. A case from South Africa illustrates how guaranteeing equal rights 
in constitutions can ensure that LGBT+ citizens receive equal treatment from the 
government, as well as equal recognition of private relationships that are shaped 
by government rules.
South Africa: Protecting Equal Rights of Same-Sex Couples in 
Immigration Law
Under the Aliens Control Act, spouses of South Africans were supported in apply-
ing for permanent residence in the late 1990s. Same-sex couples, however, were 
unable to legally marry and received no such benefit. In 1999, six couples, each 
comprising one South African national and one noncitizen, united to challenge the 
discriminatory barrier in court. Each pair had been in a committed relationship 
for at least a year, some for longer than four years. Some owned homes together, 
while others served as each other’s beneficiaries in their wills. One couple had 
invited friends and family to a gathering to celebrate and formally acknowledge 
their partnership. However, the law did not allow these couples to marry. Unable 
to access the support provided to heterosexual spouses who sought to live together 
in South Africa, at least two of the South African nationals were planning to emi-
grate if their partners could not get permanent legal residence.
The 12 plaintiffs joined with the National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equal-
ity and the Commission for Gender Equality to challenge the constitutionality of 
Section 25(5) of the act, the provision that granted preferential treatment to legal 
spouses. Their challenge was based on Section 9 of the South African Constitu-
tion, which prohibits direct and indirect discrimination on the basis of both sexual 
orientation and marital status.
In court, the Ministry of Home Affairs argued that it had broad discretion to 
set immigration policy, and that the distinction made in the Aliens Control Act 
was based on “non-spousal” grounds, rather than sexual orientation or marital 
status.24 Alternatively, they argued, even it were a marital status distinction, “there 
was nothing that prevented gays and lesbians from contracting marriages with 
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persons of the opposite sex, thus becoming and acquiring spouses and accordingly 
being entitled to the spousal benefits under section 25(5).”25
The Constitutional Court, however, dismissed this claim, finding: “The respon-
dents’ submission that gays and lesbians are free to marry in the sense that noth-
ing prohibits them from marrying persons of the opposite sex, is true only as a 
meaningless abstraction. This submission ignores the constitutional injunction 
that gays and lesbians cannot be discriminated against on the grounds of their 
own sexual orientation and the constitutional right to express that orientation in a 
relationship of their own choosing.” Instead, the Court found, the challenged pro-
vision amounted to “overlapping or intersecting discrimination on the grounds of 
sexual orientation and marital status.”26 Because marriage was a prerequisite for 
the immigration preference, there was marital status discrimination—and because 
marriage was only available to heterosexual couples, there was sexual orientation 
discrimination. Further, the Court found that excluding same-sex couples from 
the immigration preferences accorded to legal spouses was a violation of their con-
stitutional right to dignity, and noted that “the denial of equal dignity and worth 
all too quickly and insidiously degenerates into a denial of humanity and leads to 
inhuman treatment by the rest of society in many other ways.”27
To implement this finding, the Court ordered that the words “or partner, 
in a permanent same-sex life partnership” be “read in” after the word “spouse” 
in Section 25(5) of the Aliens Control Act.28 A few years after the decision, the 
Immigration Act of 2002, which was enacted to supplant the Aliens Control Act, 
explicitly specified that the word “spouse” also applied to those in permanent 
same-sex relationships.29
The Home Affairs case proved to be an instrumental component of the grow-
ing body of case law around sexual orientation discrimination that has emerged 
in South Africa since the constitution first protected equal rights on the basis of 
sexual orientation in 1996. Six years later, in Minister of Home Affairs v. Fourie, the 
Constitutional Court addressed the issue of same-sex marriage directly. In a land-
mark and unanimous ruling, which cited the Home Affairs case, the Court found 
that same-sex couples have a constitutional right to marry, and ordered Parlia-
ment to pass legislation to that effect within a year.30 As a result of the decision, on 
November 30, 2006, South Africa became the first country in Africa and just the 
fifth in the world to legalize same-sex marriage.31
THE STATE OF THE WORLD’S  C ONSTITUTIONS
Currently, South Africa is among just 6% of constitutions that explicitly protect 
equal rights on the basis of sexual orientation (Map 18). For example, Portugal’s 
constitution provides that “[n]o one may be privileged, favoured, prejudiced, 
deprived of any right or exempted from any duty on the basis of . .  . sexual ori-
entation.”32 In one country, Nepal, “sexual orientation” is not listed as a protected 
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ground in the equal rights provision, but the constitution does provide that “noth-
ing shall be deemed to prevent the making of special provisions by law for the 
protection of . . . sexual and gender minorities.”33
Among the 6% of constitutions that address sexual orientation, more than 
half also protect equal rights on the basis of gender identity (Bolivia, Ecuador, 
Fiji, Malta, Nepal, and the United Kingdom). For example, Bolivia’s constitution 
expansively provides: “The State prohibits and punishes all forms of discrimina-
tion based on sex, color, age, sexual orientation, gender identity, origin, culture, 
nationality, citizenship, language, religious belief, ideology, political affiliation or 
philosophy, civil status, economic or social condition, type of occupation, level of 
education, disability, pregnancy, and any other discrimination that attempts to or 
results in the annulment of or harm to the equal recognition, enjoyment or exer-
cise of the rights of all people.”34
Importantly, although SOGI protections in constitutions remain uncommon, 
they are found in nearly all regions of the world. As discussed, through its 1996 
constitution, South Africa became the first country in the world to explicitly pro-
tect equal rights on the basis of sexual orientation. Fiji followed in 1997, the first 
country in the Asia-Pacific,35 and 13 years later became the first Pacific island to 
repeal its colonial-era criminalization law.36 In 1998, Ecuador adopted the first 
constitution in Latin America to ban discrimination on the basis of sexual orien-
tation; its 2008 constitution extended this protection to gender identity as well.37 
And through a 2004 amendment, Portugal became the first European country to 
constitutionally protect equal rights across sexual orientation, following an eight-
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Sexual Orientation/Gender Identity Rights    135
Constitutional Backlash: Denial of Rights and Gendered Language
Although the recent progress in establishing equal rights on the basis of SOGI 
across regions is encouraging, these steps forward have also met with backlash, 
both in countries that have begun enacting reforms to advance equality and in 
those not yet touched by improved laws. Nowhere in the law is this clearer than in 
the articulation of marriage rights.
In only one country, Ireland, does the constitution explicitly protect same-sex 
couples’ right to marry (Map 19). Under Article 41(4), as amended by the 2015 ref-
erendum, “[m]arriage may be contracted in accordance with law by two persons 
without distinction as to their sex.”39 However, 6% of countries prohibit the right 
to marry for same-sex couples or allow legislation to do so. Zimbabwe’s 2013 con-
stitution, for example, states clearly that “[p]ersons of the same sex are prohibited 
from marrying each other.”40
An additional 8% define marriage as exclusively between a man and a woman, 
such as that of Slovakia: “Marriage is a unique union between a woman and a 
man.”41 By contrast, 4% of countries phrase the right to marry in ungendered lan-
guage. Albania’s constitution, for instance, declares that “[e]veryone has the right 
to get married and have a family.”42 The majority of constitutions (81%) do not 
address same-sex marriage.
Notably, all of the constitutional bans on same-sex marriage were enacted since 
2000, suggesting that they were direct responses to gains for LGBT+ rights (see 
Figure 8). In some countries, politicians’ statements have left no doubt that their 
efforts to restrict rights were prompted by progress within their own countries or 
elsewhere. For example, Honduras explicitly restricted equal rights on the basis of 
sexual orientation in 2005, through the unanimous adoption of a constitutional 
amendment barring both same-sex marriage and adoption. The amendment 
Denied or may be denied
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between a man and a woman
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resulted as part of the backlash to Honduras’s granting of legal status to three 
LGBT organizations, which 80 evangelical groups started a petition to revoke.43 
The congressman who proposed the bill, Jose Celin Discua, cited developments 
on equal rights in other countries as threats: “In various countries of the world—
Holland, Spain, various states of the United States—there is already [same-sex] 
marriage. It is already coming, and it is already accepted.”44
EVALUATING PATHS FORWARD
As detailed in this chapter, progress has been made in passing SOGI equal rights 
in constitutions when there was wide public support or when participatory pro-
cesses for constitution drafting supported the broad elimination of all forms of 
discrimination. But given that few constitutions to date explicitly protect equal-
ity on the basis of SOGI, other aspects of constitutions have also been used to 
advance equality.
Leveraging Broad Equality Clauses
Broad equality provisions, which do not explicitly mention sexual orientation or 
gender identity, can provide important tools for reform. As for other forms of 
discrimination, however, general guarantees of equal rights have yielded mixed 
results for LGBT+ equality. One example of a positive outcome from this approach 
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FIGURE 8. Explicit constitutional progress and backlash across sexual orientation and gender 
identity by region
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Canada: Strengthening Protections from Employment Discrimination
Delwin Vriend worked in a laboratory at King’s University College, a Christian lib-
eral arts school in Edmonton, Alberta. After he had worked there for several years, 
consistently receiving positive evaluations, the college president asked Vriend 
about his sexual orientation, and Vriend confirmed that he was gay. The follow-
ing year, the college adopted a new policy on sexual orientation and the president 
requested that Vriend resign. When he refused, he was fired based on his failure to 
comply with the new policy.45
Vriend sought to file a complaint with the Alberta Human Rights Commission, 
but the commission informed him that he could not file a claim under the Individual’s 
Rights Protection Act (IRPA), a statute banning discrimination by private employers, 
since it did not explicitly prohibit discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. 
As Vriend recalled years later, “[t]o walk out of the human rights office and realize 
they couldn’t do anything, it was such a shock.”46 As a result, he went to court and 
challenged the constitutionality of the IRPA on the basis of its exclusion of sexual 
orientation as a protected ground. But though he initially succeeded at trial in 1994, 
an appeals court overturned the ruling in 1996, finding that the general equality guar-
antee in the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms “could not force the legislature 
to enact a provision dealing with a ‘divisive’ issue if it ha[d] chosen not to do so.”47
Finally, the case reached the Supreme Court of Canada in 1998, where the key 
issue was whether the legislative omission of sexual orientation from the IRPA was 
unconstitutional government action. According to the Court, findings of uncon-
stitutionality were not “restricted to situations where the government actively 
encroaches on rights,” but could also apply in cases where the government failed 
to act to protect charter rights.48
In its reasoning, the Court emphasized the importance of both substantive and 
formal equality. Since the omission of “sexual orientation” meant that gay and les-
bian workers were not specifically protected from discrimination by the act, they 
were not being treated equally with other marginalized groups that did receive 
explicit protection—a violation of formal equality. Assessing the effects of this 
omission, the Court found that:
[T]here is, on the surface, a measure of formal equality: gay or lesbian individuals 
have the same access as heterosexual individuals to the protection of the IRPA in the 
sense that they could complain to the Commission about an incident of discrimina-
tion on the basis of any of the grounds currently included. However, the exclusion 
of the ground of sexual orientation, considered in the context of the social reality 
of discrimination against gays and lesbians, clearly has a disproportionate impact 
on them as opposed to heterosexuals. Therefore the IRPA in its underinclusive state 
denies substantive equality to the former group.49
The Court then reasoned that as “a deeply personal characteristic that is either 
unchangeable or changeable only at unacceptable personal costs,” sexual 
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orientation was analogous to the other explicitly protected grounds in Section 15.50 
The Court also explained that the exclusion of sexual orientation from the IRPA 
had harmful effects by precluding those who had experienced discrimination 
from pursuing legal recourse, and by subtly sending a message that the govern-
ment would tolerate discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation.51 Finally, the 
Court concluded, “Even if the discrimination is experienced at the hands of pri-
vate individuals, it is the state that denies protection from that discrimination.”52
Following this analysis, the Supreme Court ordered that Alberta “read in” the 
words “sexual orientation” to the prohibition of discrimination in the IRPA, rather 
than declaring the whole provision unconstitutional and leaving all Albertans 
unprotected from private-sector discrimination in the interim. Since then, the 
IRPA, now called the Alberta Human Rights Act, has been amended to explicitly 
prohibit discrimination on the basis of both sexual orientation and gender iden-
tity and expression.53 The Vriend case has also served as a critical precedent in 
strengthening LGBT+ rights nationwide.54
Although it took seven years and a series of appeals to reach a positive outcome, 
Vriend v. Alberta provides a powerful example of how a general equality provi-
sion, particularly in a country where the top court applies a doctrine of “analogous 
grounds” to determine which groups receive protection, can be an important tool 
for advancing equal rights on the basis of SOGI and amending discriminatory or 
underprotective laws. Likewise, protections against gender discrimination have 
been interpreted by some courts and international legal bodies to encompass pro-
tections against discrimination on the basis of SOGI.
Other examples can be found around the world.55 General equality provisions 
were used to strike down provisions of Colombia’s Standards for the Exercise of 
the Teaching Profession56 and Peru’s Military Justice Code that discriminated on 
the basis of sexual orientation.57 In Slovenia, general protections against discrimi-
nation were leveraged to extend equal inheritance rights to same-sex couples.58 
In India59 and Pakistan,60 overall guarantees of equality before the law provided 
the constitutional foundation to establish that transgender individuals have equal 
rights. Most recently, in Taiwan, the Supreme Court ruled in May 2017 that ban-
ning same-sex marriage was “incompatible with the spirit and meaning of the 
right to equality” in the constitution, making Taiwan the first in Asia to legalize 
same-sex marriage.61 And a few months later, a high court in Botswana ruled that 
transgender citizens have a constitutional right to change their gender on official 
documents, even though the country still prohibits homosexual acts.62
Argentina: Inspiring Regional Progress through a Court Decision on Marriage 
Equality
Court cases brought under broad equality clauses can also demonstrably accel-
erate national and regional change. In Argentina in 2009, Alex Freyre and José 
María Di Bello became the first same-sex couple to marry in Latin America after a 
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Buenos Aires judge ruled that it was unconstitutional for civil law to permit mar-
riage only between a man and a woman.63 While the case was decided just on a 
general equality clause, the decision accelerated more extensive legal progress on 
SOGI rights. Within a year, the Senate voted to legalize same-sex marriage nation-
wide, making Argentina the first country in the region to do so.64 Over the next 
four years, nearly 10,000 same-sex couples married in Argentina.65
What’s more, the successes across Latin America, in terms of both explicit con-
stitutional rights and court victories, further affirm that progress is possible even 
before public opinion is fully aligned. World Values Surveys document a lack of 
popular acceptance of same-sex relationships prior to the court case and legislative 
reform in Argentina, and significant improvements afterward. The surveys simi-
larly show that legal changes preceded widespread recognition of equality in Brazil 
and Mexico.66 However, the region has emerged as a recognized leader in advanc-
ing equal rights on the basis of SOGI—a process that has been aided by rights-
based constitutions, expansive access to the courts,67 and the region-wide influ-
ence of groundbreaking court victories and laws like Argentina’s.68 In the words of 
Brazilian legislator Jean Wylyss, “after passing this law, Argentina became a refer-
ence for the whole of Latin America.”69 Argentina itself had learned from Spain’s 
legal reform process,70 and “in turn sought to create a regional ‘demonstration 
effect’ and transfer its experience to other countries where debates on the topic 
were only beginning, such as Brazil, Chile, Colombia, and Uruguay.”71 Individual 
activists from other Latin American countries also employed a strategy of marry-
ing in Argentina and then demanding that their own governments recognize their 
same-sex unions.72
Further, the influence of Argentina’s marriage decision reflects one example 
of a larger trend. Even before the push for full marriage rights, Latin Ameri-
can supporters of LGBT+ equality were citing legal progress in other coun-
tries on same-sex unions. For example, in 2000, as Uruguay was considering a 
bill to recognize same-sex civil unions, legislator Daniel Díaz Maynard argued: 
“Almost all European and Latin American legal systems have contained, for 
some time now, regulations which recognize civil union between same sex cou-
ples who have lived together for many years, some countries even formalizing it 
in their constitutions.”73
Argentina’s more recent progress on gender identity has also inspired similar 
efforts in other countries. In 2012, Argentina enacted legislation allowing people 
to self-define their gender identity without providing medical documentation.74 In 
Colombia, the new law gave “a push among activists,” according to Andrea Parra, 
director of the Action Program for Equality and Social Inclusion at the University 
of Los Andes School of Law.75 Transgender activists in Colombia first pursued a 
strategy of seeking victories on individual cases in the Constitutional Court. One 
powerful ruling in favor of a transgender woman who had struggled to get her ID 
changed “was a green light for the ministry to proceed” with broader legal reform, 
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according to Parra.76 In 2015, Colombia issued an executive decree echoing Argen-
tina’s law.77
While there is far to go on public opinion, these examples illustrate how advanc-
ing rights can precede full consensus on equality. Moreover, transnational activ-
ism on LGBT+ rights can provide a powerful mechanism for accelerating change.
United States: The Risks of Failing to Clearly Address LGBT+ Rights
Still, as in other areas of equal rights, the absence of language specifically prohibit-
ing discrimination against a particular group, in both the constitution and other 
laws and policies, can allow for regress. For example, in 2014 the U.S. Department 
of Justice issued guidance stating that laws covering employment discrimination, 
specifically Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, protect against SOGI discrimination.78 
Three years later, however, after a change in administration, the department issued 
new guidance reversing this interpretation. According to the 2017 document, since 
the Civil Rights Act only explicitly prohibits workplace discrimination based on 
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin, LGBT+ workers are excluded. The 
memo urged that “[a]ny efforts to amend Title VII’s scope should be directed to 
Congress rather than the courts.”79
Meanwhile, fewer than half of U.S. states prohibit employment discrimina-
tion on the basis of sexual orientation,80 and bills have been introduced across 
the country to effectively legalize SOGI discrimination claiming a religious free-
dom basis. Although the U.S. Constitution broadly establishes “equal protection 
of the laws,” this has been insufficient to fully guarantee the equal rights of the 
LGBT+ community.
Ensuring Other Constitutional Guarantees Apply to Everyone 
Regardless of SOGI 
An additional approach that advocates and citizens have taken is going to court to 
ensure that other guarantees in constitutions—whether to privacy, dignity, liberty 
or otherwise—apply to all, regardless of sexual orientation or gender identity. As 
with general equality provisions, this approach has yielded some remarkable suc-
cesses but provides far less reliable and consistent protections than specific guar-
antees of equal rights.
India: The Right to Privacy
For example, in an important case from 2009, the Delhi High Court ruled 
that the Penal Code’s criminalization of “carnal intercourse against the order 
of nature” was unconstitutional based on the rights to equality, nondiscrimina-
tion, and life and liberty. The decision was widely celebrated as a landmark case 
for the LGBT+ community.81 Yet in 2013, after an appeal by religious groups,82 
a two-bench ruling by the Supreme Court, which is a case decided by just two 
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judges, overturned the decision. According to the Court, Section 377 of the 
Penal Code “does not criminalise a particular people or identity or orientation. 
It merely identifies certain acts which if committed would constitute an offence. 
Such a prohibition regulates sexual conduct regardless of gender identity and 
orientation.”83 The ruling also admonished the lower court for having “exten-
sively relied upon the judgments of other jurisdictions” to protect the “so-called 
rights of LGBT persons,” whom they referred to as a “minuscule fraction of the 
country’s population.”
In 2017, however, the Supreme Court of India issued a lengthy judgment 
confirming that the constitution guarantees the right to privacy, and directly 
addressed the implications of this analysis for the 2013 ruling. In so doing, the 
nine-judge bench noted that “[t]he purpose of elevating certain rights to the stat-
ure of guaranteed fundamental rights is to insulate their exercise from the disdain 
of majorities, whether legislative or popular.”84 And in 2018, the Supreme Court 
built on this decision in a groundbreaking ruling that overturned Section 377 once 
again, based on both the right to privacy and the general guarantee of equality in 
the constitution.85
The 2018 decision was a landmark for equality, and a testament to the effec-
tiveness of India’s LGBT+ community in advancing fundamental human rights. 
Justice Indu Malhotra recognized the judgment’s profound significance after such 
a long struggle for equality, saying, “History owes an apology to members of the 
community for the delay in ensuring their rights.”86 Likewise, Menaka Gurus-
wamy, one of the lawyers challenging the law, commented on the ruling’s powerful 
message: “This decision . . . is basically saying: ‘You are not alone. The court stands 
with you. The Constitution stands with you. And therefore your country stands 
with you.’ ”87 Still, the dismissive language of the 2013 ruling, which questioned the 
very premise that members of the LGBT+ community have constitutional rights, 
plainly illustrates why explicit constitutional rights matter for protecting against 
judicial retrenchment.
United States: The Right to Liberty
Another example of successfully—but narrowly—leveraging other rights comes 
from the United States. In 2015, the Supreme Court made marriage equality the 
law of the land in Obergefell v. Hodges. The momentous ruling was premised on 
the Court’s finding that “[t]he right to marry is a fundamental right inherent in the 
liberty of the person, and under the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of 
the Fourteenth Amendment couples of the same-sex may not be deprived of that 
right.”88 While the ruling was a remarkable step forward for LGBT+ rights in the 
U.S., the Court stopped short of declaring that sexual orientation discrimination 
receives the same level of constitutional protection as discrimination on the basis 
of gender, race, religion, or national origin.89 Although the decision was widely 
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celebrated, even supporters lamented that its reasoning was “dubious,” and argued 
that it was a missed opportunity to establish a stronger precedent specifically con-
demning sexual orientation discrimination.90
Costa Rica, Tunisia, and Turkey: The Right to Freedom of Association
Beyond individual rights, the rights to free association and freedom of assembly 
have played an important role in combatting discrimination on the basis of SOGI, 
and particularly in ensuring that advocacy groups in countries where LGBT+ pop-
ulations face state oppression can continue operating. For example, in Costa Rica, 
a gay rights group was shut down in 1995 due to a legal prohibition on groups that 
“undermine good customs and morality.” In response, the organization contacted 
the new ombudsman’s office and threatened to sue the Registry of Associations 
for a violation of the right to free association. The registry backed down, paving 
the way for the registration of a dozen other gay and lesbian advocacy groups.91 
Likewise, in Tunisia, advocates cited constitutional and international commit-
ments to freedom of association in challenging the government’s suspension of 
the country’s first official LGBT organization in 2016.92 Although they continue to 
face repression, Tunisia’s LGBT+ groups have made important strides in advanc-
ing equal rights, and are currently actively involved in a coalition campaign to end 
the criminalization of homosexuality.93
Similarly, in Turkey, the Istanbul offices of Lambda, an international LGBTI 
rights group, were closed after a complaint that the organization’s activities con-
flicted with Turkish “moral values and family structure.” However, after a lengthy 
legal battle, the Supreme Court of Appeals ruled that the closure violated the rights 
to free association and assembly. The case was not an isolated incident; according 
to Yasemin Öz, a lawyer who drafted a report on homophobia and transphobia in 
Turkey for the Danish Institute of Human Rights, “whenever an LGBT organisa-
tion has been established in Turkey, the Directory of Associations has requested 
the closure of the organisations.”94 As a result, she argues that the constitution’s 
equality provision, Article 10, must also be “amended to specifically guarantee the 
equal rights of LGBT persons. . . . Although Article 10 of the Constitution looks 
like guaranteeing equality among all citizens, since the equality among citizens 
regardless of sexual orientation and gender identity is not guaranteed explicitly, 
the LGBT community face discrimination in practice.”95
Across Contexts: Evaluating the Range of Constitutional Approaches
While all these court victories merit celebration, it is important to note the distinc-
tions in their constitutional justifications and the potential limitations of a more 
roundabout approach to equality. For example, protecting same-sex relationships 
solely through the right to “privacy” may reinforce notions that these relation-
ships do not deserve public or state recognition. In presentations to the U.N., for 
instance, Namibia’s government asserted: “Article 13 of the Constitution protects 
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the right to privacy. No person is requested to disclose his or her preferred sexual 
orientation in any official Government form or document and no person can be 
refused access to public or private services based on their preference. The laws do 
not make provision for marriage between same sex adults.”96
Likewise, the “don’t ask, don’t tell” policy, which prohibited U.S. service mem-
bers from disclosing that they were gay or engaging in same-sex sexual conduct, 
was based in part on the concept of “privacy,” further underscoring how this right 
on its own does not necessarily lead to greater equality or freedom.97 When a fed-
eral court finally deemed the policy unconstitutional after 17 years, it was on the 
basis not of equality but of free speech.98
Similarly, the right to dignity is powerful due to its broad scope. Lawyers and 
judges have successfully invoked the right to dignity not only to advance rights on 
behalf of the LGBT+ community but also in a wide range of cases advancing social 
and economic rights. Yet the concept’s breadth also gives courts substantial discre-
tion to determine in what circumstances it applies.
For these reasons, although creative legal arguments leveraging other funda-
mental rights can and have yielded transformative victories, there is no substitute 
for an explicit protection against discrimination on the basis of SOGI in the con-
stitutional text.
Building Up from States and Municipalities
In moving to strengthen LGBT+ rights, some countries with federalist systems, 
such as the United States and Brazil, have had success with implementing state-
level reforms to build momentum for national reforms. For example, after fac-
ing roadblocks to enacting national legislation, LGBT+ activists in Brazil began 
focusing on getting antidiscrimination laws passed by state and municipal gov-
ernments, with remarkable success: over 80 municipalities had passed antidis-
crimination legislation by the early 2010s, while at least two states have prohibited 
sexual orientation discrimination in their own constitutions.99 These reforms can 
also help shift norms and build consensus about LGBT+ rights before broader 
changes are implemented. In the U.S., 2011 marked the first time more Americans 
supported rather than opposed gay marriage;100 at that point, same-sex marriage 
had been legalized in six states, followed by three more the following year and 
another seven the next.101
Although neither country has yet to enact a national constitutional protection 
of equal rights on the basis of SOGI, state-level progress on laws and public opin-
ion signals an increasingly favorable climate for national reforms, and may have 
contributed to changes in case law and constitutional interpretation. Moreover, 
studies show local laws can have important effects. For example, in a 2013 study of 
Texas cities with and without legislation prohibiting sexual orientation discrimi-
nation, researchers found that gay and lesbian job applicants experienced less dis-
crimination when people believed protective laws were in place.102
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IMPORTANT—AND IMPERFECT—PRO GRESS
In a range of countries, steps forward on equal rights regardless of SOGI have been 
followed by steps back. Sometimes a transformative court case is followed by strug-
gles to implement its ruling. Other times, countries miss the opportunity to enact 
strong constitutional protections when they otherwise have momentum to advance 
LGBT+ rights. Finally, in some countries, guarantees of equal rights still coexist 
with other laws denying full equality to same-sex couples. In each circumstance, the 
successes still matter—yet these cases illustrate the importance of ongoing efforts 
to advance equality following successes and setbacks alike. A few examples follow.
Mexico: Major Steps Forward on Marriage Equality, 
but Challenges in Imple mentation
In 2011, Mexico amended its constitution to explicitly prohibit discrimination 
based on “sexual preference” in Article 1.103 Four years later, the Supreme Court 
ruled that all state laws banning same-sex marriage were unconstitutional—effec-
tively legalizing same-sex marriage nationwide.104
The sweeping and unanimous decision was directly based on Article 1’s new 
protection of equal rights on the basis of sexual orientation. It also referenced 
struggles against discrimination in other countries, citing famous case law like 
Brown v. Board of Education and its powerful conclusion that “separate but equal” 
was unconstitutional. And like the South African Constitutional Court in the 
Home Affairs case, the Mexican Supreme Court noted that discriminatory mar-
riage laws both rested on and tacitly condoned bigotry: “Just as racial segrega-
tion was based on the unacceptable idea of  white supremacy, the exclusion of gay 
couples from marriage is also based on prejudices that historically have existed 
against homosexuals. Their exclusion from the marriage institution perpetuates 
the notion that same-sex couples are less worthy of recognition than heterosexu-
als, thus offending their dignity as persons.”105
Finally, the Court cited Mexico’s obligations to uphold equal rights under inter-
national law, and noted that the Constitution required “adopting the most favor-
able interpretation of the human right in question.”106
In 2010, when same-sex marriage was legal only in Mexico City, 689 same-sex 
marriages took place, according to government records; in 2016, by which point 
ten states had legalized same-sex marriage, this number increased to 2,378.107 
Same-sex marriages have by now occurred in every state, enabling couples nation-
wide to not only make their partnerships official, but also access all the benefits 
and protections often linked to marriage.
Yet challenges remain for ensuring all people can effectively exercise their right 
to marry. Under Mexico’s civil law system, court decisions are generally binding 
only on the parties.108 With its 2015 ruling, the Supreme Court essentially instructed 
lower courts how they had to rule, but did not directly invalidate contradictory 
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state legislation; the process of actually changing laws and enforcing the right to 
marry will require continued effort.109 Despite the ruling, as of April 2017 just 12 
of Mexico’s 32 states had enacted laws to allow same-sex marriage, while others 
maintain discriminatory laws on the books.110 Consequently, while same-sex mar-
riage is now a legal right, couples have reported being refused licenses by state 
registrars, especially in areas where political opposition to same-sex marriage 
remains significant.111 One lawyer, Alex Alí Méndez, has been strategically filing 
cases in every state to strengthen the right around the country; once a court finds 
the same law unconstitutional in three separate cases, the law is invalidated for 
all.112 Following the Supreme Court ruling, Méndez explained: “[D]iscrimination 
will continue as long as the normative framework around marriage is not changed 
throughout the country in order to eliminate the obstacles that prevent same-sex 
couples from marrying.”113
To strengthen the right to marry nationwide, on the International Day Against 
Homophobia and Transphobia in May 2016, President Enrique Peña Nieto sent 
legislation to Congress to amend Mexico’s constitution to “incorporate clearly the 
judgment of the Supreme Court so that people can marry without discrimination” 
on the grounds of “gender or sexual preference.”114
Public opinion data illustrated growing support for LGBT+ rights in tandem 
with the 2011 constitutional amendment and the municipal- and national-level 
marriage decisions. Just 23% thought same-sex marriage should be legal in 2000, 
increasing to 55% at the time Peña Nieto  proposed the constitutional amend-
ment in 2016; over the same period, opposition to same-sex marriage decreased 
from 62% to 25%.115 Some of the increase in support clearly corresponded with 
the court rulings: between November 2009 (the month before same-sex marriage 
was legalized in Mexico City) and March 2010, the share of people saying they 
supported full marriage equality increased by five percentage points, while the 
share saying same-sex marriage should not be legal decreased by 12 percentage 
points.116 In another poll, 69% of respondents said they were in favor of the mar-
riage equality amendment.117
Nevertheless, the amendment was ultimately defeated in the legislature due to 
pressure from religious groups.118 So although same-sex marriage is indeed legal 
throughout Mexico, and public support has grown significantly over the past two 
decades, implementation challenges create ongoing barriers to the full realization 
of marriage equality.
Nepal: Major Progress on LGBT+ Rights in the Courts, 
but Smaller Gains in the Constitution
As a second example, in 2007, Nepal’s constitutional guarantee of gender equal-
ity provided the basis for a landmark case advancing equal rights for the LGBT+ 
community. The case was initiated by Sunil Pant, a lawyer who had spent years 
documenting the human rights abuses faced by other LGBT+ people throughout 
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the country—often at the hands of government security forces. By the time he 
brought a public interest litigation claim to fight this widespread mistreatment, 
Pant had piles of photographs and medical reports offering indisputable proof of 
the systematic discrimination facing LGBT+ people in Nepal.119 In a far-reaching 
decision that drew on the constitution’s protection against sex-based discrimina-
tion, the Supreme Court not only ordered the state to abandon all laws that dis-
criminated based on sexual orientation or gender identity, but also formally rec-
ognized a third gender category. Further, the Court called for the new constitution 
to explicitly protect against discrimination on the basis of SOGI, using the South 
African Constitution as a model.120
Since then, Pant has become the first openly gay member of Nepal’s Parlia-
ment, and Nepal has become the first country to include a third gender category 
on the census.121 Still, the fight for full equal rights continues, with the 2015 con-
stitution prohibiting discrimination on “similar grounds” to those explicitly listed 
and allowing for special measures to protect “gender and sexual minorities,” but 
not explicitly protecting the equal rights of the LGBT+ community.122
Ecuador: Progress on Equal Rights, but Inconsistent Provisions
Finally, in Ecuador, the 2008 constitution built on the inclusion of sexual orienta-
tion in its 1998 predecessor to specifically prohibit discrimination on the basis of 
both sexual orientation and gender identity. It also articulated a more expansive 
definition of family using the term familia diversa, now widely understood across 
Ecuador to encompass same-sex couples, single-parent families, and migrant 
households.123 At the same time, the constitution stated that “marriage is the union 
of man and woman” and that “adoption shall only be permitted for different-gen-
der couples.”124
This apparent tension in the constitutional text resulted from a political com-
promise, with equal rights activists championing the familia diversa while reli-
gious opponents protested to demand language referencing God and protecting 
the traditional family.125 In the end, President Rafael Correa conceded, and reas-
sured the opposition before the 2008 referendum vote that “marriage will con-
tinue to be the union of a man and a woman.”126 In 2013, an activist named Pamela 
Troya initiated a lawsuit challenging the ban on same-sex marriage as unconstitu-
tional, which worked its way up the courts but stalled at the Constitutional Court 
for four years.127 Finally, in June 2019, the Court ruled that the ban on same-sex 
marriage was discriminatory. The Court left the responsibility for amending the 
constitution with the National Assembly and did not eliminate the ban on same-
sex adoption.128
These examples illustrate how progress is often iterative. Countries sometimes 
move forward quickly, as when Ecuador progressed from decriminalizing same-
sex relationships in 1997 to constitutionally prohibiting sexual orientation discrim-
ination in 1998, but then regress in the face of political pushback. Nevertheless, as 
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the examples from Mexico and Ecuador illustrate most acutely, taking the first 
strong step of establishing equal rights in the constitution provides a foundation 
for further advances.
THE URGENCY OF ACTION
The evidence of ongoing discrimination and violence that LGBT+ people face 
around the globe speaks to the urgency of action. As observed by the U.N. High 
Commissioner on Human Rights: “In all regions, people experience violence and 
discrimination because of their sexual orientation or gender identity. In many 
cases, even the perception of homosexuality or transgender identity puts people 
at risk. Violations include—but are not limited to—killings, rape and physical 
attacks, torture, arbitrary detention, the denial of rights to assembly, expression 
and information, and discrimination in employment, health and education.”129
While global data on violence against LGBT+ individuals is far from compre-
hensive,130 statistics from individual countries affirm this account. In the United 
States, for example, the government recorded 1,470 incidents of violence moti-
vated by SOGI in 2017.131 Across Europe, over a quarter of respondents to a survey 
of LGBT citizens reported that they had been victims of violence within the past 
five years, 59% of whom believed the violence was solely or partly motivated by 
their sexual orientation or gender identity.132 Similarly, according to a 2015 U.N. 
report that cited data from an independent global NGO, over 1,600 transgender 
people were murdered across 62 countries between 2008 and 2014, or one person 
every two days.133 These vulnerabilities are compounded by state-sponsored dis-
crimination and violence in some countries, and the unwillingness of leaders in 
others to acknowledge LGBT+ residents’ experiences.
Toward a Global Agreement on LGBT+ Rights
Despite some encouraging national developments, one critical missing piece 
for equal rights on the basis of SOGI is a binding global agreement. There is no 
explicit protection of equal rights on the basis of SOGI in the Universal Declara-
tion of Human Rights (UDHR) or any fundamental treaty, although there have 
been some recent and important international developments. In November 2006, 
a group of international human rights experts drafted the Yogyakarta Principles, 
which articulate how existing international human rights law should be applied to 
SOGI-related issues.134 A decade later, the U.N. Human Rights Council passed a 
resolution to appoint an independent expert on “protection against violence and 
discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity.”135 This develop-
ment built on a resolution passed in 2011, which called for a study of discrimina-
tory laws on the basis of SOGI, and a second passed in 2014, which requested that 
the High Commissioner for Human Rights provide best practices for preventing 
this discrimination.136 Still, in the absence of a binding global agreement, states 
148    Sexual Orientation/Gender Identity Rights
have no obligation to report what steps they are taking to ensure the equality, 
safety, and full citizenship of their LGBT+ populations.
At the regional and international levels, the question of whether existing trea-
ties fully cover discrimination on the basis of SOGI—which is not explicitly ref-
erenced—has been a subject of debate for several decades. In a landmark 1994 
case, Toonen v. Australia, the U.N. Human Rights Committee determined that the 
protections against sex discrimination in the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR) extended to sexual orientation discrimination, finding 
that the ICCPR was a “living document.”137 The decision led to the repeal of a pro-
vision in Tasmania’s criminal code that prohibited sexual relationships between 
men, and more recent U.N. guidance has clarified that the ICCPR and other global 
treaties do indeed prohibit SOGI discrimination under their “other status” cat-
egory.138 Similarly, in a 1996 ruling, the European Court of Justice found that the 
prohibition on sex discrimination in the U.K.’s Sex Discrimination Act, its employ-
ment discrimination law in place at the time, extended to gender identity discrim-
ination.139 A range of countries, however, reject these interpretations, and refuse to 
acknowledge the application of global or regional human rights treaties to SOGI 
discrimination without explicit textual protections.140
Further, evidence from individual countries shows that the presence—and 
absence—of international guidance and standards on discrimination can 
importantly shape national constitutions. For example, during the process of 
drafting Uganda’s constitutional equality provision, delegates argued that the 
constitution should prohibit discrimination on the grounds of religion, race/
ethnicity, age, color, and birth, because these protections were included in the 
UDHR and African Charter. Meanwhile, “[i]t was submitted that some forms 
of discrimination should be permitted in the Constitution because they were 
also permitted in international law.” Only one delegate suggested prohibiting 
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation and was interrupted and dis-
missed.141 By contrast, while discussing whether to include sexual orientation in 
South Africa’s constitutional equality provision, drafters cited four prior deter-
minations by international human rights bodies that sexual orientation was a 
ground for protection.142
Likewise, Mexico’s 2011 constitutional reforms show that international law 
matters not only in drafting but also in amending constitutions. The addition of 
sexual orientation to Mexico’s equality provision was part of a series of “human 
rights amendments” designed to advance the “adoption of . . . international human 
rights standards.”143
In other words, international-level progress on SOGI provided support for 
reforms in South Africa and Mexico, both of which broadly consulted interna-
tional law, but the lack of an explicit protection in a binding treaty inhibited prog-
ress in Uganda, which more narrowly focused on formal agreements. An interna-
tional treaty on LGBT+ rights, like those established to advance equal rights on the 
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basis of gender, race, and disability, would create a stronger basis for advocating 
for national-level SOGI protections.
Addressing a History of Deep Discrimination
In recorded human history, nearly every group treated in this book faced a period 
of extreme, widespread discrimination. Different racial and ethnic groups were 
enslaved through the ravages of war and commerce. Religious groups coalesced 
to segregate, oppress, and kill members of other religious groups who would 
not convert. Marriage between racial groups and cohabitation across religions 
were outlawed.
But for the majority of groups discussed in this book, the use of laws to actively 
segregate, discriminate, and disadvantage has dramatically declined. There are 
three groups for which this is not yet true across countries. Migrants are treated 
as having given up their human rights after crossing borders. People with dis-
abilities are treated as if conditions affecting one aspect of their lives somehow 
affect all aspects—and that the disadvantages they face stem entirely from these 
conditions, rather than society’s responses. Finally, being a sexual or gender 
minority is treated as an identity incompatible with full citizenship, and acts of 
love are treated as actions worthy of punishment. It is long past time to eliminate 
legal discrimination.
Religious groups have disproportionately been involved in opposing progress 
to equality and passing laws that add layers of legal discrimination. Yet removing 
these historic and violent forms of discrimination will no more threaten religion 
than the removal of past forms of profound discrimination for which religious 
justifications were used against racial/ethnic groups or women. The significance of 
religion in people’s lives survived what was perceived as a cataclysmic threat to the 
church when science determined the world was not flat. Religion will continue to 
provide meaning and solace in people’s lives long after the removal of discrimina-
tion against all groups.
Moreover, some religious groups have actively embraced the equal rights of 
the LGBT+ community. In 2012, the Union for Reform Judaism issued a resolu-
tion “affirm[ing] its commitment to the full equality, inclusion and acceptance of 
people of all gender identities and gender expressions,” nearly 40 years after adopt-
ing a similar statement affirming “the rights of homosexuals.”144 In 2013, a coalition 
of religious groups across the United States, including the country’s largest Islamic 
organization, submitted a letter to Congress supporting a proposed law that would 
have prohibited SOGI discrimination in employment.145 And just in 2018, the 
National Council of Churches, a network of 30 Christian member churches that 
represents 14 million people across India, issued a statement on the court case 
addressing the criminalization of same-sex relationships, noting that “our call is to 
reject all laws that demonize, criminalize, and exclude human beings, and work to 
facilitate just inclusive and loving communities.”146
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Neither the absence of an international agreement nor delays in public opin-
ion’s recognition of equal rights is reason not to pursue guarantees of equal treat-
ment for all regardless of SOGI. Countries in all regions, and with varying degrees 
of public consensus, have shown that it is possible and that it makes a difference. 
Justice Albie Sachs made this case powerfully in the decision that brought mar-
riage equality to South Africa:
[T]he antiquity of a prejudice is no reason for its survival. Slavery lasted for a century 
and a half in this country, colonialism for twice as long, the prohibition of interracial 
marriages for even longer, and overt male domination for millennia. All were based 
on apparently self-evident biological and social facts; all were once sanctioned by 
religion and imposed by law; the first two are today regarded with total disdain, and 
the third with varying degrees of denial, shame or embarrassment. Similarly, the fact 
that the law today embodies conventional majoritarian views in no way mitigates its 
discriminatory impact. It is precisely those groups that cannot count on popular sup-
port and strong representation in the legislature that have a claim to vindicate their 
fundamental rights through application of the Bill of Rights.147
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From Nondiscrimination to 
Full Inclusion
Guaranteeing the Equal Rights of People with Disabilities
In 2007, Mariana Díaz Figueroa, a law student, came across a posting on her uni-
versity’s job board. A large hotel chain in Mexico was seeking a paralegal. The ad 
specified that applicants for the position should have experience in corporate law.
It also stated that they could not have a disability.
Díaz Figueroa’s diagnosis with cerebral palsy in childhood had not deterred her 
from pursuing two master’s degrees and a law degree.1 Nevertheless, a potential 
employer had opted to outright exclude her from consideration, and Díaz Figueroa 
decided to take action against the hotel’s flagrant discrimination. In 2009, Díaz 
Figueroa initiated a civil suit with the Superior Tribunal of Justice, arguing that she 
was not given the chance to prove she could do the job.
The court, however, dismissed Díaz Figueroa’s claim. In the following years, she 
appealed three times; each time, the courts found for the hotel. Finally, the case 
reached the Supreme Court of Justice, Mexico’s highest court, which ruled in 2014 
that the job posting had violated two constitutional rights: the right to equal pro-
tection before the law, regardless of disability, and the right to work. Díaz Figueroa 
was entitled to damages, as the Court ruled that the post’s publication was in itself 
discriminatory and harmful.2
Further, the Court clarified that in cases of disability discrimination, the bur-
den falls to the party charged with discrimination—in this case, the hotel—to 
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prove that its contested action was “objective” and “reasonable.”3 Because Díaz 
Figueroa’s disability was irrelevant to her ability to fulfill the duties of the para-
legal position, the hotel was unable to do so. Through this standard, the Supreme 
Court overturned the lower courts’ ruling that it was up to the petitioner to show 
she was qualified for the position despite her disability.4 Additionally, the deci-
sion affirmed that the equality provision of Mexico’s constitution applied against 
private employers. The ruling was a landmark for employment discrimination in 
Mexico, and one of the first cases on disability rights heard by the Supreme Court.5
The decision also illustrated how a series of constitutional reforms articulat-
ing stronger rights for people with disabilities had laid the foundations for Díaz 
Figueroa’s successful challenge. First, in 2001, Mexico amended its constitution to 
broadly prohibit discrimination on the ground of disability. In the following years, 
12 of Mexico’s 31 states adopted similar amendments to their state constitutions.6 
Second, in 2011, a constitutional amendment proclaimed that all human rights 
treaties that Mexico ratified would become immediately enforceable in court—
including the U.N. Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD).7
Ending obstacles to employment for people with disabilities will require action 
on many fronts, including strong legislation guaranteeing reasonable accommo-
dations in the workplace. Yet constitutional rights on the basis of disability can 
provide critical foundations for shifting norms, providing recourse against dis-
crimination, and creating more inclusive economies.
FROM OVERT DISCRIMINATION TO IMPLICIT BIAS
As Díaz Figueroa’s experience demonstrates, blatant forms of explicit discrimina-
tion against people with disabilities persist in some countries. Job ads tell people 
with disabilities not to bother applying. Individual schools, as well as school sys-
tems, exclude children with a wide range of disabilities.
Meanwhile, implicit bias is so widespread as to have equally large, if not larger, 
impacts. People with movement disorders, often presumed to be cognitively 
impaired, face discrimination when applying for jobs that utilize intellectual skills 
and training and impose no physical requirements they cannot meet. People in 
wheelchairs are presumed to be less able to compete in courtrooms and corpo-
rations, though their wheelchairs are irrelevant to their job roles. Even without 
written prohibitions on their candidacy, people with disabilities who show up for 
interviews often face immediate discrimination. Likewise, people with intellectual 
disabilities are often not even considered for job roles they could successfully fulfill.
One study of more than two million tests found that rates of implicit bias 
were highest against persons with a disability, among all the categories tested.8 
For people with disabilities, stigma and implicit bias have been linked to reduced 
employment opportunities, housing, and access to healthcare, as well as increased 
involvement with the criminal justice system.9 The Americans with Disabilities 
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Act (ADA), a landmark U.S. law, even acknowledges implicit bias by prohibiting 
discrimination against people “regarded as” disabled; claims based on this provi-
sion account for a significant share of ADA filings with the Equal Employment 
Opportunities Commission.10
Biased institutional rules and practices have further consequences. Discrimina-
tion against people with mental health problems provides one example of many. 
Mental health conditions have long received a fraction of the healthcare coverage 
offered for physical conditions, and medical care systems often refuse to cover 
mental health treatment. Treating mental health with the same consideration and 
urgency as physical health can transform the lives of hundreds of millions.
This bias and discrimination compounds the needless barriers that societies 
erect to full participation, and the obstacles societies could address simply but 
often fail to remove. When a school, workplace, or community center entrance 
has only stairs, it bars access by wheelchair users. When an employer or public 
institution makes documents available only as hard-copy written texts inacces-
sible to screen readers, it excludes people with visual impairments from full access 
and engagement.
Removing obstacles is fundamental to equality and inclusion. Further, doing so 
benefits not only people with disabilities but also a wide range of others, a prin-
ciple central to the concept of “universal design.” Sidewalk curb cuts provide a 
common example: conceived as a way to make sidewalks accessible to wheelchair 
users, they also improve accessibility for parents with strollers and people making 
deliveries using carts.11 Similarly, text-to-speech software ensures full access for 
people with visual impairments or language-based learning differences, and for 
adults whose lack of access to formal education in childhood limited their extent 
and pace of text reading. Put simply, universal design aims to ensure that products 
and environments are accessible and useable by all people without modification.12
THE L ARGEST GROUP LEFT BEHIND
The combined effects of overt discrimination, implicit bias, and failure to take the 
simple steps that would ensure equal opportunities have made people with dis-
abilities the most disadvantaged minority group around the world. In nearly all 
countries, adults and children with disabilities have among the lowest access to 
education, quality work, and incomes.
Education
Equal access to education for children with disabilities is critical to providing a 
foundation for full participation later in life. Many children with disabilities are 
excluded from schools entirely or put in separate schools.13 In low- and middle-
income countries (LMICs), enrollment rates for children with disabilities are com-
monly 30–50 percentage points lower than for their counterparts, while children 
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with disabilities who enroll often face discrimination or poor-quality education.14 
Even in high-income countries, students with disabilities are less likely to complete 
primary school and on average receive fewer years of basic education than other 
students.15 Across the European Union, 31.5% of young adults with disabilities did 
not complete secondary school, compared to 12.3% of those without disabilities.16
Employment
Similar patterns play out in the workplace. A study of 27 OECD countries found 
that the employment rate of working-age people with disabilities was just 44%, far 
below that of working-age people without disabilities (75%).17 Across 18 countries 
included in the World Health Survey, the employment ratio of people with dis-
abilities compared to the overall population ranged from 30% in South Africa and 
33% in Poland to 92% in Malawi; across all countries studied, people with disabili-
ties were significantly less likely to be employed than people without disabilities.18
Income
Exclusion from employment opportunities puts people with disabilities at a disad-
vantage with respect to income, which is further compounded by discrimination 
within the workplace after jobs are attained. In the United Kingdom, for instance, 
a 2017 study found that the average hourly earnings of men with disabilities were 
13% below those of their peers without disabilities, while for women the disparity 
was 7%. For certain types of conditions, the “disability pay gap” grew even wider: 
men with epilepsy, for example, earned around 40% less than their peers. The 
gaps also widened further for racial minorities.19 Consequently, poverty rates are 
higher. In Australia, Ireland, and South Korea, for example, working-age people 
with disabilities are more than twice as likely to be in poverty as working-age peo-
ple without disabilities.20 Poverty can in turn reduce the odds of accessing care or 
living in safe, healthy conditions.
WHY C ONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT S ON THE BASIS  OF 
DISABILIT Y MAT TER
Discrimination against people with disabilities is one of the few types of discrimi-
nation that is widespread, while addressing it remains normatively contested. Gov-
ernments are known to target education for children with disabilities for the first 
cuts when budgets are tight.21 Employers admit to passing over qualified job appli-
cants with disabilities because they expect accommodations will be costly, when 
in fact such costs are typically minimal. Moreover, efforts to ensure full inclusion 
are too often framed as elective, rather than integral to fundamental rights and 
equality. Meanwhile, explicit discrimination, as in this chapter’s opening example, 
remains commonplace.
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Constitutions are norm-setting documents. In addition to providing tools to 
challenge discrimination in court, constitutions express values on behalf of the 
government, which in turn helps shape societal values. Moreover, constitutions 
can help advance an understanding of equality that goes beyond nondiscrimina-
tion, and is truly rooted in enabling all people to fully participate in society. On 
average, one in six citizens of a given country have some form of disability. Clearly 
establishing the rights of persons with disabilities is fundamental to ensuring con-
stitutions protect all people’s rights.
GLOBAL FOUNDATIONS FOR EQUALIT Y 
AND INCLUSION
To determine how best to protect the rights of people with disabilities, constitution 
drafters need not start from scratch.
The U.N. Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities
The CRPD, adopted in 2006 and drafted with deep engagement of disabled per-
sons’ organizations (DPOs), embodies a comprehensive set of commitments to 
equal rights and full inclusion in areas including education, healthcare, civil and 
political life, family life, and work, effectively laying out a framework for structur-
ing societies to facilitate the full inclusion and equal opportunities of people with 
disabilities. The CRPD made history as the treaty with the largest number of signa-
tory countries (82) on its opening day, and became one of the most quickly ratified 
treaties ever adopted.22 Further, the CRPD’s legally binding nature distinguished it 
from previous decades’ declarations and awareness-building efforts on disability 
rights. The treaty had, and continues to have, tremendous potential to influence 
domestic laws and policies around disability, particularly since many countries 
simply had not enacted any relevant laws before the CRPD’s adoption. According 
to Kanter, “[o]nly 40 of the 191 countries that [were] members of the UN ha[d] 
enacted domestic disability laws” as of 2003.23
The CRPD begins by acknowledging that how societies are constructed shapes 
whether a given condition is disabling: “[D]isability results from the interaction 
between persons with impairments and attitudinal and environmental barriers 
that hinders their full and effective participation in society on an equal basis with 
others.” In the 50 articles that follow, the CRPD thoroughly addresses inclusive 
education, the right to work, the right to liberty, access to justice, social protec-
tion, and a wide range of other fundamental rights and freedoms. For example, 
its education provision requires countries to ensure that “[p]ersons with disabili-
ties can access an inclusive, quality and free primary education and secondary 
education on an equal basis with others in the communities in which they live.”24 
Similarly, the employment article obliges countries to “[e]nsure that reasonable 
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accommodation is provided to persons with disabilities in the workplace.”25 As 
we will explore, these provisions have set important standards for national-level 
approaches to disability.
The Sustainable Development Goals and “Leave No One Behind”
In 2015, the U.N. General Assembly unanimously adopted the Sustainable Devel-
opment Goals (SDGs), 17 “Global Goals” and 169 targets in a wide range of areas 
designed to advance human health, equity, and development by 2030. The SDGs 
built on the commitments of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), which 
helped accelerate change on health and extreme poverty in 2000–2015. Impor-
tantly, the SDGs explicitly addressed the rights and needs of people with disabili-
ties—an area where the MDGs had been silent.
Commitments to advance inclusion are found throughout the Goals.26 For 
example, SDG 4 calls on countries to “ensure equal access to all levels of educa-
tion and vocational training” for persons with disabilities. Likewise, SDG 8 estab-
lishes a commitment to “full and productive employment and decent work for all 
women and men, including for persons with disabilities,” while SDG 10 broadly 
calls for reducing inequality within countries and “promoting the social, economic 
and political inclusion of all, including persons with disabilities.” Additionally, the 
SDGs urge countries to ensure environments are inclusive and accessible. Specifi-
cally, SDG 11 calls on governments to provide “access to safe, affordable, accessible 
and sustainable transport systems for all . . . with special attention to the needs of 
those in vulnerable situations, such as persons with disabilities.”
Translating International Commitments into Domestic Law
As for the other groups included in this book, an overall constitutional guarantee 
of nondiscrimination is essential to realizing the rights of people with disabilities. 
Yet given that people with disabilities remain widely excluded from jobs, educa-
tion, and opportunities to fully participate in public and private life, specifically 
addressing each of these aspects is also vital to advancing equality and establish-
ing new baselines of inclusion. To assess the status of rights in 193 countries, we 
examined the extent to which constitutions guaranteed overall equal rights, equal 
access to education, equal opportunities at work, and equal access to healthcare to 
people with disabilities.
EQUAL RIGHT S FOR PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES IN 
ALL THE WORLD’S  C ONSTITUTIONS
An Overall Guarantee of Nondiscrimination
Around the world, a growing number of constitutions include disability in their 
overall equality provisions (Map 20). For example, the Maldives’s 2008 constitution 
provides: “Everyone is entitled to the rights and freedoms included in this Chapter 
without discrimination of any kind, including . . . mental or physical disability.”27
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However, these protections lag far behind those afforded to other groups. Glob-
ally, just 27% of constitutions explicitly prohibit discrimination or guarantee equal 
rights on the basis of disability.
The Right to Education
Designed to ensure children have opportunities to learn and fulfill their potential, 
the right to education can promote equality far more effectively when combined 
with a comprehensive commitment to nondiscrimination, which is fundamental 
to ensuring all children can learn. In the case of children with disabilities, consti-
tutions can powerfully advance equal rights by not only explicitly protecting the 
right to education, but also ensuring that schools and classrooms are inclusive and 
equipped to accommodate all needs. Inclusive and integrated settings can both 
strengthen learning outcomes and increase students’ exposure to peers with other 
backgrounds, life experiences, and capabilities.
The Importance of Inclusion—Not Mandatory Segregation
Evidence shows that both children with and without disabilities learn well in inclu-
sive classrooms.28 Moreover, inclusive classrooms enable interaction between stu-
dents with and without disabilities and reduce bias.29 Inclusive education reflects 
a principle applicable across groups: equality is not achieved with segregation. As 
for achieving equality across religions or racial/ethnic groups, integration and 
representation are fundamental for achieving equality for people with disabilities. 
This begins with children and full inclusion in schools. While government-sanc-
tioned racial/ethnic, religious, and gender segregation in education has declined, 
segregation of children with disabilities remains too common. Although there may 
be a case for providing an option for children with disabilities to attend specialized 
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schools, there is no more case for requiring children with disabilities or differences 
to attend separate schools than there was for segregating racial/ethnic groups.
The CRPD Committee makes clear that integration alone, while essential, is not 
sufficient for inclusive education: “Inclusion involves a process of systemic reform 
embodying changes and modifications in content, teaching methods, approaches, 
structures and strategies in education to overcome barriers with a vision serving 
to provide all students of the relevant age range with an equitable and participa-
tory learning experience. . . . Placing students with disabilities within mainstream 
classes without accompanying structural changes to, for example, organization, 
curriculum and teaching and learning strategies, does not constitute inclusion. 
Furthermore, integration does not automatically guarantee the transition from 
segregation to inclusion.”30
Beyond providing integrated settings, to be truly inclusive, schools and class-
rooms must be equipped to meet the needs of students with disabilities and 
teachers must be adequately trained, which requires investment. All countries 
can invest, and not all inclusion is costly: many steps toward providing quality, 
inclusive education involve planning, community mobilization, and political will, 
rather than funding alone. Successful projects across a range of LMICs, such as 
Bangladesh, India, Kenya, Laos, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, Vietnam, and 
Zambia, have shown that inclusive education is achievable.31 Where costs outstrip 
resources in low-income settings, international donors can fill gaps to make inclu-
sive education financially feasible.32
Nondiscrimination and Inclusive Education in Constitutions
Globally, 19% of constitutions explicitly guarantee educational rights for children 
with disabilities (Map 21). Another 9% protect the right to education generally 
and broadly prohibit disability discrimination. Fourteen percent of constitutions 
guarantee specialized education or general educational support to children with 
disabilities, while 2% specifically require schools to be accessible to children with 
disabilities. Yet only 4% of constitutions explicitly provide for the integration of 
children with disabilities within the public school system. For example, Bolivia’s 
constitution provides: “The State shall promote and guarantee the continuing edu-
cation of children and adolescents with disabilities . . . under the same structure, 
principles and values of the educational system, and shall establish a special orga-
nization and development curriculum.”33
While only seven constitutions explicitly address integrated education and not 
all of these guarantee full inclusion, these provisions have had impact in both pub-
lic and private schools. Under the Brazilian Constitution, the government com-
mits to implementing the right to education through “special educational assis-
tance for the handicapped, preferably within the regular school system.”34 In 2015, 
a consortium of Brazilian private schools challenged a law requiring schools to 
provide inclusive education, claiming it was unconstitutional as applied to private 
schools.35 Upholding the law, the Court emphasized that inclusion benefits society 
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as a whole, and that all schools—public and private alike—had a duty to promote 
integrated education and advance Brazil’s global commitments.
The Right to Work
Guaranteeing the right to work and preventing workplace discrimination are funda-
mental to the rights of persons with disabilities, while relationships built at work are 
fundamental to reducing bias.36 However, just 12% of constitutions explicitly guar-
antee the right to work for people with disabilities or prohibit disability discrimi-
nation in employment (Map 22). Malawi’s constitution, for example, states: “Every 
person shall be entitled to fair wages and equal remuneration for work of equal value 
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without distinction or discrimination of any kind, in particular on basis of gender, 
disability or race,” and states as a “principle of national policy” that people with dis-
abilities should be ensured “fair opportunities in employment” and “the fullest pos-
sible participation in all spheres of Malawian society.”37 Further, since it adopted its 
constitution in 1994, Malawi has enacted a series of laws aimed at strengthening 
opportunities at work regardless of disability, which may help explain the country’s 
relatively high employment ratio for people with disabilities (as noted earlier in this 
chapter).38 An additional 10% of constitutions generally guarantee the right to work 
or nondiscrimination at work and prohibit disability discrimination broadly.
Why Constitutions Should Expand Protections of Reasonable Accommodations
While prohibiting employment discrimination is a crucial start, ensuring that all 
workplaces also provide reasonable accommodation is essential to equal oppor-
tunities. For an employee whose obsessive-compulsive disorder prevents him/her 
from taking public transportation at its most crowded, accommodations could be 
as straightforward as providing parking or changing work shifts by an hour. An 
individual with a visual impairment may succeed at a job when accommodated 
with a low-cost screen reader and be unable to perform the role without it. Like-
wise for an individual who is deaf but to whom low-cost automated captioning 
opens many previously inaccessible positions. Lowering barriers so everyone can 
perform at their highest level benefits employers and employees alike.
For workplaces, ensuring reasonable accommodations has become the lead-
ing legal standard for reducing socially constructed barriers. “Reasonable accom-
modations” are measures that make employment opportunities equally accessible 
to individuals with disabilities, such as making workplaces physically accessible, 
modifying test procedures, and allowing employees to adjust work schedules, 
without imposing “undue hardship” on employers. Under the CRPD, the right to 
work “includes the right to the opportunity to gain a living by work freely chosen 
or accepted in a labour market and work environment that is open, inclusive and 
accessible to persons with disabilities,” and governments are obligated to realize 
this right through the provision of reasonable accommodations.39
Reasonable accommodation is important in civic spaces as well as workplaces, 
and failure to provide reasonable accommodations to realize fundamental rights has 
been rightly interpreted by constitutional courts as disability discrimination. For 
example, in 2008, Slovenia’s Supreme Court found the Civil Procedure Act to be 
unconstitutional, as it indirectly discriminated on the basis of disability by failing to 
ensure access to court documents in Braille.40 Because of the ruling, the government 
now must provide Slovenians with visual impairments with Braille transcripts and 
other forms of assistance with nonwritten legal documents (such as court sketches).41
Currently, just two of 193 constitutions address reasonable accommodation 
directly. Incorporating language articulating this principle in the remaining con-
stitutions would strengthen the fulfillment of equal rights at work for adults with 
Rights of People with Disabilities    161
disabilities and differences.42 Although legislation may best detail employers’ obli-
gations, constitutional provisions provide a strong foundation for advancing rea-
sonable accommodations as fundamental rather than ancillary to equal rights at 
work. Fiji’s constitution provides an example: “A person with any disability has 
the right to reasonable adaptation of buildings, infrastructure, vehicles, working 
arrangements, rules, practices or procedures, to enable their full participation in 
society and the effective realisation of their rights.”43
While the rights-based argument for reasonable accommodations is strong, so 
is the evidence of their economic feasibility. Employers have reported that accom-
modation costs are typically low: according to a survey of 2,387 U.S. employers, only 
41% had expenditures associated with hiring someone with a disability. The median 
cost for a one-time accommodation was $500, compared to around $200 for an 
employee without a disability in the same position.44 These costs represent just 1.6% 
of the 2016 individual median personal income.45 These are affordable for employ-
ers not only in high-income countries but also in LMICs, where wages are generally 
lower but so too are costs of accommodation. Moreover, at a societal level, growing 
evidence suggests that such accommodations quickly pay for themselves; creating 
the conditions for more people with disabilities to access health, education, and jobs 
leads to higher workforce participation, in turn fueling economic growth.46
The Right to Health
Globally, 13% of constitutions explicitly guarantee the health rights of persons with 
disabilities (Map 23). Spain’s constitution, for instance, establishes: “The public 
authorities shall carry out a policy of preventive care, treatment, rehabilitation and 
integration of the physically, sensorially and mentally handicapped by giving them 
the specialized care they require.”47 An additional 8% guarantee an approach to 
No specific provision
Right guaranteed, not 
disability-specific
Aspirational provision
Health rights generally guaranteed and disability discrimination prohibited
Guaranteed right
Free medical services broadly guaranteed
MAP 23. Does the constitution explicitly guarantee the right to health for 
persons w th disabiliti s?
MAP 23. Does the constitution explicitly guarantee the right to health for persons with 
disabilities?
162    Rights of People with Disabilities
health generally and prohibit disability discrimination. Seven percent of countries 
do not explicitly address health rights for persons with disabilities but broadly 
guarantee that medical services are free, which can be particularly important for 
persons with disabilities. Finally, 6% of constitutions allow for positive action on 
health rights for people with disabilities.
Even broad constitutional guarantees of healthcare can guard against threats to 
access that emerge amid shifts in government or economic downturns, which may 
disproportionately affect people with disabilities. For example, in Portugal, home 
to at least one million people with disabilities, the constitution protects the right 
to free universal healthcare by requiring the government to enact a national pro-
gram, which became the National Health Service (NHS).48 When the legislature 
proposed eliminating the NHS in 1984, the Constitutional Court invoked this pro-
vision to strike down the reform, explaining: “The constitutional tasks imposed 
on the State as a guarantee for fundamental rights, consisting in the creation of 
certain institutions or services, do not only oblige their creation, but also a duty 
not to abolish them once created.”49
Safeguards for Civil and Political Rights
While this book focuses on overall equality and social and economic rights, it is 
undeniable that civil and political rights are equally critical to ensuring all people 
can participate in public and private life and influence their governments’ deci-
sions. These decisions in turn shape the scope of equal rights and whose needs 
are prioritized. For most groups, explicit restrictions on these rights have been 
largely eliminated. For people with disabilities, however, many explicit restrictions 
persist, as detailed in the following section. Additionally, many societal barriers—
such as inaccessible voting booths—impede the full exercise of these rights. To 
ensure people with disabilities can fully engage in civic and political life and have 
protections against arbitrary infringements of their liberties, constitutions need to 
take additional steps to protect these rights unambiguously.
Protecting the Right to Liberty
The right to liberty is a fundamental right that undergirds all others. Article 14 
of the CRPD protects the right to liberty of people with disabilities, and further 
clarifies that “the existence of a disability shall in no case justify a deprivation of 
liberty.” Nevertheless, people with disabilities worldwide face heightened risks of 
involuntary confinement. According to UNICEF, in Central and Eastern Europe, 
a child with a disability is nearly 17 times as likely to be institutionalized as a child 
without a disability.50 Migrants and refugees with disabilities often encounter 
unique restrictions and disadvantages, especially within refugee camps.51
Countries can take an affirmative step toward reducing these abuses by clearly 
protecting the right to liberty for people with disabilities in their constitutions. 
One-quarter of constitutions explicitly do so, either by prohibiting disability 
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discrimination and guaranteeing the right to liberty generally or by explicitly 
guaranteeing the right to liberty for persons with disabilities. However, as detailed 
further in the following section, five countries that guarantee the right to liberty 
for persons with disabilities also have broad provisions that could be used to 
restrict rights, while nine of the countries also have specific exceptions for mental 
health conditions. Just 8% of constitutions guarantee access to medical treatment 
when liberty is infringed.
Facilitating Political Engagement
Finally, in terms of political participation, constitutions can require specific mea-
sures to increase inclusion of people with disabilities. Five constitutions include 
provisions to facilitate voting for persons with disabilities, though some are 
phrased more expansively than others. Uganda, for example, provides: “Parlia-
ment shall make laws to provide for the facilitation of citizens with disabilities to 
register and vote.”52 By contrast, Malta limits its provision to blind voters, provid-
ing that if “a person is by reason of blindness unable to mark on his ballot paper, 
provision may be made by law requiring that . . . adequate and special means are 
to be provided which will enable that person to mark on his ballot paper indepen-
dently and without the need of assistance.”53
Six percent of constitutions take broader approaches by aspiring to or guaran-
teeing the right to accessibility of public places for persons with disabilities. Four 
constitutions include provisions to ensure accessibility of transportation. Three 
constitutions guarantee the right to use Braille as an alternative form of communi-
cation, and five do so for sign language. An additional 4% of constitutions commit 
to promoting the use of sign language.
BARRIERS TO EQUALIT Y WITHIN C ONSTITUTIONS: 
DISCRIMINATORY L ANGUAGE AND 
RESTRICTIONS ON RIGHT S
Despite important advances in prohibiting discrimination and guaranteeing equal 
rights for persons with disabilities, some constitutions explicitly restrict rights 
or use vague wording that leaves the door open to discrimination. Meanwhile, 
other constitutions, particularly older ones, refer to disability using discrimina-
tory or stigmatizing language. While these provisions and language choices may 
often reflect outdated notions about disability, their retention in constitutional 
texts poses substantial risks to fundamental rights, and undermines constitutions’ 
potential to shift norms toward equality. By contrast, strong constitutional protec-
tions can do the opposite: in Uganda, for instance, the Centre for Health, Human 
Rights and Development successfully challenged three laws that referred to people 
with disabilities as “imbeciles,” “idiots,” and “criminal lunatics,” based on the con-
stitution’s explicit protection of the right to dignity of people with disabilities.54
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Disability Definitions and Terminology in Constitutions
Globally, just three constitutions include definitions of disability that reference the 
impact of social and environmental factors. For example, Zambia’s constitution 
was amended in 2016 to state: “In this Constitution, unless the context otherwise 
requires: . . . ‘disability’ means a permanent physical, mental, intellectual or sen-
sory impairment that alone, or in combination with social or environmental bar-
riers, hinders the ability of a person to fully or effectively participate in an activity 
or perform a function as specified in this Constitution or as prescribed.”
Restricting Rights on the Basis of Mental and 
Physical Health Conditions
While discriminatory language can be ambiguous, explicit limitations on rights 
are not. Globally, a significant portion of constitutions, including many of those 
using discriminatory language, allow for restrictions on the rights of people with 
disabilities. These restrictions are especially common with respect to certain civil 
rights and liberties. Twenty-two percent of constitutions specify that persons with 
mental health conditions can be denied the right to vote, as do 33% for the right to 
hold legislative office.
Constitutions also commonly restrict the rights to liberty and movement on 
the basis of mental health (see Figure 9). Specifically, 19% of constitutions specify 
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FIGURE 9. Explicit constitutional provisions that allow for civil and political rights to be 
denied based on health conditions
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the 36 constitutions that explicitly allow infringement of the right to liberty for 
persons with disabilities, 29 require that it be for the protection of the community 
and treatment of the individual, and three require it to be for the protection of 
the individual and community. However, three countries place no requirements, 
and one country protects only the community and not the individual. Finally, 
four constitutions state that freedom of movement can be denied to “persons of 
unsound mind.” According to the U.N. Human Rights Committee, while the rights 
to liberty and movement are linked, deprivations of liberty, which include every-
thing from police custody to involuntary hospitalization, “involv[e] more severe 
restriction of motion within a narrower space than mere interference with liberty 
of movement.”55
Some constitutions also open the door to limiting rights on the basis of phys-
ical health conditions: three constitutions allow for restrictions on the right to 
vote, as do four for the right to hold legislative office. Namibia’s constitution allows 
Parliament to restrict individuals’ right to vote and hold office on “grounds of 
infirmity.”56 Uruguay’s constitution states that “[c]itizenship is suspended: 1) By 
physical or mental ineptitude which prevents free and reflective action,”57 and is 
silent regarding how physical disabilities would prevent reflective action. Zambia’s 
constitution does not limit the right to vote, but does provide that “[a] person is 
disqualified from being elected as a Member of Parliament if that person . . . has a 
mental or physical disability that would make the person incapable of performing 
the legislative function.”58 Beyond these three, others use troubling exclusionary 
language in describing civil and political rights; Serbia’s constitution, for example, 
limits the right to vote to those of “working ability.”59 In addition to opening the 
door for discrimination against those not working, this language lays a foundation 
for discriminatory assumptions about “working ability” to determine both who 
can vote and who can work; for example, as detailed in this chapter, discrimina-
tion that includes presumptions of incapacity and lack of reasonable accommo-
dations—rather than lack of “working ability”—often limits full participation in 
employment by persons with disabilities.
Historic examples of disenfranchisement reveal that restrictions are often 
imposed as pretexts for discrimination. Literacy tests and poll taxes, for example, 
were instituted to limit voting by poor and minority voters, rather than out of 
genuine concern for the integrity of elections. As observed by Fiala-Butora, Stein 
and Lord,60 “[N]early every state has at some time in its history restricted the basic 
human right of voting for women, ethnic and racial minorities, immigrants, per-
sons with low literacy levels, and/or persons with disabilities. Common to these 
exclusions are justifications that are grounded in deeply embedded but empiri-
cally unfounded social constructs as to the lesser ability of the given category 
of individuals.”61
A health history including episodes of depression or anxiety, for example, has 
nothing to do with voting capacity. According to the World Health Organization 
166    Rights of People with Disabilities
(WHO), around one in four people globally have a history of a mental or emo-
tional health problem,62 including 300 million who suffer from depression, which 
WHO ranks as “the single largest contributor to global disability.”63 Broad men-
tal health-based voting restrictions open the door to abuse and over-exclusion, 
especially since these assessments may be informed by stigma rather than science, 
and begin from the assumption of incapacity. In Hungary, for example, voting 
restrictions resulted in the disenfranchisement of over 70,000 individuals, even 
as only 8,000–12,000 Hungarians were considered to have “severe” or “profound” 
disabilities that could plausibly impair voting capacity.64
Similarly, there is no case for basing restrictions on freedom of movement or 
liberty on a specific condition or category of people instead of actual risk. Some 
countries’ courts have adopted standards for evaluating whether individuals pose 
imminent threats to themselves or others. Although individual assessments in 
these cases will likely never be fully accurate evaluations of risk, and some poten-
tial for abuse persists, this approach is far more narrowly tailored to the issue of 
personal and public safety than an exception applying to an entire group based 
on disability status. Basic due process rights, including the right to a fair hearing 
and the right to appeal, are essential additional measures to protect against abuse.
It is critical that countries’ foundational texts do not carve out exceptions to 
fundamental rights for people with disabilities, especially given the long histories 
of involuntary institutionalization and disenfranchisement experienced by this 
group, which is not fully behind us: people with disabilities continue to face high 
rates of institutionalization, often without fair and transparent processes to protect 
against arbitrary confinement or inhumane conditions. Altogether, these denials 
and exceptions embody presumptions about all people with disabilities or certain 
types of disabilities that obscure the diversity of circumstances and experiences, 
and create significant risks for the protection of individual rights.
Restricting Rights on the Basis of Ability, Capability, or 
Being “Able-Bodied”
Finally, constitutional provisions that use language about “able-bodied” people 
create the potential for employment discrimination against adults with physical 
disabilities. Two constitutions limit the right to work to “able-bodied” citizens. 
Denmark’s constitution states: “In order to advance the public weal efforts should 
be made to afford work to every able-bodied citizen on terms that will secure his 
existence.”65 Similarly, Saudi Arabia’s constitution provides: “The State shall pro-
vide job opportunities to all able-bodied people and shall enact laws to protect 
both the employee and the employer.”66
Provisions that limit rights based on abilities also have discriminatory poten-
tial. Four countries have provisions broadly guaranteeing equal opportunities in 
education on the basis of ability. One country guarantees the right to secondary 
education on the basis of intellectual ability; an additional two guarantee on the 
basis of merit or in “deserving” cases. While these provisions may or may not 
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be used to discriminate against people with disabilities in practice, their wording 
undercuts the idea that education is a universal right and may pose risks for chil-
dren whose abilities are undervalued because of discrimination and bias.
Similarly, even provisions that broadly support equal rights for persons with 
disabilities may leave room for limitations of those rights. Five countries have pro-
visions guaranteeing equal rights to persons with disabilities, but only to the extent 
they are able to enjoy them. For example, Timor-Leste’s constitution states: “A dis-
abled citizen shall enjoy the same rights and shall be subject to the same duties as 
all other citizens, except for the rights and duties which he or she is unable to exer-
cise or fulfil due to his or her disability.”67 While these provisions may be intended 
to recognize constraints faced by persons with disabilities, they also leave room to 
potentially limit rights for persons with disabilities rather than removing social 
and environmental barriers to full inclusion.
THE CLEAR NEED TO STRENGTHEN 
C ONSTITUTIONAL APPROACHES TO DISABILIT Y—
AND FURTHER STR ATEGIES TO ADVANCE EQUALIT Y
As the preceding sections illustrated, the world’s constitutions have far to go on 
protecting equal rights on the basis of disability. While the increasing share of 
constitutions that include disability-specific equal rights provisions is encourag-
ing, far too many embed language or restrictions on rights that reflect a histori-
cally stigmatizing understanding of disabilities. Failure to accelerate progress on 
strengthening protections can have profound consequences for the millions of 
people whose rights remain in limbo.
Advancing Equality with General Equality Clauses
While constitutions that specifically prohibit disability discrimination likely pro-
vide the most powerful guarantees for equal rights, broad constitutional equal-
ity guarantees have also provided effective tools for advancing the equal rights of 
people with disabilities in domestic courts. Although persistent efforts to establish 
explicit constitutional protections of equality on the basis of disability are criti-
cal for ensuring consistent, human rights-based rulings, in the meantime, this 
strategy may serve as an important approach for accelerating change globally. As 
in other areas, however, while general equality clauses can facilitate important 
advances, they often do not provide protections as strong as specific bans on dis-
ability discrimination.
India: Using Overall Equality to Challenge Rules Based on Presumptions of Incapacity
India provides an example of how a broadly worded equal rights guarantee can 
have impact. In the Delhi High Court, the National Association of the Deaf filed 
a petition to end the blanket ban on driver’s licenses for deaf people, which was 
based on the presumption that they would endanger the public. The petitioners’ 
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brief noted how deaf drivers were able to obtain licenses in numerous other coun-
tries (sometimes with stipulations such as equipping their vehicles with extra-
large mirrors).68 Under an international convention signed by India, deaf drivers 
could also obtain international licenses enabling them to legally drive in India. In 
a landmark ruling citing the constitution’s general guarantee of equality, the Court 
held in 2011 that deaf individuals should be eligible to take a driving test.69
Japan: Overall Equal Rights as a Basis for Integrated Education—But Judicial 
Reasoning That Leaves Full Inclusion in Question
In Japan, the constitution’s overall equality clause and protection of the right to 
education provided the basis for a decision ensuring that a child with a physical 
disability could enroll in kindergarten at her local public school. The Board of 
Education had initially denied the girl admission because of her disability, spe-
cifically her inability to walk on her own.70 However, after the girl’s mother sought 
a court order, citing both the constitution and protections for inclusive education 
in legislation and the U.N. Convention on the Rights of the Child, the Tokushima 
District Court ruled that the school had to immediately admit the girl for full-
time kindergarten.
Nevertheless, the district court stopped short of mandating fully inclusive edu-
cation that would accommodate all children’s needs. In its reasoning, the court 
noted that the girl’s mother was prepared to accompany her daughter to school 
every day and attend to her needs in the classroom, ensuring there would be no 
“undue burden” on the school. However, the principle of inclusive education as 
defined in the CRPD and elsewhere requires governments to ensure that all chil-
dren have the support they need to attend and fully participate in school, regard-
less of disability; fulfillment of this right should not be contingent on parents’ 
availability to provide full-time assistance. Further, Japan’s education provision 
guarantees the right to “an equal education correspondent to [the person’s] abil-
ity,” which could open the door to exclusion. While the Tokushima District Court’s 
ruling yielded a positive outcome, stronger, disability-specific protections in the 
constitution would provide a sturdier foundation for future cases.
United States: A Mixed History on Disability with Broad Protections for Equality
In the U.S., the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause, which broadly 
guarantees equality before the law, has provided an important tool for advocates 
seeking to ensure equal rights regardless of disability. Yet historic examples illus-
trate the serious risks of failing to protect equal rights explicitly.
In 1972, the Equal Protection Clause provided the basis for a strong decision 
on children’s equal rights in education by the U.S. District Court for the District 
of Columbia. In Mills v. Board of Education, seven low-income black boys, rang-
ing from eight to 16 years old, brought a lawsuit to enforce their right to public 
education after being excluded from public schools. While some of the boys had 
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been formally diagnosed with disabilities, including epilepsy and hemiplegia, oth-
ers had been deemed “exceptional” and excluded from school because of “behav-
ioral problems.” In their court filings, the plaintiffs estimated that within D.C., 
there were “22,000 retarded, emotionally disturbed, blind, deaf, and speech or 
learning disabled children, and perhaps as many as 18,000 of these children are 
not being furnished with programs of specialized education.”71 A report from the 
Department of Education further revealed that at least 12,340 children with dis-
abilities were excluded from D.C. schools in the 1971–72 school year. Many were 
expelled from school without a hearing, and their families were unable to afford 
private school.
In a comprehensive order, the court found that the D.C. Board of Education 
was responsible for providing “publicly supported education suited to each child’s 
needs, including special education and tuition grants, and also, a constitutionally 
adequate prior hearing and periodic review public education to all students in the 
District, including children with disabilities.” Citing Brown and the Equal Protec-
tion Clause, the court reminded the defendants that “the opportunity of an educa-
tion . . . where the state has undertaken to provide it, is a right which must be made 
available to all on equal terms.”72 Further, the court ordered the school board to 
produce a list of all other children who had been expelled and why, and to identify 
and contact all other students in the same position as the plaintiffs. Finally, the 
court ordered the board to fill all vacant “special education” positions and ensure 
that the budget allocated for the education of children with disabilities was indeed 
spent on their education.
Despite being issued by a district-level court, rather than the Supreme Court, 
Mills v. Board of Education had national impacts. Three years after the decision, 
Congress passed the Education for All Handicapped Children Act, which preceded 
the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act that remains in place today.73 Guar-
anteeing children with physical and mental disabilities equal rights to a “free and 
appropriate public education,” the legislation became one of the most important 
legal tools for disability advocates in the following decades. Nevertheless, the case 
also illustrated intersections between disability discrimination and discrimination 
on the basis of race and socioeconomic status, which persist today. Research sug-
gests that black children in the U.S. are more likely to be misdiagnosed as having 
intellectual disabilities by school administrators, which some argue is contribut-
ing to resegregation, especially in the American South;74 additionally, black boys 
diagnosed with disabilities have the highest rates of corporal punishment in U.S. 
schools.75 This trend parallels Roma students’ overrepresentation in schools for 
students with disabilities in some European countries (discussed in chapter 2 and 
later in this chapter), and underscores the importance of examining how different 
forms of discrimination and exclusion intersect.
Finally, the worst-case scenario when constitutional equality provisions do 
not address disability explicitly is that courts will simply refuse to recognize dis-
crimination against persons with disabilities as unconstitutional, and sanction 
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policies and practices that are grave violations of human rights. Like a range of 
other historically marginalized groups, people with disabilities in many countries 
have faced compulsory sterilization and other threats to bodily integrity, which 
have often been upheld in court. The most notorious U.S. case on this topic is 
Buck v. Bell.
The case concerned the constitutionality of a 1924 eugenics law allowing for the 
compulsory sterilization of anyone in a state institution with “hereditary forms 
of insanity, imbecility.”76 The plaintiff, 18-year-old Carrie Buck, was a mother of 
a one-year-old and an inmate at the Virginia State Colony for Epileptics and Fee-
bleminded. The colony’s superintendent, Dr. Albert Priddy, had urged the state 
legislature to adopt the sterilization law, arguing that the state could not afford 
to support “defectives.”77 After Priddy ordered Buck’s sterilization, she was given 
a chance to appeal. However, the lawyer she was provided was a former colony 
director and an old friend of the opposing counsel. At the 1924 trial, eugeni-
cists testified as “experts,” and eight witnesses were called to testify about Buck’s 
“social inadequacy.”78
After the Virginia Supreme Court affirmed the ruling upholding the law, Buck 
appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court. Supporters of the eugenics law hoped this 
would be a test case affirming the constitutionality of compulsory sterilization.79 
And in 1927, with barely a mention of the Equal Protection Clause, their wishes 
were realized: the Court ruled that Buck’s sterilization was in the state’s best inter-
est, asserting that “society can prevent those who are manifestly unfit from con-
tinuing their kind.”80
Later investigations indicated that Buck did not actually have an intellectual 
disability and became pregnant after being raped by a relative, leading her fos-
ter family to send her to the colony to preserve their reputation.81 Meanwhile, as 
a result of the decision, Virginia sterilized more than 8,300 inmates of similar 
institutions from 1927 to 1972, and paved the way for laws that permitted tens of 
thousands more forced sterilizations across the country.82 The impacts were not 
limited to the U.S.; at the Nuremberg Trials, Nazi doctors cited Buck v. Bell in their 
defense.83 While broad equal rights provisions have led to transformative victories 
for people with disabilities, as Buck v. Bell reminds us, their lack of specificity also 
leaves the door open to devastating rights violations.
Advancing Equality with the CRPD
A second strategy for advancing equal rights in the absence of a disability-specific 
constitutional provision is invoking the CRPD. The 1948 Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights (UDHR) represented a profound step forward for protecting human 
rights. Yet neither the UDHR nor the two documents that comprise the “Inter-
national Bill of Human Rights”—the International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights (1966) and the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (1966)—explicitly protected the rights of people with disabilities, even while 
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establishing protections based on sex, race, religion, and other characteristics. In 
the 1980s, the U.N. adopted the World Programme on Action Concerning Disabled 
Persons, which laid out recommendations focused on prevention, rehabilitation, 
participation of people with disabilities in decision-making, and equalization of 
opportunities in all aspects of life.84 The following decade, the U.N. adopted the 
Standard Rules on Equalization of People with Disabilities, which explicitly recog-
nized that “intensified efforts are needed to achieve the full and equal enjoyment of 
human rights and participation in society by persons with disabilities.”85
But it was not until the twenty-first century that these commitments achieved 
the force of a global convention. With the leadership of DPOs worldwide, in 
December 2006, the U.N. finally adopted what many in the disability commu-
nity had urged for decades: a binding human rights treaty specifically articulating 
states’ obligations to “promote, protect and ensure the full and equal enjoyment of 
all human rights and fundamental freedoms by all persons with disabilities, and to 
promote respect for their inherent dignity.”86
The CRPD’s passage has helped accelerate countries’ adoption of laws and con-
stitutional amendments to guarantee equal rights. Moreover, for constitutions that 
directly incorporate international treaties into domestic law, CRPD ratification 
has demonstrably strengthened courts’ interpretations of equal rights guarantees.
India: Recognizing the Right to Reasonable Accommodations
One important case illustrating the CRPD’s impact comes from India. The peti-
tioner in the case, Ranjit Kumar Rajak, had a renal transplant in 2004. A few years 
later, Rajak applied for a job as a probationary officer with the State Bank of India. 
The job posting specifically noted it was open to people with disabilities; however, 
it also stated that “appointment of selected candidates is subject to his/her being 
declared medically fit by Medical Officer(s) appointed/approved by the Bank.”87
Rajak got the job, but after his required medical examination, the offer was 
revoked. The bank had determined that, given his medical history, employing 
Rajak would be too costly, since he would be “in continuous need of quality medi-
cal care” and the bank’s rules required the reimbursement of its officers’ medical 
costs. The bank consequently declared him “unfit” for the job. After being denied 
the position, however, Rajak secured a job at another bank.
In a powerful order, the Bombay High Court found that the Bank of India’s 
revocation of Rajak’s job offer violated his constitutional rights to equality and 
to life, as well as the right to reasonable accommodation under the CRPD. In its 
first ruling recognizing the reasonable accommodation standard, the Court ruled 
that the CRPD definition should apply, since domestic laws had not yet provided 
a definition of the concept.
Applying the “undue burden” test, the Court found no evidence that Rajak’s 
condition would “cause undue hardship in the content of the size of the organiza-
tion, the financial implications on the organization and/or on the morale of other 
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employees.”88 Consequently, the Court ruled in Rajak’s favor, in a landmark rul-
ing incorporating the CRPD’s commitments to equal rights in employment and 
clearly illustrating their resonance with established constitutional rights.89
Czech Republic: Leveraging the CRPD to Strengthen Inclusive Education
A second case showing the CRPD’s domestic impacts comes from the Czech 
Republic. As a preschooler, a young boy from Milešovice, a small village, was 
diagnosed with autism and a “moderate mental disability.”90 Consequently, he was 
placed in a “special school” in the city of Brno, though he quickly outpaced his 
fellow students and was unable to receive a quality education. The Special Educa-
tional Centre in Brno recommended that he switch back to a mainstream school, 
provided he could receive some basic assistance in the classroom.91
The boy’s mother agreed, and in 2012, sought permission to have him admitted 
to a mainstream school nearby. However, her request was quickly rejected. School 
administrators contended that they did not have the capacity to educate her son, 
and noted that parents of existing students had expressed concerns. Undeterred, 
she reached out to 11 other mainstream schools in the area. All 11 said no.92
As in Hungary, described in chapter 2, in the Czech Republic, discrimina-
tion against students with disabilities intersects with discrimination against the 
Roma, one of Europe’s largest, most marginalized ethnic minorities. While the 
Roma comprise only 3% of the Czech population, one-third of students in the 
country’s so-called “practical schools,” or schools designed for children with “mild 
mental disabilities,” are Roma.93 Nationally, only 2% of all students attend practi-
cal schools.94 Many activists have questioned the validity of the disproportionate 
number of Romani children diagnosed with “mental disabilities,” and decried the 
limited educational and economic opportunities available to these children after 
their exclusion from mainstream schools.95
Fortunately, the boy was accepted at one mainstream school in a neighboring 
town, which he began attending in 2012. In 2014, however, his mother initiated an 
antidiscrimination lawsuit against the first school district, contending that it had 
violated her child’s rights to education and equal treatment under the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights and Freedoms—the Czech Constitution’s bill of rights.
Despite not explicitly guaranteeing equal rights on the basis of disability, the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms does affirmatively protect the 
universal right to free education.96 Additionally, the constitution provides that 
treaties ratified by the Czech Republic, including the CRPD, “form a part of the 
legal order” and take precedence over conflicting statutes.97 Citing these provi-
sions, in 2016, the Vyškov District Court handed down a landmark judgment 
affirming the mother’s allegations and ordering the city to apologize and pay 
damages.98 In so doing, the court “confirmed that the child has the right to inclu-
sive education in accordance with Art. 24 of the Convention on the Rights of 
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Persons with Disabilities and the failure to provide such education can be quali-
fied as discrimination.”99
This ruling helped lay the foundation for further action. A few months after the 
decision, new legislation went into effect strengthening the country’s commitments 
to inclusive education by increasing funding and urging mainstream inclusion of 
the students diverted to “practical schools,” with a two-year timeline for imple-
mentation.100 The new law was envisioned as a strategy to both integrate students 
with disabilities and diminish racial/ethnic segregation in the school system.101
Further, the Vyškov ruling and subsequent developments illustrate how con-
stitutional provisions, alongside complementary global treaties, work together 
to accelerate change. While an explicit constitutional protection of equal rights 
on the basis of disability would have provided a stronger legal framework, the 
broad equal rights clause, in conjunction with the right to education and the con-
stitution’s recognition of international treaties’ domestic applicability, enabled the 
child’s lawyers to build a compelling case for his right to attend school. The new 
law makes this legal foundation even stronger.
Advancing Equality with “Leave No One Behind”
Finally, despite carrying less legal weight than a constitutional provision or the 
CRPD, the SDGs’ overarching principle of “leave no one behind” provides a use-
ful frame for approaching disability rights. While the MDGs helped improve out-
comes for many, millions of people who were most marginalized or economically 
vulnerable experienced no significant changes in their circumstances. With their 
specific commitments to people with disabilities and guiding value of “leave no 
one behind,” the SDGs are better positioned to have impact for all. Although the 
SDGs are not legally binding, countries have committed to providing periodic 
updates on their progress toward realizing the Goals, and international bodies will 
monitor progress on a global scale.
Abundant evidence shows that the integration and inclusion of people with 
disabilities benefit our schools, workplaces, economies, and society as a whole. 
Yet even if these benefits were not compelling, fundamental rights, such as the 
rights to nondiscrimination, education, healthcare, and dignity, are nonnegotia-
ble, regardless of the nature or extent of disability. Advancing and protecting the 
rights of the most vulnerable or marginalized must therefore be core to broader 
efforts to realize equality.
Case law demonstrates these principles in action. Courts in countries at all 
income levels have found that equal rights means ensuring access to education 
for all, irrespective of the nature of disability. For example, in 2010, a consor-
tium of NGOs managing schools for 1,000 children with profound intellectual 
disabilities in the Western Cape province of South Africa sued the govern-
ment for providing inadequate subsidy amounts to cover the children’s care and 
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educational expenses. Additionally, the subsidies provided per child with severe 
intellectual disabilities were smaller than those provided for children without dis-
abilities, and amounted to less than 20% of those provided for students with mild 
or moderate disabilities.102
The government contended that these funding disparities were justified by lim-
ited resources. However, the Western Cape High Court found that the government 
had failed to explain “why it is reasonable and justifiable that the most vulnerable 
should pay the price” for the budgetary shortfall, and held that the lack of state 
support breached the children’s rights to equality, basic education, dignity, and 
protection from neglect or degradation.103 Importantly, the decision focused on 
the children’s fundamental rights. At the same time, the ruling may yield imme-
diate and long-term economic value by enabling parents and caregivers to work 
while their children with disabilities are at school.
This decision also aligns with international guidance. In a 2016 General Com-
ment, the Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities clarified that 
“provisions that limit [children’s] inclusion on the basis of their impairment or its 
‘degree,’ such as by conditioning their inclusion ‘to the extent of the potential of the 
individual’ ” would violate the right to inclusive education.104 Likewise, the com-
mittee made clear that upholding inclusive education requires that “recognition is 
given to the capacity of every person to learn.”105
MOVING FORWARD
As of 2017, over one billion people—around 15% of the global population—had 
some form of disability.106 As many as four of five people with disabilities live in 
low-income countries, in cities and in rural areas,107 and worldwide, an increasing 
number of people develop disabilities throughout the life course.
In almost every society, disability is linked with disadvantage. Children with 
disabilities are less likely to get an education, while girls with disabilities face even 
greater odds. In Colombia, for example, only 56% of children with disabilities aged 
6–11 attend school, compared to 92% of children without disabilities in the same 
age group.108 Beyond denying children a fundamental right, these early inequali-
ties contribute to barriers to work later in life.
Around the world, adults with disabilities remain far less likely to have a job, 
despite a well-documented desire and capacity to contribute to the workforce—
and having a disability increases the risk of poverty where work opportunities and 
social insurance are inadequate.109 People in poverty often face heightened risks of 
developing a disability due to insufficient access to healthcare, unsafe living condi-
tions, and lower resources, and poverty can exacerbate existing disabilities because 
of unmet needs for care, habilitation, and rehabilitation.
Finally, in many countries, this discrimination is buttressed by discriminatory 
laws. According to a 2015 report by the U.N. Special Rapporteur for Persons with 
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Disabilities: “Most legal systems in the world still contain provisions that discrim-
inate against persons with disabilities and violate their human rights, from the 
denial of legal capacity or the right to vote to education laws that exclude children 
with disabilities from the general education system. Although efforts have been 
made to harmonize national legislation with the Convention on the Rights of Per-
sons with Disabilities, much remains to be done.”110
Progress in Constitutions
The persistence of discrimination in laws and practice is not inevitable. The global 
movement for equal rights for persons with disabilities is the most recent of many 
equal rights movements, and its success yielded a global treaty that has achieved 
near-universal ratification. The movement and the CRPD are also leading to 
powerful changes in national constitutions. Seventy-one percent of constitutions 
adopted in 2010–17 explicitly guarantee equal rights or nondiscrimination to per-
sons with disabilities, compared to only 11% of constitutions adopted before 1990 
(see Figure 10). Likewise, guarantees of equal rights on the basis of disability across 
health, education, and work have all increased.
The Potential for Impact
These reforms have had practical impacts for both people born with disabilities and 
the many individuals who develop disabilities later in life. In Bolivia, a man who 
had suffered from polio in childhood and continued to experience partial paraple-
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FIGURE 10. Explicit constitutional guarantee of equality or nondiscrimination for persons with 
disabilities by year of constitutional adoption
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from his municipal job following a change in administration.111 Citing the constitu-
tion’s protection of the rights of people with disabilities, alongside an International 
Labour Organization convention on disabilities and employment, the Court ruled 
in the man’s favor, ordering his reinstatement and payment of damages.112 When 
Bolivia adopted a new constitution in 2009, the same year it ratified the CRPD,113 
it strengthened its guarantees of equal rights for people with disabilities, including 
specific commitments to health, education, work, and integration.114
In Canada and Iceland, the top courts ruled in cases in 1997115 and 2015116, 
respectively, that hospitals should provide interpreters for the deaf. More recently, 
in 2017, advocates filed a similar petition with the Ugandan Constitutional Court 
based on the constitution’s protection of equal rights for persons with disabilities 
and the right to health.117 In Hungary, the constitution’s prohibition of disability 
discrimination and protection of the right to work, alongside the CRPD, provided 
the foundation in 2018 for reforming a law requiring small businesses to use online 
cash registers that were inaccessible to visually impaired people.118
From Bolivia to Uganda to Hungary and beyond, these cases show that consti-
tutions have the potential to address discrimination, and to help reduce socially 
constructed barriers to full participation by people with disabilities in both the 
public and private sectors. Yet despite recent progress and constitutional rights’ 
documented impact, only a minority of national constitutions explicitly prohibit 
disability discrimination, and a significant minority open the door to discrimi-
nation with unexamined historical language, such as provisions limiting rights 
based on “infirmity” or “unsound mind.” What’s more, given the high proportion 
of people globally who have a history of some kind of mental health condition, 
which often has no bearing on decision-making capacity, these broad limitations 
create the potential for abuse. Similarly, restrictions based on “infirmity” create an 
extremely ambiguous and irrational standard for limiting rights.
Successful Approaches
More needs to be done, from strengthening constitutions to increasing the CRPD’s 
incorporation throughout countries’ national laws and policies. DPOs’ participa-
tion in constitution drafting has been one successful path to change. For example, 
disability rights groups and other civil society organizations played active roles in 
shaping Egypt’s new constitution in 2014. As a result, the adopted draft included a 
comprehensive article on the “rights of the disabled,” while separate articles explic-
itly outlined the rights of children with disabilities and established the “National 
Council for Disability Affairs.”119 Through these reforms, Egypt joined several 
other countries in the Middle East and North Africa that have newly enacted con-
stitutional rights for persons with disabilities following the Arab Spring. Similarly, 
DPOs were involved in the constitutional reform processes of Uganda and South 
Africa, both of which adopted strong protections for disability rights.120
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Yet even before achieving constitutional reforms, citizens can continue pressing 
for change through advocacy and litigation. In countries that have not yet ratified 
the CRPD, national movements are calling on their governments to take action.121 
In countries that have ratified the CPRD, advocates can pressure their domestic 
legal systems to interpret existing laws consistently with the convention’s prin-
ciples.122 Citizens can also continue leveraging their constitutions’ general equality 
provisions as well as broad rights to education and health in pushing for disability-
specific protections. The potential of universal education and health guarantees 
to advance equality illustrates why social and economic rights, as well as non-
discrimination, are critical for creating inclusive societies where everyone has an 
equal chance to participate, as this book’s final chapters discuss in detail.
But enshrining equal rights on the basis of disability in constitutions has both 
practical and normative value. Around the world, people with disabilities and civil 
society groups have leveraged these protections to increase the accessibility and 
inclusiveness of schools, workplaces, legislatures, and public spaces. These tangible 
impacts flowed from the shift in norms and understanding of disability heralded 
by the disability rights movement, and the leadership of DPOs. Governments have 
the opportunity and responsibility to build on this progress by explicitly guaran-
teeing equality to all people with disabilities within their borders.
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Ensuring Rights and Full Participation 
Regardless of Social and 
Economic Position
In the early 1950s, just a few years after India gained independence, Banamali Das 
was earning his living making shoes in Suri, a town in West Bengal. One day, he 
visited the local barbershop for a haircut. Yet the barber, Pakhu Bhandari, refused 
to serve him—or any other member of his caste.1
In January 1951, Das filed a complaint against Bhandari, arguing that Bhandari’s 
refusal to cut his hair violated the West Bengal Hindu Social Disabilities Removal 
Act of 1949. Under the act, no Hindu—a broadly defined designation2—could be 
“denied any service whatsoever” on the ground that he “belongs to a particular 
caste or class .  .  . by a Hindu who habitually renders such service in the course 
of his profession.” Das belonged to a lower caste largely comprising cobblers 
and leatherworkers, and according to his complaint, Bhandari had categorically 
declined their business. In his defense, Bhandari claimed the act infringed on his 
constitutional right to freely practice his profession. Furthermore, he alleged that 
the act violated his own constitutional right to equality.
When the case reached the High Court of Calcutta, however, the judges quickly 
dispensed with these arguments. First, as the Court noted, rather than prevent 
Bhandari from practicing his profession, the act in fact “enlarge[d] the scope of his 
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services” by compelling him to “serve all alike.”3 By contrast, the Court explained, 
if the act had prohibited barbers from providing services to those from lower-
caste backgrounds, it clearly would have infringed upon their work rights. Further, 
restrictions on the right to practice a profession could nevertheless be constitu-
tional if they were reasonable and served a public purpose.4
Turning to Bhandari’s claim that the new law violated his right to equality, the 
Court found that the act in fact had the opposite effect; the equality provision of 
India’s constitution “is directed against discrimination and what the impugned Act 
wishes to abolish is discrimination.”5 Furthermore, the Court clarified that “the 
general scheme of the Act is to protect the lower castes against being discriminated 
against by the higher castes and to make all castes or classes of Hindus equal in the 
social, civic and religious fields.”6 As a result, rather than infringe upon it, the act 
would only further the goals of the new constitution, which specifically prohibited 
caste discrimination. Moreover, the ruling highlighted the importance of ensuring 
that laws regulating the provision of private services affirm constitutional protec-
tions of equality—an issue that continues to be relevant in 2019, especially in the 
context of LGBT+ discrimination.
The Banamali Das case illustrates one way in which discrimination on the basis 
of socioeconomic status takes place—and how constitutions can address it. Das 
experienced explicit discrimination based on his social status, which was clearly 
prohibited by both the national constitution and more targeted legislation. More 
recent cases from India have made clear that, in addition to the explicit bias on 
display in Banamali Das, financial barriers to key resources like health and educa-
tion are also rightfully understood as unconstitutional discrimination on the basis 
of socioeconomic status. For example, in a 1992 case, the Supreme Court held that 
the exorbitant fees required to attend a private medical school made “the availabil-
ity of education beyond the reach of the poor,” therefore violating the constitution’s 
equality provision.7
Global human rights agreements prohibit discrimination on the basis of 
class. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), adopted by the U.N. 
in 1948, guarantees all rights and freedoms without distinction on the basis of 
“social origin, property, birth or other status,”8 as do the International Covenant 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), and the Convention on the Rights of the 
Child (CRC), among other treaties. These international agreements also make 
clear that the rights to health services and education should be equally accessible 
to all. More recently, through the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), all 193 
U.N. countries agreed to take steps between 2015 and 2030 to “end poverty in all 
its forms everywhere,” reduce inequality, end hunger, ensure inclusive education, 
and address other fundamental barriers to the well-being of all people, regardless 
of socioeconomic status and other factors.9
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The 1950 Indian Constitution, which abolished “untouchability” and prohib-
ited caste discrimination, was a sharp repudiation of the country’s widely known 
caste system and a global milestone for equal rights regardless of socioeconomic 
status. But globally, how many countries have embedded these commitments in 
their constitutions and explicitly prohibit discrimination on grounds like income, 
wealth, social origin, or property? And how do broader aspects of countries’ legal 
systems, including the accessibility of courts, shape rights for people who are eco-
nomically marginalized?
SO CIOEC ONOMIC STATUS AND 
DISCRIMINATORY BARRIERS
The concept of socioeconomic status (SES) or social position in constitutions and 
elsewhere is operationalized in a range of ways, including with respect to inherited 
status, income and wealth, educational attainment, and occupation.10 Together, 
these and other factors shape SES, which is generally understood as an individual’s 
social and economic position relative to others.
Discrimination on the basis of SES manifests in a variety of ways. While explicit 
class or caste discrimination remains critical to address, subtler forms of SES dis-
crimination also markedly impact opportunities and inclusion, and barriers to the 
exercise of other rights linked to SES present profound challenges for equity. A 
brief survey of some of the research and history in these areas offers important 
context for the potential of constitutional approaches.
Direct Discrimination: Class, Caste, and Property
Globally, SES discrimination, and particularly discrimination against the poor, has 
a long history in the law. Under feudalism, which structured European societies 
throughout the Middle Ages, social status and rights hinged on land ownership. 
Beginning in the fourteenth century and continuing for nearly 500 years, “poor 
laws” governed the lives of people in poverty in Elizabethan England, prohibiting 
alms-giving to the “able-bodied” poor, threatening servants with imprisonment if 
they quit a job, and creating “poorhouses” to segregate those in poverty from the 
general population, where they often lived in squalid, unsafe conditions.11 In other 
countries, rigid SES-based social hierarchies governed access to jobs and educa-
tion for centuries.12
SES continued to play a definitional role in the first constitutions, some of which 
made property ownership a prerequisite for full citizenship. Under the 1791 French 
Constitution, for instance, only “active citizens”—which did not include paid ser-
vants—could serve as electors in the National Legislative Assembly, and only if 
they lived or worked on a property that met a minimum value requirement speci-
fied in the constitutional text.13 Likewise, New York’s first constitution, adopted 
in 1777, restricted the right to vote to male citizens who possessed a “freehold of 
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the value of twenty pounds, within the said county, or have rented a tenement 
therein of the yearly value of forty shilling.”14 The U.S. Constitution, adopted 12 
years later, left the door open to state-level property restrictions on the right to 
vote that would persist through the late nineteenth century.
Today, in some communities, landownership continues to dictate who partici-
pates in local decision-making processes—a barrier to entry that disproportion-
ately impacts women, partly because of discriminatory inheritance laws.15 More-
over, more formal class and caste systems, despite having been legally abandoned, 
continue to structure societies and interpersonal relationships in parts of the 
world because of their historical entrenchment. Against this backdrop, protections 
against explicit SES discrimination remain relevant and necessary.
Class Discrimination by Proxy: Names, Neighborhoods, and Accents
Although SES discrimination is generally less explicit or codified than in centuries 
past, poverty remains stigmatized in many countries, and SES discrimination per-
sists in more invidious ways. Often, this discrimination is based on class signifiers 
rather than direct assessments of income, property, education, or profession.
For example, in modern-day India, studies have found that employers continue 
to discriminate on the basis of caste not by posting caste-specific job advertise-
ments but by examining applicants’ names. In 2006, researchers in Chennai sub-
mitted over a thousand fictitious resumes for entry-level jobs. While every resume 
reflected very similar levels of experience and education, there was one critical 
difference: the researchers used names widely affiliated with higher castes for half 
the applications, and distinctively low-caste names for the other half. The results 
clearly indicated that caste still matters: applicants with low-caste names had to 
send out 20% more resumes just to receive callbacks.16
Studies from other parts of the world have documented a similar phenomenon, 
while further illustrating how SES discrimination and racial/ethnic discrimina-
tion are often deeply intertwined. A U.S. field experiment that involved submit-
ting 5,000 fictitious resumes in response to 1,300 job ads found that applicants 
with “white” names received about 50% more callbacks than those with names 
perceived as more commonly African American. Yet across the applicant pool, the 
address listed on the resume—a proxy for the applicant’s neighborhood and social 
class—had an independent effect, with those living in wealthier areas receiving 
more favorable treatment.17
Aspects of personal appearance or speech suggesting lower SES have also been 
identified as bases of discrimination. Research has shown that inadequate access 
to affordable dental care is the primary factor driving inequalities in oral health 
between the rich and poor.18 Surveys, however, find that many people attribute “bad 
teeth” to personal choices and neglect, thereby justifying discriminatory attitudes 
on the basis of poor dental appearance.19 Likewise, in many countries, accents and 
language usage have become class signifiers.20 In Britain, over a quarter of people 
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report facing discrimination because of their accents, and surveys of employers 
have confirmed the accuracy of their perceptions.21
Mounting research shows that experiences of SES discrimination, like racial dis-
crimination, negatively affect physical and mental health.22 A study of 252 Ameri-
can adolescents, for example, found that perceived SES discrimination accounted 
for 13% of the negative impacts of poverty on aspects of health like blood pressure 
and cortisol levels.23 Moreover, SES discrimination interacts with other forms of 
discrimination and is worse when combined with other bases of discrimination.24 
The persistence of SES discrimination, alongside the significant body of evidence 
that experiences of discrimination have profound consequences for health25 as well 
as education, work, and income, underscores the urgency of action.
Economic Barriers to Health and Education
Beyond SES discrimination, income barriers affect the ability to realize the fun-
damental rights to health26 and education,27 which in turn affects access to jobs 
and civic and political participation. Across low- and middle-income countries, 
the imposition of fees to access public healthcare has been found to widen socio-
economic disparities in access to health services, and increase the risk of prevent-
able diseases and deaths.28 Likewise, in high-income countries without universal 
healthcare, such as the United States, the costs of medical treatments and prescrip-
tions have been shown to deter low-income individuals from accessing needed 
care, while driving others to bankruptcy.29
In education, tuition fees for primary and secondary school have been found to 
keep poor students and girls out of the classroom—while abolishing fees has the 
opposite effect.30 Likewise, the high costs of higher education often make it more 
challenging for lower-SES students to get their degrees, erecting insurmountable 
barriers to entry for some while driving others to balance multiple jobs with their 
coursework to make ends meet. Finally, while unequal educational opportuni-
ties can translate into unequal work opportunities, SES discrimination can also 
directly affect success in the labor market. For example, a study of graduates from 
a large, highly ranked public university in Chile found that those from lower-SES 
backgrounds went on to earn 35% less than their higher-SES peers, controlling for 
academic performance, second-language proficiency, postgraduate studies, geo-
graphic origin, and other factors.31
Addressing disadvantage linked to SES consequently requires addressing all 
three elements: direct SES discrimination, discrimination on the basis of other 
characteristics commonly associated with lower SES, and policies and practices 
that indirectly impede full participation in society and exercise of other rights by 
people with fewer economic resources. To what extent can constitutions address 
these barriers, and how have existing constitutional approaches to SES discrimina-
tion made a difference?
Rights across Social/Economic Position    183
C ONSTITUTIONAL APPROACHES AND IMPACT S
Current constitutions shape the impact of SES on the full exercise of rights in sev-
eral key ways. First, and most directly, some constitutions explicitly prohibit SES 
discrimination, which can provide a tool for challenging identifiable forms of bias 
and dismantling the vestiges of discriminatory systems. Meanwhile, in some coun-
tries without direct constitutional prohibitions of SES discrimination, individuals 
and civil society groups have used general guarantees of equal rights before the law 
for the same purposes, although not all courts have been receptive to this strat-
egy. Second, constitutions continue to shape whether and how SES influences the 
exercise of civil and political rights, which has broader implications for whether 
laws and policies address the needs and interests of people at all income levels. For 
example, under various countries’ constitutions, personal debt can jeopardize the 
ability to exercise political voice. Finally, constitutions can play a role in reducing 
income barriers to health and education. An overview of where the world stands 
in each area—and why these choices matter—follows.
Addressing Discrimination with Explicit Protections 
Globally, 59% of constitutions include explicit protections related to some aspect 
of SES, employing a diversity of terms for addressing SES discrimination (Map 24). 
For example, Bolivia’s constitution provides that “[t]he State prohibits and pun-
ishes all forms of discrimination based on . . . economic or social condition, type 
of occupation, [and] level of education.”32 Malawi’s constitution establishes that 
“[a]ll persons are, under any law, guaranteed equal and effective protection against 








MAP 24. Does the constitution explicitly guarantee equality or non-discrimination 
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More recently adopted constitutions are likelier to explicitly prohibit SES dis-
crimination: only about one-third of constitutions adopted before 1990 include an 
explicit guarantee, compared to more than three-quarters of those adopted since 
1990 (see Figure 11). Still, the prevalence of these provisions falls far short of the 
share of constitutions that prohibit discrimination on the basis of race/ethnicity 
(76%), gender (85%), or religion (78%).
Nepal: Impact of Explicit Prohibitions of Caste Discrimination
Since its founding in 1974, a Sanskrit education school in Kathmandu, Nepal, had 
admitted only students from the Brahmin caste, a hereditary distinction of high 
social class. Brahmins, who occupy the highest tier of the traditional Nepalese 
caste system, have historically received exclusive access to the highest-status jobs, 
such as priests and educators.
In 1990, however, Nepal’s new constitution prohibited caste discrimination 
(though notably including an exception for “Hindu religious practices”). In 2009, 
Mohan Sashanker, a local lawyer, brought a public interest litigation challenge 
against the Kathmandu school, arguing that its admissions policy was discrimina-
tory and unconstitutional.34 The Supreme Court agreed, finding that the policy 
violated the constitution’s prohibitions on both untouchability and caste discrimi-
nation. In its ruling, the Court explained: “Education is to be acquired by human 
beings, not by a particular caste. The prestige of Sanskrit language does not dimin-
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FIGURE 11. Explicit constitutional guarantee of equality or nondiscrimination across socioeco-
nomic status by year of constitutional adoption
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by persons of another caste .  .  . [S]uch a distinction only promotes inequality 
in society.”35
In recent years, Nepalese courts have struck down numerous laws and tradi-
tions that restricted members of the Dalit caste from accessing temples, public 
hostels, and schools on an equal basis with others. In September 2015, Nepal 
adopted a new constitution reaffirming the prohibition on caste discrimination.36 
Although implementation of the law remains a critical challenge,37 these develop-
ments indicate a marked shift from the legalized discrimination that structured 
society just a few decades ago.
The Mohan Sashanker case clearly illustrates how a constitutional prohibition 
of caste discrimination can provide a legal tool for overturning explicit exclusion-
ary practices. Addressing caste has important implications for SES.
Belgium: Impact of Explicit Prohibitions on Class Discrimination
Like Nepal, Belgium provides an example of a country where explicit protections 
mattered. Many countries, including Belgium, have long made a distinction in 
benefits guaranteed in legislation to people engaged in “blue collar” work, includ-
ing manual labor, and “white collar” work, including office jobs, as well as between 
domestic service work and other forms of work. These distinctions may manifest 
in different sets of labor standards or benefits for each type of employment. Is there 
any legal justification for creating different classes of work, or is this differentia-
tion just a cover for SES discrimination? Whether there is a legal justification may 
depend on the difference and its rationale. Constitutional guarantees against SES 
discrimination can help guarantee that these differences are not implemented for 
arbitrary reasons or based primarily on bias.
In Belgium, this question has worked its way through the courts and legislature 
for decades. While there are various differences between labor policies governing 
blue- and white-collar jobs in Belgium, one obvious example is sick leave. Whereas 
white-collar workers have historically been entitled to paid sick leave from the first 
day of illness, the first day for blue-collar workers was until recently designated 
as unpaid, unless their illness lasted for seven workdays or longer. In addition to 
ensuring workers do not have to sacrifice income to recover from illness or see 
doctors, providing sick leave from the first day of illness is important for prevent-
ing illnesses from spreading in workplaces. In Belgium, however, only white-collar 
workers have traditionally had access to this full coverage.
In 1993, Belgium’s Constitutional Court held that the distinction between blue-
collar and white-collar jobs in allocation of sick days and other benefits violated 
the constitution’s equality provision, and ordered the legislature to gradually har-
monize the policies that applied to both classes of workers. However, Parliament 
took no action for nearly 20 years. In July 2011, the Court once again pronounced 
the distinctions unconstitutional, this time focusing specifically on the disparities 
in sick leave and giving the legislature just two years to comply.38 Under Article 10 
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of the Belgian Constitution, “[n]o class distinctions exist in the State,” while Arti-
cle 11 guarantees nondiscrimination in the enjoyment of rights and freedoms.39
Just before the deadline for complying with the 2013 order, Parliament passed 
a new act to comprehensively merge both systems. In addition to equalizing sick 
leave, the new law harmonized the rules on dismissals for both classes of workers. 
Prior to the law, blue-collar workers were entitled to 28–56 calendar days of notice, 
while white-collar workers were entitled to three months for every five years, or 
portion thereof, they had worked for the employer.40 Under the new regime, notice 
periods are determined strictly on the basis of seniority. With these changes, Bel-
gium is on its way to becoming one of the final OECD countries to harmonize the 
labor laws applying to its two classes of workers.41
In Belgium and elsewhere, distinctions in benefits and labor protections 
between classes of workers are often premised on cost savings. Employers save 
money by withholding first-day sick leave benefits and providing shorter notice 
periods for terminations. Over time, these different standards for different types 
of jobs have become expected and normalized. However, as the Belgian Consti-
tutional Court noted, this does not mean that the lesser protections provided to 
blue-collar workers were “based on objective and reasonable criteria.”42 In other 
words, cost savings and tradition alone cannot justify discrimination under the 
constitution. This development provides an important example of how constitu-
tions can provide a mechanism for increasing equality in labor conditions.
Addressing Discrimination with General Equality Guarantees
As in other areas of discrimination, broadly worded constitutional protections of 
overall equal rights have yielded inconsistent outcomes with regard to SES dis-
crimination. In the absence of specific language, courts in some countries have 
been reluctant to recognize SES discrimination as unconstitutional. Finding 
SES similar to other grounds of discrimination the constitution clearly prohib-
its, courts in other countries have extended constitutional protection to SES. The 
United States and Canada provide examples of each possibility.
United States: Poverty Receives Limited Protection
Under the broadly worded Equal Protection Clause, race and religion have 
received the greatest protection—that is, the government must meet a higher stan-
dard to prove the necessity of any action that distinguishes among people based 
on these characteristics. Gender has been provided with intermediate protection. 
By contrast, discrimination on the basis of income, wealth, or social class receives 
only “rational basis,” the lowest form of review.43
Under the rational basis standard, as illustrated in chapter 3, the person chal-
lenging the law must show either that the government has no legitimate purpose 
for the law, or that the law is not “rationally related” to that purpose. As Supreme 
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Court Justice Potter Stewart explained in a 1980 opinion addressing the limited 
services covered by Medicaid, the federal healthcare program for very low-income 
adults, “this Court has held repeatedly that poverty, standing alone, is not a sus-
pect classification.”44 Consequently, as long as a given policy or practice is ratio-
nally connected to a legitimate government interest, it does not unconstitutionally 
discriminate on the basis of SES.
These low levels of constitutional protection make it hard to successfully oppose 
in court important forms of legal discrimination. For example, in most U.S. states, 
it remains legal to discriminate against prospective renters who plan to pay their 
rent using a federal housing subsidy45—even as discrimination in housing on the 
basis of race, gender, religion, and other constitutionally protected statuses are all 
prohibited.46 As of 2018, 15 states had passed laws to prohibit “source of income” 
discrimination in housing, and studies suggest that these laws can increase the 
probability of finding housing by 12 percentage points.47 With such little protection 
against SES discrimination in federal law, however, low-income renters in most 
states commonly encounter property listings stating plainly they are ineligible 
to apply even when they receive adequate income and housing support to cover 
rent.48 In addition to the consequences for individuals, this exclusion may lead to 
further segregation across both SES and race/ethnicity in settings where historical 
discrimination and barriers have shaped SES disparities.49
Canada: Poverty Is “Analogous” to Prohibited Bases of Discrimination
By contrast, in 1993, a Canadian court deemed discrimination on the basis of pov-
erty “analogous” to the prohibited grounds of discrimination enumerated in the 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Consequently, providing lower levels of legal 
protection to public housing renters compared to those living in private housing 
was found to be discriminatory and unconstitutional.
The appellant in the case was Irma Sparks, a 42-year-old black woman and 
single parent to two children. Sparks had moved into public housing in 1980 and 
had a year-to-year lease.50 On May 1, 1991, she received a notice to vacate within 30 
days, in accordance with the requirements of her lease. However, the Residential 
Tenancies Act required landlords to give tenants in private housing at least three 
months’ notice for a one-year lease. Additionally, the act provided that landlords 
could not serve a “notice to quit” on tenants who had lived in an apartment for 
five years or longer, unless they stopped paying rent. Facing eviction and likely 
homelessness, Sparks brought a lawsuit challenging the lower levels of protections 
provided to public housing tenants, and contesting her own notice to vacate as 
discriminatory on the bases of race, sex, marital status, and poverty.
At trial, the judge dismissed Sparks’s complaint, holding that the differential 
treatment of public housing residents did not single out women, black people, 
or single mothers.51 However, the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal found that the 
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challenged provision amounted to “adverse effect discrimination,” similar to “dis-
parate impact” discrimination in other jurisdictions, on all four grounds Sparks 
had argued. As a result, the Court struck down the portions of the Residential 
Tenancies Act that excluded public housing tenants from the fundamental protec-
tions that other renters enjoyed, newly extending these basic safeguards to approx-
imately 10,000 tenants across the province.52
Other countries have also overturned SES discrimination based on the asso-
ciation of SES and race/ethnicity. The United Kingdom’s first legal case of caste 
discrimination was decided on the basis of protections against race discrimination 
in the country’s Equality Act,53 prompting the government to begin a consultation 
on whether “caste” should be specifically protected too.54
As these contrasting examples from the U.S. and Canada show, general equal-
ity provisions may provide some protection against SES discrimination, but we 
cannot presume these broadly worded guarantees will be sufficient. According to 
analysts from the International Network for Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 
the finding in the Irma Sparks case “that poverty is a prohibited ground of discrim-
ination was ground-breaking,” signaling that such a result is uncommon when SES 
is not explicitly listed as a prohibited ground of discrimination.55
Political Rights and Representation
Ensuring that democracies are accountable to people across the socioeconomic 
spectrum is fundamental to equality. A foundation of equal political rights is one 
part of the solution. Joining a union, voting, and running for political office are all 
important ways that citizens can express their political voice, and these rights and 
opportunities must be guaranteed to all regardless of income, wealth, property, or 
occupation. Historically, as mentioned earlier and in prior chapters, governments 
have employed policies like poll taxes, literacy tests, and property or tax require-
ments to disenfranchise would-be voters, disproportionately affecting citizens 
with lower SES in ways that intersect with other forms of marginalization.
These barriers continue.56 A quarter of countries constitutionally restrict the 
right to hold office based on SES. Although such restrictions have become less 
common, SES-based limitations on political rights were still included in 13% of the 
constitutions enacted between 2010 and 2017 (see Figure 12).
The majority of these restrictions are based on personal debt, with prohibitions 
on legislators having bankruptcies, insolvency, or creditor debt. Antigua and Bar-
buda’s constitution states: “No person shall be qualified to be elected as a member 
of the House who: . . . is an undischarged bankrupt, having been declared bank-
rupt under any law.”57 Other constitutions go beyond debt. Haiti establishes that 
any candidate to the lower house of the legislature must “be the owner of real 
assets in the circumscription or exercise a profession or an industry there.”58 Den-
mark’s constitution provides that “[i]t shall be laid down by Statute to what extent 
conviction and public assistance amounting to poor relief within the meaning of 
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the law shall entail disfranchisement,” and stipulates that only those who have the 
right to vote can hold office.59
Most agree that prohibiting citizens from voting based on their use of public 
assistance or other SES indicators is discrimination. However, some argue that 
restrictions on debtors serving as public officials are necessary to prevent corrup-
tion and susceptibility to bribes. While supported by some anecdotal evidence,60 
this theory is largely speculative; researchers who study corruption’s causes cau-
tion that “[i]t is difficult to know when, or if what factors are responsible for acts 
of fraud and corruption, as they are multi-layered and complex.”61 Moreover, the 
level of documented corruption among wealthy public officials across countries 
suggests that this justification is merely pretext for SES discrimination.62
The practical impacts of limiting rights on the basis of debt can also be severe. 
In Moldova, the Constitutional Court recently struck down a ban on issuing mar-
riage licenses, divorce papers, driver’s licenses, and passports to individuals with 
debt, pronouncing the ban an unconstitutional infringement of the rights to pri-
vacy and freedom of movement. In particular, the Court found that the constitu-
tion required a balancing of interests, and that an interminable ban on fundamen-
tal documents was disproportionate to the goal of enforcing a creditor’s rights.63
Education and Health and Their Foundational Role in 
Realizing Broader Rights
Finally, constitutional rights can provide tools for removing barriers linked to 
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FIGURE 12. Explicit constitutional limits on holding office based on income by year of consti-
tutional adoption
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addition to providing overall rights to health and education, for example, constitu-
tions can guarantee that schools and healthcare will be free, or at least that cost will 
not be a barrier to access for those who cannot afford to pay. Cases from Colombia 
and Kenya illustrate these approaches in action.
Colombia: Accounting for Costs in School Assignments
In Mora v. Bogota District Education Secretary & Ors,64 a five-year-old girl was 
assigned to a school outside her district by local education authorities, who divided 
students among schools based on capacity. Consequently, her family would have to 
pay for transportation to the school, which created an insurmountable cost burden.
The girl’s mother challenged her daughter’s assignment to the school as a viola-
tion of her constitutional right to education. Colombia’s constitution guarantees 
that public education is free, and further states that “[i]t is the responsibility of 
the State to .  .  . guarantee for minors the conditions necessary for their access 
to and retention in the educational system.”65 In 2003, Colombia’s Constitutional 
Court agreed, finding that the school district should “take into account social and 
economic factors” in assigning students to schools, and that the right to educa-
tion and the safety of the child should prevail over other considerations.66 As a 
result, the Court ordered the girl’s admittance to one of the three schools within 
her neighborhood.
Kenya: Addressing Accessibility of Health Services Regardless of SES
The fundamental principle underlying the Mora v. Bogota decision is that SES 
should not be a barrier to fundamental public goods and services like educa-
tion. The same is true for health, as illustrated by a case decided nine years later 
in Kenya.67
The petitioners, Millicent Awuor Omuya and Margaret Anyoso Oliele, were 
mothers who had just given birth but were detained at the hospital in unsafe 
and unsanitary conditions because they could not pay their medical bills in full. 
Omuya had initially gone to give birth at a clinic where she knew she could afford 
the fee, but when it appeared that her baby was in breech position, she was referred 
to Pumwani Maternity Hospital, where her costs more than tripled. As it turns 
out, Omuya gave birth without complications just 15 minutes after arriving at the 
hospital, but she was still charged the full fee. When she could not pay it, she was 
detained for 24 days. Oliele, meanwhile, was a 15-year-old girl who delivered by 
caesarean section and then lost consciousness for 10 days. When she woke, she 
was detained for another seven days for her inability to pay.68 Both patients, who 
had other children to care for at home, were released only when their friends and 
family helped pay their outstanding bills.69
The Kenyan High Court found that the hospital’s actions violated the women’s 
rights to liberty, freedom of movement, dignity, and health, and that they had been 
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unconstitutionally discriminated against “on the basis of their economic status.”70 
Article 43 of the Kenyan Constitution provides that “everyone has . . . the right to 
health care services, including reproductive health care,” while Article 27 prohib-
its direct and indirect discrimination on “any ground,” including “social origin.” 
Additionally, Article 21(3) establishes that the state has “the duty to address the 
needs of vulnerable groups within society,” which the Court held to clearly include 
“poor expectant women who are in labour.”71 In summary, the Court held: “The 
result is that there was a disproportionate impact on poor women’s ability to access 
health care, which constitutes discrimination on the basis of social origin, and 
negates the right of women to enjoy their constitutionally guaranteed rights and 
freedoms. The consequences of this pervasive discrimination is the inaccessibility 
of maternal health services overall, which in turn hinders the attainment of the 
highest attainable standard of health for poor women.”72
As a remedy, the Court ordered the Nairobi county government, which funded 
the hospital, to pay substantial damages to the two women; ordered the eradica-
tion of the practice of detaining patients who could not pay their bills; and called 
on the government for stronger implementation of policies providing for fee waiv-
ers in public hospitals for patients in need.
Current Constitutional Approaches
As these cases from Colombia and Kenya show, across both education and health, 
upholding the fundamental principle of equal access regardless of SES may require 
governments to remove cost barriers through affirmative steps rather than merely 
prohibiting discrimination. Currently, over half of constitutions guarantee free 
primary education, although only one-third extend this same guarantee to sec-
ondary school. Only 10% guarantee universally free medical care, although an 
additional 6% guarantee the right to medical services specifically for low-income 
adults and children. Through these guarantees, constitutions can play a critical 
role in reducing disadvantage linked to SES and supporting universal access to two 
fundamental building blocks of opportunity and well-being.
IMPLEMENTATION CHALLENGES 
AND C ONSIDER ATIONS
SES plays an important role in access not only to public and private sector oppor-
tunities, decent working conditions, and basic health and educational services, but 
also to justice. Lack of resources to hire a lawyer and initiate a lawsuit often makes 
the enforcement of rights through the courts a practical impossibility for people 
in poverty. Although these challenges affect all people’s ability to claim their rights, 
they have a disproportionate impact on the basis of SES. However, there is sig-
nificant variation in the extent to which countries’ constitutions and legal systems 
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support equal justice for all. Assessing which strategies are effective and which are 
likely to further marginalize people in poverty is important for evaluating whether 
the other rights examined in this chapter will have impact.
Cases Brought by and on Behalf of Groups
Access to the courts is directly shaped by countries’ rules on legal standing, which 
determine who is eligible to bring a claim and under what circumstances. Under 
most countries’ rules, individuals cannot bring claims before the courts unless they 
have been personally affected, and the right to individually apply to the Supreme 
or Constitutional Court may be subject to further restrictions. However, many 
countries allow plaintiffs to bring claims on behalf of a class. Some, such as India, 
do not require plaintiffs to have been directly affected by the issue at hand if there 
is evidence that it has had a broad societal impact.
Being able to bring a claim on behalf of a group presents many advantages. 
First, from an administrative standpoint, courts can achieve greater efficiency 
when they can address multiple similar claims at once rather than a series of indi-
vidual claims. Given that many countries’ courts systems are overburdened, this is 
an important consideration for supporting access to justice more broadly. Second, 
collective claims can ensure that the benefits of litigation reach a much broader 
population, including those likely lacking the resources to hire a lawyer on their 
own. Finally, collective claims can expose major gaps or flaws in laws and policies 
and catalyze structural reforms.
Collective legal actions take different forms in different countries and go by 
varying names. Across regions, group-based approaches to enforcing fundamental 
rights have provided a tool for compelling action for large populations, rather than 
for single individuals. In India and Nepal, “public interest litigation” has become 
a powerful mechanism for advancing human rights and demanding greater gov-
ernment accountability. In Delhi, for example, a public interest litigation case on 
poor air quality resulted in new regulations on commercial vehicles, which the 
World Bank estimated saved over 14,000 lives between 2002 and 2006.73 In other 
countries, like the United States, class action lawsuits or so-called “impact litiga-
tion” can have similar aims and effects, although they still require a plaintiff or 
plaintiffs who have been personally harmed. For example, class actions have been 
used in the U.S. to secure justice for a community whose water was contaminated 
by a utility company,74 enforce protections against sexual harassment for female 
mine workers,75 and uphold the right to family visits for prisoners.76 More recently, 
the former Soviet states of Central and Eastern Europe have embraced variants of 
public interest litigation, which have been effectively used to challenge discrimina-
tion in public services, education, and employment.77
Access to Legal Representation and Assistance
The assistance of an attorney is often critical for claiming rights, effectively navi-
gating the legal system, and accessing a fair process. However, many low-income 
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people cannot afford a lawyer and are not provided one by the state, or are guar-
anteed legal counsel only in limited circumstances. While class actions can help 
democratize the benefits of legal representation, access to lawyers is a separate 
approach to improve the realization of rights across SES. This is important espe-
cially for legal issues that are individual by nature.
Around the world, the importance of guaranteeing the right to counsel at key 
stages of the criminal process is getting closer to global consensus.78 In 2013, the 
European Union (EU) enacted a Directive on Access to a Lawyer, which is binding 
on all EU states and requires that “suspects or accused persons have the right of 
access to a lawyer without undue delay.”79 Meanwhile, according to a 2016 study of 
125 countries’ legal frameworks by the United Nations Development Program, the 
majority take some approach to guaranteeing the right to counsel in criminal cases 
through their constitutions; a small but growing number make clear, primarily 
through legislation, that free access to a lawyer extends to indigent civil litigants.80 
To ensure access to justice regardless of SES, this will be an important area for 
further global reform.
Social Rights vs. Social Policies?
Because of the above challenges, some have claimed that putting too much empha-
sis on a rights-based framework may take the pressure off governments to enact 
strong social policies that affirmatively provide for the needs of the poor, rather 
than fulfilling basic needs only upon demand. Likewise, some have argued that 
social and economic rights in particular disproportionately benefit the rich, who 
have easier access to courts. However, there is little evidence that governments 
are making calculated trade-offs between strong constitutional rights and strong 
social policies; in fact, research has demonstrated that at least in the context of 
education, the existence of a constitutional right is positively associated with the 
existence of a national policy.81 Additionally, neither of these approaches to change 
acts in isolation. Class actions in particular can lead to the strengthening and 
expansion of social policies, with benefits for large populations. For example, the 
“right to food” case in India, which expanded the country’s free school lunch pro-
gram, improved nutrition for nearly 10 million children and boosted girls’ first-
grade enrollment by 10% per year.82
Further, recent empirical research has shown that economic and social rights 
litigation can have benefits that disproportionately affect lower-income commu-
nities and extend far beyond the parties in the case, depending on the nature 
of the claim.83 For example, in South Africa, a case holding that asylum seek-
ers could not be excluded from receiving public education or seeking work is 
estimated to have impacted over 50,000 individuals, all of whom were socio-
economically disadvantaged.84 Similarly, in India, litigation to reduce air pollu-
tion in Delhi improved health for hundreds of thousands, and disproportionately 
benefitted people in the two lowest income quintiles, which include 47% of those 
diagnosed with asthma.85
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Although improving access to the courts and legal aid is critical for ensuring 
countries’ judicial systems are effective for people across SES, the litigation process 
itself is not inherently at odds with “pro-poor” aims—and, in fact, can be a power-
ful tool to support these movements.
Participatory Drafting Processes
Participatory drafting has shown potential for designing constitutions that more 
comprehensively address the needs and interests of marginalized communities. 
According to one longitudinal study of 138 constitutions, countries whose con-
stitutions were drafted with more direct citizen participation had higher levels of 
democratic practices after the constitutions’ enactment.86 Increasing the involve-
ment of people across SES in the constitutional drafting process can strengthen the 
extent to which constitutions effectively protect rights regardless of SES.
Examples from individual countries illustrate the feasibility of widespread par-
ticipation. In South Africa, for example, the government undertook a comprehen-
sive process of education and public consultation while drafting its 1996 consti-
tution, which prioritized the input of marginalized communities. The education 
component, which focused on building general knowledge about the constitution 
and citizens’ right to submit input, reached over 95,000 rural and marginalized 
people through over 1,000 participatory workshops, while its media campaign 
reached 73% of adult South Africans through radio broadcasts in eight languages.87 
As part of the consultation component, members of the Constituent Assembly met 
with 20,500 individuals and 717 organizations over the course of 27 public meet-
ings, all of which took place in rural and disadvantaged areas.88 Finally, after a draft 
of the constitution was prepared, the public had another opportunity to submit 
comments before the final negotiation.89
Establishing a responsive, accountable, and inclusive relationship between the 
government and the people is a key function of constitutions. Creating inclusive 
and equitable processes for drafting these fundamental documents is a first step 
toward ensuring that constitutions lay the foundation for more inclusive and equi-
table laws, policies, and practices.
SES discrimination is often overlooked in constitutions, even as it profoundly 
shapes health, educational and economic opportunities, and the ability to exercise 
other fundamental rights. Including more people who have felt the impacts of this 
type of discrimination firsthand in the process of building constitutions, while 
deepening our collective understanding of how constitutional protections on the 
basis of SES have made a difference in people’s lives globally, can help ensure con-
stitutions fulfill their potential as powerful instruments of democracy.
C ONCLUSION
Beginning with the UDHR, countries around the world agreed that fundamental 
rights and freedoms should not be contingent on “social origin, property, birth or 
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other status.”90 Likewise, the UDHR and key international treaties adopted during 
the following decades, including the ICCPR and the ICESCR, embraced a mul-
tidimensional approach to poverty alleviation that recognizes the importance of 
access to education, healthcare, fair labor conditions, and political rights and par-
ticipation. In 1995, through the Copenhagen Declaration on Social Development, 
118 world leaders committed their countries to “create an enabling economic envi-
ronment aimed at promoting more equitable access for all to income, resources 
and social services” and to reaffirm and strive to realize the rights embodied 
in international treaties, “including those relating to education, food, shelter, 
employment, health and information, particularly in order to assist people living 
in poverty.”91 And in 2015, all 193 U.N. member states unanimously committed to 
ending poverty and reducing inequality by adopting the SDGs.
In theory, then, there is wide global agreement on preventing SES discrimina-
tion and ensuring that having a low income does not preclude full participation 
in society. But in practice, we still have far to go—and addressing the gap between 
these international commitments and countries’ domestic legal frameworks is an 
important first step. Globally, nearly half the world’s constitutions fail to prohibit 
discrimination on any aspect of SES. Even fewer guarantee that the ability to pay 
will not be an insurmountable obstacle to accessing healthcare and an adequate 
education. While some forms of SES discrimination may not be immediately 
apparent, a greater political commitment to identifying and testing for these more 
invidious forms of bias would go a long way toward realizing equal rights for all. 
In the context of rising economic inequality globally, strengthening protections on 
the basis of SES has become all the more critical.
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The Right to Education
A Foundation for Equal Opportunities
A LONG HISTORY OF EXCLUSION
History is littered with countries actively denying the chance for an education. In 
the United States, colonies and then states enacted laws that prohibited educat-
ing African American slaves in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.1 South 
Carolina, for example, passed a law in 1740 imposing a £100 fine—equivalent to 
over $21,192 in 20192—on anyone who dared to “teach or cause any slave or slaves 
to be taught to write,”3 while Virginia’s 1819 Revised Code proclaimed that pro-
viding schools for slaves would be considered “unlawful assembly,” punishable by 
20 lashes.4 The result was widespread exclusion, particularly across the American 
South: according to the 1850 Census, of the 58,558 African Americans in Texas, just 
397 were free—of whom 20 were in school.5
In South Africa, the Dutch settlers established schools for African slaves in the 
seventeenth century, but they focused solely on religious instruction, and largely 
served as tools for social control rather than empowerment.6 In the mid-nine-
teenth century, the governor of the Cape of South Africa described the purpose of 
educating black South Africans as “peaceful subjugation,” while curricula designed 
for black students focused on the skills required to perform manual labor.7
In both countries, segregation of public schools came later, after courts and 
legislatures had begun ruling against complete exclusion.8 In 1889, South Africa’s 
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superintendent general for education argued in Parliament for “a differentiated 
education thereby ensuring that the Whites maintained their supremacy, while 
the mass of Africans were confined to a humbler position.”9 In the post–Civil War 
U.S., many states’ laws and constitutions mandated public school segregation; in 
Alabama, the 1901 constitution’s requirement that “[s]eparate schools shall be pro-
vided for white and colored children, and no child of either race shall be permitted 
to attend a school of the other race” remains, despite ballot initiatives in 2004 and 
2012 proposing its removal.10
Beyond limiting access to education on the basis of race, governments have sys-
tematically excluded immigrants, girls, and children with disabilities. In Califor-
nia, which saw an influx of labor migrants from China and Mexico in the late nine-
teenth century, employers complained that “the schools teach Mexicans to look 
upon farm labor as menial,”11 while the state superintendent argued against fund-
ing schools for Chinese students given their supposed lack of interest in learning.12
In Afghanistan, girls have faced a series of evolving barriers to education for cen-
turies. In 1919, Habibullah Khan, the country’s ruler since 1901, was assassinated after 
attempting to open a school for girls.13 In 1923, Habibullah’s son Amanullah drafted 
Afghanistan’s first constitution, and continued his father’s fight for girls’ education. 
However, after Amanullah raised the minimum age of marriage to 18 and banned 
polygamy, a council of tribal leaders and elected officials rebuked his leadership and 
ordered the closure of the girls’ schools in Kabul and rural areas.14 In the decades since, 
girls have faced persistent obstacles to accessing education, most recently resulting 
from the Taliban’s closure of schools, particularly those for girls, across the country. 
Today, according to UNICEF, 60% of Afghan girls aged 7–17 are out of school.15
EDUCATION AND THE FIGHT FOR EQUAL RIGHT S
South Africa, the United States, Afghanistan, and other governments denied cer-
tain populations access to education because they recognized its fundamental role 
in empowering people to fight for equality. Education (both informal and formal) 
provides individuals and communities with knowledge of their civil, political, 
social, and economic rights, how these compare to the rights of others, avenues 
for seeking change, and tools for recourse upon experiencing discrimination 
and rights violations. Therefore, in a book fundamentally about equal rights, we 
believe it is essential to examine whether everyone has the right to an affordable, 
accessible, quality public education.
The right to education is also firmly grounded in international human rights 
agreements including the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Interna-
tional Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), and the U.N. 
Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC). What difference have education 
rights made, and what more must be done to ensure all children have the oppor-
tunity to learn?
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India: Marching for a Constitutional Right to Education
On June 19, 2001, after a 115-day journey, a group of 150 activists, teachers, and citi-
zens reached the Indian capital of Delhi, where temperatures neared 100 degrees 
Fahrenheit. The group had already traveled over 15,000 kilometers across 20 states, 
rallying thousands of supporters along the way.16 Their mission? The enactment of 
a fundamental right to education.
The Shiksha Yatra, or March for Education, was the culmination of over a 
decade of activism and legal action aimed at strengthening the constitution’s pro-
tections of education. India’s independence constitution, enacted in 1949 following 
the end of British colonial rule, was among the first to include a comprehensive 
list of social, economic, and cultural rights, in addition to the civil and political 
rights that have been common in constitutions for centuries. Yet most of the social 
and economic rights, including the right to education, were enacted in a separate 
section of the constitution reserved for “directive principles,” whereas the civil and 
political rights were categorized as fundamental rights. As the constitution explic-
itly noted, this distinction meant that although it was the “duty of the state to 
apply” the directive principles, they “shall not be enforced in any court.”17
In the decades following the constitution’s adoption, India’s economy grew sub-
stantially. Yet the pace of progress in education gradually slowed. By 1990, just 
seven girls were in primary school for every ten boys, and 90 million children 
aged 6–14 were out of school in 1991.18 Literacy rates had improved markedly since 
the 1950s but remained low when viewed in a global context, with only 64% of 
men and 39% of women able to read and write in 1991.19 Advocates and civil soci-
ety groups began identifying the education provision’s nonbinding nature as part 
of the problem, arguing that over four decades since the constitution’s birth, it 
was time for a stronger legal commitment to free education to accelerate progress 
toward its full realization.
Two early 1990s Supreme Court cases, Mohini Jain v. State of Karnataka20 and 
Unni Krishnan J.P. v. State of Andhra Pradesh,21 became the catalysts for change. 
While both cases actually dealt with fees for higher education, the Court took the 
opportunity to examine the constitutional “right to education” more generally. 
Article 45 stated: “The State shall endeavour to provide, within a period of ten 
years from the commencement of this Constitution, for free and compulsory edu-
cation for all children until they complete the age of fourteen years.” Noting that 
the education provision was the only directive principle that included a time frame 
for its realization, the Court observed that the drafters clearly understood it to be 
particularly consequential, and urged that after 44 years, the constitutional aspi-
ration to provide universal education should become a reality. The Court found 
further support for this interpretation in the ICESCR. Finally, the Court reasoned 
that Article 21 of the constitution, which guarantees the “right to life” and “right to 
liberty,” is enforceable and justiciable, and basic education provides the foundation 
for these rights—making education justiciable by implication.
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While celebrated by activists, the Court’s rulings on free education also stirred 
controversy about the scope of judicial review; critics questioned whether the 
Court had overstepped its bounds.22 To ensure the right to education had a stron-
ger legal basis, the National Alliance on the Fundamental Right to Education, a 
network of nearly 2,400 civil society groups from around the country, began orga-
nizing around a constitutional amendment that would clearly establish education 
as a fundamental right.23
In 1997, a bill was introduced to amend the constitution to create an enforce-
able right to free education for all children ages 6–14; after a change of govern-
ment, it was reintroduced in 2001. The civil society movement embarked on the 
Shiksha Yatra that same year, spearheaded by the South Asian Coalition on Child 
Servitude, a national child rights organization. And in December 2002, after pass-
ing both houses of Parliament and attaining presidential assent, the Eighty-sixth 
Amendment became law.24
India’s “Right to Education” movement strikingly illustrates a common issue 
regarding constitutional protections for social and economic rights. While some 
constitutions guarantee these rights through authoritative language and make 
clear they can be claimed in court, others describe them in aspirational or condi-
tional terms—for example, by urging states to “endeavor to protect” the right to 
education or by guaranteeing the right “subject to available resources.” Compared 
to leaving the right to education unaddressed, these aspirational approaches signal 
that ensuring all children can attend school is a priority. Citizens and civil soci-
ety can leverage aspirational rights to advocate for more inclusive and progres-
sive educational policies. However, the conditional language implies limits on the 
extent to which the right can be enforced.
Although the resulting amendment still has its critics—including those 
who feel it did not go far enough, as it guarantees free education only for ages 
6–14—India’s right to education movement provides a prime example of how 
civil society can employ the constitution to meaningfully advance equal rights. 
Through key court decisions and the engagement of thousands of citizens seeking 
change, an aspirational constitutional provision transformed into an enforceable 
right, building a strong legal foundation for millions of children to access basic 
education. Since 2000, India has reduced the number of out-of-school children 
by over 90% and closed the gender gap in both primary and lower secondary 
school enrollment.25
Colombia: Fulfilling the Right to Free Education for 
Internally Displaced Children
Enshrining educational rights in constitutions, rather than legislation alone, mat-
ters—especially against the backdrop of social or political instability. In 2002, the 
same year India enacted its constitutional amendment, halfway around the world, 
a record number of Colombians were displaced by civil war, which had embroiled 
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their country since the 1960s. A ten-year-old at the time, José vividly remembers 
the day his family was forced to flee their home in Tolima, Colombia: “They said 
that if we didn’t leave, they would kill us. They gave us half an hour to leave.”26 On 
average, every ten minutes, a family was forced to gather their most essential pos-
sessions and flee, often under threats of violence or accusations of “collaboration” 
with the government. José and 13 of his relatives left immediately, migrating over 
100 miles to Bogotá.
For children like José, forced displacement was a destabilizing, traumatic 
experience, with both immediate and long-term impacts. As in many conflict 
situations, children have faced among the most devastating and enduring con-
sequences of the violence in Colombia. Despite parents’ best efforts to reestablish 
a sense of normalcy for their kids, financial barriers often put school—central to 
children’s healthy development, opportunities, and daily life—out of reach. The 
devastation disproportionately affected families that were already marginalized. 
For some families in desperate economic circumstances, it can feel like a neces-
sary choice to have children work rather than finish their education. In Colombia 
in the early 2000s, compounding this issue was the government’s imposition of 
tuition—even for public primary school.
Numerous personal accounts revealed the burden of tuition on families try-
ing to rebuild their lives. On top of tuition fees, children like Eduardo, an eighth 
grader, found themselves facing additional $4 monthly charges just for water, not 
to mention the costs of uniforms, books, and backpacks.27
In the context of Colombia’s economy at the time, these expenses were often 
debilitating. According to the Colombian Commission of Jurists, as of 2003, the 
average annual cost of sending a student to school in Bogotá equaled around three 
months’ work at the minimum wage.28 For many displaced families in Colombia, 
the cost burden was untenable. In 2002, fewer than 9% of the displaced children 
in 21 “receiving communities” were attending school, compared to 93% of all chil-
dren living there.29 In a study of why displaced children were leaving school, the 
Colombian ombudsman’s office found that education costs outweighed almost 
every other factor.30 By the early 2000s, it was becoming undeniably clear that the 
displacement crisis would put its youngest victims at a lifelong disadvantage.
However, the Colombian Coalition for the Right to Education, in partnership 
with DeJusticia, a Colombian NGO focused on social and economic rights, saw 
an opportunity to shift the tide for José and his peers—and it started with the 
constitution. The option to charge primary school tuition had been instituted by 
a 1994 law that departed from Colombia’s legal tradition, since the 1930s, of guar-
anteeing free education.31 Challenging the law, DeJusticia pointed to Article 67 
of Colombia’s 1991 constitution, which guaranteed free education. But Article 67 
qualified this guarantee with the phrase “without prejudice to charges for the cost 
of academic rights for those who can afford them,” which some argued allowed for 
charging tuition or fees if affordable. The DeJusticia lawyers argued that Colombia’s 
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constitutional history made clear that fees were never permissible at the primary 
level. Moreover, Colombia’s regional and international commitments bound the 
country to ensure that primary education was compulsory and tuition-free.
The Constitutional Court agreed. International treaties ratified by Colombia, 
including the ICESCR, unequivocally protected the right to free primary educa-
tion; under Article 93 of the constitution, these treaties were legally binding and 
enforceable. Further, the Court affirmed that given how the right to education had 
developed in Colombia, the 1991 constitution’s cost-related provision clearly “was 
never meant to apply to tuition fees for primary education and therefore not to 
modify the standard of free education as set forth in the previous Constitution.”32 
Accordingly, Judge Luis Ernesto Vargas Silva found that charging tuition for public 
primary school was unconstitutional.
The Colombian court’s decision was a major step forward. Overnight, primary 
school became free by law, benefiting millions of children nationwide, including 
the vast numbers affected by displacement.33 The decision also brought Colombia 
in line with every other Latin American country, which had already guaranteed 
free primary education.34
Furthermore, the case underscored the power of establishing the right to free 
education through constitutions rather than statutes or policies. Because Colom-
bia constitutionally guaranteed the right to free education for those who could not 
afford fees, it provided DeJusticia with the strongest basis for challenging legisla-
tion curtailing that right.
The Power of Constitutional Education Rights— 
and Questions for Their Design
Together, these cases from India and Colombia illustrate that constitutional rights 
to education have powerfully aided efforts to strengthen children’s educational 
opportunities, with particular benefits for marginalized students. They also dem-
onstrate the feasibility of guaranteeing the right to free education even in lower- 
and middle-income settings.
However, the differences between these two countries’ approaches to the right 
to education raise key questions, relevant across contexts. For example, is it best to 
guarantee a broad right to education, or are constitutions most effective when they 
specifically guarantee primary or secondary education? At each level, what should 
the guarantees include? In practice, can these provisions advance both access to 
education and its quality? And finally, how should a constitution negotiate the rela-
tionship between these protections and a country’s level of economic development?
After diving deeper into the evidence on why education matters for equality—
and what barriers remain for achieving universal education—this chapter exam-
ines these more pragmatic questions, drawing on further examples from around 
the world to understand the potential for impact of constitutional education rights.
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THE TR ANSFORMATIVE POTENTIAL OF EDUCATION
Leaders around the world have highlighted the transformative power of education, 
from South African president Nelson Mandela, who in 2003 declared education 
“the most powerful weapon we can use to change the world,”35 to Malala Yousafzai, 
who in advocating for girls’ education urged the U.N. General Assembly: “[L]et us 
pick up our books and our pens, they are the most powerful weapons. One child, 
one teacher, one book and one pen can change the world. Education is the only 
solution.”36 As both speakers’ words make clear, education is important not just 
for each child, but for our collective well-being and broader struggles for equality. 
Innumerable studies back these calls up.
Individual Earnings and Employment
Across high- and low-income countries alike, evidence shows that increased edu-
cational attainment leads to higher-paying jobs, lower unemployment rates, and 
even higher agricultural productivity.37
In the United States, adults with a college degree earn about 50% more than 
those who have completed only high school, and are less than one-third as likely 
to be unemployed.38 Similarly, across OECD countries, employment rates for 25- 
to 34-year-olds with a tertiary education range from 8 to 43 percentage points 
higher than for those who did not finish high school.39 Education economically 
benefits residents of low- and middle-income countries (LMICs) as well as high-
income countries, and rural areas as well as urban. In a study of 73 countries, the 
average rate of return, as measured by earnings per additional year of schooling, 
is 9.7%, ranging from 7.4% in high-income countries to 10.7% in middle-income 
countries and 10.9% in low-income countries, with the highest rates of return 
estimated in Latin America and the Caribbean (12%) and sub-Saharan Africa 
(11.7%).40 In Uganda, farmers who have completed four years of primary school 
are estimated to increase crop production by 7%, while seven years of primary 
school are associated with a 13% increase; given that the majority of Ugandan 
families live in rural areas and practice subsistence farming, these findings have 
tremendous practical import.41
While the trends are consistent, increased education does not always lead to 
markedly improved employment prospects. In some settings where the supply of 
high-skill jobs is limited, a university degree might not be the primary pathway to 
economic security. Still, despite varying impacts across settings and from person 
to person, the evidence is strong that, on the whole, higher educational attainment 
supports higher earnings and employment rates.
Health
Increased educational attainment is also associated with better health out-
comes.42 For example, a study of 22 European countries found that adults who 
206    Equal Opportunities for Education
had completed upper secondary or higher education were commonly 2–3 times 
more likely to report being in good health than individuals with less education.43 
A study of 80 LMICs found that increases in women’s educational attainment 
accounted for 14% of the reductions in under-five mortality, 30% of the reduc-
tions in adult female mortality, and 31% of the reductions in adult male mortality 
from 1970 to 2010.44 The study further estimated that educational gains saved 
7.3 million lives across LMICs from 2010 to 2015.45 Likewise, a study spanning 
95 LMICs found that a one-year increase in girls’ education was associated with 
a 3.6% decrease in under-five mortality from 1970 to 2004.46 These benefits are 
likely explained partly by education’s impact on socioeconomic status, but lit-
eracy and formal schooling may also independently affect healthcare practices 
and behaviors, with benefits for entire families.47
Gender Equality
While education benefits all children, expanding girls’ access to education can 
be especially powerful, both because girls have historically received less formal 
schooling than boys and because of the multigenerational benefits. Staying in 
school is associated with lower rates of early marriage, fertility, and maternal mor-
tality, in addition to improved long-term economic opportunities and autonomy.48 
For each additional year a girl stays in school, her wages rise 10–20%.49 With 
increased income, women can exercise greater autonomy and assume a greater 
role in household decision-making, which often leads to higher spending on chil-
dren’s health and education.50
Children whose mothers have had access to education often have lower mortal-
ity and malnutrition rates, higher immunization rates, and overall better health.51 
In a study of families in Malawi, Tanzania, and Zimbabwe, when mothers had 
a least a secondary school education, their children’s odds of stunting (impaired 
growth) decreased by 44%, 69%, and 49%, respectively, compared to mothers with-
out any formal education.52 Likewise, a 56-country study concluded that increased 
maternal education reduced the odds of stunting in both “low-burden” and “high-
burden” countries.53 Husbands’ health benefits as well. In Bangladesh, men with 
more educated wives face lower mortality risks regardless of their own education 
or occupation.54
Benefits for National Economies
Finally, when more children get an education, countries’ economies do better. 
A study of the OECD found that greater educational attainment was responsi-
ble for around half the economic growth across 30 countries between 1960 and 
2008.55 Meanwhile, discrimination and unequal opportunities in education have 
the opposite effect; according to the International Labour Organization and the 
Asian Development Bank, gender disparities in access to education in the Asia 
and Pacific region diminish overall GDP by up to $30 billion yearly.56 Similarly, 
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across many African countries, girls’ high dropout rates dramatically reduce eco-
nomic growth.57 According to estimates by Plan International, the collective costs 




Although the barriers to equal access to education are wide-ranging, poverty is 
a common thread. Child labor, driven largely by families’ underlying economic 
circumstances, jeopardizes millions of children’s opportunities to stay in school. 
And both paid child labor and unpaid family labor at high hours impede chil-
dren’s ability to learn even if they can attend school. In addition, the direct costs of 
attending school, including tuition and fees for books, uniforms, or other materi-
als, put education out of reach for many. These fees also disproportionately affect 
girls, since investing in boys’ education is often viewed as a higher priority due to 
cultural norms and labor market discrimination that may reduce women’s earn-
ing potential. Disadvantage due to poverty and gender compound one another. 
According to UNESCO, “girls from the poorest families in sub-Saharan Africa will 
only achieve [universal lower secondary school completion] in 2111, 64 years later 
than the boys from the richest families.”59
Quality and Value
Second, even where children are in school, ensuring that they receive quality edu-
cation, particularly in lower-resource areas, remains a key challenge. In at least 
26 countries (including 23 in sub-Saharan Africa), the average student–teacher 
ratio exceeds 40:1 in primary schools.60 And in some countries, teachers are only 
required to have a few more years of education than their students.61 UNESCO 
reports that just one-third of primary-age children worldwide are achieving basic 
literacy and numeracy.62
These findings are troubling for children who are already in classrooms, but also 
may lead to more children missing out on education entirely. Concerns about inad-
equate educational quality may deter some families from sending their children to 
school, especially if a child’s school attendance means reduced household earnings.
Discrimination and Exclusion
Finally, discrimination within classrooms against girls or students from particular 
racial, linguistic, or economic backgrounds, or disparities in school quality that 
disproportionately affect particular groups, continue to create barriers to equal 
chances at education. In many countries, students with disabilities still face wide-
spread exclusion from mainstream schools due to discrimination or inaccessibility, 
while other students lack access to education in their native language. Meanwhile, 
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discrimination in education can have profound consequences for societies’ overall 
inclusiveness and equality. Research shows that inclusive and integrated educa-
tional settings are best suited to prepare all students to live and learn together.63 
In short, proactive efforts to prevent discrimination in schools are vital to both 
students’ ability to learn and a country’s success.
Critically, to ensure the right to education is fully accessible to all, reducing 
discrimination and promoting integration are equally important in public and pri-
vate schools. In a substantial number of countries, a significant portion of children 
attend private schools.64 In Australia, for example, 41% of secondary students are 
enrolled in private schools.65 In Uganda, 27% of primary schools and 66% of sec-
ondary schools are private. And globally, private education is on the rise: UNESCO 
reports that the share of secondary school students enrolled in private institutions 
worldwide increased from 19% in 1998 to 27% in 2017.66 These high ratios have trig-
gered equity-related concerns among civil society groups, who suggest that these 
schools take advantage of inadequate investments in public education to convince 
lower-income families that private schooling is necessary, even as private educa-
tional offerings vary in quality.67
EDUCATION FOR ALL:  ENSHRINING EFFECTIVE 
APPROACHES IN C ONSTITUTIONS
Ensuring that education yields the maximum possible benefits requires address-
ing equal access to quality education from a young age. While removing barriers 
to higher education is also essential, investing in schooling from the very begin-
ning is critical for providing all children with opportunities to reap education’s 
benefits for their health, economic mobility, and future careers. It is also clear that 
addressing education alone is insufficient to create an equal playing field in the 
labor market—one reason the comprehensive protections of equal rights and non-
discrimination discussed in the first half of this book are so critical. Education 
can indeed be transformative, but every piece of a country’s social and legal fabric 
works together to shape access to opportunities and resources.
While the challenges are complex, some solutions are relatively straightfor-
ward, such as reducing educational costs and requiring governments to prevent 
discrimination and ensure schools are universally available. These approaches 
also align with countries’ commitments under international treaties including the 
CRC. The CRC recognizes every child’s right to an education, requires parties to 
ensure primary education is free and compulsory, and urges parties to make sec-
ondary “available and accessible to every child,” including by providing free educa-
tion. The CRC also commits countries to respect the rights of every child “without 
discrimination of any kind” including on the basis of “race, colour, sex, language, 
religion, political or other opinion, national, ethnic or social origin, property, dis-
ability, birth or other status.” Importantly, the CRC has been ratified by 196 coun-
tries and territories, including all but one country—the United States—worldwide.
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The ICESCR embodies the same commitments for education, and also artic-
ulates the standard of “progressive realization,” which applies to aspects of edu-
cation rights as well as other social and economic rights. This standard requires 
countries to invest greater resources in education as their economies grow, with 
the goal of expanding the availability of free education at the secondary level 
and beyond. Eliminating primary-level tuition and ensuring nondiscrimina-
tion are immediate obligations. In 1999, the U.N. Committee on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights provided further guidance on the right to education, 
specifying four elements central to its realization: adaptability, accessibility, 
availability, and acceptability.68 How do these commitments align with consti-
tutional approaches, and what is their potential for impact on the key barriers 
identified?
Adaptability: Keeping Up with Evolving Educational Standards
Countries across all regions and income levels have adopted constitutional rights 
to education, which have become more prevalent over time. As of 2017, 83% of 
countries take some constitutional approach to protecting the right to education, 
either protecting education as an individual right or making clear the state’s obli-
gation to provide education for all (Map 25). Less than two-thirds of constitutions 
adopted before 1970 include a right to education, compared to all constitutions 
adopted since 2000.
Further, evidence suggests that a constitutional right to education supports 
enrollment rates. In a 2013 global study of constitutions, those that took some 
approach to guaranteeing the right to primary-level education reported primary 
enrollment rates that were, on average, 4.8 percentage points higher than those in 
countries without a constitutional guarantee. Likewise, looking at constitutional 
protections for the right to secondary education, the associated net secondary-
level enrollment rates were 8.3 percentage points higher than in countries without 
such a provision.69
Beyond whether to protect the right to education generally, a key question is 
what level of schooling this right should include. Globally, 60% of constitutions 
explicitly guarantee the right to primary education, while 33% explicitly extend 
this guarantee to secondary education. Just 17% guarantee the right to tertiary edu-
cation (Map 26). Seventy-seven percent generally guarantee the right to education, 
either in addition to or without specifying levels (Map 27).
A small number of countries specify age ranges for education rights, typically 
in designating how long education will be compulsory or free. For example, Lithu-
ania’s constitution provides: “Education shall be compulsory for persons under the 
age of 16.”70 Brazil’s constitution establishes a specific age range for free and com-
pulsory education but clarifies that these parameters are not intended to exclude 
those who missed out on schooling as children: “The National Government’s duty 
towards education shall be effectuated through the guarantees of: I. free, compul-
sory elementary education from 4 (four) to 17 (seventeen) years of age, including 
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assurance that it will be offered gratuitously to all who did not have access to it at 
the proper age.”71 Six percent of countries establish specific age ranges for which 
education is compulsory, and two countries do so for free education.
Whether the right addresses a designated age group or schooling level can 
matter for vulnerable students. In some countries, grade repetition is high. Sim-
ilarly, students who started school late (whether because of conflict, inacces-
sibility, costs, or other barriers), as well as students with cognitive disabilities, 
may be placed below the typical grade for students their age. Limiting education 
rights to a certain age range may unnecessarily impede the completion of such 
students’ schooling.
Additionally, 12% of constitutions include explicit provisions addressing adult 
education, including adult literacy or continuing education programs. For exam-
ple, Costa Rica’s constitution provides: “The State shall organize and support adult 
education, designed to combat illiteracy and to provide cultural opportunities for 
those who wish to improve their intellectual, social, and economic position.”72
Adaptability requires that the right to education meet “the needs of changing soci-
eties and communities.”73 To advance adaptability, constitutions can ensure that their 
protections of education rights keep pace with expanding educational standards.
In considering adaptability, it is worth returning to the primary purpose of a 
constitutional right to education: to ensure that all children, regardless of other 
circumstances, have an equal chance to obtain the education level necessary to 
fully participate in society and lead full lives. Exactly what this means in different 
contexts will change over time. For example, in most countries, a primary educa-
tion no longer suffices to secure a job paying a decent wage or participate in all 
aspects of civil and political life—secondary and higher education have become 
increasingly critical for competitiveness in the labor market. Yet the economic bar-
riers to secondary-level enrollment and attendance are greater than for primary, 
and competing economic pressures too often compel students to put work before 
school as they get older. While overcoming those pressures will require action on 
many fronts—including ensuring adults can earn wages sufficient to support their 
families so children need not labor—a constitutional right extending to second-
ary education can make a difference, especially if it also explicitly guarantees that 
secondary will be free.
Across countries, given the importance of reaching a certain level of educational 
attainment for future job prospects, the level of schooling a constitution protects, 
and whether the right’s scope keeps pace with education requirements for strong 
employment opportunities, can have real implications for the goal of equal oppor-
tunity. While a general “right to education” may suffice to protect equal chances 
over time if courts and administrators interpret it through an equal opportunity 
lens, advantages may also lie in using specific language to ensure the right applies 
at the higher levels that can be most critical for shaping individuals’ futures.
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Further, as evidence mounts about pre-primary education’s importance for 
early childhood development,74 it has become clear that expanding educational 
guarantees to include earlier education is critical to achieving equality. Yet few 
constitutions address this right. The core question is how to design a constitutional 
right to education that provides both strong and specific enough protections and 
can easily adapt as educational standards rise and new evidence emerges.
In countries where amending constitutions is especially difficult, a broad guar-
antee of the right to education may be the most adaptable approach to ensuring 
the right keeps up with evolving educational standards. This can be strengthened 
by specifying all education levels that should be guaranteed and free at the time of 
enactment and noting that additional education should be covered if it becomes 
important to full equality of opportunity at work and in civil life.
However, it is not enough to only specify lower education levels. If the con-
stitution explicitly guarantees the right to primary school but does not mention 
secondary, courts may interpret the right to education narrowly, thus limiting 
a constitution’s potential to continue supporting equal educational opportuni-
ties as minimum standards rise and a country’s ability to invest in education 
increases. By contrast, a broad guarantee of the right to education can provide 
courts and advocates with a tool to build and expand the right to education as 
development and educational expectations evolve. So too can specifying levels 
currently covered and explicitly stating criteria for additional levels of coverage 
in the future.
Accessibility: Addressing Income Barriers and 
Discrimination in Education
While protecting the right to education broadly and at expanded levels is an 
important first step, accessibility requires that countries also actively reduce the 
economic and social barriers to schools, and ensure all students have an equal 
chance to get an education.75 Two key ways that constitutions can advance these 
goals are by reducing or eliminating educational costs and by prohibiting discrim-
ination in all forms.
In many countries, making school tuition-free has markedly increased enroll-
ment, especially by girls and other marginalized students. For example, when 
Ghana first piloted free primary education in 40 districts, overall enrollment 
increased 14.6%, and gender and economic disparities decreased.76 Likewise, in 
Uganda, which introduced free primary throughout the country in 1997, primary 
school attendance rates increased from 62% in 1992 to 84% in 1999, while inequali-
ties in enrollment across gender and income dropped.77
Because the children of mothers who receive an education are healthier, mak-
ing school tuition-free can also drive important health improvements. A 2014 
study of 37 LMICs found that establishing tuition-free primary education was 
associated with 15 fewer infant deaths per 1,000 live births by young mothers who 
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were primary-school-age when it was free, adjusting for household socioeconomic 
status.78 As this example suggests, well-designed and implemented legal commit-
ments to education can yield positive impacts for generations.
Enshrining the right to free education in constitutions, rather than laws and 
policies alone, can provide more powerful and enduring protection, as illustrated 
by the introductory case from Colombia. A country’s constitutional guarantee of 
tuition-free education safeguards against regression during conflict, economic 
instability, or political shifts resulting in the imposition of new fees or the repeal 
of protective policies.
While provision of free basic education requires government investment, numer-
ous lower-income countries have demonstrated its feasibility.79 As of 2017, 53% of 
constitutions, spanning all regions and income levels, established that primary 
school would be free (Map 28).80 These guarantees are more common among more 
recently adopted constitutions. Whereas only one-third of constitutions adopted in 
the 1960s guarantee free primary education, two-thirds of those adopted between 
2010 and 2017 do so. However, these guarantees drop off at the secondary level: just 
30% of constitutions guarantee free secondary school (Map 29).
Laws and policies also reflect governments’ more modest efforts to ensure free 
secondary education compared to free primary.81 Yet greater investment is often 
feasible; policymakers could improve affordability if they prioritized education. As 
of 2014, among countries that had yet to legally guarantee free secondary school, 
nearly half were spending less than 4% of their GDP on education.82 The Education 
Framework for Action, an agenda for expanding access to education and attain-
ment adopted by UNESCO in 2015, recommended that countries’ investments in 
education equal at least 4–6% of GDP.83 While national investment is always criti-
cal and may suffice in many countries given adequate political will, some of the 
poorest countries will likely need transitional support from the global community 
to make quality secondary education free. After investment generates improved 
educational outcomes and rising GDP, they too will be able to provide free second-
ary education from their own budgets.
Finally, reducing university tuition barriers can be an important way to 
strengthen the impact of higher education on social mobility and other eco-
nomic outcomes (Map 30). While only one factor in social mobility, access to 
affordable, high-quality higher education is key. Many of the OECD countries 
that consistently rank highest for social mobility, such as Norway, Finland, and 
Denmark, are also among those providing free university education.84 For exam-
ple, in Finland, students whose parents have a university education are only 1.4 
times more likely to attend university themselves, compared to six times as likely 
in the United Kingdom, which charges tuition; in other words, parental educa-
tion levels play a smaller role in shaping children’s opportunities in Finland.85 
Social mobility in the United States, which charges high university tuition, is 
low compared to in other high-income countries.86 Access to lower-cost higher 
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education, where it exists, has been shown to raise social mobility. Specifically, 
lower-cost public universities and community colleges top the list of schools 
where U.S. students are most likely to ascend from the bottom income quintile 
to one of the top three.87
Still, reducing or eliminating tuition alone may be insufficient to eliminate 
socioeconomic disparities in higher education, especially when inequities persist 
at lower levels of schooling. Across Ecuador, Brazil, Argentina, and Mexico, case 
studies and comparative analyses suggest that the lowest-income students continue 
facing obstacles to access and completion even when tuition is removed. As in the 
U.S., in some countries, this results from disparities in primary- and secondary-
level educational quality that leave students from poor families less prepared.88 If 
these students cannot pass the rigorous entrance exams required for free public 
universities, their only options are expensive private schools. In Nicaragua, for 
example, two-thirds of enrolled college students from the lowest income quintile 
attend private universities, despite the availability of free public tertiary education.89
As these examples suggest, making higher education tuition-free or low-
cost can significantly broaden access by students from all socioeconomic 
backgrounds. Six percent of constitutions guarantee the right to free tertiary 
education, while an additional six percent provide for scholarships to facilitate 
attendance. Still, while expanding the affordability of tertiary education is criti-
cal, taking this step alone will not ensure social mobility. Addressing educa-
tional disparities that surface at much younger ages—including by ensuring 
pre-primary, primary, and secondary education are tuition-free; reducing the 
social and financial barriers to pursuing post-secondary schooling; and address-
ing broader labor market discrimination that shapes the value of educational 
credentials—are all similarly important.90
Progressive Realization of Higher Levels of Guaranteed Free Education 
As noted earlier, countries are immediately obligated only to make education 
tuition-free at the primary level. Yet under the ICESCR principle of progressive 
realization, countries must also take steps “to the maximum of [their] available 
resources” to eliminate tuition barriers at higher levels.91 Enshrining commitments 
to secondary and tertiary schooling is an important step toward broader fulfill-
ment of the right to education.
Some countries’ constitutions specifically invoke the language of progressive 
realization, consistent with international agreements. For example, Ghana’s con-
stitution provides: “[S]econdary education .  .  . shall be made generally available 
and accessible to all by every appropriate means, and in particular, by the progres-
sive introduction of free education.”92
In addition to the 53% of countries that guarantee the right to free pri-
mary education, 4% of countries specify that free primary education will be 
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progressively realized, and 8% aspire to providing free primary education.93 Sim-
ilarly, in addition to the 30% of countries guaranteeing free secondary education, 
5% have committed to progressively realizing the right, and five countries aspire 
to it.94 Finally, on top of the 6% that include guarantees, 2% of constitutions 
commit to the progressive realization of free higher education, while 4% include 
aspirational provisions.
India and Swaziland: Moving from Aspirational to Firm Commitments 
In two cases where aspirational or progressive realization provisions were espe-
cially successful, countries put a time horizon on the right to free education 
becoming enforceable, providing a tool for advocates as that deadline approached 
or passed. As discussed earlier, in India, the directive principle on education speci-
fying it would become an enforceable right within ten years provided textual fuel 
for the movement to pass new legislation and, ultimately, a constitutional amend-
ment. Likewise, in Swaziland, a constitutional deadline for free education gave 
parents a tool for accountability.
Indeed, in 2009, a group of parents brought a case to enforce Section 29(6) of 
Swaziland’s 2005 constitution, which provides: “Every Swazi child shall within 
three years of the commencement of this Constitution have the right to free 
education in public schools at least up to the end of primary school, beginning 
with the first grade.” As the parents argued, free primary education was a right 
subject to immediate, rather than progressive, realization. In other words, the 
cost of basic education could not excuse the government from providing it, 
since free primary school was a “minimum core obligation” of fulfilling the right 
to education.95
However, while the High Court ruled in the parents’ favor, in a follow-up to 
enforce the judgment, it found that although “the Government demonstrated that 
it had taken steps towards implementation of a program for free education .  .  . 
there was no evidence that the Government had resources available at that time to 
fulfil its constitutional obligation.”96 In other words, the Court accepted the gov-
ernment’s rationale that progressive realization was the appropriate standard.97 
The Supreme Court upheld this decision in 2010, dismaying activists who felt it 
undercut Swaziland’s commitments under international law. That same year, how-
ever, the legislature passed the Free Primary Education Act of 2010, which rolled 
out free primary grade by grade from 2010 to 2015.98
As this example shows, when constitutions use progressive realization language 
to describe rights that should be immediately realizable, they risk letting courts 
define the government’s obligation in a way that falls short of global standards. At 
the same time, including a “deadline” for realizing a right can provide a tool for 
citizens and activists. Whether a time horizon, as used in India and Swaziland, or 
an income or GDP horizon that kicks in when additional financial resources are 
available, specifying when a goal must be achieved can accelerate action.
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Prohibiting Discrimination in Education
Beyond reducing financial barriers, ensuring equal access to education also 
requires guaranteeing equal opportunities for all children in education and/or 
prohibiting discrimination in education on the basis of race/ethnicity, gender, dis-
ability, religion, sexual orientation and gender identity, and other characteristics. 
While substantive rights like the right to free education provide essential building 
blocks for opportunity, their full effectiveness relies on a critical foundation of 
nondiscrimination and addressing histories of past discrimination.
Only 22% of constitutions explicitly guarantee nondiscrimination or equal 
opportunities in education generally or to three or more groups (Map 31). 
An additional 13% of constitutions provide these guarantees to one or two 
specific marginalized groups. For example, Peru’s constitution states: “It is the 
duty of the State to insure that no one should be prevented from receiving an 
adequate education on account of his economic circumstances or his mental or 
physical disabilities.”99
Four constitutions contain provisions guaranteeing children equal opportuni-
ties in education on the basis of merit or capabilities. Without a nondiscrimination 
clause, language about “merit” or “capabilities” may open the door to significant 
discrimination. First, explicit and implicit bias shape perceptions of “merit” and 
“capability,” and studies have shown that children from different marginalized 
groups are commonly perceived as less “capable” or deserving than other students. 
Second, for students with disabilities or different abilities, who already face wide-
spread exclusion from education, this language could easily serve as a mechanism 
for further discrimination. Moreover, under the Convention on the Rights of Peo-
ple with Disabilities, there is no justification for excluding any child from educa-
tion based on perceived capabilities; states must provide an “inclusive education 
system at all levels,” including the reasonable accommodations that ensure educa-
tion is universally accessible.100
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Availability: Ensuring Governments Make Quality Public Schools 
Available to All
Ensuring that education is adequately “available” means providing sufficient num-
bers of functional schools throughout countries. One way that constitutions can 
support the availability of education is establishing that school is compulsory.101
Making school mandatory implicitly commits governments to ensuring that 
staffed schools are available and accessible to all children, while encouraging 
parents to send their children to school rather than keeping them home to help 
with household or other work. Compulsory education can also encourage enroll-
ment and support students to stay in school longer, rather than dropping out to 
work full-time. For example, after the U.K. extended mandatory education from 
age 14 to age 15 in 1945, 14-year-olds’ dropout rate fell from 57% to below 10%.102 In 
a study across 12 European countries that enacted reforms lengthening compul-
sory education between 1949 and 1983, researchers found increases in both edu-
cational attainment and wages.103 In China, average years of education increased 
from fewer than five to over eight from the early 1980s to 2004, corresponding 
with the introduction of nine years of compulsory education in 1986.104 However, 
if school is to be compulsory, it is especially important that it also be free, so as 
not to saddle the poorest families with mandatory tuition and fees or make them 
targets for prosecution.
As of 2017, 52% of constitutions explicitly make at least some education com-
pulsory, and an additional 8% either aspire to compulsory education105 or com-
mit to progressive realization of compulsory education (Map 32). Eighty-nine of 
these 117 constitutions make specific levels of education compulsory, as opposed to 
specifying the ages at which children must be in school. Two countries (Colombia 
and Pakistan) address both the level and ages at which education is compulsory. 
Colombia’s constitution states: “The State, society, and the family are responsible 
for education, which will be mandatory between the ages of five (5) and fifteen (15) 
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years and which will minimally include one (1) year of preschool instruction and 
nine years of basic instruction.”106 Seventeen constitutions with compulsory edu-
cation provisions do not specify the duration of compulsory schooling or the ages 
at which school attendance is mandatory.
Acceptability: Improving Education Quality
Quality of education shapes learning—invaluable for its own sake—and all the 
outcomes associated with learning, literacy, and numeracy, from health to employ-
ment and income. Specific guarantees of factors that affect quality rarely appear in 
constitutions. Quality can be transformed by teachers and pedagogical approaches 
and affected by factors including teacher training, student–teacher ratios, the 
availability of supplies, curriculum strength, and school infrastructure, including 
transportation and sanitation.
While constitutions are not the location to embody specific approaches to edu-
cation—an area where best practices may rapidly evolve—constitutional rights to 
education can provide a basis for advocacy to address quality. For example, several 
U.S. state constitutions guarantee a right to education and either reference quality 
or include specific provisions. Florida’s constitution, for instance, provides: “The 
education of children is a fundamental value of the people of the State of Florida. 
It is, therefore, a paramount duty of the state to make adequate provision for the 
education of all children residing within its borders. Adequate provision shall be 
made by law for a uniform, efficient, safe, secure, and high quality system of free 
public schools that allows students to obtain a high quality education and for the 
establishment, maintenance, and operation of institutions of higher learning and 
other public education programs that the needs of the people may require.”107
In states like Arkansas and Montana, advocacy groups successfully challenged 
school financing policies based on their state constitutions’ specific commitments 
to “quality” education.108
Similarly, in South Africa, advocates invoked the constitutional right to educa-
tion in two cases to compel the government to supply desks and chairs for class-
rooms109 and updated textbooks corresponding with a new curriculum.110 The lat-
ter case also relied on the constitution’s equal rights guarantee, and interpreted 
the disparities in quality of materials—which disproportionately affected black 
students—as discrimination. With a broad guarantee of education rights and 
quality, and clear language prohibiting discrimination, parents and civil society 
may have the greatest flexibility to leverage constitutions to achieve these types of 
improvements, as evidence on which interventions are most effective continues 
to develop.
Private Schools: The Last Refuge and the State Escape
Finally, two aspects of private education should concern any government. The first 
is ensuring that it is not necessary. For the true fulfillment of children’s right to 
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education, free, accessible, and available public education must be of sufficient qual-
ity that families are not forced to send their children to private school for a good 
education. Absent this, the right to education is only nominal. In settings where ele-
mentary school students find themselves in a classroom of 300–400 other students 
and a teacher inevitably unable to teach, the education is only nominal. Likewise, 
in a school setting with neither desks nor books, no right to education is fulfilled.
The second way in which private education must concern governments is the 
prohibition of discrimination. Discrimination in private schools not only erodes 
equal access and equal opportunity for students who would but cannot attend, but 
also trains youth who may be headed for public- or private-sector leadership posi-
tions that people are created unequal and segregation is natural.
Importantly, a few constitutions explicitly establish that their protections of 
equal access to education apply to both public and private schools. For example, 
Panama’s constitution provides: “Educational institutions, whether public or pri-
vate, are open to all students without distinction of race, social position, politi-
cal ideology, religion, or the nature of the relationship of the student’s parents or 
guardians.”111 Likewise, Ecuador’s constitutional provision on higher education 
establishes: “Regardless of their public or private character, equality of opportu-
nities with respect to access, permanence, passing and graduation shall be guar-
anteed, except for the charging of tuition in private education.”112 While courts 
have also provided important rulings extending protection from discrimination 
to private institutions, in the context of growing privatization of education, consti-
tutional language which makes it clear that antidiscrimination provisions apply to 
private schools is likely to become increasingly important. 
WHEN C ONSTITUTIONS ARE SILENT ON EDUCATION
As in other areas, when constitutions’ protections for education are not explicit, 
the extent of their coverage is unpredictable. Two contrasting cases on the right to 
education, from Israel and the United States, illustrate how constitutional silence 
can yield strongly contrasting outcomes, with diverging implications for equality.
Israel: Geographic Accessibility of Schools 
In Israel, the High Court of Justice addressed schools’ geographic accessibility in an 
important 2011 ruling. Since 2001, Palestinian families had been filing complaints 
about the inadequate number of free public schools in their neighborhoods, which 
had compelled many families to send their children to expensive private schools or 
“unofficial” schools instead.113 All told, just over half the children in East Jerusalem 
who were legally entitled to attend free public schools were in fact attending.114 
The petition before the Court was brought by five students, ranging from second 
to ninth graders, who had attempted to enroll at nearby public schools but were 
rejected because of classroom shortages.115
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In its decision, the Court acknowledged that the constitutional text did not 
specifically address the right to education. However, education is fundamental to 
other enumerated rights, justifying its protection. As the Court explained: “The 
right to education is entwined as a basic element in the entire moral infrastructure 
of the constitutional system of Israel. . . . The realization of additional basic rights 
is premised on the right to education, such as the freedom of speech and the ability 
to obtain information, the freedom to elect and be elected, the freedom of asso-
ciation and freedom of occupation. In the absence of the right to education, such 
other rights may also be infringed.”116
The Court further found that the right to education was a core component of the 
right to dignity and went “hand in hand with the right to equality, jointly forming 
a right to equality in education.”117 As a remedy, the Court ordered the government 
to “create a gradual physical infrastructure which will enable the integration of all 
East Jerusalem students who are entitled to free compulsory education and who 
wish to receive same, into the official education framework in the city” within five 
years.118 If it failed to comply, it would be required to pay private-school tuition for 
the students who could not be accommodated in the public system. By 2015, while 
the decision had not been fully implemented, 195 new classrooms had been built.119
United States: Unequal Funding 
By contrast, in a notorious 1972 case, the U.S. Supreme Court reached a different 
conclusion about the constitution’s silence on education rights. The case originated 
at Edgewood High School in San Antonio, Texas, where 400 students walked out 
of class on May 16, 1968, protesting insufficient supplies and poorly trained teach-
ers.120 The students’ action prompted their parents to organize and join their calls 
for change through the newly formed Edgewood District Concerned Parents 
Association, led by Demetrio Rodríguez, a sheet metal worker.
The group quickly uncovered the critical funding disparities underlying their 
children’s grievances. In Edgewood, which was at the time 90% Mexican Ameri-
can, educational spending per pupil was only $356; in Alamo Heights, another 
San Antonio district that was 80% white, spending was $594 per pupil.121 The gap 
stemmed from Texas’s policies around education financing, which funded public 
schools partly through local property taxes. Consequently, students in less wealthy 
districts—who were disproportionately from Mexican American families—had 
access to lower-quality schools than their more well-off counterparts.
Later that year, Rodríguez and his fellow parents went to court, challenging the 
education finance policy as discriminatory against low-income families, and an 
infringement of the fundamental right to education. In 1973, however, the Supreme 
Court overturned a favorable district court ruling in a 5–4 decision, finding that 
the constitution does not explicitly establish education as a fundamental right and 
thus does not compel a “strict scrutiny” review of the policy. Further, building on 
prior cases, the Court reiterated that discrimination on the basis of wealth does 
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not require a heightened standard of review, unlike discrimination on the basis 
of race or gender. In his dissent, Justice Thurgood Marshall, a champion of civil 
rights, called the decision “a retreat from our historic commitment to equality of 
educational opportunity.”122
Justice Marshall’s critique proved prescient. While the 1954 Brown v. Board of 
Education ruling formally desegregated U.S. public schools , the Supreme Court’s 
decision in San Antonio v. Rodriguez eroded protections and contributed to the de 
facto resegregation, massive disparities in public school quality, and unequal edu-
cational opportunities found across the U.S. today. More recently, lawyers brought 
a class action lawsuit against the State of Michigan on behalf of Detroit public 
school students, alleging that the failure to provide trained teachers, textbooks, 
and safe learning conditions violated students’ “fundamental right to literacy,” 
which they argued was inherent to their constitutional right to liberty. While a 
lower court ruled in July 2018 that no such right exists, in November 2018, the 
Detroit students appealed, supported by an amicus brief filed by nearly 70 educa-
tors and organizations (and counting).123 In other words, the fight for education 
rights continues. However, for now, the ruling in San Antonio v. Rodriguez poses 
a barrier to equal opportunities to education, and powerfully illustrates what is at 
stake when such foundational rights remain unwritten.
With no national guarantees of educational equality, many states have enshrined 
the right to education within their own constitutions, which in some jurisdictions 
have provided tools for reforming school finance and challenging inequity.124
Why Enshrining the Right to Education in the Constitution 
Makes a Difference
As these examples underscore, while regular legislation and detailed education pol-
icies are critical elements of a strong education system, constitutional rights matter 
to equality and accountability. And although court decisions can advance rights 
in common law countries, enshrining the right to education in the constitutional 
text more powerfully and permanently assigns the state responsibility for ensuring 
schools are widely available and adequately staffed, and provides citizens with a 
straightforward tool to hold their governments accountable. Moreover, in common 
law countries like the U.S., once the constitutional court has determined there is not 
a right to education, the challenge of overturning precedent becomes a significant 
barrier, even as constitutional education rights become more common globally.
BUILDING ON PRO GRESS AND ADDRESSING 
PERSISTING GAPS
In recent decades, national and global efforts have been remarkably success-
ful at expanding access to primary and secondary education and reducing 
gender disparities. Since 2000, the number of out-of-school children globally 
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has dropped by nearly half, while gender gaps at all levels of education have 
substantially narrowed.125
Still, much work remains to truly achieve education for all. Fifty-seven million 
children of primary school age remain out of school globally; 55 percent are girls.126 
In nearly one-third of developing countries, girls remain at a disadvantage in access-
ing both primary and secondary school, perpetuating gender gaps in wages and 
employment. Although secondary enrollment rates have markedly improved, com-
pletion rates have not risen quite in step, while across education levels, upholding 
quality remains a key challenge. Finally, children with disabilities remain particu-
larly at risk of exclusion: in a study covering 13 LMICs, the gap in school attendance 
between 6- to 11-year-olds with disabilities and children in the same age group with-
out disabilities ranged from 10 percentage points in India to nearly 60 percentage 
points in Indonesia, with even greater disparities among older children.127
Taking the next step toward education for all will require addressing gaps in 
laws and implementation, accelerating progress on norms, and ensuring that 
policies and programs comprehensively support all children’s ability to learn and 
think critically.
Further Constitutional Rights Needed to Make the 
Right to Education Meaningful
Fulfilling the right to education requires teaching students how to learn, question, 
and find solutions—not indoctrinating them. Historically, schools have been used 
for both. Autocratic regimes have taught their own versions of history. Democra-
cies, too, have often neglected to ensure that education includes the experiences, 
perspectives, and history of minority populations and those out of power as well 
as majority populations and those in leadership positions. Yet if education is to 
enable the exercise of full civil and political rights, and give citizens the chance 
to learn from history, then we must ensure opportunities for students to wrestle 
with difficult questions, to hear a multiplicity of viewpoints, to sort through the 
evidence, to learn how to learn and how to think.
Three other rights make a difference in this process: the right to information, 
the right to free speech, and freedom of belief. Globally, nearly all constitutions 
guarantee freedom of expression (96%), which includes the right to free speech, 
while 74% protect freedom of belief. Meanwhile, a growing global movement 
has elevated the right to information as a centerpiece of improving government 
accountability. Continuing to advance these rights and principles will be para-
mount to ensuring the right to education can be fully realized.
Accelerating Change
Important progress in constitutions over the past few decades can provide a foun-
dation for further action (see Figure 13). While only 44% of constitutions adopted 
before 1970 ensured that primary school was free, 67% of those adopted since 
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2010 do so. At the secondary level, only 20% of constitutions adopted before 1970 
addressed the right to secondary education through guarantees or aspirational 
language, compared to approximately 67% of those adopted since 2010. Already, 
constitutional guarantees have provided important bases for new legislation and 
judicial decisions that have resulted in increased enrollment, improved accessibil-
ity, and better resources for schools. Further, while guarantees are likelier to appear 
in new constitutions, it is possible to adopt or strengthen right-to-education provi-
sions by amendment. For example, Mexico’s 1917 constitution was among the first 
to guarantee a broad range of social and economic rights, and ensured that basic 
education would be free and compulsory well before many others. In February 
2012, to prepare students to succeed in the twenty-first-century economy, the gov-
ernment extended this guarantee to secondary school.128
While the world has achieved remarkable educational gains over the past sev-
eral decades, the remaining gaps should trouble us all. For society to flourish, all 
individuals need the opportunity to reach their potential. Today, millions of chil-
dren are missing out on that chance, often simply because they were born poor, 
female, or with a disability. By establishing a constitutional right to education, 
national governments can both symbolically and practically support efforts to 
ensure all receive a quality education. When people have a legal right to education 
and the ability to pursue it, case law from around the world demonstrates its power 
as a tool for tearing down barriers to equal opportunity, increasing the resources 
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The Right to Health
From Treatment and Care to 
Creating the Conditions for a Healthy Life
SOUTH AFRICA:  HOW A C ONSTITUTIONAL 
RIGHT TO HEALTH PREVENTED HUNDREDS OF 
THOUSANDS OF HIV CASES 
At one month old, Busisiwe Maqungo’s daughter Nomazizi became seriously ill,1 
suffering from dehydration, diarrhea, and pneumonia. When Busisiwe took her 
to the hospital, the doctor delivered two potentially life-threatening diagnoses: 
Busisiwe was HIV-positive, and Nomazizi was too.
Although Busisiwe had been tested for HIV during an antenatal care visit 
in Cape Town, the nurse who administered the test neither informed her of its 
purpose nor disclosed the positive result—and certainly did not offer Busisiwe 
treatment that could avert the transmission of HIV to her unborn child. Busisiwe 
already knew from television that there were drugs that could prevent mother-to-
child transmission of HIV, but had no reason to think this applied to her own preg-
nancy. After Nomazizi’s diagnosis, Busisiwe borrowed money to pay for countless 
trips to the hospital, where doctors told her there was nothing they could do and 
that Nomazizi would die. Eight months later, she did.
In the late 1990s, stories like Busisiwe’s were far too common in South Africa. 
By 1998, approximately 70,000 infants across the country were contracting HIV 
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from their mothers annually.2 The manufacturer of Nevirapine, a drug found to 
prevent mother-to-child transmission, offered it for free to South Africa for a five-
year period. Nevertheless, although the World Health Organization (WHO) and 
South Africa’s Medicines Control Council deemed Nevirapine safe, the govern-
ment chose to provide it only at a select number of private-sector pilot sites, mak-
ing it impossible for public-sector doctors to prescribe it for patients in need.
Nomazizi’s death devastated Busisiwe. Yet she realized that numerous women 
were having similar experiences, which could be prevented by a government com-
mitment to ensuring universal access to anti-retroviral drugs. To help make this a 
reality, Busisiwe joined the Treatment Action Campaign (TAC), a South African 
activist organization that had long advocated for people with HIV/AIDS, includ-
ing by leading a campaign to reduce the price of patented drugs used to treat HIV.
In 2001, following years of advocacy outside the courts, TAC initiated a law-
suit against the South African government, arguing that its failure to provide 
comprehensive services to prevent mother-to-child HIV transmission violated 
the right to healthcare services in the 1996 constitution. Along with several other 
women, Busisiwe told her story in an affidavit, helping TAC build a compelling 
case grounded in the experiences of South African mothers.
In July 2002, South Africa’s Constitutional Court handed down a ground-
breaking decision in the TAC case, finding that the constitutional right to health 
“require[d] the government to devise and implement within its available resources 
a comprehensive and co-ordinated programme to realize progressively the rights 
of pregnant women and their newborn children to have access to health services 
to combat mother-to-child transmission of HIV.”3 Further, the Court specifically 
ordered the state to remove restrictions on Nevirapine’s availability at public hos-
pitals and clinics.4
Since the TAC case, many more women in South Africa have received access to 
drugs to prevent mother-to-child HIV transmission.5 While the Court’s order has 
not been perfectly or universally implemented, this litigation ultimately prevented 
hundreds of thousands of HIV infections.6 Globally, the case provided one of the 
most powerful illustrations of how social movements can leverage constitutional 
health rights to produce meaningful change.
INDIA:  STRENGTHENING AC CESS TO HEALTHCARE 
BEFORE AND AFTER BIRTH,  REGARDLESS OF INC OME
As the TAC litigation was unfolding, in other parts of the world, a movement was 
building to apply a human rights approach to mothers’ survival.7 At the interna-
tional level, a 2009 U.N. Human Rights Council resolution acknowledged that 
ending preventable maternal mortality would require “the effective promotion and 
protection of the human rights of women and girls,” including the right “to enjoy 
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the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health, including sexual and 
reproductive health.”8 At the national level, lawyers and civil society were increas-
ingly turning to constitutional protections to apply this rights-based approach to 
protecting women’s health before, during, and after childbirth.
Some of the most groundbreaking cases were taking place in India. Notably, 
unlike South Africa, India has no explicit “right to health” in its constitution. How-
ever, Article 21’s protection of the “right to life” has come to embody an expan-
sive legal protection for medical services, a healthy environment, and access to 
essentials for a healthy life. Constitutional protections of the “right to life” have 
advanced the right to health in some countries and created potential threats to 
individual health and healthcare decision-making in others. In India, however, 
advocates have successfully leveraged Article 21 in wide-ranging health-related 
matters, including a “right to food” case that dramatically expanded access to free 
school lunch9 and an air pollution case that yielded important new regulations 
promoting the use of clean fuels.10 Within the past decade, the health protections 
encompassed by the right to life have provided powerful tools to promote account-
ability for the preventable deaths of poor women during childbirth because of 
inadequate medical services.
Exclusion from Basic Care and Services
On a hot day in May 2009, Fatema11 went into labor beneath the tree where she 
herself had been born 21 years earlier,12 in an open area steps from the Nizamuddin 
Dargah, a popular Delhi mausoleum frequented by thousands weekly.13 Fatema 
lived in the open space with her mother Jaitun, a retired laborer in her sixties, 
along with a number of other homeless families. Abandoned by her husband upon 
becoming pregnant, Fatema had turned to her mother for support throughout her 
pregnancy. With only the tree’s boughs offering any protection from the elements, 
Fatema gave birth to a baby girl, Alisha, in full view of passersby and without any 
professional help.14
This was not by choice. Fatema had tried, repeatedly, to access the care she 
needed—and qualified for.15 Given her epilepsy, which caused regular seizures, she 
had known she faced additional medical risks. Twice while pregnant, she visited a 
government-run maternity hospital near where she lived, inquiring about the cash 
assistance she could receive upon giving birth there through the Janani Surak-
sha Yojana (JSY) program. Both times, her questions were ignored, her pregnancy 
went unregistered, and medical staff made no effort to provide her with the other 
prenatal services, benefits, and nutrition for which all poor pregnant women in 
India are eligible.
Shortly after Fatema gave birth outside, Jaitun once again went to the maternity 
hospital, alerting staff to the delivery and requesting an ambulance. Yet no ambu-
lance was dispatched, and no hospital staff visited. In the ensuing weeks, the frustra-
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tions mounted: Fatema was able to get Alisha vaccinated at the maternity hospital 
in early June, but the child received no checkup. Hospital staff told Fatema she was 
anemic, but conducted no blood tests. Fatema, who was illiterate, received from the 
hospital the discharge slip she needed to get her JSY benefits, but it was written in 
English and she was unable to understand the actions required. She visited the hos-
pital repeatedly seeking the benefits, but was refused. Finally, with an activist’s help, 
Fatema collected 550 rupees from the hospital—around 8–9 U.S. dollars.16
In the following months, both Fatema’s and Alisha’s health deteriorated. With-
out adequate nutrition, Fatema could not breastfeed, and had no money to buy 
milk. Alisha was going hungry during the most critical time of her development. 
Despite having repeated contact with a government hospital during and after her 
pregnancy, neither Fatema nor Alisha received the assistance designed to help 
impoverished mothers and their children.17
Finally, as their circumstances grew truly desperate, Fatema and her daugh-
ter connected with legal assistance and discovered that they could initiate a case 
against the maternity hospital for its failure to provide care. In interim orders, 
the Delhi High Court ordered immediate relief for Fatema and Alisha: Alisha 
would receive the nutritional benefits provided by the Integrated Child Develop-
ment Scheme; Alisha and Fatema would receive their ration card for grains and 
oil; Fatema would receive the cash assistance guaranteed by the National Mater-
nity Benefit Scheme; and both would receive a checkup at the maternity hospital, 
accompanied by social workers, and have access to an ambulance in case further 
treatment at the primary hospital was necessary.18
The Court did not stop there. A few months before hearing Fatema’s case, the 
presiding judge, Justice Muralidhar, had heard arguments in a similar case, Laxmi 
Mandal v. Deen Dayal Harinagar Hospital.19 The case had been brought by the 
brother of an impoverished woman, Shanti Devi, who was also denied the care she 
was entitled to and died just minutes after giving birth. To address issues common to 
both cases, Justice Muralidhar issued a joint decision the following summer. In June 
2010, the Delhi High Court established for the first time that India’s constitution 
protects the right to maternal health—thus obligating the government to ensure all 
pregnant women and new mothers can access the services they need. As the Court 
declared, Article 21 of the Indian Constitution protects “the right to health, repro-
ductive health and the right to food. . . . [T]he right to health . . . would include the 
right to access government (public) health facilities and receive a minimum stan-
dard of treatment and care. In particular this would include the enforcement of the 
reproductive rights of the mother and the right to nutrition and medical care of the 
newly born child and continuously thereafter till the age of about six years.”20
One Case Leads to Another
According to lawyers who worked on the Laxmi Mandal case, the recognition of a 
constitutional right to maternal health in India was a turning point: failure to pro-
vide adequate care would no longer be mere medical negligence, but a violation of 
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a fundamental, justiciable right.21 While ensuring implementation of the Court’s 
orders has posed significant challenges, advocates’ commitment to leveraging the 
judgment to improve maternal health nationwide invites hope.
Because the decision came from the Delhi High Court rather than the Supreme 
Court, it was binding only in Delhi. Nevertheless, the judgment is clearly influenc-
ing other High Courts’ decisions. For example, in a 2012 case in the rural state of 
Madhya Pradesh, advocates argued that the poor quality of medical services was 
contributing to high maternal mortality rates and violating poor pregnant wom-
en’s constitutional rights. Echoing Justice Muralidhar, the High Court found that 
the right to survive pregnancy was a fundamental right guaranteed by Article 21.22
Moreover, the case compellingly illustrates how courts can help enforce sub-
stantive constitutional rights despite government inaction. Months after issuing 
the decision in Shanti Devi’s and Fatema’s cases, Justice Muralidhar learned of 
another woman who died days after giving birth in the street near busy Connaught 
Place. Dismayed, he contacted the chief justice, urging him to initiate a case sua 
moto (on his own motion)—a power of the courts established in India as part 
of the “public interest litigation” permitted by the constitution.23 The chief justice 
agreed and ordered the Delhi government to establish five shelters for poor preg-
nant and lactating women, with food and medical care available around the clock. 
Again, the Court grounded its ruling in Article 21: “[W]e . . . cannot become the 
silent spectators waiting for the Government to move like a tortoise and allow 
the destitute pregnant women and lactating women to die on the streets of Delhi 
. . . giving birth to a child or . . . along with the child. Such a situation cannot be 
countenanced and is not possible to visualize in the backdrop of Article 21 of the 
Constitution of India.”24
Health Rights’ Growing Role in Addressing Maternal Mortality Globally
These rulings from India affirm the potential of constitutional rights as tools for 
addressing preventable deaths and strengthening health protections for some of 
the most marginalized groups. Moreover, the role of the right to health in promot-
ing accountability for preventable maternal deaths is gaining traction in other parts 
of the globe. In Uganda, where 16 women die during childbirth every day, a case 
initiated in 2011 to hold the government accountable for two mothers’ preventable 
deaths, based on the constitutional rights to health, life, and gender equality, was 
still moving through the court system as of 2018.25 Similarly, in Brazil, the family 
of a woman who died during childbirth brought a claim before the Convention 
on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) 
Committee in 2007, arguing that the government had violated her rights to health 
and life by failing to provide her timely access to emergency care.26 In the first-
ever decision on maternal mortality by an international body, the committee ruled 
that the state’s responsibility to prevent maternal deaths was “strongly anchored” 
in Brazil’s constitution, particularly five articles addressing the right to health.27 
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Through these landmark cases, the right to health has emerged as a critical tool for 
promoting accountability and reducing preventable deaths worldwide.
As these examples illustrate, constitutional health rights have significant poten-
tial to have both individual- and population-level impacts. But how commonly do 
constitutions guarantee health rights, and where are these rights lacking? Further, 
is an enforceable constitutional right to health feasible across countries, or will 
it overburden medical and legal systems? Finally, how can constitutional health 
rights be most effectively designed and implemented to improve health outcomes 
for everyone in a country—not just those who make it to court?
H E A LT H  A S  A  H UM A N  R IG H T: 
G LOBA L  F OU N DAT ION S
The first global agreements recognizing health as a human right were drafted in 
the wake of World War II, as international human rights law was gaining legiti-
macy globally as a mechanism for maintaining peace and promoting well-being.28 
In 1945, delegates from around the world began drafting the constitution of the 
emerging WHO, which opened for signature the following year and defined health 
as “a state of complete physical, mental and social well-being and not merely the 
absence of disease or infirmity.”29
This broad understanding of health is reflected in other U.N. agreements. The 
1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights laid out a similarly comprehensive 
understanding of health’s foundations: “Everyone has the right to a standard of liv-
ing adequate for the health and well-being of himself and of his family, including 
food, clothing, housing and medical care and necessary social services, and the 
right to security in the event of unemployment, sickness, disability, widowhood, 
old age or other lack of livelihood in circumstances beyond his control.”30
In 1966, the U.N. built on this agreement and adopted the International Cov-
enant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), which guarantees the 
“right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical 
and mental health,” specifically calling on states to fulfill this right through disease 
prevention, the reduction of infant mortality, and universal access to medical ser-
vices.31 In detailing this right, the U.N. Committee on Economic, Social and Cul-
tural Rights has affirmed that “the right to health embraces a wide range of socio-
economic factors that promote conditions in which people can lead a healthy life, 
and extends to the underlying determinants of health, such as food and nutrition, 
housing, access to safe and potable water and adequate sanitation, safe and healthy 
working conditions, and a healthy environment.”32
THE NATURE OF HEALTH RIGHT S
At the national level, what do health rights cover? Do they primarily focus on 
access to medical care and medicines, as in this chapter’s introductory cases, or 
Right to Treatment and Care for Health    231
do they also cover crucial aspects of public health that prevent sickness or injury 
in the first place? For example, does a right to health cover a right to vaccines, 
which can prevent illnesses; a right to information about and access to measures 
necessary for preventing the spread of infectious diseases; and a right to the 
kind of prenatal nutrition and testing that would lower the risk of pregnancy- 
related complications?
Accounting for the Full Range of Factors Influencing Health
This chapter’s opening cases illustrate a trend in many countries, wherein most 
health rights cases brought to court focus on the right to treatment or medical 
care. Care and treatment are unequivocally important. Yet substantial evidence 
shows that medical care contributes to a minority of overall health improvements.33
Public health measures, from immunization campaigns to effective efforts to 
lower smoking and traffic accident injuries, profoundly impact health. Similarly, 
the health of one’s environment, including exposure to pollutants or violence, 
shapes the likelihood of injury and illness. Likewise, social conditions ranging 
from income, which shapes access to food and other necessities, to access to edu-
cation, which can shape health literacy, all critically influence health outcomes. 
This final set of factors is commonly referred to as “the social determinants of 
health,” which WHO defines as “the conditions in which people are born, grow, 
work, live, and age, and the wider set of forces and systems shaping the conditions 
of daily life.”34
The Broad Benefits of Preventive Health Measures—and Risks of Fo-
cusing Exclusively on Medical Care
Given the importance of public and population health approaches to improving 
health from the get-go, policymakers, civil society leaders, and researchers alike 
have warned of the risks of any approach to health rights that solely addresses 
access to medications and medical care.
The problems are twofold. First, prioritizing medical care alone would neglect 
many of the most effective means of improving individuals’, families’, and whole 
countries’ health. It makes little sense to pay for young children’s hospitalization 
for diarrheal disease but not for lower-cost sanitation measures that would pre-
vent their illness in the first place. Prevention measures can help far more people, 
and no one would prefer treatment for a severe illness over the ability to avoid 
it altogether.
Second, with regard to rights, if courts address only individual treatment for 
specific illnesses without considering the broader needs for public health, they 
may shift resources in resource-constrained environments away from critical mea-
sures to protect and promote health for all.
To comprehensively address the right to health, constitutions must address 
both access to health services and the underlying determinants of health, includ-
ing social determinants like education, poverty, and equality and environmental 
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factors like access to clean water and sanitation. Chapters throughout this book 
address constitutional approaches to some core social determinants of health, 
including inequality, discrimination, and access to education. This chapter focuses 
on constitutional approaches to public health, a healthy environment, and health-
care services. In the following section, we examine how often countries guar-
antee a right to medical care; a broad right to health, interpretable as primarily 
a right to medical care but potentially extendable to public health; and/or a specific 
right to public health.
THE RIGHT TO HEALTH IN C ONSTITUTIONS
As of 2017, nearly 60% of the world’s countries take some approach to guarantee-
ing the right to public health, overall health, or healthcare services through their 
constitutions (Map 33). Nineteen percent guarantee the right to public health, com-
pared to 41% guaranteeing the right to medical care and 36% guaranteeing the right 
to overall health. Additionally, 16% protect health rights in aspirational terms; as 
with education rights, these provisions commonly describe the right to health as a 
“goal” or “principle” of the state. Despite providing more modest protections than 
guarantees, aspirational provisions have catalyzed tangible health improvements, as 
we explore later. Further, some governments explicitly commit to progressively real-
izing the right to health as resources increase, consistent with international treaties.
Countries’ commitments vary enormously in their level of detail. Some coun-
tries, like Cape Verde, delineate how the protection and promotion of health will 
be accomplished:
1. Everyone shall have the right to health and the duty to defend and promote it, 
independently of economic condition.
2. The right to health shall be realised through an adequate network of health 
services and through the creation of economic, social, cultural and environ-
mental conditions which promote and facilitate a better quality of life for 
the population.
No specific provision
Guaranteed for some 
groups, not universally
Aspirational or subject to progressive realization
Guaranteed right
MAP 33. Does the constitution explicitly guarantee an approach to
the right to health?
MAP 33. Does the constitution explicitly guarantee an approach to the right to health?
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3. In order to guarantee the right to health, the state shall have the following duties:
(a) To assure the existence and functioning of a national health system;
(b) To encourage the community’s participation at the various levels of health 
services;
(c) To assure the existence of public health care;
(d) To encourage and support private initiative in the rendering of preventive, 
curative and rehabilitative health care;
(e) To promote the socialisation of the costs of medical care and medication;
(f) To regulate and supervise the activity and quality of health care services;
(g) To regulate and control the production, commercialisation and use of phar-
macological products, and other means of treatment and diagnosis.35
Other countries provide little specificity in describing the state’s responsibility. 
For example, Togo’s constitution provides: “The State shall recognize to all citizens 
the right to health. The State shall strive to promote it.”36
The Right to Public Health
Among the 19% of constitutions guaranteeing the right to public health, the provi-
sions vary widely in scope (Map 34). Some countries’ constitutional public health 
protections primarily focus on preventing the spread of disease. For example, 
Kuwait’s constitution states: “The State cares for public health and for means of 
prevention and treatment of diseases and epidemics.”37 Other constitutions, like 
Venezuela’s, provide for broader public health protections: “In order to guaran-
tee the right to health, the State creates, exercises guidance over and administers 
a national public health system that crosses sector boundaries, and is decentral-
ized and participatory in nature, integrated with the social security system and 
governed by the principles of gratuity, universality, completeness, fairness, social 
integration and solidarity. The public health system gives priority to promoting 
health and preventing disease, guaranteeing prompt treatment and quality reha-
bilitation. Public health assets and services are the property of the State and shall 
not be privatized.”38
No specific provision




MAP 34. Does the constitution explicitly guarantee citizens' right to 
public health?
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An additional 6% of constitutions address public health narrowly by address-
ing only the duty to prevent epidemics or by providing for specific public health 
measures. For example, Belarus’s constitution provides: “The right of citizens of 
the Republic of Belarus to health care shall also be secured by the development of 
physical training and sport, measures to improve the environment, the opportu-
nity to use fitness establishments and improvements in occupational safety.”39 Nine 
percent of constitutions address reproductive healthcare or maternal health.
The Right to a Healthy Environment
Although relatively few countries explicitly guarantee the right to public health, 
nearly half guarantee the right to a healthy environment (Map 35), which is funda-
mental to health now and for future generations. Some of these provisions focus 
on health protection, others on environmental conservation.40 Georgia includes 
environmental protection in the same article as other health rights:
1. Everyone shall have the right to enjoy health insurance as a means of accessible 
medical aid. In the cases determined in accordance with a procedure prescribed by 
law, free medical aid shall be provided.
2. The state shall control all institutions of health protection and the production and 
trade of medicines.
3. Everyone shall have the right to live in healthy environment and enjoy natural and 
cultural surroundings.41
Belgium’s constitution focuses on a healthy environment as one aspect of the 
“right to lead a life in conformity with human dignity,” alongside rights to employ-
ment, social security, decent housing, and others.42 Ensuring a healthy environ-
ment is often framed as both a right and an individual duty. For example, Angola’s 
constitution states that “[e]veryone has the right to live in a healthy and unpol-
luted environment and the duty to defend and preserve it,” and enumerates mea-
sures the state must take for environmental conservation.43
No specific provision
Aspirational or subject to 
progressive realization
Guaranteed right
MAP 35. Does the constitution explicitly guarantee citizens' right to a 
healthy environment?
MAP 35. Does the constitution explicitly guarantee citizens’ right to a healthy environment?
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The Right to Medical Care or Services
As of 2017, 41% of constitutions guarantee a universal right to medical care (Map 36). 
Fifteen percent address the medical needs of specific groups (such as children, older 
residents, persons with disabilities, or people living in poverty), either in addition 
to a universal right (11%) or instead (4%). For example, Nicaragua’s constitution 
guarantees free healthcare “for the vulnerable sectors of the population, giving pri-
ority to the completion of programs benefiting mothers and children,”44 while Italy’s 
constitution requires the state to “[provide] free medical care to the poor.”45 Ten 
percent of constitutions guarantee the right to universal free healthcare; an addi-
tional 5% guarantee free healthcare to one or more groups listed above.
Countries define the right to medical care in varying detail and take differ-
ent approaches to describing its scope. Some include healthcare under a broader 
guarantee of social protection or a minimum standard of living for individuals. 
For example, Romania’s constitution states:
(1) The State shall be bound to take measures of economic development and social 
protection, of a nature to ensure a decent living standard for its citizens.
(2) Citizens have the right to pensions, paid maternity leave, medical care in public 
health centres, unemployment benefits, and other forms of public or private social 
securities, as stipulated by the law. Citizens have the right to social assistance, ac-
cording to the law.46
Other countries include more detailed provisions on medical care systems. 
For example, Bolivia’s constitution guarantees the right to health and further pro-
nounces: “There shall be a single health system, which shall be universal, free, equi-
table, intra-cultural, intercultural, and participatory, with quality, kindness and 
social control. The system is based on the principles of solidarity, efficiency and co-
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The Right to Life
Some countries guarantee a constitutional “right to life,” which in some contexts 
has been interpreted to include a “right to health” and thus extend similar protec-
tions, as illustrated by the introductory case from India. The ambit of this right 
is wide-ranging. In some countries, the “right to life” is part of the constitution’s 
due process or liberty protections. For example, Canada’s constitution establishes: 
“Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of the person and the right 
not to be deprived thereof except in accordance with the principles of fundamen-
tal justice.”48 In others, the “right to life” appears in relation to the death penalty, 
as in Ghana’s constitution: “No person shall be deprived of his life intentionally 
except in the exercise of the execution of a sentence of a court in respect of a 
criminal offence under the laws of Ghana of which he has been convicted.”49 In 
some, the “right to life” is framed as limiting or negating women’s reproductive 
health options and decision-making,50 contradicting international law51 and plac-
ing women’s health at risk.52
Overall, of the constitutions lacking a “right to health,” approximately three-
quarters describe life as a value or right.53 Because of its wide-ranging meanings 
explored above, our data on constitutional approaches to health do not capture 
the “right to life.” Nevertheless, depending on its articulation, the right to life can 
be important for advancing health. In countries whose constitutions include both, 
the rights to life and to health are commonly invoked together in court; in a study 
of 71 access-to-medicine cases across 12 Central and Latin American countries, 
83% of successful cases referenced both rights.54
Impact of Emphasis on Medical Care
The numbers show that countries far more often guarantee a right to medical care 
than a right to preventive healthcare. Moreover, countries that provide a broad 
right to health have overwhelmingly interpreted it as a right to medical care. Fur-
ther, courts have often resolved cases focused on an individual’s right to medical 
treatment without considering impacts on the government’s ability to fund impor-
tant preventive measures.55
This is not always the case. While South Africa’s right to health jurisprudence 
has largely focused on access to pharmaceuticals and medical care,56 the constitu-
tion’s explicit guarantee of broader social rights enables South Africans to claim 
their rights to adequate housing, food, and other basics essential to health. Nota-
bly, the TAC case, the first major success in applying health rights to expand access 
to medicines, was for a preventive measure. Moreover, the Constitutional Court’s 
general approach of evaluating “reasonableness” rather than ordering specific 
individual remedies, as we later discuss in more detail, enables the government to 
evaluate how to balance prevention and treatment in fulfilling the right to health.
Clearly, countries can guarantee rights to both the foundations for health—
decent housing, adequate nutrition, education, and public health—and medical 
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care. These are complementary. For example, protecting and fulfilling the right 
to public health, from essential vaccinations to clean water, lowers the cost of the 
right to medical care. But to be realized, it requires explicit attention.
IMPACT S OF C ONSTITUTIONAL HEALTH RIGHT S
A critical question for policymakers and civil society members who care about 
advancing health is whether a constitutional right to health is necessary, or 
whether a comprehensive social safety net in legislation and policy would just as 
effectively achieve the goals of fostering healthy environments and ensuring uni-
versal quality care. Growing evidence suggests that constitutional health rights 
have the potential to yield unique additional benefits that strengthen health sys-
tems overall.
Protecting and Improving Access to Essential Medicines
One way that health rights may improve health outcomes is by providing tools 
for advocacy and improvements in national health systems. For example, consti-
tutions’ health rights protections have played notable roles when other policies 
or international relations have created health threats. In Peru, the constitutional 
protection of the right to health provided an important basis for trade negotiations 
with the United States on access to essential medicines,57 an important example of 
the intersection among the right to health, global trade, and intellectual property 
law that emerges across contexts.58 Likewise, in Kenya, HIV-positive individuals 
successfully challenged portions of a law limiting their access to generic anti-ret-
rovirals, based on their constitutional right to health.59 Health rights litigation can 
also pressure governments into improving policies to avoid being taken to court. 
In Brazil and Costa Rica, for instance, health authorities decided to include anti-
retroviral drugs in their public health plans after losing multiple lawsuits calling 
for coverage of those drugs.60
Providing a Foundation for Systemic Improvements
Brazil also provides an example of a country where the introduction of a constitu-
tional right to health led to broader systemic improvements. Brazil’s 1988 constitu-
tion made health a fundamental right following two decades of social mobiliza-
tion.61 The provision’s introduction had faced strong resistance from politicians 
wanting to privatize the healthcare system, and the government elected after the 
constitution’s passage continued to resist the idea of a unified national health sys-
tem.62 However, pursuant to the constitutional guarantee, the Sistema Único de 
Saúde (SUS) was implemented in 1992. Today, approximately 70% of Brazilians 
are exclusive users of SUS, which has become the world’s largest free public health 
system.63 Additionally, in 2000, a constitutional amendment guaranteed funds to 
finance health and public services.64 Over the following decades, wide-ranging 
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studies have found SUS to be associated with significant decreases in hospitaliza-
tions and infant and child mortality.65
Some countries without a constitutional right to health have achieved widely 
accessible, high-quality healthcare through strong social service provision. Den-
mark, for example, has a strong public healthcare system but no constitutional 
right to health; its constitution was adopted in the 1950s, when constitutions less 
commonly included health rights.66 In Brazil, however, the constitutional right to 
health catalyzed this change.
Improving Health Outcomes over Time
Two studies have quantitatively documented the relationship between a constitu-
tional right to health and improved population health outcomes for large num-
bers of countries. One difference-in-differences study of 157 countries from 1970 
to 2007 found that introducing a justiciable constitutional right to healthcare 
reduced the under-five mortality rate by 5%—increasing to 8.7% for countries with 
high levels of democratic governance—after controlling for women’s education 
levels, country GDP, and country and year fixed effects.67 Using a difference-in-
differences approach and individual-level data on more than 400,000 births in 15 
Latin American countries, another study by the same author found the enactment 
of a constitutional right to health or healthcare to be associated with a 2.6% subse-
quent reduction in infant deaths among poor mothers, but not the population as 
a whole, after controlling for other constitutional economic and social rights and 
both country-level and child-specific factors.68
Supporting the Expansion of Life-Saving Public Health Interventions
Finally, constitutional health rights, including the right to a healthy environment, 
can provide a powerful legal basis for enacting life-saving public health measures, 
including immunization campaigns. For example, in Argentina, a woman went 
to court in 1998 to urge the government to complete production of the vaccine 
against Argentine hemorrhagic fever, a potentially deadly disease that put over 
3.5 million people at risk, especially in rural areas. In 1991, Argentina had begun 
producing the vaccine, which was shown to be 95% effective, but discontinued 
production before the vaccine was made publicly available. In its ruling, citing 
Argentina’s commitments to health rights in both international treaties and the 
constitution, the Court ordered the government to complete production accord-
ing to a specific timeline.69
Similarly, that same year in Colombia, over 400 parents from a poor part of 
Bogotá filed a lawsuit demanding that the government provide their children with 
a free meningitis vaccine, citing their constitutional rights to health, life, and social 
security.70 The minister of health had previously stated that a new program would 
make the vaccine freely available in poor neighborhoods, but the program had not 
been implemented. Meanwhile, many of the petitioners’ children were attending 
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crowded daycares while their parents worked, putting them at high risk of con-
tracting the disease, while the vaccine’s cost made it inaccessible.71 Citing the con-
stitution’s right to health, along with its provision allowing affirmative measures 
for marginalized groups, the Court ordered the Ministry of Health to immedi-
ately implement the free vaccine program, underscoring that it “[could not] accept 
that indigent children or those whose parents do not have sufficient resources, 
have to face the risks that are products of terrible diseases and the inaction of pub-
lic health administrations.”72
Health rights have also provided foundations for improving nutrition,73 
upholding restrictions on exposure to tobacco,74 and strengthening other public 
safety and environmental health measures.75 Catalyzed by the constitutional right 
to health, these improvements have collectively saved countless lives.
THE FEASIBILIT Y AND EFFECTIVENESS 
OF A RIGHT S APPROACH
Questions about a constitutional right to health commonly surround the economic 
and judicial challenges of implementation. While this issue emerges across social 
and economic rights, the right to health, perhaps more than any other, raises ques-
tions about the level of government investment required for fulfillment. While 
challenging for all countries, this question is most pressing for low-income coun-
tries. The judicialization of the right to health also has implications for courts and 
for equity: if too many health cases come before the courts, the judicial system’s 
overall efficiency may decrease, and if the only people bringing those cases and 
benefitting from their rulings are those who can afford private lawyers, the right to 
health may undermine rather than advance health equity.
Economic Questions: Affordability for the Government
Although the issue of limited resources is more acute in low-income countries, 
similar debates emerge in courts across middle- and higher-income contexts. In a 
2010 case from Latvia, in which a plaintiff challenged the cap on reimbursement 
for a drug used to treat leukemia, the Riga District Court ruled that the compen-
sation limit was necessary “to provide as large [a] part of society as possible [the] 
right to health,” citing the constitution’s guarantee of “a basic level of medical assis-
tance for everyone.”76 Likewise, in a case about dialysis, South Africa’s Constitu-
tional Court reasoned: “There will be times when [fulfilling health rights] requires 
[the Court] to adopt a holistic approach to the larger needs of society rather than 
to focus on the specific needs of particular individuals within society.”77
The principle of progressive realization offers an approach to drafting and inter-
preting constitutions that shows promise for both broadly advancing health rights 
and ensuring that governments of all resource levels can manage costs. This prin-
ciple rests on the acknowledgment that many countries will need time for further 
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economic development before they can fully guarantee access to comprehensive 
medical care for all residents. Nevertheless, all countries can begin to fulfill the 
right to health; public health can provide a tool for preventing illness for entire 
populations and reducing future healthcare costs.
Progressive Realization 
Under many international human rights agreements, like the ICESCR, coun-
tries are only allowed to “progressively realize” rights that are likely to involve 
more significant financial costs, like the right to health. While ratifying countries 
agree to devote the maximum available resources and take immediate concrete 
steps toward realizing these rights, fulfillment is expected to grow over time as 
resources increase.
At the same time, low-cost steps and the guarantee of nondiscrimination are 
understood as immediate obligations.78 Further, the U.N. has articulated a set of 
core, “nonderogable” obligations states must meet to fulfill the right to health, 
including, at minimum, the provision of essential primary care; access to adequate 
food, water, and shelter; the provision of essential medicines; and the execution 
of a public health plan to meet the needs of the whole population.79 In practice, 
the line between specific state actions with respect to health that are subject to 
progressive realization and those that must be realized immediately is subject 
to debate within courts and among advocates. Further, as later sections explore, 
courts’ determinations about how to operationalize these concepts to both protect 
individual rights and ensure the health of the population as a whole vary around 
the world.80 Some countries have directly embedded the idea of progressive real-
ization in their constitutions’ approaches to articulating the right to health. For 
example, South Africa’s constitution provides that “[e]veryone has the right to 
have access to .  .  . health care services, including reproductive health care,” but 
clarifies within the same article that “the state must take reasonable legislative and 
other measures, within its available resources, to achieve the progressive realisa-
tion of each of these rights.”81
In others, although the right is “guaranteed” constitutionally, courts interpret 
the right through a progressive realization lens. For example, Peru’s constitution 
provides that “[e]veryone has the right to protection of his health” and that “[t]he 
State guarantees free access to health benefits.”82 In practice, however, Peru’s Con-
stitutional Court has held that “the enforceability of a social right always depends 
on three factors: a) the seriousness and reasonableness of the case, b) its relation-
ship with other fundamental rights, and c) budget availability.”83
Kenya’s constitution not only spells out a commitment to progressively real-
izing the right to health, but also explicitly articulates what courts must consider 
when the government has indicated it lacks sufficient resources to fulfill an aspect 
of the right. Article 43 provides that “[e]veryone has the right to the highest attain-
able standard of health, which includes the right to health care services, including 
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reproductive health care,” and guarantees that “[a] person shall not be denied 
emergency medical treatment.” Article 21, however, establishes that these rights 
are subject to progressive realization, while Article 20 articulates a set of principles 
for courts evaluating Article 43 claims:
(a) it is the responsibility of the State to show that the resources are not available;
(b) in allocating resources, the State shall give priority to ensuring the widest 
possible enjoyment of the right or fundamental freedom having regard to 
prevailing circumstances, including the vulnerability of particular groups or 
individuals; and
(c) the court, tribunal or other authority may not interfere with a decision by a State 
organ concerning the allocation of available resources, solely on the basis that it 
would have reached a different conclusion.
Globally, all countries can afford to do something to protect and promote the 
right to health. In fact, low- and middle-income countries more commonly take 
constitutional approaches to this right than their high-income counterparts (see 
Figures 14–16). By committing to progressive realization, either directly in consti-
tutional text or through court doctrine, countries can effectively advance health 
rights in step with their economic development.
The Impact and Importance of Addressing Public Health
The right to public health, by its very nature, has broad population benefits, and 
by helping prevent the spread of disease, its implementation can reduce health 
costs down the line. Courts have demonstrated the feasibility of enforcing 
rights to public health, including when they are phrased as aspirational or pro-
gressive commitments.
For example, in Bangladesh, a former Member of Parliament brought a suit 
against the government for failing to prevent arsenic contamination of wells across 
the country, which had put millions at risk of poisoning. The appellant argued that 
this negligence violated the constitutional rights to health and to life.
Under Article 18(1) of Bangladesh’s constitution, located in the section on “fun-
damental principles of state policy,” “[t]he State shall regard the raising of the level 
of nutrition and the improvement of public health as among its primary duties.”84 
Although this language did not rise to the level of a guarantee, the Court still held 
that the government’s noncompliance with laws on safe drinking water amounted 
to a violation of its duty to promote health, as well as the right to life, the right 
to protection of the law, and the state’s responsibility to provide basic necessities 
(another aspirational provision).85 Consequently, the Court ordered the govern-
ment to undertake extensive measures to comply with the law, test for arsenic in 
wells in affected areas, prevent further contamination, and initiate a media cam-
paign to increase public awareness of the risks of arsenic contamination and pro-
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FIGURE 15. Explicit constitutional protection of the right to medical care by country income 
group
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Similarly, in India, residents of Ratlam, a Madhya Pradesh city, brought a 
case before the Supreme Court in 1980 arguing that the Municipal Council had 
violated their rights to health by failing to provide adequate sanitation, par-
ticularly by allowing septic fluids and overflow from an alcohol factory to flow 
in the streets.87 Like Bangladesh’s Article 18, Article 47 of the Indian Constitu-
tion, which is a “directive principle” rather than an enforceable right, provides: 
“The State shall regard the raising of the level of nutrition and the standard 
of living of its people and the improvement of public health as among its pri-
mary duties.” Although ordered by a lower court to construct a drainage system, 
the Council had argued they did not have sufficient funds to do so. However, 
the Supreme Court, citing Article 47, ruled that this excuse was insufficient: “A 
responsible municipal council constituted for the precise purpose of preserving 
public health and providing better finances cannot run away from its principal 
duty by pleading financial inability.” As a result, the Court ordered the Munici-
pal Council to improve sanitation infrastructure based on a plan produced 
by engineers affiliated with both parties to the case, and ordered the Madhya 
Pradesh government to loan funds to the council to ensure the improvements 
were financially feasible.88
These two cases further underscore why the right to public health, though 
underrecognized in constitutions, has particularly transformative potential. In 
both India and Bangladesh, waterborne diseases are among the leading causes 
of death for young children;89 leveraging public health rights to improve sanita-
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FIGURE 16. Explicit constitutional protection of the right to public health by country income 
group
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demonstrated impact, and the fact that governments are often best positioned 
to advance public and population health, ensuring constitutions contain com-
mitments to public health should be a priority. Currently, the share of countries 
with constitutional provisions protecting public health falls far behind the share 
protecting the right to medical care, even as public health and prevention would 
reduce poor health, illness, and injury at a far lower cost than medicine can 
treat them.
Judicial Questions: Implementing Rights for All Regardless of Income
Across social and economic rights, judicial rulings that are likely to change condi-
tions for entire groups of people, rather than one individual at a time, have the great-
est potential to effectively realize these rights without clogging the courts.90 Collec-
tive actions and judgments are also often better vehicles for equity, particularly since 
litigation costs can make individual justice through the courts inaccessible to the 
poorest. The right to health is no exception.91 While public health rights are collec-
tive by nature, the collective impact of medical care litigation depends largely on the 
reach of the court’s decision. While individual claims to access a particular medicine 
or treatment can powerfully shape one person’s life, collective claims or decisions 
expanding access for an entire class can be transformative for society.
However, litigants’ ability to make claims collectively, or on behalf of a group, 
varies across countries. Likewise, the effects of courts’ rulings on future judicial 
decisions depend partly on countries’ legal traditions. As previously noted, the 
two major traditions are common law, which has origins in the United Kingdom 
and remains prevalent across former British colonies, and civil law, which began 
in continental Europe and today also applies throughout much of South America 
and East Asia. Many countries incorporate elements from both traditions and may 
also integrate aspects of customary or religious law; generally, however, one tradi-
tion is dominant.92
A key difference between the two is that common law systems rely heavily on 
court precedent, whereas civil law systems are based almost exclusively on codi-
fied law. As a result, in predominantly civil law countries, prior court decisions are 
not binding on all subsequent cases. Meanwhile, in predominantly common law 
countries, precedents typically dictate future decisions, making a series of repeti-
tive claims less likely. Furthermore, in civil law countries, usually only a special-
ized court (typically the Constitutional Court), or a small number of specialized 
courts, can declare a law unconstitutional.93 This requirement aligns with the lim-
ited role of precedent, since otherwise courts at all levels could rule inconsistently 
about constitutionality. By contrast, in the United States and some other common 
law countries, “ordinary” courts are empowered to rule on constitutionality, but 
decisions from higher courts are controlling.94 These and other procedural aspects 
of countries’ judicial systems, such as the rules of standing, have implications for 
the most effective approaches to realizing the right to health for all.95
Right to Treatment and Care for Health    245
Collective Claims across Contexts
For the right to health, issues of individual versus collective claims are often at 
the core of questions of justiciability, including whether courts have the capacity 
to both hear all claims brought before them and issue effective remedies. Across 
countries, the ease of bringing class actions and other types of collective lawsuits 
varies. Some notable examples follow.
The U.S. was among the first countries to introduce a class action lawsuit, which 
allows a group of people experiencing the same legal issue, including constitutional 
rights violations, to bring a claim together and pursue a remedy that will apply to 
all. A U.S. class action requires a “class representative” who was personally harmed 
by the challenged law or action.96 Once a class action is decided, people who were 
members of the class, or were eligible to be members but opted out, cannot bring 
individual claims based on the same allegations, regardless of how the court rules. If 
the class wins the case, all of its members are typically entitled to monetary damages 
or other relief. The U.S. also allows for punitive damages, meaning defendants can 
be required to pay compensation to the class that exceeds mere restitution, as well as 
attorneys’ fees, which increases the incentive for lawyers to bring class action cases.
While it has been criticized as making the U.S. a more litigious society, the 
class action has yielded some significant victories for health. For example, in 1997, 
facing the threat of numerous class actions nationwide, the four largest tobacco 
companies paid over $200 billion to reimburse 46 states for public health costs 
attributable to smoking, and agreed to discontinue their deceptive marketing 
practices.97 It is estimated that the settlement, which also resulted in tobacco com-
panies raising their prices, reduced the share of 18- to 20-year-olds who smoked by 
13% over the next four years, and 21- to 65-year-olds by 5%.98
Likewise, in countries like India and Bangladesh, as discussed in chapter 8, 
public interest litigation (PIL) has provided a powerful tool for securing legal 
remedies with population-wide benefits.99 While similar, an important distinction 
between PIL and the traditional class action is the standing requirement: for a PIL 
action, any concerned community member can initiate the lawsuit, even if they 
have not been directly harmed.
This aspect of PIL has enabled important rulings on behalf of vulnerable groups 
who might otherwise struggle to access the courts. For example, in 1985, a law-
yer brought a case on behalf of child laborers in match factories in Tamil Nadu, 
India, arguing that their work in dangerous conditions violated constitutional 
rights including the (aspirational) right to public health.100 In a sweeping order, 
the Supreme Court addressed the obligations of the government, employers, and 
parents in realizing the constitutional prohibition on child labor, and in subse-
quent years India strengthened its child labor laws.101
In many civil law countries, particularly in Latin America, individuals enjoy 
remarkably straightforward access to the courts, though collective actions are less 
well established. Specifically, the amparo and acción de tutela are two “fast-track” 
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mechanisms common throughout the region that allow any individual to go to 
court to immediately enforce their fundamental rights.102 Notably, some countries, 
such as Argentina, allow groups of individuals represented by an NGO to bring an 
amparo together, thus facilitating both quick court access and a more efficient path 
to justice.103 While full implementation of judicial orders in Argentina’s collective 
cases has not yet been realized,104 this mechanism, dubbed the amparo colectivo 
by some, has been instrumental in advancing more structural changes, including 
with respect to HIV/AIDS treatment.105
However, across civil law countries, traditional class actions remain rare.106 One 
exception is Brazil, which introduced a class action through a 1985 statute. By con-
trast to the U.S. model, however, a group seeking to bring a class action in Brazil 
must be represented by an NGO or government body, such as a municipality.107 
Further, the “notice” requirement—whereby potential class members learn of the 
lawsuit—requires only a single publication in a newspaper.108 Finally, the action 
itself establishes the defendant’s liability, but each class member must still initiate 
individual proceedings to claim damages, typically limited to compensation for 
actual harms.109 Consequently, the Brazilian class action as currently designed may 
not be as accessible or impactful as possible.
Further, despite the class action’s availability in Brazil, the collective approach 
is largely underutilized, at least with regard to health rights—perhaps because liti-
gants prefer the amparo’s simplicity. According to legal scholar Alicia Ely Yamin, 
the combination of unusually easy individual access to the courts in Latin Amer-
ica and the one-off nature of most courts’ decisions has produced “high levels of 
individual litigation for treatments and services, which as a general matter exploit 
the system but do not attempt to transform it.”110 Indeed, across Brazil, just 3% of 
“right to health” suits against the federal government are collective.111 This apparent 
preference may also reflect pragmatic considerations of the odds of winning: data 
on the top Brazilian courts’ decisions reveal that claimants in individual “right to 
health” cases are far likelier than those bringing collective suits to be successful, 
possibly reflecting judges’ more conservative approach to cases that would have 
sweeping impacts or significant budgetary implications.112
Regardless, as individual health rights cases have become increasingly com-
mon, the courts have become overburdened and have experienced a significant 
backlog.113 In Rio de Janeiro, the number of “right to health” cases filed skyrocketed 
from a single lawsuit in 1991 to 1144 in 2002.114 Similarly, in Colombia, the right to 
health was “the most commonly litigated right” between 1999 and 2011, accounting 
for 869,604 out of 2,725,361 total cases.115 In 2008 alone, one in every 300 Colombi-
ans filed a health-related tutela.116 Observers feared that the “high volume of rights 
litigation [could] challenge the very sustainability of a public healthcare system 
and distort resources away from those most in need,”117 while potentially undercut-
ting the tutela’s legitimacy.118
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Collective Judgments in Colombia and South Africa
As noted, to some extent, courts’ ability to issue decisions with far-reaching effects 
depends on the role of precedent within their particular legal system. In countries 
where prior decisions are not binding on future cases, it is not unusual for courts 
to hear a series of similar claims. However, courts can also shape their decisions’ 
impact by how narrowly or broadly they resolve the issue before them. Both civil 
law and common law courts have demonstrated the feasibility of deciding cases to 
have more structural effects.
For example, in Colombia, the aforementioned volume of individual claims 
culminated in a 2008 Constitutional Court ruling addressing the health system’s 
“structural failures,” including inadequate regulation of the insurance companies 
that should have been covering many of the medicines and treatments sought 
through the courts.119 The landmark decision “called for significant restructuring 
of the health system based on rights principles, including non-discrimination, 
participation, and accountability.”120
While the impact of the Court’s decision is still unfolding, its efforts to address 
the systemic issues that have engendered the high volume of litigation provide 
one example of how judges even in civil law jurisdictions can shape their rulings 
to have larger collective impact.121 In 2015, the legislature enacted a new statute 
aimed at implementing the ruling, recognizing the fundamental right to health 
and articulating new rules for insurers and health providers.122 Meanwhile, indi-
vidual health claims before the Court have been declining: health rights accounted 
for 42% of all tutela claims in 2006, falling to 24% by 2014.123
Over the past two decades, the Constitutional Court in South Africa, a pre-
dominantly common law country, has illustrated the feasibility of effectively adju-
dicating social and economic rights, even in a lower-resource setting, by focusing 
on the reasonableness of the government’s overall decision-making process rather 
than each plaintiff ’s specific circumstances.124
Justice Albie Sachs discussed the considerations in a controversial right to health 
case decided by the Court, in which a man with kidney failure, Thiagraj Soobra-
money, was seeking further treatment from a state hospital.125 He had already received 
emergency treatment at the state hospital once, and was told then that in the future 
he would have to wait his turn to receive treatment, in accordance with hospital poli-
cies establishing very strict criteria for determining which patients’ treatment was 
prioritized, given limited resources. The Court found that the hospital
had applied criteria that were compatible with constitutional standards and values, 
that they used rational grounds for deciding who should have access to emergency 
treatment, and that the selection process used was not discriminatory, except on 
pure health grounds (which was relevant as criteria); therefore, we could not order 
the hospitals to act otherwise. To move him head of the queue would be to prejudice 
other people who had greater health claims, by saying that government must take 
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money away from dealing with HIV, immunization for children, health education 
programs, victims of trauma, and all other diseases that we have such as cancer and 
tuberculosis. We decided that, as judges, we could not interfere with the priorities in 
that particular area, and could not say that the hospital’s expenditure and way it was 
utilized did not meet constitutional standards.126
In this case, rather than narrowly evaluate the facts of a particular plaintiff ’s claim, 
the Court evaluated the reasonableness and fairness of the government’s action 
(or inaction) and whether the government had established a reasonable, non-
discriminatory process for making decisions about the use of limited healthcare 
resources. In 2013, a Kenyan High Court reached the same conclusion in an almost 
identical dialysis case, applying its constitution’s criteria for progressive realiza-
tion and directly citing the Soobramoney ruling.127 These decisions thus back the 
view that courts can effectively support progressive rights realization by ensuring 
that “public decision-makers follow a fair process in decision making, weighing 
the interests of individual needs with the importance of fairly distributing limited 
public resources across the whole population.”128
However, this is not to say the “reasonableness” approach provides a perfect 
solution, or has been immune from criticism. To some, addressing “reasonable-
ness” falls short of requiring the government to fulfill a “minimum core” of the 
rights to health, housing, or other socioeconomic rights;129 some courts, such as 
Germany’s Constitutional Court, have applied a “reasonableness”-like test that 
also takes into account minimum standards, which may better ensure meaningful 
assessment of both the government’s process and what it takes to fulfill the right at 
hand.130 Others argue that it requires courts to defer too much to the executive and 
legislative branches, thereby limiting constitutional rights’ potential as a check on 
government inaction.131 Finally, despite being premised on fairness, the “reason-
ableness” approach may not always bring justice to each individual, especially if 
inadequate attention is devoted to implementation.132
Yet for those who question whether courts can address health rights in the first 
place, South Africa’s approach provides an example of judicial decision-making that 
takes collective concerns into account. Further, while the nature of the challenge var-
ies across contexts, cases from wide-ranging countries have shown that the right to 
health can improve health on a large scale. Even in civil law countries, collective “right 
to health” challenges and court actions to initiate broad improvements to health sys-
tems have yielded benefits to significant numbers of people. Continuing to identify 
effective strategies for leveraging health rights to advance collective well-being across 
different constitutional systems will be important for ensuring their full impact.
PRO GRESS ON HEALTH RIGHT S AND IMPLICATIONS 
FOR BROADER EQUALIT Y
Over the past few decades, a growing number of constitutions and courts world-
wide have begun recognizing—and enforcing—the right to health, which has 
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assumed new importance in shaping citizens’ access to public health and medical 
services. Despite the complexities explored in this chapter, the right to health has 
both yielded tangible impacts for individuals and populations, and provided the 
basis for structural improvements to national health systems.
Like other social and economic rights, explicit constitutional protections of 
health rights have become more common over time. Only 29% of constitutions 
adopted before 1970 took an approach to health, while all constitutions adopted 
in 2000–2017 included the right to health, public health, and/or medical care (see 
Figure 17). Among newer constitutions, health is emerging as a priority area: all 
four of the constitutions newly adopted following the Arab Spring, in Egypt, Tuni-
sia, Libya, and Yemen, guaranteed an approach to health, which some view as a 
step toward universal health coverage.133
Still, more is needed, especially with regard to public health. While 57% of high-
income countries, 76% of middle-income countries, and 94% of low-income coun-
tries have enacted some constitutional approach to health, only 19% across income 
groups take an approach to the right to public health. The persistence of prevent-
able diseases and death evidences the grave need for further action: despite recent 
progress, around 5.9 million children die before age five each year,134 while over 
three times as many lack key immunizations.135 Maternal mortality also remains 
indefensibly high, with approximately 830 women dying each day.136 Health dis-
parities based on gender, socioeconomic status, race, and other characteristics 
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FIGURE 17. Explicit constitutional approach to protecting the right to health by year of consti-
tutional adoption
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versal access to public health and healthcare and strong protections against all 
forms of discrimination. Countries that have already enshrined health rights in 
their constitutions can provide insight into effective approaches to drafting and 
implementing rights to health elsewhere. For the 51 countries that have yet to do 
so, establishing a constitutional right to health would be an important step toward 
strengthening the human right to health and reinforcing countries’ accountability 
to their citizens’ well-being.
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How Far Has the World Come?
Constitutions state the rules of the game for each of our countries. They represent 
agreements between governments and their people, and commitments to respect, 
protect, and fulfill fundamental rights. How far have we come as humanity in 
ensuring that everyone has the right to live, learn, love, and work fully?
In nearly every area, there has been substantial progress in equal rights since 
1970. While barely over half of current constitutions (54%) adopted before 1970 
explicitly protect women’s equal rights, 100% of those adopted in 2010–17 do so. 
Similarly, for race/ethnicity, just 49% of constitutions adopted before 1970 include 
explicit protections, compared to 79% of those adopted in 2010–17. Looking at 
religion, only 56% adopted before 1970 clearly establish equal rights; between 2010 
and 2017, 92% do so. For socioeconomic status (SES), the share with explicit pro-
tections jumped from 34% adopted before 1970 to 83% adopted in 2010–17. And 
while progress on disability rights has been more recent, the increase in protec-
tions in just the past few decades has been similarly dramatic: only 9% of constitu-
tions adopted in 1980–89 protect equal rights on the basis of disability, compared 
to 71% adopted in 2010–17. However, rights continue to lag far behind for two 
groups: people living in countries where they are not citizens, and people whose 
sexual orientation or gender identity places them in the minority.
Moreover, commitments to provide every citizen with the opportunity for an 
education, and access to the healthcare and healthy environments needed to sur-
vive and thrive, have dramatically increased. All constitutions adopted since 2010 
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take some approach to protecting the right to education, compared to just two-
thirds of current constitutions adopted before 1970. Further, while less than half of 
constitutions adopted before 1970 guarantee free primary education, two-thirds of 
those adopted in 2010–17 do so. Similarly, just one-third of constitutions adopted 
before 1970 take any approach to health, whereas all those adopted in 2010–17 
include the right to health, public health, and/or medical care.
Despite remarkable progress over the past six decades, substantial work remains 
to be done. In the following section, we summarize key findings of where we are as 
a global community, as well as priorities for action.
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS:  EQUAL RIGHT S
Historic Exclusion and Persisting Inequalities: Advancing Equal Rights 
on the Basis of Race and Ethnicity 
As of 2017, 76% of constitutions guarantee equal rights before the law regardless of 
race/ethnicity. At the beginning of the constitutional era, nothing could have been 
further from the case. Through its infamous “Three-Fifths Compromise,” the U.S. 
Constitution specified that slaves were worth “three fifths of all other Persons” for 
purposes of determining states’ representation in Congress.1 Beyond sanctioning 
slavery as an institution, this and other legal provisions symbolized the dehuman-
ization of African Americans and Native Americans that characterized centuries 
of U.S. history.
Over the past 50 years, the share of constitutions guaranteeing equal rights and 
prohibiting racial discrimination has gradually increased: 49% of current consti-
tutions adopted before 1970, 78% adopted in the 1970s, 73% adopted in the 1980s, 
88% adopted in the 1990s, 89% adopted in the 2000s, and 79% adopted in 2010–17 
explicitly protect equal rights regardless of race/ethnicity.
However, far fewer protect against subtler forms of discrimination. Through-
out history, governments have enacted laws and policies that are not racially 
discriminatory on their face, but have discriminatory impacts. In the United 
States, for instance, post–Civil War poll taxes disproportionately excluded 
African Americans from voting; it is estimated that Georgia’s poll tax, enacted 
in 1871, reduced voting overall by 16–28%, and voting by black citizens by 
half.2 More recently, some evidence suggests that strict voter identification 
laws are having similar effects.3 Private employers often engage in indirect 
discrimination as well. For example, a job posting requiring a “native Eng-
lish speaker” would indirectly discriminate against a fully bilingual candidate 
whose first language was not English. This example also illustrates how lan-
guage discrimination often intersects with discrimination on the basis of race/
ethnicity, national origin, or migration status. Yet just 45% of constitutions pro-
tect against language discrimination, while a mere 5% protect against indirect 
racial/ethnic discrimination.
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Racial/ethnic discrimination is also not solvable without addressing discrimi-
nation based on SES. Across countries, centuries of racial/ethnic segregation, bans, 
barriers, and discrimination have left racial/ethnic minorities and marginalized 
groups with a far greater likelihood of living in poverty than majority populations. 
In Australia, 19.3% of indigenous households fall below the poverty line, compared 
to 12.4% of other Australians.4 In the United States, poverty rates among the black 
and Hispanic populations are 22% and 20%, respectively, compared to 9% among 
white Americans.5
Moreover, studies have demonstrated that while there is independent discrimi-
nation based on race/ethnicity and social class, simultaneous discrimination places 
many people in greater jeopardy. As one simple example, a U.S. study involved 
responding to job openings by submitting CVs, identical but for applicant names 
and addresses, to see who would be invited to interview. Applicants with names 
that were more prevalent among African Americans were far less likely to receive 
invitations; their odds decreased even further when their addresses indicated low-
income neighborhoods.6 The same occurred in India where names on the CVs 
represented both caste or social class and the likelihood of darker skin color.7 Yet, 
while 76% of constitutions guarantee equal rights across race/ethnicity, only 59% 
protect against class-based discrimination.
In nearly one-quarter of countries, the first step must be enacting an explicit 
protection of equal rights on the basis of race/ethnicity; a constitutional equal 
rights guarantee provides a foundation for challenging a wide range of discrimi-
natory laws and practices. Moreover, a clear protection of equal rights for people 
of all racial/ethnic backgrounds represents an important rebuke of the history of 
constitutions that excluded racial/ethnic minorities from full citizenship.
For the 146 countries that already protect equal rights regardless of race/eth-
nicity, addressing the ways that racial/ethnic discrimination often overlaps and 
intersects with class discrimination would strengthen these approaches. Likewise, 
prohibiting indirect discrimination would allow for the identification of policies 
and practices that disproportionately affect specific groups, and various countries’ 
courts have shown it is feasible to evaluate these policies with nuance. Currently, 
however, just nine countries address indirect racial/ethnic discrimination. Finally, 
just a handful of countries explicitly address segregation. While it is now broadly 
recognized that “separate but equal” is not equal at all, the legacy of racial/eth-
nic discrimination in the law, including its impacts on economic inequality, has 
perpetuated segregation in practice. Including a commitment to desegregation in 
constitutions could spur governments to take more proactive steps.
Why Addressing Gender Equality Is Foundational
The history of legal discrimination based on gender is millennia old. Throughout 
much of recorded history, women have been banned from voting and holding 
office, owning property, and performing many jobs. Yet equal rights for women 
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in constitutions have dramatically transformed over the past 50 years. Among 
constitutions enacted before the 1970s—the decade of the adoption of the Con-
vention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women 
(CEDAW)—just 54% guarantee equal rights regardless of sex; among constitu-
tions adopted each decade after the 1970s, at least nine out of ten consistently 
include these protections.
And yet gender inequality remains profound around the world, with high costs 
to all.8 While countries nearly universally guarantee equal civil and political rights 
for women, a huge gap lies in addressing economic equality. Women’s wages still 
fall far behind men’s, with women globally earning 24% less than men.9 The World 
Economic Forum’s 2017 Global Gender Gap report showed that the economic gap 
between men and women had in fact widened rather than narrowed over the pre-
ceding 12 months, and that closing it would take 217 more years.10
These gaps are due to both discrimination in workplaces and disadvantages 
that surface much earlier in life. Despite progress, girls remain less likely to get 
an education: across low-income countries, just 66 girls finish secondary school 
for every 100 boys.11 Yet when education is free and discrimination banned, this 
gap closes.
Clearly, discrimination and unnecessary obstacles deeply diminish girls’ and 
women’s hopes, opportunities, and life experiences. Equally clearly, research 
reveals profound costs to whole economies. Strengthening women’s legal rights 
has been associated with higher labor force participation by women, which in turn 
boosts national GDP.12 Indeed, increasing women’s labor force participation to its 
full potential would boost annual GDP in 2025 by $2.9 trillion in India and $4.2 
trillion in China.13 Even smaller increases would be transformative. For example, 
if women’s labor force participation across the United States matched that of the 
highest-performing U.S. state, national GDP would rise $2.1 trillion over the same 
time period.14 Similarly, according to the International Labour Organization, clos-
ing the gender gap in labor force participation by just 25% by 2025 could increase 
global GDP by $5.3 trillion.15
Moreover, the extent to which countries address whether differences between 
men and women that are irrelevant to the job lead to exclusion in employment has 
varied widely. When jobs unnecessarily require individuals to be a certain height, 
more women are excluded. This form of “indirect discrimination” is covered in 
only 5% of constitutions. When countries allow employers to fire on the basis of 
pregnancy or childbearing, this affects only women. Ensuring an equal playing 
field requires recognizing, appreciating, and adapting to these differences, rather 
than allowing them to provide bases for discrimination.
For the 28 countries that have yet to enact a gender-specific constitutional 
equality provision, doing so should be a priority. This includes some of the old-
est constitutions, which were adopted at a time when women’s equal rights were 
largely ignored.
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There is no reason that older constitutions cannot be amended to explicitly 
guarantee gender equality; Luxembourg’s 2006 revision of its 1868 constitu-
tion provides a prime example. After seven years of active efforts, the legislature 
adopted new language: “Women and men are equal in rights and duties. The 
State must actively promote the elimination of any existing obstacles to equality 
between women and men.”16 The reform process was accelerated by international 
commitments; early drafts of the provision borrowed language from the Treaty 
on European Union.17 In addition, during its presentations to the CEDAW com-
mittee, delegates from other countries urged Luxembourg to hasten its reform 
process to ensure that the constitution aligned with Luxembourg’s international 
treaty commitments.18
In the United States, the revived fight to adopt the Equal Rights Amendment 
(ERA) has likewise recognized the power of globally contextualizing one’s consti-
tution. In a 2018 op-ed, a leading ERA advocate noted that gender equality provi-
sions are “enshrined in most constitutions around the world, and our government 
has insisted that an equal rights provision be included in the constitutions of other 
countries, such as Iraq and Afghanistan. Yet this same provision is missing from 
our own.”19 Amending centuries-old documents takes political will, and people 
who want to realize this change in their constitutions must demand their policy-
makers take action.
For the countries that already have gender-specific protections, in many, they 
could be strengthened. Most critically, the 14 countries that guarantee gender equal-
ity but allow customary or religious law to take precedence over the constitution, 
including when they do not provide women with equal rights, should remove these 
exceptions. Countries can also strengthen their constitutions by clearly protecting 
against indirect gender discrimination—an approach that is missing from 184 consti-
tutions globally. Similarly, protections against pregnancy, marital, and family status 
discrimination are critical if constitutions are to address some of the most common 
forms of discrimination that women face in schools, workplaces, and elsewhere. One 
hundred eighty-two constitutions have yet to prohibit pregnancy discrimination, 
while 175 are lacking protections against marital or family discrimination.
Finally, constitutions can more comprehensively protect against discrimination 
by guaranteeing equal rights regardless of both sex and gender. While most con-
stitutions use the word “sex,” including “gender” as well provides a stronger foun-
dation for addressing discrimination against people whose appearance, speech, 
or behavior does not conform to societal expectations of stereotypical male and 
female roles and characteristics.
One in Thirty: Protecting Fundamental Rights for the World’s 
Migrants and Refugees
At the time of the drafting of the U.S. and French constitutions, two eighteenth-
century documents that so many countries emulated, movement across vast 
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territories and international migration were far more limited. Traveling across the 
United States took months. No easy routes connected North Africa and France. 
And even once long-distance journeys became more feasible, discrimination 
erected high barriers to naturalization, as illustrated acutely when people from 
China immigrated to California to work in the nineteenth century.
International agreements on the rights of all people grew in number and 
strength in the twentieth century at the same time that migration for all rea-
sons—economic security, persecution and war, and environmental catastrophes—
increased. These included a binding convention specifically on refugees’ rights, 
which has 145 states parties, alongside a treaty on the rights of migrant workers 
and their families, ratified by 51 countries.
These treaties make clear that refugees and migrants do not relinquish their 
most fundamental rights upon crossing the border. Specifically, migrant workers’ 
children must have equal access to education as citizens, regardless of their par-
ents’ immigration status. Likewise, both agreements protect migrants’ and refu-
gees’ equal access to health services. With respect to work, the Refugee Conven-
tion guarantees that “lawfully staying” refugees—i.e., those who have registered 
with their host countries’ governments—are accorded the same rights to decent 
working conditions that are granted to citizens. Similarly, the Migrant Workers 
Convention guarantees that migrant workers receive treatment equal to that of 
citizens with respect to pay and working conditions.
Yet countries’ constitutions have clearly not caught up. Less than one in 
five guarantee the right to education for noncitizen children. Less than one 
in six guarantee access to health, while one in five guarantee nondiscrimina-
tion at work. This not only leaves migrants behind, but also leaves the 10 mil-
lion people who find themselves stateless deeply vulnerable to discrimination and 
exclusion across countries.
Further, even today, racism and religious discrimination infuse immigration 
policy—a fact laid bare by the Trump administration’s so-called “Muslim ban,” 
as well as wide-ranging countries’ discriminatory actions over the past five years. 
In Australia, thousands of refugees and asylum seekers from Asia and the Middle 
East have been relegated to remote detention centers, drawing comparisons to a 
set of laws and policies, in place until 1973, that the Australian government later 
referred to as the “White Australia” policy.20 Denmark’s government has officially 
designated 25 low-income, predominantly Muslim immigrant neighborhoods as 
“ghettos”; beginning at age one, children in these neighborhoods are required to 
separate from their parents to participate in 25 hours of mandatory instruction in 
“Danish values” weekly.21
The civil and political rights of racial/ethnic minorities who are citizens are far 
closer to equal in 2018 than they were in 1970. Yet immigration policies designed 
to limit racial/ethnic minority populations’ growth, and to restrict the rights and 
success of migrants who are already within country borders, are widespread. Only 
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one in four constitutions explicitly prohibit discrimination against foreign citizens 
without exceptions. For the 151 that do not, banning both discrimination against 
refugees and migrants and racial/ethnic discrimination must be a priority for 
ensuring countries do not use race/ethnicity as a criterion for deciding who stays 
and who goes.
Among the 42 countries that guarantee migrants’ rights within their broad 
equal rights provisions, 19 could further strengthen migrants’ and refugees’ ability 
to integrate into new communities and meet their basic needs by ensuring decent 
working conditions and specific protections from discrimination in education and 
health. These protections would also better align many countries’ constitutions 
with their commitments under international human rights treaties.
Negotiating the Balance of Religious Freedom and Equal Rights
Ensuring equal rights for all regardless of religion, belief, or nonbelief comes down 
to a few principles. First, governments should avoid privileging one religion over 
other religions, beliefs, or nonbeliefs. Second, governments should ensure strong 
protections against religious discrimination. And finally, the state should protect 
freedom of religion for all, up to the point that religious practice conflicts with 
other people’s fundamental rights.
Constitutions are often countries’ key instruments for defining the relation-
ship between religion and government—and constitutions around the world have 
shown it is possible to address all the elements that advance equality. Globally, 14 
constitutions take an approach to each of the following: nondiscrimination on the 
basis of religion; freedom of religion, belief, and nonbelief; limitations on religious 
practice to protect the rights of others; and no implicit or explicit state privileging 
of religion.
Many more countries have achieved at least part of this vision. Forty-one per-
cent of constitutions have language committing to the separation of religion and 
state. Ninety-five percent address freedom of religion, including 41% describing 
themselves as secular. Likewise, 25% protect the freedom to not believe, including 
21% with no state religion or affiliation with a specific religious tradition. Seventy-
eight percent of constitutions explicitly guarantee equality and nondiscrimination 
based on religion or belief, including 92% of those adopted in 2010–17. Forty-six 
percent of countries note that religious conduct may be limited when it infringes 
the rights of others.
We also know that religious practice can thrive when these principles are in 
place and respected. Every major religion can be found thriving in countries that 
separate religion and state and protect freedom of religion. Further, studies have 
shown that religious practice fares better in these settings. Countries that protect 
freedom of religion and have no state religion are less likely to have discrimina-
tory laws that privilege one faith over another, and likelier to support the regular 
practice of religion.
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At the same time, we have a long way to go to ensure that religious freedom 
and equality are realized in all countries. Moreover, some evidence indicates gov-
ernments are becoming more religious, not less, with potential consequences for 
equality. While constitutions adopted in 2000–2017 are likelier than those adopted 
before 1970 to identify as secular and have no role for religion (38% compared to 
20%), there has also been an increase in established state religions that govern 
public as well as private life. Among constitutions adopted before 2000, only 7% 
established a state religion with control over public life, compared to 26% of those 
adopted in 2000–2009 and 21% adopted in 2010–17.
Overall, 31 countries currently have constitutional provisions limiting equal 
rights for minority religions. In some, minority religions face unique and explicit 
restrictions on religious practice. In others, a single religion forms the basis for 
governance in public and/or family life. Additionally, eight constitutions allow 
religious law to fully or partly take precedence over the constitution, potentially 
threatening equal rights not only across religions but on the basis of gender, sexual 
orientation, race/ethnicity, and other aspects of identity.
Further, among countries that identify as “secular,” nearly half nevertheless 
privilege one religion in other parts of the text. While many of these references 
likely have more symbolic value than explicit impacts on equal rights, they matter 
as statements of norms. Especially in an era of growing religious diversity, indirect 
indications that people of a particular religion or heritage are more welcome than 
others can undermine full equality.
Given the history of religion-based genocides and massacres, we should all 
recognize the importance of moving equality forward. It is this history that cata-
lyzed the development of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) 
and subsequent agreements, including the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights, that clearly protect nondiscrimination on the basis 
of religion, freedom of belief, and the freedom to practice, subject to others’ fun-
damental rights. The agreements also protect the rights to change religions or 
forego religion entirely, recognizing that the rights to believe and not believe are 
two halves of a whole. Most fundamentally, equality across religions and beliefs 
is about the freedom of thought, which is core to human experience around 
the world.
The coming decades will likely bring many more constitutional drafting and 
amendment processes in which the role of religion will be a key issue. Throughout 
these processes, participants should return to these foundational human rights 
principles and areas of global consensus as a framework for taking action.
Moving Forward in the Face of Backlash: Equal Rights Regardless of 
Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity
Of all the groups we have studied, the LGBT+ community has received the fewest 
protections from discrimination in national constitutions. Only 11 constitutions 
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explicitly protect equal rights on the basis of sexual orientation, while just six also 
cover gender identity.
Over the past century, constitutional trends have overwhelmingly reflected 
progress toward equal rights for most groups. With each decade, new constitu-
tions have been increasingly likely to recognize each person’s equal worth and 
humanity regardless of gender, race/ethnicity, religion, or disability. Likewise, 
older constitutions have adopted amendments recognizing the equality of people 
of every religion, of men and women, of all racial/ethnic groups, and with and 
without disabilities.
Recognition of equality across religions began in the mid-1800s, followed 
quickly by recognition across race/ethnicity. It was not until the early 1900s that 
equal rights for women began to receive recognition, and these equal rights were 
protected in a minority of constitutions until the 1960s. Protections for persons 
with disabilities did not emerge until the 1980s.22 The vast majority of these protec-
tions were introduced when new constitutions were adopted, but countries with 
older constitutions, including Belgium, Chile, France, Greece, Haiti, Luxembourg, 
Mexico, and Panama, have strengthened equal rights for all through amendments.
But there has not been clear momentum for two groups: migrants and LGBT+ 
individuals. Even worse, for one group, the rate of constitutions’ denial of equal 
rights has kept pace with protections: although 6% of constitutions now guarantee 
equal rights regardless of sexual orientation, another 6%, all adopted or amended 
since 2000, explicitly prohibit same-sex marriage or allow legislation to do so.
Among the countries where constitutions have guaranteed equal rights on the 
basis of sexual orientation and/or gender identity (SOGI), public recognition of 
equality has begun to change. In Mexico, where the constitution newly protected 
equal rights regardless of sexual orientation through a 2011 amendment, support 
for same-sex marriage more than doubled from 2000 to 2016.23 In South Africa, 
37% of people agreed or strongly agreed that same-sex marriage should be legal 
in 2015, compared to just 14% in 2012; meanwhile, twice as many South Africans 
believe the constitution should retain its equal rights provision on the basis of 
sexual orientation as believe it should be removed.24
Cases in these countries and others with explicit protections have led to impor-
tant steps forward, while broad equal rights provisions have provided foundations 
in some countries without explicit guarantees. Still, at both the national and inter-
national levels, much remains to be done to ensure that equal rights on the basis 
of SOGI are fully protected.
With respect to constitutional protections, the next steps are clear. In 182 
countries, newly establishing equal rights on the basis of sexual orientation in 
the constitution would represent a profound step forward for equality, which 
could provide the foundation for overturning discriminatory laws and enacting 
new legislation to ensure comprehensive protections for equality in every sphere. 
Likewise, in 187 countries, extending protections to gender identity would be 
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transformative. Countries should also reform how they describe the right to marry 
specifically, beginning with the 12 countries that explicitly deny or allow the denial 
of the right to same-sex marriage. Likewise, the 16 countries that limit constitu-
tional marriage rights to a man and a woman—language that in some countries is 
a historical holdover, in others a more recent and intentional effort to limit LGBT+ 
rights—should revise this language to make marriage everyone’s right. Countries 
should also ensure these provisions do not contradict one another. While it is not 
unusual for countries to experience piecemeal progress toward equality, simulta-
neously guaranteeing equal rights on the basis of sexual orientation and prohibit-
ing same-sex marriage is an inherent inconsistency that can undermine constitu-
tions’ broader legitimacy. Finally, a global treaty specifically protecting the rights 
of the LGBT+ population is long overdue, and would strengthen efforts to pass 
critical reforms at the national level.
From Nondiscrimination to Full Inclusion: Guaranteeing the Equal 
Rights of People with Disabilities
People with disabilities are the largest group in the world whose equal rights are 
ignored. An estimated one billion people, or 15% of the global population, live with 
disabilities. Yet only a minority of constitutions, 27%, explicitly protect equal rights 
on the basis of disability, and protections in key areas of life are scarce. Less than 
one in five constitutions explicitly guarantee a right to education for children with 
disabilities. Healthcare is essential to all but particularly to the quality of life of 
people with disabilities, yet less than one in five countries guarantees the right to 
health services for children and adults with disabilities. The situation is worse with 
regard to work, where only one in nine countries guarantees nondiscrimination.
True equal rights must include nonsegregation. We have long since stopped 
accepting the legal segregation of neighborhoods or schools on the basis of 
race/ethnicity. Yet far too many countries segregate children with disabilities in 
school, implying that they are different, preventing relationships from forming, 
and implicitly supporting bias about abilities and value from the earliest ages. Just 
seven of the world’s constitutions include commitments to integration of students 
with disabilities; in most, these commitments fall short of full inclusion. In some 
cases, the segregation of children with disabilities may also reinforce racial/ethnic 
segregation, as discrimination contributes to a higher proportion of children from 
marginalized racial/ethnic groups being designated as disabled.25
Nevertheless, the progress in recent decades, and in particular since the adop-
tion of the Convention of the Rights of People with Disabilities (CRPD) in 2006, 
is encouraging. Only 12% of constitutions adopted before 1970 explicitly protect 
equal rights for people with disabilities; among those adopted between 2010 and 
2017, 71% do.
Many of the CRPD’s fundamental commitments, including inclusive education 
and reasonable accommodations in employment, have also been implemented at 
the national level through legislation. For example, the Americans with Disabilities 
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Act (ADA), enacted in 1990 and strengthened in 2008, provides comprehensive 
standards for how workplaces, schools, public transportation, hotels, stores, and 
restaurants must ensure accessibility for people with disabilities. Also in 1990, 
Congress passed the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, which addressed 
inclusive education in detail. Over the past several decades, many countries have 
enacted similar laws.
Yet in many countries, laws are much easier to amend or repeal than constitu-
tional provisions. In the United States, the ADA has been relentlessly attacked in 
recent years, while shifts on the Supreme Court may further weaken the extent to 
which persons with disabilities are interpreted as being covered by the constitu-
tion’s general equality clause.26 While ordinary laws may be the best vehicles for 
spelling out the details of standards like reasonable accommodation and inclusive 
education, enshrining these same principles explicitly in constitutions can guard 
against efforts to dismantle legislative protections, while importantly supporting 
shifts in norms and ensuring basic rights do not erode as the top court’s compo-
sition evolves. In this way, laws and constitutions play complementary roles in 
establishing rights and ensuring their enforcement.
For most—141—of the world’s countries, explicitly prohibiting discrimination 
on the basis of disability in the constitution would be a powerful step forward for 
equal rights. Additionally, 78 countries need to eliminate their constitutional pro-
visions explicitly restricting rights on the basis of disability; many more need to 
eliminate outdated language and conceptions of disability.
For the 23 countries that broadly guarantee equality for people with disabilities 
but do not address specific rights, explicit protections against discrimination in 
education, health, and work—including guarantees of reasonable accommodation 
in employment and inclusive classrooms—would strengthen constitutional sup-
port for equality.
Ensuring Rights and Full Participation Regardless of Social 
and Economic Position
Among some of the world’s first constitutions, socioeconomic status (SES), and 
particularly property ownership, dictated whether individuals had access to full 
citizenship and all associated rights. In 1948, the UDHR proclaimed that fun-
damental rights and liberties were guaranteed to all, regardless of “social origin, 
property, birth or other status.” Today, however, even as most societies have aban-
doned rigid social class distinctions, SES discrimination persists. People whose 
names, appearance, or accents suggest lower-SES backgrounds commonly face 
discrimination in employment, while poverty more broadly remains stigmatized.
Yet beyond these forms of SES discrimination targeting individuals, when basic 
healthcare or public education are available only to those with financial resources, 
these barriers sharply undermine equal opportunity on a broad scale. There is 
no way a child born into an environment where families cannot afford to send 
children to school would have the same opportunity as a child born into a wealthy 
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home where the cost of education is no barrier—unless there is a guarantee of free 
education. Clearly, even then, wealth is likely to lead to substantial disparities, but 
their impact and insurmountability are markedly reduced by the guarantee to all 
of an affordable quality education.
Compared to other areas of equal rights, relatively few constitutions, 59%, pro-
hibit SES discrimination. At the same time, these protections appear in 83% of the 
constitutions adopted in 2010–17. Where it is not included explicitly in the consti-
tution, some courts, including the U.S. Supreme Court, have held that this type of 
discrimination receives no special protection.
To better support equal opportunity, the 79 countries that have yet to enact 
constitutional protections on the basis of SES should do so. Beyond guarantees of 
nondiscrimination, these protections can include guarantees of access to educa-
tion and healthcare regardless of income. For example, one in ten constitutions 
guarantee free medical care for all, while 6% guarantee the right to medical ser-
vices specifically for low-income adults and children. In one-third of countries, 
the constitution guarantees that secondary education will be tuition-free. These 
are important initial steps for creating an equal playing field.
CROSS-CUT TING ISSUES FOR EQUAL RIGHT S
Across Part One of this book, some common themes emerged. While explicit 
protections of equal rights have generally grown for each of the characteristics 
we examined, none receives protection in all the world’s constitutions, and case 
law has underscored how these omissions matter. In 2013, India’s lack of constitu-
tional protection against discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation led the 
Supreme Court to reinstate a 153-year-old law criminalizing same-sex relation-
ships—a decision that was only overturned five years later based on an expansive 
reading of the right to privacy and the general equality clause. In the United States, 
the failure to specifically prohibit SES discrimination led the Court to uphold 
school financing policies that provided public schools in the poorest neighbor-
hoods with the fewest resources. Although general equal rights protections have 
produced some transformative victories, their coverage is unpredictable and, in 
some countries, subject to the interpretations of a handful of judges.
In addition, even when countries have enacted explicit protections, some 
broader considerations arise about their scope and potential for impact. For exam-
ple, what about discrimination bridging multiple characteristics? What about dis-
crimination by private-sector employers or private service providers? And if we 
aim to advance equality not just on paper but in practice, when is prohibiting 
discrimination inadequate?
Intersectionality
One challenge for constitutional drafters is whether constitutions and courts can 
effectively address situations where different types of discrimination intersect and 
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overlap. Facets of our identities do not work in isolation; in moving through the 
world and interacting with institutions and each other, we cannot always separate 
discrimination based on gender, race/ethnicity, disability, and other characteris-
tics. Yet in the law, these bases of discrimination are generally understood as dis-
crete categories, which often oversimplifies lived experiences of bias and creates a 
barrier to justice.
For example, if an employer terminates all black female employees but all 
the black men and white women keep their jobs, a court may find that the fired 
employees cannot statistically prove either racial discrimination or gender dis-
crimination—even when both are at work. In her seminal article on intersec-
tionality, legal scholar Kimberlé Crenshaw examined a real case involving exactly 
these facts, DeGraffenreid v. General Motors, in which a district court dismissed 
five black women’s lawsuit against General Motors, finding that “this lawsuit must 
be examined to see if it states a cause of action for race discrimination, sex dis-
crimination, or alternatively either, but not a combination of both.”27 As Crenshaw 
observed, the case revealed how under employment discrimination law, “[b]lack 
women are protected only to the extent that their experiences coincide with those 
of [white women and black men].”28
Although few constitutions explicitly address intersectionality or related con-
cepts like “multiple” or “cumulative” discrimination, these ideas are receiving 
greater attention by constitutional courts and the legal community at large—and 
are increasingly making their way into law.29 For example, Spain’s Law 3/2007 on 
Effective Equality between Women and Men calls for particular attention to “cases 
of double discrimination and to the particular difficulties that women face when 
in a situation of vulnerability, like women belonging to a minority, migrant women 
and women with disabilities.”30 Similarly, in a decision about the rights of Aborigi-
nal women, Canada’s highest court reasoned that it was essential to “recognize that 
personal characteristics may overlap or intersect (such as race, band membership, 
and place of residence in this case), and to reflect changing social phenomena 
or new or different forms of stereotyping or prejudice.”31 As courts and constitu-
tion drafters continue to wrestle with how to address all forms of discrimination, 
understanding and identifying strategies to tackle the ways that different forms of 
bias intersect will be crucial.
Affirmative Measures
As explored in detail in chapter 2, constitutional provisions that leave the door 
open to affirmative measures can provide legislatures with important flexibility to 
address past discrimination, whether on the basis of race/ethnicity, gender, SES, 
or other grounds. Without acknowledging and addressing the historic policies and 
practices that led to inequality in the present, there is no way to fully advance 
equality in the future. A common metaphor illustrates the point clearly: two adults 
do not have the same chance of crossing a finish line within seven or eight min-
utes if one begins a half-mile away and the other begins three miles away. In other 
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words, equal rights alone do not address disadvantages that preceded the compe-
tition or a chance to excel; equal rights alone do not address ongoing sources of 
disadvantage. Affirmative measures can play important roles in addressing past 
exclusion and discrimination.
Constitutions should ensure that courts do not automatically consider tak-
ing past discrimination into account an equal rights violation; in fact, doing so is 
often central to advancing equality in practice. Globally, one in six constitutions 
expressly permit affirmative measures to address histories of discrimination and 
advance equal rights on the basis of race/ethnicity, as do one in four on the basis 
of gender.
While policymakers in many countries have struggled with how to most effec-
tively design affirmative measures, experiences from various national settings have 
offered insights into promising approaches. Considering experiences of discrimi-
nation and disadvantage as part of a holistic evaluation, committing to periodic 
reviews of how policies are working, and targeting the economic and exclusion-
ary impacts of past discrimination can both advance restorative justice and foster 
more inclusive and representative institutions, with benefits for everyone.
The importance of an intersectional lens also extends to affirmative measures. 
For example, across numerous countries, past and ongoing racial/ethnic discrim-
ination has created an unequal playing field. Without taking SES into account, 
though, affirmative measures might primarily benefit individuals who are better 
off financially and were able to attend better-funded schools, faced fewer financial 
responsibilities as youth, and had other resource advantages. The issue is not about 
addressing race, ethnicity, or class—racial/ethnic discrimination and its conse-
quences cut across income levels—but about addressing them together. This also 
better positions courts and policymakers to focus their efforts on those who have 
faced the greatest consequences of past discrimination.
Reaching Discrimination in the Private Sphere
The oldest constitutional protections against discrimination applied only to the 
government, or to individuals or institutions acting on its behalf. However, pri-
vate-sector discrimination, both explicit and implicit, substantially contributes 
to group-based economic disparities and gaps in opportunities. In Brazil, black 
workers’ average wages are half those of their white counterparts.32 In Canada, 
native-born “visible minorities” are lower-paid than white Canadians in private-
sector jobs, even though earnings are closer to equal in the public sector. For 
example, controlling for sociodemographic and human capital variables, black 
men in private-sector jobs earn 16% less than their white male colleagues.33
In recent years, however, a growing number of countries have begun explor-
ing ways to hold private workplaces accountable under their constitutions. Some 
countries have done this directly through their constitutional texts. For example, 
Bolivia’s constitution provides: “The State shall . . . guarantee [women] the same 
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remuneration as men for work of equal value, both in the public and private 
arena.”34 Others, such as Colombia, have developed judicial doctrines and proce-
dures that allow individuals to enforce their equal rights against private employers 
and individuals. In Uganda, the Bill of Rights is expressly applicable against non-
state actors.35 While an expansion on the original role of constitutions, address-
ing private-sector discrimination is integral to the state’s responsibility to respect, 
protect, and fulfill fundamental human rights.
Nondiscrimination and Leveling Up
Constitutions can also help address private-sector employment inequalities by 
ensuring that all children, regardless of race/ethnicity, gender, SES, or other fac-
tors, have access to a high-quality education, including university, before entering 
the labor market—an aspect of equal rights that too many countries continue to 
neglect, despite seminal cases like Brown v. Board of Education condemning racial 
inequality in the classroom. This example also underscores the important relation-
ship between nondiscrimination and social and economic rights, and why protect-
ing both is important to substantive equality and “leveling up.”
For example, if governments respond to prohibitions of racial/ethnic discrimina-
tion in education by simply defunding public education rather than desegregating 
school systems, we have not advanced equality. In the early 1960s, these exact cir-
cumstances unfolded in Prince Edward County, Virginia, resulting in nearly 2,000 
black students going without public education after a state senator called for “mas-
sive resistance” to the Brown ruling.36 It was not until a 1964 Supreme Court decision, 
which found that the students were being denied “their constitutional rights to an 
education equal to that afforded by the public schools in the other parts of Virginia,” 
that the county was ordered to reopen—and integrate—its public schools.37
Unfortunately, the “right to education” in the United States—which is not 
explicitly protected by the constitution—would not prove to be durable, as detailed 
in chapter 9. But as the story of the Prince Edward schools underscores, the right 
to nondiscrimination can only do so much if the government refuses to provide 
essential public services that are foundational to equal opportunity.
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS: 
SO CIAL AND EC ONOMIC RIGHT S
In Part Two of this book, we move from nondiscrimination to social and eco-
nomic rights. Yet although the book’s first and second parts address different types 
of rights, they are deeply intertwined, as the previous section began to elucidate. 
There is simply no way to achieve equal opportunity without ensuring all people 
are meeting their basic needs. There is no way two children can have equal oppor-
tunities to succeed in school if one is undernourished, arrives hungry, is preoc-
cupied all day by that hunger, and leaves the same. We know this from common 
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sense, and from studies demonstrating how much better low-income children per-
form in school when provided with food. Likewise, there is no way two adults can 
have equal opportunities to succeed at work or in a profession if one has received 
extensive education and training and the other has not.
By removing financial barriers to decent healthcare services and an adequate 
education, while supporting the ability of families to have incomes sufficient to 
meet basic needs, we can reduce barriers to equal opportunity going forward.
The Right to Education: A Foundation for Equal Opportunities
The right to education is among the foundational social and economic rights. Edu-
cation has widespread individual benefits for income, health, employment, and 
equality, and just as substantial benefits for entire economies. Yet the history of 
groups’ exclusion from education by public and private sectors alike is long. For 
these reasons, embedding strong commitments to quality, accessible education for 
all in national constitutions is both an important safeguard for equal rights and a 
powerful basis for equal opportunities.
Globally, a majority of constitutions—83%—protect the right to education, 
including 53% that guarantee primary schools will be free. These provisions have 
played a critical role in advancing the accessibility, affordability, and quality of 
education in countries around the world. In Colombia and Swaziland, constitu-
tional protections provided the foundation for eliminating tuition fees that led to 
exclusion. In Indonesia and some U.S. states, constitutional protections for educa-
tion led to increased government funding for school systems. And in South Africa, 
constitutional education provisions helped ensure students have the books and 
desks they need to learn.
Yet with 57 million children still out of school, and persisting gaps in access 
and attainment across gender, disability, SES, and other factors, much remains to 
be done. Of the 148 countries that guarantee the right to education, many could 
strengthen their approach by expanding its scope to keep pace with evolving edu-
cation standards. Ensuring that the right to education ultimately extends from 
pre-primary to university would have a transformative impact for both individuals 
and each of our societies. The 75 countries that currently guarantee only primary 
can extend these protections to secondary, as Mexico did in 2012. Likewise, the 41 
that guarantee only primary and secondary, can consider expanding these protec-
tions to include post-secondary education and training.
Affordability is a critical barrier to educational access and attainment. The 47 
countries guaranteeing only that primary education is free can support more chil-
dren to finish their education by establishing that secondary is tuition-free as well. 
Further, to reduce disadvantages facing particular groups that have historically 
been excluded from schools and learning opportunities, countries should directly 
address equal opportunities in education; 122 countries currently take no approach 
to addressing discrimination within education specifically.
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The Right to Health: From Treatment and Care to Creating the 
Conditions for a Healthy Life
Health is foundational to full participation in society and the effective exercise 
of other fundamental rights. Around the world, constitutional protections for 
health have produced critical, wide-ranging improvements in people’s lives, from 
expanding access to lifesaving immunizations in Argentina to improving water 
and sanitation in Bangladesh to increasing access to essential medicines in Peru, 
Brazil, Costa Rica, and Kenya.
Constitution drafters have increasingly recognized the importance of address-
ing health. Just one-third of constitutions adopted before 1970 protect a right to 
health; among those adopted since 2000, 100% do. Nevertheless, there are still 
important ways to improve health rights’ potential to genuinely improve popula-
tion health.
First, ensuring that constitutions’ and courts’ approaches support prevention 
and health protection, not just treatment after people become sick, will reduce 
the incidence of illness and injuries and help ensure that resources for health 
have greater benefits for more people. Measures to make cars, buses, and other 
transportation safer can save millions of lives and prevent countless more inju-
ries. They also cost countries less than the medical care needed when injuries are 
not prevented. The same can be said for the millions of preventable deaths due 
to diarrheal disease, preventable cancer, cardiac conditions, and other causes. 
People would rather not get sick or injured in the first place—and in countless 
areas, prevention is far cheaper than treatment. At the same time, a right to med-
ical care is essential: not all illnesses can be prevented, and ensuring access to 
treatment when sick is fundamental to equal chances in school, work, family, 
and civic life.
Second, addressing the structural shortcomings of public health and medi-
cal systems—rather than solely individual claims that are symptomatic of those 
flaws—can more dramatically improve the lives of people throughout a country, 
while ensuring the courts’ continued accessibility and efficiency. If thousands of 
people are approaching the court to seek access to a specific essential medicine, 
addressing the gaps in their health insurance coverage that put those treatments 
out of reach would be a more effective and efficient approach than hearing and 
deciding on each individual claim. In countries that have a “common law” tradi-
tion, where prior court decisions are binding on future cases, a series of repetitive 
claims is less likely, although individuals may also face greater barriers to quickly 
accessing the courts when their rights are infringed. In “civil law” countries, 
these circumstances are common. However, courts in civil law countries including 
Brazil and Colombia have demonstrated the feasibility of calling for more struc-
tural solutions.
Ensuring that individuals facing the same legal issue can bring collective 
claims would advance rights on a broader scale and help prevent backlog in 
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court systems. In a range of countries, mechanisms like “public interest litiga-
tion” have allowed civil society organizations (CSOs) and public interest law-
yers to bring highly impactful cases on behalf of communities and vulnerable 
groups. Likewise, class action lawsuits have enabled large groups of people to 
claim their rights to health all at once. These collective approaches have yielded 
critical victories for child laborers in India, consumers harmed by misleading 
tobacco marketing in the United States, and people affected by industrial pollu-
tion in Bangladesh.38
For the 49 countries that do not yet have any constitutional rights to health—
or even goals of achieving it—the first step is to take an approach to supporting 
health promotion, disease and injury prevention, and medical treatment. For the 
58 countries that do address medical care but do not clearly address public health 
or preventive care, doing so could help ensure that the constitution improves the 
well-being of the largest number of people. Across countries, developing judicial 
procedures that allow individuals to approach the courts collectively, and courts 
to issue structural remedies, would further strengthen constitutional health rights’ 
potential to have a transformative impact on people’s daily lives and environments.
IS  ANYONE PL AYING BY THE RULES?
For the many countries that do have good rules on the books in at least some 
areas, is there any evidence that the constitutions matter? Our review of cases from 
around the world is encouraging. In every area, there are examples of major cases 
that have transformed whether all people are treated equally by the government, 
educational and health services, and employers. In Mexico, the Supreme Court 
was instrumental in establishing equal rights for same-sex couples in practice 
across the country, building on the constitution’s prohibition of discrimination on 
the basis of sexual orientation. In Brazil, the constitution’s commitment to inclu-
sive education prompted the Supreme Court to find that both public and private 
schools must provide a quality education to students with disabilities. The South 
African Constitutional Court’s decision enabling HIV-positive women to access 
the treatment necessary to prevent transmitting HIV to their babies, alongside 
large-scale social mobilization related to the judgment, saved hundreds of thou-
sands of lives.39 And in India, Supreme Court rulings have improved urban air 
quality and reduced children’s risk of malnutrition nationwide.
This is not to say there have not also been major cases that have been lost, where 
equality was diminished, despite the constitution’s clarity on the point. Lawyers 
and judges are human, and courts are imperfect institutions. Any lawyer, whether 
working to advance equal rights, ensure that governments honor the rights to edu-
cation and health, protect freedom of speech or association, or encourage the pur-
suit of environmentally sustainable approaches, will attest that they may lose many 
cases before winning an important one that proves transformative.
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Our review of cases also illustrates steps that can be taken to increase the like-
lihood that the values held in constitutions are not just aspirational but lead to 
improvements in peoples’ daily lives. This must include ensuring that all people 
have straightforward access to the courts and that access to lawyers is affordable. 
Reforms to the legal system to facilitate individual access must also be accom-
panied by efforts to remove more informal obstacles, such as language barriers 
and a distrust of legal institutions previously experienced as punitive rather than 
empowering.40 Beyond individuals having meaningful access, it is critically impor-
tant that individual cases can have benefits that extend beyond the individual who 
brings the case to larger groups.
An active civil society can be instrumental in ensuring that landmark court 
decisions are actually enforced. Beyond monitoring the implementation of courts’ 
specific orders, civil society groups can play a key role in building on judgments to 
enact complementary laws and policies. For example, the Right to Food campaign 
in India, a network of individuals and civil society groups across the country, has 
played a pivotal role in monitoring enforcement of a series of orders—issued by 
the Supreme Court since the “right to food” case was heard in 2001—addressing 
everything from the midday meal program for schoolchildren to a new maternity 
benefit designed to ensure mothers’ adequate nutrition.41 The campaign has also 
led the charge on complementary laws, including 2013’s National Food Security 
Act. In this way, using the constitution in court can be understood as just one piece 
of a broader strategy for advancing social change.
EVOLVING TOWARD EQUALIT Y
In some countries, constitutions embody transformative visions for building a new 
society. Such constitutions may include guarantees of equality of opportunity that 
exceed the on-the-ground reality at their time of passage. Other countries have 
centuries-old constitutions whose core provisions are outdated. In both cases, 
time and civic engagement will determine whether the constitution will make a 
meaningful difference for equality. In countries with transformative constitutions, 
the critical challenge will be implementing and realizing their promises to enable 
the constitutional visions to reach alignment with lived experiences. In countries 
with much older constitutions, the challenge will be amending the text to ensure 
interpretations keep pace with contemporary needs and appreciation of equality.
South Africa: Realizing a Transformative Vision
South Africa’s constitution, which provides an example of the former, was written 
at a critical period. In the midst of leaving the system of apartheid behind, the 
majority of people in South Africa were acutely aware of the importance of guar-
anteeing equal rights to all. The soon-to-be first president, Nelson Mandela, was 
committed to every minority group having equal rights, even the white Afrikaner 
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minority who had developed the system of race-based segregation and oppression. 
Leaders argued passionately that equal rights would truly be achieved for the large 
black South African majority who had been denied access to education and health 
only if the rights to education and health were enshrined in the constitution. As a 
result, South Africa’s constitution embodies an extraordinary vision.
Realizing that vision will take time. Vast educational, housing, health, and 
economic disparities are not overcome overnight. The Constitutional Court is 
constrained in the pace at which it can demand change in the spheres of educa-
tion, health, and housing, which require substantial budgets. Predictably, given 
the historical context, full participation in the political system is still emerging. In 
most countries, democratic institutions take years to fully and successfully emerge 
when they have previously been suppressed.
Still, the South African Constitution’s accomplishments are truly remarkable. 
In addition to taking a major stride forward on preventing mother-to-child HIV 
transmission, the Constitutional Court has served as a global example in other 
areas of equal rights. In a 1994 case based on the interim constitution, the Court’s 
ruling that asylum seekers could not be excluded from receiving public educa-
tion or seeking work is estimated to have impacted over 50,000 individuals, all of 
whom were socioeconomically disadvantaged.42 In a series of rulings on educa-
tion, the Court has strengthened the constitutional commitment to quality, inclu-
sive education for all students, and the end of segregation. And its 2005 ruling 
on same-sex marriage made South Africa the first African country to guarantee 
marriage equality.
United States: Cultivating Protections for Equality over Time
Similarly, though its constitution is centuries older, realizing equal constitutional 
rights in the United States has been a long—and ongoing—process. As drafted 
exclusively by a group of white, male property owners in the eighteenth century, 
the U.S. Constitution guaranteed rights to the few, not the many. Following the 
Civil War, the constitution’s potential to advance equality increased immensely, 
with the Thirteenth Amendment’s prohibition of slavery, the Fourteenth Amend-
ment’s establishment of the Equal Protection Clause, and the Fifteenth Amend-
ment’s extension of the right to vote to freed male slaves.
These provisions took on new life during the Civil Rights Movement, providing 
tools for dismantling Jim Crow and dispensing with the idea that “separate but 
equal” could be compatible with true equality. In Brown v. Board of Education, the 
Supreme Court ruled in 1954 that segregated public schools were unconstitutional. 
That same year, the Court ruled for the first time, in Hernandez v. Texas, that the 
Equal Protection Clause applied to Mexican Americans, reasoning that it should 
extend beyond distinctions between white and black Americans to any instance in 
which a particular group of people was singled out for differential treatment. In 
1960, the Court held in Gomillion v. Lightfoot that the redrawing of city boundaries 
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in Tuskegee, Alabama, into a 28-sided shape that would exclude virtually all black 
voters was unconstitutional under the Fifteenth Amendment. And in 1967, in Lov-
ing v. Virginia, the Court found that state laws prohibiting interracial marriage 
violated the Equal Protection Clause.
Civil rights lawyers also drew on both the Fourteenth Amendment and other 
constitutional provisions to expand the reach of antidiscrimination laws to the pri-
vate sphere. In Shelley v. Kraemer, in 1948, the Supreme Court held that the Equal 
Protection Clause prohibited the enforcement of real estate covenants that banned 
black people from purchasing homes. Even though the constitution did not apply 
to private contracts, the Court ruled, courts’ enforcement of discriminatory con-
tracts would amount to “state action” prohibited by the Fourteenth Amendment. 
In 1964, the Court ruled in Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States that the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964, which prohibited discrimination by privately owned hotels, 
restaurants, and other public accommodations, was a valid exercise of Congress’s 
constitutional authority to regulate interstate commerce. The Court reached the 
same conclusion in Katzenbach v. McClung, ruling against an Alabama restaurant 
owner who refused to serve black customers, arguing that the Civil Rights Act 
was unconstitutional.
Despite generations of progress, however, the U.S. has far to go toward real-
izing the ideals that many Americans believe the constitution represents. While 
the Equal Protection Clause was a critical step forward, courts and legislatures 
have still done too little to address the enduring economic impacts of centuries of 
racial exclusion created by law. For nearly four decades, an amendment to guar-
antee equal rights to women has languished in the state legislatures, although its 
momentum began rebuilding in 2017. While court rulings and legislative reforms 
have critically advanced equal rights for people with disabilities and the LGBT+ 
community, the lack of explicit protections for either group in the constitution 
puts rights at risk as politics shift and the Supreme Court’s composition evolves. 
The U.S. Constitution is also now one of the few in the world that fail to guarantee 
fundamental social and economic rights, and vast inequalities in access to quality 
education and healthcare underscore the consequences of this neglect.
Across constitutions new and old, fully realizing rights takes time. It also takes 
continued engagement by people who care about ensuring that their constitution 
genuinely reflects our shared values and priorities. But when these rights on paper 




Each of Us, All of Us
Taking Action to Strengthen Rights Globally
Expressed in our living rooms and around our kitchen tables, these are rules that 
most of us teach our children: that everyone should be treated fairly, and that we 
all have a responsibility to one another. The inherent dignity and worth of every 
human being represent widely shared values. In 57 of the 60 countries covered by 
the World Values Survey, a majority of respondents said that it is especially impor-
tant that children learn tolerance and respect for other people. Likewise, in 58 of 
the countries, large and often overwhelming majorities of respondents indicated it 
was important to them to do something for the good of society.1
These values did not originate in a single region but span countries and con-
tinents, and give shape to the agreements that have been reached globally by the 
United Nations. Consistently and comprehensively, these treaties speak to the fun-
damental value of every person. The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms 
of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), ratified by 189 countries, asks every 
government to recognize that “discrimination against women violates the prin-
ciples of equality of rights and respect for human dignity, is an obstacle to the par-
ticipation of women, on equal terms with men, in the political, social, economic 
and cultural life of their countries, hampers the growth of the prosperity of society 
and the family and makes more difficult the full development of the potentialities 
of women in the service of their countries and of humanity.”2
Similarly, the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Racial Discrimination, with 179 states parties, proclaims that “the existence of 
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racial barriers is repugnant to the ideals of any human society,”3 while the Con-
vention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, with 177 states parties, notes 
that “discrimination against any person on the basis of disability is a violation of 
the inherent dignity and worth of the human person.”4 As these commitments 
stress, equality and dignity are intimately linked; achieving one requires achiev-
ing the other.
EACH OF US,  ALL OF US
What each country’s constitution does to ensure everyone can reach their full 
potential matters to each of us. Our children, and our siblings’ children, can be 
any gender. We cannot know whom they will fall in love with, marry, and form 
families with. What will their race/ethnicity be? Their place of residence?
Globally, one in 30 (that is, 258 million) people are migrants.5 While some 
planned their moves in advance, or immigrated seeking better opportunities, oth-
ers had little warning: wars, natural disasters, or economic and political collapse in 
their countries forced their departure. Wherever we each live, the histories of our 
countries and families provide strong reminders that many of us may need to cross 
borders; we should care about having equal rights in all countries for ourselves and 
for our friends, families, and all people.
We also all face uncertainties in core aspects of life. It is impossible to predict 
our future health. While our family members may not personally face disability 
discrimination today, equal rights on the basis of disability could become critical 
to their daily lives tomorrow, or in a decade. The same is true for equal rights and 
opportunities regardless of social class. Present education and employment cir-
cumstances may have enabled our family to succeed in the current economy, but 
that does not guarantee future financial security.
Beyond the human implications, discrimination impedes our collective capac-
ity to thrive as societies. According to a 2015 McKinsey Global Institute report, 
fully closing the gender gap in the labor market by 2025 could increase global GDP 
by $28 trillion, equivalent to the U.S.’s and China’s economies combined.6 Similar 
studies have documented the widespread economic benefits of ensuring the full 
inclusion of racial/ethnic minorities, immigrants, people with disabilities, LGBT+ 
workers, and others.7
Guaranteeing equality for all changes the world we live in. Ensuring that every-
one has the chance to reach their full potential changes the art we see, the music 
we hear, the food we eat, how economically successful our countries are, what sci-
entific discoveries are made, and how well major social problems are solved. Con-
versely, every instance of discrimination both causes individual harms and dimin-
ishes our collective success. If we do not ensure that every person gets a good 
education, decent healthcare, and the opportunity to work to their full capacity, 
we are trying to build countries with half a team or less.
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Constitutions provide vehicles for translating fundamental beliefs about the 
value of every human being, and evidence on the impact of achieving equal 
opportunity for all, into meaningful improvements in people’s lives and power-
ful statements of countries’ values. In this concluding chapter, we evaluate how 
constitutions can advance equality not just on paper but in practice, highlighting 
demonstrated strategies for realizing this vision.
HOW CAN WE TAKE ACTION?
You Shape the Future
You have a part to play in shaping the future of your country. Citizens and resi-
dents of every country, community organizations and companies, lawyers and 
advocates, policymakers and business leaders all have roles and responsibilities to 
ensure that equal opportunity exists in practice.
Getting the ground rules right makes a difference. Just since we entered the 
twenty-first century, over 130 countries have enacted constitutional amendments. 
Now implementing the constitutional rules that promote equal opportunity and 
equal rights is essential.
Good building codes can ensure safe places to live and work, free from cancer-
causing asbestos or lead paint that degrades health and cognition. These ground 
rules can also help ensure buildings do not collapse. However, they work only 
when implemented. Inspectors must check whether building codes are followed. 
When neighbors, engineers, and visitors are aware of dangerous code violations, 
their active participation makes it far likelier that everyone’s life will be healthier. 
Blueprints can make buildings easier to construct, not harder.
Similarly, once a good constitution is in place, we all need to participate to 
ensure it succeeds. We each have a role to play in transforming norms, address-
ing discrimination, and ensuring our governments provide access to education, 
health, and the ability to work and live to our fullest potential.
We understand that it may be difficult initially to imagine how you can con-
tribute. But around the world, individuals and small groups have played pivotal 
roles in both strengthening their constitutions’ protections and ensuring they have 
impact. In this section, we share information about a wide range of these initia-
tives to demonstrate the many different ways it is possible.
Movements to Pass Constitutional Amendments
Over the past several decades, everyday citizens in countries around the world 
have come together to demand that their constitutions better ensure the rights of 
all. These movements have relied on various strategies for their success, including 
direct actions and demonstrations, large-scale organizing to shift public attitudes 
and get out the vote, and strategic litigation aimed at precipitating constitutional 
reform. A few examples follow.
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India: Leveraging Case Law and Building a Broad Civil Society Movement
In India, the movement to enact a constitutional right to education was a long-
term effort requiring the dedication, energy, and persistence of countless parents, 
educators, activists, and lawyers committed to change. In 1990, a government com-
mittee headed by social activist Acharya Ramamurti reviewed the national educa-
tion policy of the past five years, issuing a report urging recognition of education 
as a fundamental right and increased government expenditure on education.8 That 
same year, India joined the UNESCO-initiated Education for All movement, and, 
in 1992, ratified the U.N. Convention on the Rights of the Child.
Two Supreme Court decisions further catalyzed activism to advance universal 
education through a constitutional amendment. In a 1992 case brought by a medi-
cal school applicant who could not afford the out-of-state fees, the Court deter-
mined for the first time that the constitution guaranteed a right to free education.9 
The justices pointed to the “directive principle” on education, which described 
education for all children until age 14 as a goal of the state, as well as the “right to 
life,” which the Court stated “cannot be assured unless it is accompanied by the 
right to education.”10 The following year, in Unni Krishnan, the Court affirmed the 
existence of a constitutional right to free education, but limited its scope to ages 
6–14 rather than education at all levels.
While these court victories were major steps, advocates were nevertheless 
keenly aware that an explicit protection in the constitutional text was still needed. 
First, enshrining the right in the constitution would increase awareness that edu-
cation was a fundamental right, and that schooling was both free and compulsory. 
Although enacted by some states and local governments throughout the twentieth 
century, compulsory education laws were often perceived as a duty on parents 
(sometimes enforced through criminal penalties) rather than a right of the child 
or a governmental commitment to ensure that all children could attend school.11 
Moreover, many school administrators were unaware of the laws.12 Second, case 
law could be more easily overturned; even the two cases that established a “right 
to education” illustrated how the Court could articulate an expansive right in one 
decision and limit it in the next. Finally, some observers criticized the Court’s 
decision as overstepping its authority and changing policy in a way that should 
be reserved for Parliament.13 Consequently, even though the cases importantly 
advanced the right to education, further work was needed to ensure a strong, 
enduring constitutional right that all people would be aware of simply by reading 
the constitutional text.
In the years following Unni Krishnan, the right to education movement lever-
aged its findings and built strong partnerships with wide-ranging stakeholders, 
including families, teachers, trade unions, local government councils (panchay-
ats), and numerous national and international civil society organizations (CSOs). 
Among the primary partners were groups working on child labor, including Bach-
pan Bachao Andolan and the South Asian Coalition on Child Servitude. In 1997, 
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the movement successfully conveyed to Parliament a proposed amendment that 
was soon abandoned due to budgetary concerns and an impasse over its details. 
The CSOs’ advocacy intensified, with networks including the National Alliance on 
the Fundamental Right to Education and the Forum for Crèches and Child Care 
Services (FORCES) leading actions and continuing the campaign nationwide.14
The movement culminated in the 115-day march for education, which traversed 
thousands of kilometers and 20 Indian states. The march brought even wider 
attention to the issues at stake and helped secure the Eighty-sixth Amendment’s 
passage in 2002, thus creating an explicit, justiciable right to free and compulsory 
education for all children aged 6–14. In 2009, the legislature passed the Right to 
Education Act, which built on the amendment by establishing detailed standards, 
including the rights of students with disabilities, the prohibition of corporal pun-
ishment, and private schools’ obligations to provide tuition-free education to at 
least 25% of their pupils.
As this brief history suggests, advancing education as a constitutional right in 
India required working in broad coalitions and building on both incremental vic-
tories and international commitments. According to one observer, the movement 
represented “the largest ever social mobilisation in Indian history post-indepen-
dence for one single cause.”15 The movement also required dismantling fears and 
misinformation about what the right to education would mean. Parents feared 
that making school compulsory would open the door to criminal penalties, given 
the prosecutions under state compulsory education acts in the preceding decades. 
Advocates had to clarify that the amendment was about assigning responsibility 
to the state to guarantee free education to all.16 Today, the movement continues: 
FORCES and other organizations are building on the education amendment to 
call for an expansion of early childhood education.17
Ireland: Citizen Engagement and Building Wide Support for Same-Sex Marriage
In Ireland, the movement to enact a constitutional amendment protecting the 
right to same-sex marriage emerged not from case law, but from a constitutional 
convention. In 2011, as Ireland was recovering from the global recession, the new 
coalition government published a policy document broadly calling for a consti-
tutional convention.18 The same year, a CSO, We the Citizens, held the Citizens’ 
Assembly, which convened a randomly selected, representative group of Irish citi-
zens to discuss their ability to influence politics.19 The assembly drew inspiration 
from similar gatherings in British Columbia, Iceland, and the United States, and 
shared its findings with politicians and government leaders.20 In 2012, the govern-
ment organized a constitutional convention,21 drawing on the “Citizens’ Assem-
bly” model.22
In forming the Irish Constitutional Convention (ICC), the government had a 
polling company select participants to ensure representation across gender, race, 
SES, religion, and other characteristics. Ultimately, the 100-person ICC comprised 
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66 members of the public, 29 parliament members, four representatives from 
Northern Ireland, and a government-appointed chairperson.23 The ICC’s Terms of 
Reference, established by a parliamentary resolution, listed eight discussion topics, 
including marriage equality.24 In response to public input at regional meetings in 
the fall of 2013, the ICC added economic, social, and cultural rights.25 Throughout 
the convention, which met for livestreamed discussions over ten weekends from 
January 2012 to February 2014, participants heard presentations on each topic, 
including marriage equality, and were invited to deliberate at length.26 After tes-
timony and presentations from wide-ranging experts and stakeholders, including 
constitutional lawyers, clergy members, adult children of same-sex couples, and 
marriage-equality opponents, 79% of ICC members voted to put marriage equality 
on the ballot.27
With this hurdle cleared, advocacy groups began focusing on strategy. Unlike 
in India, where constitutional amendments are adopted by parliamentary vote, in 
Ireland, proposed amendments are subject to a popular referendum. Like India’s 
efforts on education, the movement to pass same-sex marriage in Ireland involved 
marches and public demonstrations, but ultimately focused on canvassing neigh-
borhoods, launching social media campaigns, sharing personal stories, and other 
organizing tactics designed to encourage citizens to vote for the amendment.28 The 
YES campaign emphasized a simple message: according to campaign co-director 
Grainne Healy, “[o]ur communications started with values. Our research told us 
that the electorate believed in love, equality, fairness, generosity, and being inclu-
sive. These were what it meant to be Irish.”29 In May 2015, nearly 80% of the elec-
torate turned out to vote. By a margin of 62% to 38%, voters affirmed these shared 
values, making Ireland the world’s first country to explicitly protect same-sex mar-
riage in its constitution.30
In the years since the ICC, much coverage has been positive, although some 
criticisms have also emerged regarding representative participation and trans-
parency of topic selection.31 The broader challenges with designing participa-
tory constitutional design processes include ensuring that they provide a range 
of opportunities for participation that are accessible to people nationwide, and 
meaningfully incorporate public input as drafting moves forward. Nevertheless, 
Ireland’s experience underscores ordinary citizens’ enthusiasm and capability to 
engage in debates about their constitutions and identify priorities for ensuring 
these documents align with their values. Moreover, the clear support for mar-
riage equality reflected in the 2015 vote illustrates how public education and civic 
engagement can serve as core components of movements for equal rights.
Malawi: Training Youth to Advocate for Themselves 
Finally, in Malawi, a campaign to amend the constitution to eliminate a loop-
hole perpetuating child marriage started with the people with the most at stake: 
girls and young women. Under the 1994 constitution, children as young as 15 
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could be married with parental approval.32 According to UNICEF, between 2002 
and 2012, 11.7% of girls in Malawi were married by age 15, while 49.6% were mar-
ried by 18.33
In partnership with international CSOs including Girls Not Brides and Plan 
International, a youth-led movement began campaigning in 2011 to prohibit child 
marriage at every level of law. Two national networks, the Adolescent Girls Advo-
cacy Network and the Girls’ Empowerment Network (GENET), supported these 
efforts across the country. GENET’s work in particular focused on empowering 
girls to raise their own voices and tell their stories. After GENET led an advocacy 
training with 200 girls in southern Malawi, the girls lobbied 60 village chiefs to 
strengthen community bylaws against child marriage and other harmful practices. 
In another initiative, GENET led a story-writing workshop with girls, who put 
their child marriage experiences onto paper. These powerful firsthand accounts 
were then published and distributed to policymakers.34
The campaign’s first major victory was a new law raising the minimum age 
of marriage to 18 in 2015. Yet the constitutional loophole for parental consent 
remained, and became the youth-led campaign’s primary focus over the following 
year. The campaign was boosted by the support of Malawi’s president and first lady, 
and built further momentum by engaging with key government bodies including 
the Ministries of Gender, Justice, and Education. Additionally, international and 
regional pressure, including multiple country visits by the U.N. Special Represen-
tative of the Secretary-General on Violence against Children, helped advance gov-
ernment leaders’ commitments to moving the constitutional reforms forward.35 
In 2017, the parliament voted 131–2 to amend the constitution and eliminate the 
parental consent exception.36
While much work remains to ensure implementation, girls and young women 
raising their voices effected remarkable changes in Malawi’s laws and constitution 
over six years, striking a crucial blow against the persistence of child marriage and 
laying a foundation for equality for generations to come. Memory Banda, a young 
woman who participated in the campaign, stated: “Marriage is often the end for 
girls like me. But if our leaders will invest in us and give us the chance to be edu-
cated, we will become women who create a better society for everyone.”37 Notably, 
the campaign worked to advance change at every level, from community bylaws 
to national legislation and finally the constitution.38 Further, by training girls and 
young women to be their own advocates, the campaign laid bare the consequences 
for individual lives of failing to act, while helping to cultivate Malawi’s next gen-
eration of leaders.
As the experiences from India, Ireland, and Malawi illustrate, the most effec-
tive strategies in each country vary depending on the processes for constitutional 
change, the stakeholders involved, and the issues at stake. Nevertheless, the critical 
role of individual people throughout the process is consistent, and foundational 
for securing change.
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Forming Coalitions
As the examples throughout this section have shown, ensuring the rights of all 
often requires building partnerships and recruiting allies to support broader 
movements. While a single person can make a difference, the more people who 
are engaged and the more voices that are raised, the greater the odds of creating 
lasting change.
Working in coalitions is especially important for strengthening rights for 
minority groups. In South Africa and Ecuador, for example, coalition-building 
was essential to successful efforts to include sexual orientation in the constitu-
tional equality provision. In South Africa, integrating the fight for LGBT+ rights 
within the broader post-apartheid struggle for equality was pivotal for securing 
support for the world’s first specific constitutional protection against sexual ori-
entation discrimination.39 In Ecuador, LGBT+ activists partnered with feminist 
groups and labor organizations to enact a SOGI-specific equal rights provision 
and strengthen fundamental social and economic rights. It is unlikely these new 
protections would have been achieved if the LGBT+ advocacy groups had not col-
laborated with others.
Partnering with other groups is also important for larger populations that have 
been politically marginalized historically. In Tunisia, women’s groups played a 
powerful role in drafting the 2014 constitution, which explicitly protected women’s 
equal rights for the first time. Women’s groups nationwide partnered with other 
CSOs and labor groups to advance both strong protections for women’s equal 
rights and provisions supporting economic opportunity.
Likewise, within Parliament, women worked across parties and religious lines 
to advance the new gender equality provisions. A key issue in the drafting process 
was how to reconcile Islam and strong protections for equality, but both religious 
and secular women parliamentarians exhibited a commitment to ensuring a wom-
en’s rights provision made it into the final text.40 In the words of Hela Hammi, a 
member of the religious party Ennahda, during the drafting process “there [were] 
a lot of political tensions among members of Parliament, but the women worked 
more or less in tandem.”41
Sharing the Constitution
Everyone needs to know their constitutional rights for them to be realized. It is 
important for individuals to know both their own rights and the expectations for 
respecting the rights of others.
To increase awareness of constitutional rights, CSOs, governments, and con-
cerned individuals have undertaken efforts to share their country’s constitution—
including both physical copies and education on its key principles. For example, 
the CSO Uraia Trust works to distribute copies of Kenya’s constitution through-
out the country, including copies in Braille, while providing civic education to 
empower citizens to claim their rights. The Indian organization Nazdeek trains 
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communities about their constitutional rights to health, and has instituted a com-
munity monitoring program in the rural area of Assam to track implementation 
of the right to health for expectant mothers.42 In South Africa, as part of a “Know 
Your Constitution Campaign,” the Constitutional Literacy and Service Initiative 
hosts workshops and constitutional debates at high schools and universities in 
disadvantaged areas throughout the country.43 And in Germany, the government 
translated the first 20 articles of its constitution into Arabic in 2015, and distrib-
uted 10,000 copies of the document at refugee registration centers.44 These initia-
tives underscore how sharing constitutions can both increase public awareness of 
rights and improve the prospects for their effective implementation.
Invoking the Constitution to Change Norms
With knowledge of what their constitution protects, individuals and communi-
ties can do more to change norms and attitudes, and begin productive conversa-
tions about critical issues. In South Africa, politicians and advocates have spoken 
out against xenophobia by referencing the constitution’s protections of refugees’ 
rights, which have been clarified through case law.45 In Colombia, advocates cit-
ing their government’s constitutional obligation to uphold its commitments under 
CEDAW spurred a dialogue across Latin America about reproductive rights, 
which culminated in a Constitutional Court decision ending Colombia’s complete 
ban on abortion.46
Individuals and groups can also invoke constitutional provisions and values 
to contest discriminatory policies or legislation before they are passed. In India, 
activists cited the constitution’s equality guarantee in protesting an amendment 
to the Citizenship Act introduced in 2016 that would create different standards 
for refugees’ ability to naturalize based on their religion.47 In Malaysia, 51 national 
and regional civil society organizations collectively condemned the Malaysian 
government’s proposed “Foreign Workers First Out” policy, which urged employ-
ers to fire migrant workers before laying off citizens, notwithstanding their 
employment contracts. Citing the constitution’s guarantee that “all persons are 
equal before the law,” the groups rallied against the “unjust, discriminatory and 
unconstitutional policy.”48
Finally, invoking the constitution can be a powerful tactic for pushing back 
against discriminatory statements or unconstitutional actions undertaken by peo-
ple in positions of power or influence. For example, in 2006, then-former South 
African deputy president Jacob Zuma came under fire after making disparaging 
public remarks about homosexuality and same-sex marriage, which he described 
as “a disgrace to the nation and to God.”49 Activists and other government lead-
ers quickly condemned Zuma’s comments, partly by referencing the constitu-
tion’s explicit protection of equal rights regardless of sexual orientation. Within 
days, Zuma apologized, acknowledging that “[o]ur Constitution clearly states 
that nobody should be discriminated against on many grounds including sexual 
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orientation, and I uphold and abide by the constitution of our land.”50 While norm 
change is a complex process shaped by many factors, individuals raising their 
voices play an important role in shifting societal expectations.
Claiming Rights and Challenging Discriminatory Laws in Court
Importantly, as emphasized throughout this book, claiming rights through the 
courts can be among the most powerful ways to realize constitutions’ promise 
and translate their commitments into impact in people’s day-to-day lives. Affected 
individuals, government actors, and community organizations all have roles to 
play in ensuring that constitutional rights are fulfilled.
Addressing Inconsistencies between Constitutions and Laws
One powerful way that individuals and CSOs can use constitutions is to demand 
reforms to laws and policies that are inconsistent with constitutional values. In 
various countries, especially those whose laws are far older than their constitu-
tions, aspects of the national legal system may not fully align with constitutional 
commitments to equality. For example, around the world, many countries’ laws 
treat women and men unequally, even when their constitutions guarantee equal 
rights. Almost one-third of countries allow girls to be married younger than boys. 
Nearly half of countries provide paid maternal leave but not paid paternal leave, 
and those with paid paternity leave often provide men with a small fraction of 
what they provide women. These inequalities make women more vulnerable to 
employment discrimination, while reducing equality at home. Scores of countries 
have laws barring women from certain types of work. Women often have far fewer 
legal rights in families than men, from financial rights, to the right to pass citizen-
ship to children, to safety from violence. The list goes on.
Individuals and civil society groups have shown that constitutional protections 
can provide tools for addressing these disparities. In Zimbabwe and Tanzania, 
constitutional guarantees of gender equality empowered young women to demand 
an increase in the minimum age of marriage for girls.51 In the United Kingdom, 
the Equality Act enabled a new father to access sufficient paid leave to take the 
primary caregiving role in his household while his wife returned to work.52 And 
in Sudan, the 2005 constitution’s new “bill of rights for women” provided a foun-
dation for activists to demand reform of the country’s rape laws, which provided 
that survivors of rape could be prosecuted for having sex outside of marriage. 
Although significant challenges remain to ensure its implementation, the law was 
amended in 2015 to redefine rape and eliminate this possibility.53
While inconsistencies between constitutional law and ordinary legislation are 
common, people have the power to close these gaps. Moreover, efforts that simul-
taneously change norms and challenge laws can be particularly effective. In South 
Korea, a network of 113 women’s organizations invoked the constitution’s protec-
tion of gender equality in its nationwide campaign to educate the public about the 
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“head-of-family” system, which automatically designated the eldest male family 
member as the legal head of household.54 Alongside its efforts to increase public 
awareness of the issue, the group initiated a lawsuit, which resulted in a 2005 Con-
stitutional Court ruling declaring the policy unconstitutional.55
Bringing Individual Cases to Advance Broader Change
Cases brought by individuals are most transformative when their benefits extend 
to society as a whole. Brown v. Board of Education, the seminal U.S. case that ended 
formal school segregation, relied on the courage of 13 black families that purpose-
fully tried to enroll their children at white schools. The case would go down in 
history in the name of Oliver Brown, father of nine-year-old Linda, who was the 
first plaintiff listed in the court filings. Linda’s case changed history.56 In Canada, 
a case brought by a single couple, the Eldridges, both improved their access to 
services and changed the standard of care for people with hearing impairments in 
hospitals nationwide.57 And in India, one woman’s fight against the discrimination 
she had personally faced in getting promoted at work led to a change in the law 
benefitting all women.58
Holding Private Actors Accountable
Individuals have also brought cases, sometimes in partnership with and some-
times against government, to hold private actors accountable for rights violations. 
In Colombia, for example, Marco Gómez Otero brought a case against the private 
company charged with providing water to his neighborhood (which the public 
water service would not serve), arguing that it failed to supply sufficient water 
for personal use.59 The company provided water only between 6 p.m. and mid-
night, and houses at higher elevations rarely received water at all, despite paying 
for it. Otero brought a lawsuit on behalf of his neighborhood. Citing the constitu-
tion’s protection of the rights to water and health, as well as international human 
rights standards, the Court ordered the company to make the necessary technical 
upgrades and investments to ensure an adequate daily water supply to all in Otero’s 
neighborhood within a month.60
Advancing Equality across Communities through Civil Society Organizations
Lastly, CSOs can play major roles in identifying common rights violations in their 
communities, mobilizing potential parties and resources, and providing legal 
and technical assistance to prepare cases for court. In some countries, such as 
the United States, CSOs do not have jurisdiction to approach the courts on their 
own. In others, however, CSOs can bring cases to court directly. For example, the 
South African CSO Section 27 is dedicated to realizing the social and economic 
rights articulated in Section 27 of the constitution, and brings wide-ranging cases 
seeking to implement the rights to health and education for all. In 2015, Section 
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27 won a case on behalf of children in Limpopo, South Africa’s northernmost, 
poorest province, establishing that students have a right to one textbook for each 
subject. As part of the broader campaign around the case, Section 27 engaged 
with parents, students, and community members to raise awareness about why 
#TextbooksMatter through marches, artistic demonstrations, and media out-
reach. More recently, the organization filed a case to secure Braille textbooks for 
students with visual impairments, which is still moving through the courts as of 
this writing.61
As these examples affirm, individuals can make a difference—whether by 
standing up on behalf of their communities, identifying and seeking to redress 
problems in their neighborhoods, joining broader equal rights campaigns, or sim-
ply speaking out against personal experiences of discrimination. Governments 
and private companies likewise have roles to play in understanding and fulfilling 
their constitutional and human rights commitments. While there are many effec-
tive approaches to achieving change, and going to court is rarely the first step, con-
stitutional cases have been undeniably transformative in many of our countries. 
We can expect many more landmarks for equality in the decades to come.
C ONCLUSION 
Laws and constitutions alone, even well implemented, cannot ensure every per-
son is treated equally. But they do provide important foundations. And just as 
constitutions have evolved over the past century, so too has our understanding of 
equality. Advancing equality requires creating conditions that provide all people 
with equal opportunities to thrive, eliminating present-day discrimination and 
dismantling the lingering impacts from past discrimination. It requires recog-
nizing, respecting, appreciating, and accommodating our real differences, while 
ensuring our laws are not shaped by stereotypes. It means ensuring all people have 
a seat at the table and the opportunity to voice their needs and opinions. And it 
means guaranteeing that all people can meet their basic needs and have access to 
foundational education, healthcare, and employment opportunities.62
Data on where countries, regions, and the global community are making prog-
ress and falling behind will have impact only if individuals use this information 
to make a difference. In the Philippines, two senators picked up our findings that 
the country provided less paid maternity leave than most of the world, and that 
it mattered for infant mortality. In 2017, they used these findings to pass a bill in 
the Senate to double maternity leave from 60 to 120 days.63 In October 2018, the 
House of Representatives approved a similar bill guaranteeing 105 days of leave, 
which as of this writing awaits the president’s signature.64 In Ireland, together with 
the CSO Equality Now, we focused attention on the country’s status as one of the 
few high-income countries not providing paid paternity leave. This inequality and 
the data showing that Ireland lagged behind other European countries became 
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an important topic of discussion in Parliament. In 2016, Parliament passed a law 
providing fathers with two weeks of paid paternity leave.65
Will it make a difference that we now know which countries ensure equal rights 
regardless of gender, and which do not? And that we have similar information 
about the marked advances in countries guaranteeing equal rights across race/
ethnicity and religion—but also about those countries that have yet to do so? Or 
the fact that people with disabilities, immigrants, and the LGBT+ community have 
the least protections? That’s up to each of us, and all of us.
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The mission of the WORLD Policy Analysis Center (WORLD), based at the Fielding School 
of Public Health at the University of California Los Angeles, is to strengthen equal rights 
and opportunities globally by providing civil society, policymakers, citizens, and other re-
searchers with tools to advance feasible and effective policy approaches for improving the 
well-being of individuals, families, communities, and societies. To date, WORLD captures 
quantitatively comparative data for 193 U.N. countries on constitutional rights, education, 
health, disability, family, adult labor and working conditions, discrimination at work, child 
labor, child marriage, aging, migration, environment, and income policies. WORLD works 
in partnership to promote evidence-based decision-making across these areas. This ap-
pendix provides an overview of our approach to constructing our constitutions database 
and variables used in this book. More detailed variable descriptions and information on 
WORLD’s methodology is available at worldpolicycenter.org.
BUILDING THE C ONSTITUTIONS DATABASE
For nearly 15 years, we have measured the extent to which all of the world’s constitutions 
prohibit discrimination and protect core social and economic rights, including the rights to 
health and education. This book pulls together these 15 years of work, including more de-
tailed findings from our most recent database expansion, along with an analysis of change 
in rights over time, based on the prevalence of protections for equality in constitutions 
adopted each decade.
Appendix:  Methods
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The constitutional rights examined in this book are rooted in the Universal Declara-
tion of Human Rights (UDHR) as well as numerous binding international treaties, many 
of which have been widely ratified globally. As explored in each chapter, these rights also 
map onto the research evidence about what matters to the health, well-being, and economic 
conditions faced by individuals, families, communities, and societies.
To construct the most recent database, we located full-text constitutions and amend-
ments as of May 2017. These documents were obtained in their original language or a 
translation into English, French, or Spanish from government websites or other reliable 
sources. Coding languages on the team included English, French, Spanish, Italian, Por-
tuguese, Arabic, German, Turkish, Croatian, Polish, and Maltese, while colleagues within 
our broader network provided assistance with Russian, Mongolian, and other languages 
when reviewing original language text was indicated. For the minority of countries with-
out written constitutions, we identified those documents or laws that are generally con-
sidered to have constitutional status within the country and by the global community of 
legal scholars. We focused on national constitutions and did not include constitutions at 
the subnational level.
FR AMEWORK FOR C OMPARING C ONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTIONS
Approach to Rights Analysis
Our analysis was designed with two goals in mind: (1) to evaluate the extent to which con-
stitutions guarantee equal rights across a wide range of human domains and (2) to un-
derstand the evolution of economic, social, and equal rights over time. Beyond the many 
normative reasons to care about these rights, they are also embedded within numerous 
international treaties and agreements, such as the UDHR, the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, and most recently, the U.N. Sustainable Develop-
ment Goals. Additionally, within the past several decades, the global community has aimed 
to strengthen the individual rights of members of historically marginalized groups through 
a series of widely adopted treaties specifically focused on these populations.1
Constitutional Rights Coded
For each right mentioned in a constitution we captured the specific right protected, the 
level of protection, the social group to which it applies, whether the language specifically 
referred to citizens, and the relevant article number(s). Based on 37 international conven-
tions and fundamental equity principles, we developed a framework of rights in the follow-
ing categories:
• Equality and nondiscrimination (equality before the law, prohibition of discrimina-
tion, formal equality or equality of opportunities, enjoyment of rights)
• Education (free, compulsory, primary through university)
• Health (public health, preventive health services, medical care)
• Family (entering and exiting marriage, same-sex marriage, equal rights within 
marriage)
• Disability (equal rights, accessibility, educational support, reasonable accommo-
dation in employment, right to liberty)
• Religion (right to believe and not believe, separation of religion and state, pro-
tection of rights of others)
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• Labor (right to organize, free association, equal pay, nondiscrimination)
• Civil and Political Rights (equality before the law, movement, religion, expres-
sion, association, political participation)
Social Classifications
For each of these areas, we performed a comprehensive analysis of constitutional protec-













• Intellectual Disability or Mental Health Condition
• Prisoner Status
• Beliefs or Convictions
Categorizing Levels of Protection
In order to evaluate the level of protection afforded under constitutions we recorded the 
quality of the language used to describe rights.
Guaranteed Rights
Constitutional articles that unambiguously protected a right or phrased its implementation 
as a duty or obligation of the state were coded as guaranteed rights. We also coded a guar-
antee when constitutions declared violations of particular rights to be prohibited or illegal.
Aspirational Protections and Progressive Realization
Rights phrased in nonauthoritative language or described as state objectives were categorized 
as aspirational protections. Examples of this occurred when the enforcement of a right was 
limited by the state’s resources or the constitution specified that the right could not be claimed 
in court. If the constitution only granted a right in the preamble, and did not specify that the 
preamble was an integral part of the constitution, we coded the right as an aspiration. We 
separately captured constitutional provisions that explicitly described a right as subject to 
progressive realization or that a right would be realized within a certain time period.
Restrictions or Denials of Rights
We also reviewed constitutions for any clauses that explicitly restricted or denied rights to 
a particular group or groups. These included denials of the rights of same-sex couples to 
marry, statements restricting rights on the basis of citizenship, or any disqualifications for 
voting or elected office, for example.
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Rights with Exceptions
When a constitution granted a right, but allowed for possible limits to that right on the ba-
sis of an individual’s membership in some identifiable group in specific circumstances, we 
categorized the relevant provisions as rights with exceptions.
Affirmative Measures
Finally, we captured cases in which constitutions permitted, promoted, or mandated posi-
tive measures to advance equality in general or in family, economic, social, or political life.
Developing Comparable Measures
To systematically code all 193 U.N. member states’ constitutions, we relied on an interna-
tional, multilingual team of researchers, with expertise in law, economics, health, and inter-
national development. The team includes people with fluency in ten languages, including 
four of the U.N. official languages.
Each researcher read the full constitution in its original language or an official transla-
tion. Whenever possible, when an official translation was unavailable and no team mem-
bers could read the constitution in its original language, we used translations from reliable 
secondary sources or professional translation services. Researchers used a coding manual 
with detailed instructions on how to answer questions about the constitutional provisions 
and code them accordingly. Each constitution was double-coded and once each researcher 
had completed coding, they met as a pair to reconcile their answers. If the research pair was 
unable to reach agreement or thought the decision was not well addressed by the existing 
coding manual, the full research team met to discuss the best approach. The decisions from 
these meetings were then added to the coding manual to inform coding on all countries.
Ensuring Rigor and Accuracy
Once coding was complete, we conducted systematic quality checks across rights, social 
groups, and quality of rights. We also did targeted checks of outlier countries.
For each of our databases, we use the most up-to-date sources available. While this ap-
proach is designed to achieve accuracy, it is important to note that when publicly available 
sources have not been fully updated, the most recent amendments may not be captured 
in our databases. Further, our process of coding constitutions and other laws inevitably 
involves important matters of interpretation. For all databases, we welcome receiving feed-
back and copies of laws from anyone who believes the databases may not be fully up-to-
date.
Understanding Who Has Equal Rights
In considering whether a particular group is guaranteed a right, we included both specific 
guarantees (e.g., “Women have the right to health”) and instances in which constitutions 
broadly guaranteed a right and guaranteed enjoyment of rights for a specific group (e.g., 
“Everyone has the right to health” and “Women and men have equal rights”).
Analyzing Rights over Time
Throughout this book, graphs present constitutional rights over time. These graphs provide 
a picture of how constitutional rights varied as of 2017 based on when the constitution was 
adopted as a proxy for change over time. We recognize that some provisions in older con-
stitutions may have been introduced via amendment. For example, equal rights on the basis 
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of sexual orientation appear in some older constitutions and in all cases were introduced 
by amendment. However, the adoption of a new constitution represents perhaps the best 
opportunity to enact protections for equal rights.
As an alternative method of analyzing constitutional change over time, we considered 
showing constitutional rights by year of most recent constitutional amendment, as each 
amendment process represents a potential opportunity to strengthen equal rights and this 
would allow us to proxy for differences in difficulty of amending the constitution. However, 
constitutions are frequently amended and 87% of the world’s constitutions were either ad-
opted or amended since 2000, making it harder to identify patterns of change over time and 
obscuring stark differences that exist between constitutions that were adopted prior to 1970 
and those that have been adopted in the last decade.
Linking Constitutional Guarantees to Legal Change and Outcomes
The constitutions database is part of a larger effort by the WORLD Policy Analysis Cen-
ter to systematically collect data on laws and policies that matter to advancing equality. 
WORLD is the largest global quantitative policy center, capturing well over 2,000 leg-
islative and policy indicators for 193 countries. Countries may take many approaches to 
ensuring equal rights and opportunities by embedding guarantees in constitutions and/
or national legislation and/or policy documents. While countries do not necessarily need 
to be exhaustive in enumerating rights across all of these legal approaches, they do need 
to be consistent in ensuring that national legislation and policies fulfill and support con-
stitutional rights.
Together, the constitutional and legislative data allow us to assess where countries’ laws 
and policies are inconsistent with guaranteed constitutional rights. For example, in this 
book, we highlight where countries have made constitutional guarantees of equality and 
nondiscrimination based on gender, but undermine these guarantees by legally allowing 
girls to be married at younger ages than boys, perpetuating gender discrimination in law. 
Similarly, we can match constitutional data on the right to free education with legislative 
and policy data on whether countries charge tuition fees to highlight gaps between consti-
tutional rights and policies.
Our quantitative data on constitutional rights can also be matched to harmonized data 
on individual-, household-, or country-level outcomes to assess the impact that constitu-
tional rights have on outcomes. New analytic tools allow us to answer the question of what 
impact individual constitutional rights have on measures of health, educational attainment, 
poverty, and equity. Using longitudinal data on constitutional rights and outcomes, we can 
compare how outcomes changed in countries that enacted new constitutional guarantees 
compared to those that did not, all while controlling for confounding factors. We have 
used this approach, for example, with legislative guarantees to assess the impact that paid 
maternity leave has on infant mortality,2 minimum wage policies have on child nutrition,3 
and tuition-free education has on infant mortality.4 These methods provide the opportunity 
for future work to rigorously evaluate the impact of constitutional rights on individual and 
population outcomes.
Identifying Case Law
Together with our data on constitutional rights, this book reviews a wide array of upper and 
constitutional court decisions that illustrate how those rights are enforced in practice—and 
therefore why those rights matter.
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Sources
In total, we used search engines to access approximately 16,000 cases from 164 countries. 
We reviewed all cases and/or used topic and keyword searches to identify relevant cases in 
the following global databases:
• CODICES, an initiative of the Venice Commission that includes around 9,000 
constitutional court decisions from the Supreme and Constitutional Courts of 105 
countries5
• ESCR-Net, which includes cases from several dozen countries, mostly in Europe, 
sub-Saharan Africa and the Americas, in the broad areas of economic, social, and 
cultural rights6
• The Global Health and Human Rights Database, which includes over 1,600 cases 
from 119 countries in areas relevant to health and equality7
We also consulted regional databases, including:
• The European Equality Law Network, which includes around 400 cases from 34 
European countries collected since 20118
• Centre for Justice and International Law, which includes 220 cases from 18 coun-
tries in the Americas over the last 25 years9
In addition, we used the Common Portal of Case Law, which draws directly from existing 
national databases across Europe to provide access to tens of thousands of cases dating back 
to 1997.10
We were able to supplement our searches of these relatively broad databases through 
sources that address more specific topics, including sexual orientation and gender identity;11 
children’s rights;12 women’s rights;13 and reproductive health.14
We also used academic and general search engines for very specific purposes, especially 
when the type of decision we were searching for was necessarily narrow. For example, only 
a small number of constitutions explicitly address equal rights on the basis of sexual orien-
tation. To identify cases applying these provisions, we used specific keyword searches for 
those few countries instead of searching global case law databases.
Finally, we sought to identify both landmark cases as well as newer and even ongoing 
cases that illustrate the relevance of constitutional rights in the current moment. The list-
servs of the Comparative Constitutions Project, the International Society of Public Law, and 
the International Association of Constitutional Law were regular sources for information 
about recent cases. For all cases, in addition to the court’s decision itself, we consulted as 
many supplementary court filings, journal articles, NGO websites, book chapters, and me-
dia articles as possible to deepen our understanding of the circumstances of the case, the 
parties, and the implications of the decision.
Case Selection
We included cases from 45 countries. In selecting what cases to present, we focused on 
court decisions that fulfilled the following criteria:
1) Significant impact
2) Effective remedies
3) Clear link between constitutional protection and court outcome
4) Geographic diversity
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Limitations
While there is no repository of constitutional law cases in the same way that there are repos-
itories for actual constitutions, by searching through a range of global and regional case law 
databases, we were able to access constitutional cases from most of the world’s countries. 
Nevertheless, the examples included throughout this book are not representative of all cases 
adjudicated by constitutional courts worldwide. First, because not all countries make their 
decisions easily available to researchers, different countries are, despite our best efforts, not 
equally represented. Second, the cases we present were chosen to illustrate broader points 
about constitutional protections, rather than randomly selected.
However, while the cases presented cannot represent the totality of constitutional deci-
sions worldwide, they clearly demonstrate how clear constitutional protections for equal 
rights make a difference across contexts. Collectively, the cases in this book have led to 
health policy reforms that saved hundreds of thousands of lives, overturned discrimina-
tory laws that excluded half a country’s population from full participation, and ensured 
millions more children have a chance to go to school. These powerful impacts reveal the 
potential of a strong constitution in the hands of people determined to advance equality in 
their communities.
Analyzing the Role of Constitutions in Parliamentary Debates
Finally, in this book, we provide data on an important function of constitutional rights 
that often goes unrecognized: their role in shaping debates about new legislation. To better 
understand how frequently legislators invoke constitutional rights during these debates, we 
analyzed the transcripts of legislative sessions from four countries in different regions with 
constitutions of varying ages: Brazil, Canada, India, and Kenya.
Data Sources
We gathered official transcripts of legislative debates in the lower houses of Brazil, Canada, 
India, and Kenya from each country’s government online portal. We collected transcripts 
from the same three-year period for each country: January 1, 2015 to December 31, 2017. In 
the case of Brazil, “nondeliberative solemn” sessions, which serve a ceremonial purpose 
and which in the vast majority cases only included a summary of events rather than a full 
transcription, were subsequently removed from the sample for comparability; also in Brazil, 
sessions that were immediately cancelled without any substantive discussion because not 
enough parliamentarians were present were removed as well. In total, we gathered official 
transcriptions for 911 legislative sessions from Brazil, 321 sessions for Canada, 198 sessions 
for India, and 373 sessions for Kenya.
Approach to Analysis
To quantify references to the “constitution” in legislative debates, we first analyzed a com-
bination of keywords in context, and created a dictionary of relevant terms; for example, 
in Canada, the dictionary would include not only the word “constitution” and its multiple 
variations (constitutionality, unconstitutional), but also references to the Canadian Charter 
of Rights and Freedoms. For Brazil, we translated relevant terms into Portuguese. In some 
cases, we may have underestimated how frequently legislators refer to the constitution in 
debates; for example, in Canada the use of the term “charter” by itself was excluded to 
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prevent false positives (for example, in references to chartered banks), and in India, where 
legislative debates occur mostly in English but to some extent also in Hindi, only instances 
of the terms in English were captured.
This method provides a valuable initial look at the impact of constitutional rights on 
decisions by other branches of government. In future work, we expect to apply the same 
methods to a wider selection of both countries and constitutional provisions.
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Glossary
Amparo a fast-track judicial mechanism found in many Latin American 
countries that allows individuals to directly approach the courts 
to seek a remedy for the violation of their constitutional rights. 
Similar to the acción de tutela in Colombia.
Civil law a legal tradition that emphasizes codified law, rather than court 
interpretations. Predominantly civil law systems give less weight 
to precedent than common law systems.
Civil society  
organization (CSO)
a voluntary, nonprofit, nonstate organization composed of people 
working in the public domain to pursue shared interests or ad-
vance a particular cause.
Class action a lawsuit brought by an individual or small group on behalf of a 
large group of people who all have the same legal claim.
Common law a legal tradition based primarily on prior court decisions 
(precedents). The common law tradition originated in the United 
Kingdom and is predominantly found in former British colonies.
Direct  
discrimination
a law, policy, or action that explicitly and unjustly distinguishes 
between individuals or groups on the basis of a protected charac-
teristic (e.g., race, gender, or religion).
Disparate impact See indirect discrimination.
Formal equality the identical treatment of two different people or groups, without 
regard to preexisting disadvantages, meaningful differences, or 
unequal outcomes.
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Indirect 
discrimination
a law, policy, or action that does not explicitly distinguish between 
groups on the basis of a protected characteristic, but has the effect 
of disproportionately disadvantaging a certain group or groups. 
Also known as disparate impact discrimination.
Judicial review a court’s authority to determine whether a law is constitutional.
Justiciability whether courts have the capacity to provide effective remedies for 
the violation of a specific constitutional right.
Negative rights fundamental rights that primarily require the government to 
refrain from interfering with individuals’ exercise of those rights. 
Most civil rights and liberties, such as freedom of speech, are 
generally viewed as negative rights.
Positive rights fundamental rights whose fulfillment requires significant govern-
ment action. Most social and economic rights, such as the right to 
education, are generally viewed as positive rights.
Precedent a prior court decision that governs or influences future interpreta-
tions of the law.
Progressive realizationthe principle found in some international treaties that while coun-
tries must take immediate concrete steps toward the realization of 
rights that require greater investment, those rights will be more 
fully realized over time as resources increase. Low-cost steps, and 
the guarantee of nondiscrimination, are immediate obligations.
Public interest  
litigation
a legal action brought on behalf of a vulnerable group. Unlike a 
class action, a public interest litigation case can be initiated by 
any concerned community member, rather than only by someone 
directly affected.
Standing the legal capacity to bring a claim before the court.
Substantive  
equality
the enjoyment of equal rights in practice and not just on paper, 
achieved through policies that take into account meaningful dif-
ferences between groups, historical advantages and disadvantages, 
and the persistence of bias and discrimination.
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Foreword by Dikgang Moseneke, 
former Deputy Chief Justice of South Africa
In a world where attacks on the basic human rights and equal 
worth of all people are escalating, Advancing Equality reminds us 
of the critical role of constitutions in protecting equal rights. An-
alyzing the constitutions of all 193 United Nations countries, this 
book traces fifty years of change in constitution drafting and ex-
amines how stronger protections against discrimination, along-
side core social and economic rights, can transform lives. Looking 
across gender, race and ethnicity, religion, sexual orientation and 
gender identity, disability, social class, and migration status, the 
authors reveal whose rights are increasingly guaranteed in con-
stitutions, identify which nations and groups lag behind, and share 
inspiring stories of activism and powerful court cases from around 
the globe. Advancing Equality serves as a comprehensive call to 
action for anyone who cares about their country’s future.
“Advancing Equality shows how far we have come around the 
world in protecting human rights, but also how far we still have to 
go. Working together and taking action, we can make sure every-
one’s rights, particularly the most discriminated against and mar-
ginalized, are protected in every constitution and enforced by law 
and societal change to realize true equality and a better world.”
ANTONIA KIRKLAND, Global Lead, Legal Equality and Access to 
Justice, at Equality Now
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inequality.
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